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Preface
This Training Resource Manual provides step-by-step guidance to assist instructors in training policymakers 
and practitioners in the use of economic instruments for environmental and natural resource management. 
The Manual offers substantial flexibility for trainers to custom design courses to meet local needs and 
priorities. 
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) designed this Manual for use by trainers who have 
some background in resource management or a basic understanding of environmental economics. Trainers 
will be able to use the Manual to produce a range of training courses from short introductory programmes 
for government officials to intensive programmes for practitioners. 
As natural resources come under increasing pressure and countries face ongoing budget constraints, 
economic instruments – pollution taxes, user fees and other incentives to improve environmental quality 
– can provide an important tool to complement command-and-control measures to ensure sustainable 
development.
The challenges, however, arise in the practical application. Understanding the nature and baseline 
conditions of the problem to be solved as well as choosing instruments most suited to address that 
structural problem can greatly increase the likelihood of success. However, many countries lack the 
capacity to do this. Building the capacity of planners, environmentalists and decision makers to design 
and implement economic instruments is critical to their success. This requires high quality training. 
Member governments, through the UNEP Governing Council, have specifically requested that UNEP 
provides assistance so that countries – especially developing countries and countries with economies 
in transition – can effectively use economic instruments at the national level. In response to this request, 
UNEP has developed an integrated range of activities to advances both theory and use of economic 
instruments in achieving sustainable development including this Training Resource Manual.
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About This Manual
This is a training resource manual. It supports the development of training in the use of economic 
instruments – pollution taxes, user fees, property rights, etc, – for sustainable development in general and 
for environmental and natural resource management in particular. 
It is designed for use by trainers with some background experience and understanding of environmental 
and natural resource management and at least intermediate level economics. It is meant to assist such 
trainers prepare and deliver training courses that provide an understanding of economic instruments and 
a basic capability to use such instruments in a practical setting. 
Specifically, the Manual is designed to assist trainers to:
•	 Identify	needs	and	priorities,
•	 Custom	design	training	to	meet	those	needs,
•	 Conduct	training	to	develop	new	skills	among	key	players,
•	 Encourage	information	exchange	among	policymakers	and	practitioners.
The Manual offers concepts, tools, and examples for use by trainers, particularly for those in developing 
countries and economies in transition. It is intended that the concepts and tools be adapted and applied 
to country-specific environmental and natural resource management needs and priorities. 
Local needs and priorities should be identified before the training begins so that they can be incorporated 
into the training. A training needs analysis could also incorporate local sources of information, contacts, 
and case studies to make the training more relevant, useful and interesting to course participants.
A range of courses can be prepared using this Manual; for instance, a short programme for high-ranking 
government officials to introduce them to the benefits of using economic instruments for sustainable 
development. Alternatively, longer courses can be designed for environmental and natural resource 
management practitioners who require a detailed understanding of the use of economic instruments for 
environmental and natural resource management.
Rationale and Background 
Various organizations have conducted environmental management training in developing countries over 
the years. However, these training activities have rarely emphasized the use of economic instruments for 
environmental and natural resource management. In general, such training has lacked coherence and 
consistency and has often remained unconnected to broader capacity building efforts. 
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UNEP developed the Manual to address these issues and to respond to requests for training assistance, 
particularly from developing countries. The sponsors hope that this Manual will stimulate a wider interest 
in the use of economic instruments for environmental and natural resource management.
Target Audience 
UNEP designed this Manual primarily to aid instructors in training policymakers, their advisers, and 
practitioners on effective use of economic instruments in designing and implementing environmental 
policy. 
Policymakers and practitioners with a basic understanding of economics and environmental or natural 
resource issues can make use of the Manual directly to design and implement policy using the tools 
provided in Part III, though training is highly recommended. 
Principles
This Manual reflects a set of core principles. To this end, the Manual:
Adheres to sound training principles. It emphasizes that local trainers take the lead in implementing 
training using the best principals of instructional design in doing so;
Addresses the needs of participants. It offers a training needs analysis package in Part I to help identify 
the participants’ requirements and relate them to the environmental and natural resource management 
situation in the countries concerned;
Facilitates the training of instructors. It provides information and tools to design and deliver in-
country training courses;
Encourages local institutions and individuals to take ownership throughout the Manual to adapt 
training on the use of economic instruments to local conditions to facilitate a sense of ownership among 
trainees and their institutions.
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Design of the Manual
The authors designed this Manual to serve as an interactive working document composed of flexible 
modules that can evolve with use and experience. The training modules can be updated, revised and 
added to as appropriate as new background materials, case studies, relevant reading materials, or training 
activities become available.
The Manual consists of Four Parts: 
Part I: Preparing the Course provides information necessary for designing a course. The tools contained 
in Part I can be used to establish training for the use of economic instruments as part of a broader strategy 
for capacity building appropriate to a given country.
Part II: Trainer’s Guide includes suggestions about how to present the materials, lead plenary 
discussions, and conduct training exercises. 
Part III: Training Modules provides text and materials to be adapted to local requirements and realities. 
The materials draw upon international experience in the use of economic instruments for environmental and 
natural resource management. Numerous case descriptions and applications of economic instruments 
are available throughout.
The annexes provide detailed information to be used as a resource both during and following the training. 
They include a comprehensive glossary, detailed case studies, references and other material.
Part I: Preparing the Course
Introduction: Capacity Building and the Environment The introduction describes the role of capacity 
building, and training in particular, in the development of effective environmental and natural resources 
management policy. 
Training Needs Analysis This chapter provides guidance on collecting background information and 
materials on local conditions. The latter can identify specific training requirements and highlight the 
economic, political and social contexts that should influence the design of the course. The chapter 
describes several aids and tools that are used for this purpose.
Course Design, Delivery and Evaluation This section provides tools to:
•	 Develop	course	outlines,
•	 Present	courses	effectively,
•	 Prepare	participants’	handbooks,	and
•	 Evaluate	the	success	of	a	course.
Resource Aids and Templates This section provides a range of concrete materials for use in developing 
and evaluating the course. 
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Part II: Trainer’s Guide
The trainer’s guide offers specific advice for trainers on how to conduct a course based on the text 
provided in the training modules (Part III), including organising work groups and conducting plenary 
discussions. Part II includes instructions for the following material:
Course Material The trainer’s guide describes the purpose and offers a synopsis of each module of the 
proposed training course.
Participant Involvement Tools The training involves a considerable number of group exercises and 
plenary discussions. 
Group Exercises at the end of Modules 1, 2, 3, 10 and the case study exercise reviewing Modules 5 to 8 
(following Module 8) are designed to reinforce participants’ appreciation of the concepts by application to 
concrete situations. The trainer may wish to use other examples if they are more relevant to the participants 
in a particular training course.
Discussion Questions are povided for the Modules 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11 to help trainers stimulate 
discussion among participants on the topic of the module. Trainers should use the discussion to allow 
participants to share their experiences. 
To assist trainers and participants in getting the most out of these exercises, the Manual includes: 
•	 Instructions	for	trainers	for	the	organization	of	the	group	exercises,
•	 Instructions	for	group	exercises	for	participants	to	be	used	as	handouts	(in	Part	III),
•	 Discussion	questions	for	use	in	plenary	session	discussions
All the modules encourage the incorporation of local materials and information. The trainer may add or 
delete materials to suit the needs of the participants as identified during training needs analysis. 
Part III: Training Modules 
Part III provides a series of eleven training modules for use by the trainers and training course participants. 
The text covers various aspects of environmental and natural resource management policy with a focus 
on the use of economic instruments. 
Each module generally consists of several parts:  
Defining Terms at the beginning of each module provides the definitions of terms used in the module in 
the order they appear in the text. The trainer may wish to use these in the training presentation or distribute 
them to participants at the beginning of the session as reference. (A comprehensive Glossary of all terms 
related to the training in alphabetical order is available in Annex I of this Manual.)
 
The Main Text provides a brief review of the major concepts under consideration in the module. The 
text will help the trainer prepare speaking notes for presentations. Trainers could also distribute the main 
module texts to participants as part of the training packet. 
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Case Study Summaries For Modules 6, 7, 8 and 9, the training materials contains specific applications 
of various economic instruments in countries around the world. These case studies can be used as 
examples to illustrate points in general presentations or discussions, as the basis of group work sessions, 
or as background reading material. The Manual provides advice on their use throughout.
Participant Involvement Tools A module either ends with a group exercise or a plenary discussion. 
Trainer instructions for group exercises for Modules 1, 2, 3, 10 and the case study exercise reviewing 
Modules 5 to 8 (following Module 8) are provided in Part II, and handouts for participants are provided 
in Part III. For Modules 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11 guiding questions for plenary discussions are provided in 
Part II.
The Annexes
Seven Annexes at the end of the Manual provide detailed information to be used as additional material 
for training course participants during the course or for the development of a more intensive course. The 
Annexes are: 
I. A comprehensive glossary	of	terms	organized	in	alphabetical	order	for	general	reference	as	a		
companion	to	the	Defining	Terms	section	provided	at	the	beginning	each	Module.
II.	 A primer on economic instruments	summarizing	the	uses	and	benefits	of	economic	instruments	
and	related	to	content	covered	in	Module	5.
III.	A matrix for analysing the impact of economic instruments on incentives of firms and 
individuals.
IV.	An extended analysis of selected economic instrument case studies.
V. A template for assessing important factors affecting instrument choice.
VI.	A table of common applications of economic instruments by resource area. 
VII. A list of additional sources of information and references. 
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United Nations Environment Programme
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) is the overall coordinating environmental organization 
of the United Nations system.  Its mission is to provide leadership and encourage partnerships in caring 
for the environment, by inspiring, informing, and enabling nations and people to improve their quality of 
life without compromising that of future generations.  In accordance with its mandate, UNEP works to 
observe, monitor, and assess the state of the global environment; improve the scientific understanding of 
how environmental change occurs; and in turn, determine how such change can be managed by action-
oriented national policies and international agreements.  UNEP’s capacity building work thus centres on 
helping countries strengthen environmental management in diverse areas, which include freshwater and 
land resource management; the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, marine and coastal 
ecosystem management; and cleaner industrial production and eco-efficiency, among many others.
 
UNEP, headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya, marked its first 30 years of service in 2002. During this time, 
in partnership with a global array of collaborating organizations, UNEP achieved major advances in the 
development of international environmental policy and law, environmental monitoring and assessment, and 
our understanding of the science of global change.  This work also supports the successful development 
and implementation of the world’s major environmental conventions.  In parallel, UNEP administers several 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), including the Vienna Convention’s Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements 
of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (SBC), the Convention on Prior Informed Consent Procedure 
for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (Rotterdam Convention, PIC), the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Stockholm Convention 
on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs). 
Division of Technology, Industry and Economics
The mission of the Division of Technology, Industry and Economics (DTIE) is to encourage decision 
makers in government, local authorities and industry to develop and adopt policies, strategies, and 
practices that are cleaner and safer, make efficient use of natural resources, ensure environmentally 
sound management of chemicals, and reduce pollution and risks for humans and the environment.  
In addition, it seeks to enable implementation of conventions and international agreements and encourage 
the internalization of environmental costs.  UNEP DTIE’s strategy in carrying out these objectives is to 
influence decision-making through partnerships with other international organizations, governmental 
authorities, business and industry, and NGOs; facilitate knowledge management through networks; 
support implementation of conventions; and work closely with UNEP regional offices.  The Division, with 
its Director and Division Office in Paris, consists of one centre and five branches located in Paris, Geneva 
and Osaka.
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Economics and Trade Branch 
The Economics and Trade Branch (ETB) is one of the five branches of DTIE. Its mission is to enhance the 
capacities of developing countries and transition economies to integrate environmental considerations 
into development planning and macroeconomic policies, including trade policies. ETB helps countries 
develop and use integrated assessment and incentive tools for achieving poverty reduction and sustainable 
development. The Branch further works to improve our understanding of environmental, social, and 
economic effects of trade liberalization and the effects of environmental policies on trade, and works to 
strengthen coherence between Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the World Trade Organization. 
ETB also helps enhance the role of the financial sector in moving towards sustainability. Through its finance 
initiatives, ETB also helps enhance the role of the financial sector in moving towards sustainability. 
Division of Environmental Policy Implementation
The objective of the Division of Environmental Policy Implementation (DEPI) is to promote and support 
the sustainable management of ecosystems for human well-being. Based on its core competencies, 
DEPI’s responsibility lies in addressing Ecosystem management; Economics of ecosystems; Conflicts, 
disaster and ecosystem recovery; and Adaptation to climate change. DEPI facilitates implementation of its 
programmatic areas in developing countries and countries with economies in transition through capacity 
building, mainstreaming of ecosystem services, technology support, knowledge management, up-scaling 
from pilot to programme phase, and partnerships for institutional strengthening.
DEPI’s activities are implemented by a number of Branches/Units which are principally located in Nairobi 
and Geneva, namely: Programme Planning and Project Services; Freshwater and Terrestrial Ecosystems; 
Ecosystems Services Economics; Climate Change Adaptation; Environmental Education and Training; 
Coastal and Marine Ecosystems - the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Land-based Activities and Regional Seas Programme; and Post-Conflict and Disaster 
Management with focus on assessment and environmental emergencies preparedness and response. 
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 I1. Introduction1
This section addresses basic terminology, the context, necessary conditions, and the essentials of quality 
training.
1.1 Basic Terminology
To understand the subject of this Manual, it is first necessary to understand the meaning of key terms 
used including:
Economic Instruments are measures that provide economic incentives for sustainable economic 
development and disincentives for practices that degrade the environment or deplete natural resources. 
Economic instruments include charges, pollution taxes, tradable pollution permits, transferable 
development rights and payments for environmental services, among others.
Sustainable Development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.2
Command and Control Measures are legal prohibitions of undesirable practices accompanied by the 
policing power of the state to control violations of law. 
Capacity means the knowledge, skills, and organizational capability necessary to achieve a stated goal. 
It may also include the political, social, and cultural willingness to support the practical requirements of 
sustainable development. 
Capacity building is the long-term, voluntary process for increasing a country’s ability to identify and 
solve environmental and natural resource problems, to minimize risks, and maximize opportunities. It 
requires the strengthening, development, and mobilization of human, institutional, and other resources. 
Training is a means of developing the knowledge and skills of public officials and practitioners through 
classroom instruction or self-study combined with practical exercises in the development and application 
of economic instruments for environmental and natural resource management.
For the training content itself, there are many more terms that both the trainers and trainees will need 
to understand. Many of these are defined within the Modules provided in Part III of this Manual as well as 
in a Glossary at the end.
1 The following sections are based on UNEP (2002). 
2 This standard definition is taken from UN (1987), the “Brundtland Report”.
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1.2 The Need for Training
National governments and international organizations alike generally recognize sustainable development 
as an important and desirable goal. It provides for the long-term welfare of the people without destroying 
the environment or depleting natural resources, which, over time, undermine all economic growth. 
However, failure of markets to prevent or address problems, poor government policy, weak public or 
private institutions, and failure of command and control measures can undermine the best intentions for 
sustainable development. Too often the result is environmental degradation; permanent loss of valuable 
natural resources and, in the end, unsustainable development.
Thus, achieving sustainable development requires not only good intentions, but also skilful management. 
Economic instruments can serve as valuable tools in addressing market, policy, and institutional 
failures. They integrate environmental and economic policy, are inexpensive, can be targeted to specific 
environmental problems, and can change private sector behaviour by altering economic incentives. 
Yet economic instruments are sophisticated and often require considerable knowledge and skill to 
implement. Their use requires that government and non-governmental organizations have the capacity to 
develop and effectively apply these instruments. This Manual provides guidance for the development of 
training necessary to build that capacity. 
1.2.1 International Support for Capacity Building 
The United Nations Environment Programme supports the proposition that all countries should have the 
capacity to address environmental issues and manage their own natural resources. 
The global plan to achieve sustainable development agreed to at the UN Conference on Environment 
and Development (1992) in Rio de Janeiro3, Agenda 214, stressed the need for capacity building for 
environmental management generally and for developing countries in particular. To this end the major 
international lending aid agencies have promoted the capacity development for environmental and natural 
resource management in developing countries ever since the Rio Summit.
 
Capacity building measures supported by UNEP emphasize collaboration between international 
organizations and local organizations. UNEP encourages local organizations to take progressively greater 
responsibility for long term, structural changes that are necessary to integrate environmental concerns 
into the mainstream of development activities. 
Requests from developing countries for training on the use of economic instruments for environmental 
management have multiplied over the years. Every indication is that demand for this training will continue 
to grow. New international requirements and evolving management practices are driving demand for more 
– and more diverse – training. Trainers will need to keep pace with these developments.
3 This conference is often referred to as The Earth Summit. 
4 http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.htm
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This Manual focuses on training. To be effective, however, training cannot be provided in isolation of other 
initiatives to strengthen environmental stewardship or their overall relation to the economic and social 
fabric.
Capacity building encompasses a range of activities in addition to training including enactment of enabling 
legislation, provision of budget support, and organization of appropriate government agencies.
In countries that have little economic growth, limited finances, lack of political commitment, and public 
indifference to protecting the environment, the usefulness of training alone can be severely constrained. If 
training is to be successful, a minimum level of these enabling conditions must be in place already.
One vital prerequisite for building capacity is public awareness of environmental problems and support 
for measures necessary to address those problems. In many developing countries, capacity building will 
need to address inadequate public concern for the environment, which is often the underlying cause of 
depletion of natural resources and deterioration of the environment. 
Ways of promoting environmental awareness include:
•	 Establishing	environmental	awards	in	the	community	and	the	workplace	
•	 Organizing	conferences	and	meetings	to	address	environmental	issues
•	 Holding	an	environment	‘day’	or	‘week’	or	events
•	 Soliciting	public	participation	in	environmental	projects	and	activities	
•	 Recognizing	the	particular	contribution	of	women,	NGOs	and	local	communities
•	 Encouraging	corporate	environmental	policies	and	programmes,	and
•	 Promoting	environmental	stewardship	and	community-based	resource	management
1.3 Basic Components of Capacity Building 
A comprehensive programme of capacity building for the environment should address five issues: 
Training and Education—needed to develop the skills and competencies necessary for environmental 
and natural resource management good practice.
Organization and Management—needed to strengthen the structures, processes and delivery 
systems for the application of economic instruments for environmental and natural resource management 
implementation.
Networks and Linkages—needed to foster cooperation, information exchange and professional 
development among environmental and natural resource management stakeholders, both individuals and 
organizations within and outside the public sector.
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Policy and Institutional Framework—needed to enact legislation, promulgate regulations and institute 
procedures, and manage programmes to establish economic instruments.
 
Sensitivity to Social and Economic Context—needed for effective support within the broader society 
and the political culture of decision-making in the country.
1.4 Essentials of Quality Training
This section provides information to assist in-country trainers to assume this role of training their fellow 
citizens directly. The training of trainers is particularly important because it allows the primary trainers to 
transfer their expertise to local personnel who, in turn, can train others within the country. 
The purpose of training is to develop knowledge and skills needed by participants. Training will be most 
effective when carried out within a strategic framework, consistent with the principles of capacity building 
described above. 
In addition, to be effective, training on economic instruments needs to:
Raise Awareness The value of economic instruments for environmental and natural resource 
management is now recognized in developing countries. This is expected to grow in the coming years. 
But there is still a general lack of understanding among the general public and key constituencies in 
most countries. The training should raise the awareness among policymakers and practitioners alike of 
economic instruments and their effective uses.
Instil Core Competencies Many countries have begun to establish procedures and regulations for use 
of economic instruments but lack a broad base of policymakers and practitioners who understand the 
uses of economic instruments to effectively apply them. To address these deficiencies, training should 
address technical and administrative matters as well as techniques for increasing public participation in 
developing environmental policy. The latter is acknowledged as a particular weakness in many developing 
countries. 
1.5 Quality Training Practices 
The need for consistently high quality training cannot be overemphasized. In this regard, it is important to 
identify principles of good practices for training on the use of economic instruments and the key aids and 
measures that support such an approach. The following provides an initial framework for ensuring quality 
training with an emphasis on four questions:
1.	 What	are	the	basic	requirements	for	high	quality	training?
2.	 What	should	the	training	aim	to	provide	for	its	target	audience?
3.	 Who	should	provide	the	training?
4.	 How	should	this	activity	be	designed	and	delivered?
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Box I-1: Basic Principles for Effective Training
Have Clear Objectives
The purpose of training on the use of economic instruments for environmental and natural resource 
management is to promote good practice. Therefore, guidance should be sought as to what 
constitutes good practice in order to clarify the objectives and content of training.
Target the Right People
Environmental and natural resource management training programmes and courses should focus 
on the needs of well-defined target groups and take, when necessary, sufficient account of their 
varied background.
Use Appropriate Teaching Methods
These should be practical in nature, action-oriented and emphasize problems and conflict-solving 
situations, as well as technical skills (including the use of information technology).
Use Effective Training Aids
Effective use should be made of real-world case studies and simulation exercises, role-playing 
situations, etc.
Choose Trainers Carefully
Develop a roster of suitable environmental and natural resource management trainers to deliver 
the course. Trainers should possess practical environmental and natural resource management 
experience and sound pedagogical skills. 
Source:	Adapted from UNEP, 2002 
1.6 Achieving High Quality Training 
One approach to understanding the basic requirements of quality training is the ‘KITS’, which requires that 
trainers impart all Knowledge, Information, Tools and Skills (KITS) necessary for the target audience to 
perform to internationally agreed or locally defined standards. The elements of the KITS approach are:
•	 Appropriate	knowledge	of	environmental	and	natural	resource	management	good	practice	at	the	level	
necessary	for	those	being	trained	to	undertake	their	roles	and	responsibilities	effectively;
•	 Up-to-date	information	on	relevant	developments	and	case	experience	in	environmental	and	natural	
resource	management,	procedure	and	methodology;
•	 Best-practice	tools	and	lessons	that	are	applicable	and	work	in	the	situation	and	setting	in	question;	
and
•	 ‘Hands-on’	experience	to	apply	these	factors	to	local	problem	solving	and	decision-making.
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1.7 Choosing Trainers
The issues of who should provide training and how to assure their competency are sensitive ones. However, 
to maintain training quality, the training must address these issues head on. Preferably, those designing and 
delivering a major programme (for ‘training the trainers’) should meet basic ESP qualifications, namely:
•	 Experience	in	environmental	and	natural	resource	management	training	and/or	practice	(and	ideally	
both)	in	a	given	country	or	region;
•	 Sensitivity	to	local	needs	and	cultural	considerations	and	their	reflection	in	environmental	and	natural	
resource	management	trends	and	issues;	and
•	 Professionalism	as	demonstrated	by	a	proven	record	of	environmental	and	natural	resource	management	
training	and	practice	in	similar	contexts	and	settings.
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The goal of this section is to assist the course designer to compile the information necessary to designing 
an effective training strategy for the use of economic instruments for environmental and natural resources 
management objective(s):
 
By the end of this section, the trainer will be able to:
•	 Identify	the	groups	who	require	training,
•	 Conduct	a	Training	Needs	Analysis,
•	 Establish	the	purpose	and	scope	of	the	training.
2.1 Objectives
Whatever the means of gathering information, the main objective is to identify environmental and natural 
resource management training needs. These include:
•	 The	target	groups	to	be	trained,
•	 The	content	of	the	training,
•	 The	most	effective	format	for	training,
•	 	The	 expected	 benefits	 (bearing	 in	mind	 the	 larger	 social,	 political,	 economic	 and	 cultural	 context	 
and	its	likely	influence	on	the	planning,	and	implementation	of	training	courses.
2.2 Target Groups
Anyone with an involvement or an interest in the use of economic instruments for environmental and 
natural resource management can benefit from the training. However, experience indicates that the 
demand for training is more frequent from those stakeholders who have key roles in environmental and 
natural resource management. 
Such stakeholders require training that is more intensive and they stand to gain the most benefit from the 
training. Other participants in environmental and natural resource management, such as development 
planners, local administrators and public, community and environmental interest groups may also require 
and benefit from training, but usually not in as much detail as the above groups.
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Box I-2: Main Target Groups for Training
This Manual can assist trainers in developing courses for four main target groups. These are:
Practitioners who need to develop or strengthen their technical expertise in some or all of the 
different aspects (For example, this group could include staff of major development or proponent 
bodies, private sector consultants, officials from competent authorities responsible for environmental 
and natural resource management, etc.);
Decision Makers and Their Policy Advisers, some of whom may have little or no previous 
exposure to environmental and natural resource management, who need to understand the 
objectives, procedure and outcomes of economic instruments on environmental and natural 
resource management and their own role and obligations within the environmental and natural 
resource management;
Other Stakeholders including members of non-government organizations, interest groups and 
the public affected by the proposals, who may need to be introduced to environmental and natural 
resource management to better understand their role and relationship to others; and
Trainers and Course Designers who are identified as candidates to develop and deliver situation-
specific training courses.
2.3 Conducting the Needs Analysis5
An assessment of national capacity is the first step in selecting an appropriate training strategy. Capacity 
assessment identifies constraints and opportunities. In many cases, there will be a range of previous 
activities and ongoing initiatives upon which to build. The scope of training requirements will depend, in 
part, on the extent to which these other components are in place.
The training needs analysis should assist the trainer/course designer in compiling the information required 
to design an effective economic instruments training strategy, one that will build institutional and human 
capacity. Even if specific training needs have already been identified, undertaking all or part of this analysis 
will still be useful. 
Current or recent training and capacity building activities on the use of economic instruments for 
environmental and natural resource management in the country or region should be reviewed. This will 
help to determine the feasibility of any proposed training, for example by identifying demands for which 
there is insufficient provision.
For training to be effective, it should meet:
•	 The	requirements	for	improving	environmental	and	natural	resource	management	practice	in	the	region	
or	country	and	
•	 The	specific	needs	of	the	people	who	will	attend	the	training	session	or	course.
5 The analysis of training needs in this Manual requires that the course designer have at least some training and experience in course design. 
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social, and environmental conditions) on the feasibility of, and options for training on the use of economic 
instruments for environmental and natural resource management. 
Some of these conditions may constrain the introduction and/or implementation of the economic 
instruments while others may provide opportunities for their use. This information indicates how the design 
of the training relates to its delivery. 
2.4 Using Training Needs Workshops
A training needs workshop is the preferred means of gathering information on training requirements6 
especially when developing a comprehensive country or region-wide training programme. Before holding 
such a workshop, the trainer/course designer needs to collect information about the environmental and 
natural resource management situation in the country and discuss the potential training needs with a wide 
range of people involved in environmental and natural resource management. 
2.4.1 Preparing for the Workshop 
A full training needs analysis workshop requires several weeks of planning, analysis and review. In 
some cases, this process may take longer, such as when defining environmental and natural resource 
management training needs for varied regions with different problems. 
Beyond being a tool for gathering information, the needs analysis workshop can serve, in part, as a 
consensus building exercise. A consensus building approach helps:
•	 Identify	the	groups	requiring	training	on	the	use	of	economic	instruments	for	environmental	and	natural	
resource	management,	 their	specific	needs	and	the	expected	benefits	of	 the	type	of	 training	to	be	
provided,
•	 Consider	the	influence	of	the	political,	social	and	environmental	situation	on	the	training	that	is	being	
developed,	therefore	ensuring	it	is	a	feasible	and	effective	means	of	capacity	building,	
•	 Avoid	tensions	and	disputes	that	may	arise	from	a	more	confrontational	or	majority	rule	approach.
The outcomes of the workshop should comprise:
•	 A	set	of	summaries	of	training	needs	for	selected	target	groups	(in	table	form),
•	 Feedback	notes	for	the	trainer/course	designer	that	will	assist	in	planning	and	delivering	the	training	
course	or	programme.
2.4.2 Selecting Workshop Participants 
Preparing a one-day workshop requires bringing together a range of relevant stakeholders. It is important 
to ensure a good cross-section of stakeholders active in environmental and natural resource management, 
including, where possible, some senior decision  makers. At a local level, it may be helpful to include 
members of the community who are involved and knowledgeable about environmental and natural 
resource management. 
6 Although the training needs analysis is best carried out as a group activity, the course designer can use a combination of telephone, mail and personal 
contacts for most of the activities listed in this section. In some cases, training needs may already have been identified or the developer may lack time or 
money available for a detailed analysis. In such cases, other means should be found to identify and confirm needs, - e.g. consultation with experienced 
environmental and natural resource management practitioners and trainers.
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If the training needs analysis is focused on a particular sector, then a more specialized list of participants may 
be appropriate. A national level workshop may have between 15 and 50 participants, with representation 
from both environmental and natural resource management administrators and policy specialists from key 
implementing agencies.
The choice of appropriate participants is crucial to the success of the workshop. Workshop representatives 
could include people from the following groups:
•	 Administrators/practitioners	from	environmental,	natural	resource	ministries	and	agencies,
•	 Elected	officials	and	government	ministers,
•	 Representatives	of	non-government	organizations	(NGOs),
•	 Aid	agencies,
•	 Special	groups	e.g.	minority	indigenous	peoples,	women,
•	 Academics,	lawyers,	engineers,	health	professionals,	
•	 Trainers	and	training	organizations,
•	 The	media,	and
•	 Members	of	community	groups.
2.4.3 Facilitation and Structure 
A national level workshop should probably have an experienced facilitator to manage and structure the 
process. At the local level, less structured meetings could still be very valuable, covering the same ground 
and pooling the knowledge of available representatives.
2.4.4 Timing and Funding 
The trainer should make sure that there is sufficient lead-time to make arrangements, identify, invite and 
confirm participants, brief participants and produce workshop materials. This may take months rather 
than weeks. If funding is needed, then probably the planning time line will be longer.
2.4.5 Choosing a Workshop Location 
If at all possible, the training designers should hold the workshop in a location away from work places 
to avoid distractions. In addition, the venue must be large enough to accommodate the whole group 
comfortably, and allow the group to break into smaller working groups.
2.4.6 Designing a Course Programme 
During the phase of the training needs analysis, the training designers need to decide on the length and 
content of the training course depending on the professional background of the participants who will take 
part in the course. They will also need to design the specific session of the course programme. For this 
purpose, they can take use of the training needs workshop discussion guide provided in section 4.1 of 
Part I.
If the list of participants of the training course is already known before the training needs analysis workshop, 
the pre-course questionnaire provided in section 4.3 of Part I can be mailed out before the workshop. The 
responses can then feed into the training needs workshop.
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The trainers should conduct an evaluation of the workshop. All participants should receive copies of final 
training needs summaries and the contact details of the other participants. The workshop leader should 
distribute these at the end of the workshop rather than sending them out later. A sample of the information 
that should be included in such a training needs summary can be found in section 4.2 of Part I. 
2.5 Gathering Information without a Workshop
If a training needs workshop is not conducted, the trainer/course designer will need to gather the information 
that will provide an understanding of current conditions for training and insights that can usefully be 
passed on to course participants. This may be done by interviewing key stakeholders conference call, by 
telephone conversations with individual stakeholders, or by e-mail, using the same questions that would 
be put to the Training Needs Workshop. The sample training needs summary provided in section 4.2 of 
Part I should be completed even if the training needs analysis is conducted without holding a workshop.
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The goal of this section is to provide information and guidance on planning and implementing a course 
programme. By the end of this section, the trainer/course designer will be able to:
•	 Develop	a	Course	
•	 Prepare	a	Participant	Handbook
•	 Address	Logistical	Concerns
•	 Present	a	Course	Effectively
•	 Evaluate	the	Course.
3.1 Developing a Course
Training designers should use results of the training needs analysis as the basis of a course outline and 
build up from the materials contained in the guidance and modules provided in Part II and Part III of this 
Manual. Not all modules will need to be used for each training course, nor is it expected that all of the 
materials relating to a topic will be used.
Trainers are encouraged to adapt the Manual and to develop their own materials in order to meet 
the specific needs of prospective course participants.
A customized training course can be designed by:
•	 Establishing	objectives	 that	 reflect	 the	priorities	already	established	 for	 training	 (as	 indicated	 in	 the	
training	needs	summary);
•	 Selecting	the	modules,	topic	materials	and	training	activities	that	are	appropriate	for	the	target	groups;	
and
•	 Amending	and	adding	to	the	materials	as	necessary	to	meet	the	participants’	needs.
The training course can be developed from the training needs summaries and discussion sheets produced 
during the training needs workshop (sections 4.1 and 4.2 of Part I). Taking the information for one target 
group at a time, the trainer/course designer can select the appropriate modules, topics and training 
activities. In doing so, the trainer needs to keep in mind the specific training needs of the group and the 
depth of training required. In this context, it will be very helpful to use the responses on the pre-course 
questionnaire (section 4.3). The questionnaire should be sent out to participants at this stage if this has 
not been done before the training needs analysis workshop already.
The choice of training activity depends on the time and resources available and the identified training 
needs. For example, the emphasis in specialized training should be on practical activities, case examples 
and relevant tools in the use of economic instruments in environmental and natural resource management. 
This approach is important especially where participants are required at the end of the course to 
demonstrate proficiency in analysis of economic instruments for environmental and natural resource 
management. Site visits and excursions should be used to reinforce the materials whenever possible.
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A session planning form should be completed, an example of which is presented at the end of Part I in 
section 4.4. The trainer/course designer should ensure that the course length is approximately the same 
as the time available, making appropriate adjustments accordingly.
Do not forget the importance of the opening and closing sessions. If possible, use an interesting and 
significant person to formally commence and conclude the proceedings.
3.1.1 Preparing the Course Programme 
The next step is to complete the programme within the course outline. The required sessions and activities 
should be fitted into an ordered and logical structure, allowing sufficient time for networking during lunch 
and tea breaks. Usually, the times indicated for topics in the Session Planning Form will require some 
juggling or adjustment to fit into a suitable schedule.
Such a programme should be included in the course brochure or participants’ handbook discussed in 
this section. However, much more detailed information, including course notes and resource lists, will be 
necessary for the trainer to present the course.
3.1.2 Developing Course Materials 
Once the programme is finalized, the materials on the topics and training activities should be prepared. 
This can be done by:
1.	 Working	 through	 the	 information	 checklist	 for	 each	 topic	 to	 collect	 the	 necessary	 documents	 and	
materials;
2.	 Contacting	 the	 speakers	 required	 to	 support	 each	 training	 activity	 (do	 not	 forget	 to	 draw	 on	 the	
experience	of	course	participants);
3.	 Adapting	the	session	presentations	for	each	topic	to	suit	the	needs	of	the	participants;
4.	 Preparing	overheads	and	handouts;	
5.	 Selecting	and	copying	materials	to	include	in	the	pre-training	assignment;	
6.	 Reviewing	the	related	literature	to	identify	any	relevant	case	studies	and/or	lessons	of	application	and	
use	of	economic	instruments	for	environmental	and	natural	resource	management	7;
7.	 Preparing	a	participant’s	handbook.
3.2 Preparing a Participants’ Handbook 
A participants’ handbook should be prepared for each training course. The handbook should preferably 
be available on the website or as a hard copy. The handbook provides information and guidance on 
course presentation and can be kept as a resource for future use. 
Handbooks can be prepared in loose-leaf form (in a binder), as a booklet, or even as stapled sheets. 
Regardless of how the material is presented, it needs to be consistent in format.
7 A list of sources of information is given in Annex VII.
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•	 A	 list	 and	 contact	 details	 of	 all	 course	 participants,	 training	 faculty,	 course	 administrators,	 guest	
speakers,	and	site/topic	leaders;
•	 The	 final	 training	programme	 including	a	 timetable,	 logistical	 arrangements	 for	breaks,	 excursions,	
etc;
•	 Copies	of	the	reading	materials	provided	for	each	topic	together	with	any	background	information;
•	 A	list	of	key	references	for	each	topic	and	resource	management	in	general;
•	 Copies	of	all	overheads,	handouts,	case	studies	and	other	resource	materials;
•	 Copies	of	instructions	for	group	training	activities	and	work	assignments	with	space	for	making	notes;	
and
•	 An	evaluation	sheet	to	be	completed	and	returned	at	the	end	of	the	course.
3.3 Logistics 
The logistics of organizing a training course is a vital but often overlooked activity. The main tasks to be 
covered are listed below in the approximate order in which they are undertaken:
3.3.1 Choosing a Venue 
The venue for training should be as functional and comfortable as possible. In many cases, there may be 
financial or other constraints, such that it may not be possible to produce ideal training conditions.
However, course organizers should aim to provide some, or all, of the support facilities for efficient and 
effective training. Facility considerations include:
•	 Rooms,	seating	and	desks	sufficient	to	accommodate	the	number	of	participants	attending	for	both	
large	group	presentations	and	small	group	activities;
•	 Location	away	from	work	places;
•	 Adequate	lighting,	heating/cooling,	quietness;
•	 Access	to	electricity;
•	 Provision	of,	or	access	to,	food	and	refreshments	during	breaks;
•	 Communication	facilities	such	as	internet,	telephone	and	fax	for	course	leader	and	participants;
•	 Blackboards	 and	 chalk,	 white	 boards	 and	markers,	 flipcharts,	 overhead	 transparency	 sheets	 and	
pens;
•	 A	table	set	aside	for	display	of	reference	materials;
•	 Audio-visual	equipment	(overhead	projectors,	slide	projectors,	video	players,	tape	recorders)	and	any	
backup	equipment	such	as	bulbs;
•	 Office	equipment	 (computers	and	printers,	photocopying,	etc)	and	any	backup	equipment	such	as	
discs	or	tapes.
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Depending on the length of the course, there may be a need for participant’s accommodation. This can 
be an important ingredient of course satisfaction and should be of acceptable quality to those attending. 
In some cases, the location of the venue may be determined by ease of access for possible site visits.
3.3.2 Setting Course Dates 
Timing of courses is important at a number of different levels:
•	 Time of Year	Schedule	 the	course	 far	enough	ahead	of	 time	 to	accommodate	 the	 target	groups	
and	to	avoid	conflicts	with	holidays,	religious	festivals,	major	events,	conferences	and	other	training	
activities	or	periods	when	natural	events	such	as	floods	or	rains	may	make	accessibility	difficult.
•	 Length of Course	The	course	length	should	be	appropriate	to	the	objectives	and	type	of	training	to	
be	provided	for	the	target	group.	For	instance,	courses	designed	for	senior	decision	makers	need	to	
be	very	short	and	focused	on	their	immediate	concerns	and	interests,	otherwise	they	will	not	attract	
the	right	people.	On	the	other	hand,	practitioners	may	require	much	longer	and	more	intensive	training,	
which	may	take	place	in	several	sessions	(e.g.	a	series	of	one	or	two	week	courses).	These	sessions	
may	be	coordinated	with	shorter,	specialized	training	for	the	one	involved	in	the	actual	practice	of	the	
use	of	economic	instruments	for	environmental	and	natural	resource	management.
•	 Structure of Course Agenda	Provide	sufficient	breaks	in	the	schedule.	Participants	need	time	off	
to	consolidate	their	learning,	to	relax,	and	most	importantly	to	get	to	know	each	other	and	establish	
networks	that	will	benefit	them	in	the	future.
3.3.3 Providing Pre-Course Information 
A course brochure should be sent out to confirmed and interested participants well in advance of the 
training. This brochure should describe the location, course objectives, the programme of activities, the 
training faculty, who will or should attend, and how to register or apply. Make sure that other relevant 
information is provided as well, including:
•	 Contact	details	for	registration	and	venue;
•	 Any	fees	and	costs	to	the	participants,	with	details	of	how	these	should	be	paid;
•	 What	to	bring	with	them,	including	any	required	materials	or	case	studies.	
3.4 Recruiting Trainers
Other than for very short courses, lasting for one half-day or less, a roster of trainers who are knowledgeable 
about the subject matter should be drawn up.
The session outlines for each topic have been designed on the basis that the lead trainer will recruit local 
experts to assist in the development of relevant learning materials and/or undertake training activities. 
At least some of the trainers should have practical experience in the use economic instruments for 
environmental and natural resource management locally.
During the training course, the trainers should tap into any participant experience or specialized knowledge 
in using economic instruments. The pre-course questionnaire can provide information about the expertise 
of course participants. The questionnaire is designed specifically to pre-identify the background, skills and 
knowledge of course participants and their training needs. 
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Course participants will have different learning styles and responses to training activities, as well as different 
orientations on the use of economic instruments for environmental and natural resource management. 
When presenting the course, a mix of training methods and aids should be used to accommodate these 
differences. The materials in this Manual cater for such a varied approach. 
3.5.1 Getting Ready 
In most cases, the trainer should visit the training venue and sites well beforehand to note any problems and 
constraints concerning course presentation. During this visit, contact should be made with local experts 
and trainers who have experience in the use of economic instruments for environmental and natural 
resource management, and their views and advice should be sought on presentations and materials. All 
those who are involved in providing the training, site visits, or talks should be fully briefed on their role and 
the relationship to course objective, structures, etc.
The participants should also be briefed in advance on how to get the most out of the training course. This 
is particularly important when interactive training methods are to be used. Participants should know the 
issues to be covered and the work they will be required to do. The style of presentation and activities need 
to be tailored to the learning needs and style of participants.
3.5.2 Making Presentations Relevant and Interesting 
As indicated above, trainers should be aware of differences in individual learning styles and, as far as 
possible, take them into account in presenting the course. Particular attention should be given to any 
cultural issues that may make course members reluctant to participate within group activities. In some 
cases, a ‘warm up’ or getting acquainted exercise can help to overcome initial reservations.
The style of presentation needs to be varied in order to keep participants’ attention. Lectures should 
include opportunities for questioning and discussions among participants. They should be interspersed 
with more interactive training methods, which have proven effective in reinforcing learning and skills 
acquisition.
Interactive training methods that can be used to make courses more interesting and relevant include:
•	 Exercises,	role	playing	and	simulation	to	mimic	aspects	of	the	process	involved	in	the	use	of	economic	
instruments	for	environmental	and	natural	resource	management;
•	 Case	studies	of	locally-relevant	environmental	problems;
•	 Team	assignments/project	work,	for	example	to	review	case	studies	on	the	use	of	economic	instruments	
for	environmental	and	natural	resource	management;
•	 Site	visits	and	field	excursions	to	observe	the	effects	of	the	use	of	economic	instruments	for	environmental	
and	natural	resource	management.
3.5.3 Getting Started
Before the training course begins, make sure that all facilities and equipment are ready and that the 
training and resource materials are at hand. Start formal training sessions with an introductory activity 
to help participants to get to know each other.
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Outline the structure of the course and review the contents of the participant’s handbook so that 
participants are aware of what notes have been provided (this will avoid unnecessary note taking and 
copying of transparencies or PowerPoint slides). Remember to check that participants understand the 
information being presented by using the various modes of teacher-student interactions. 
3.5.4 Managing Group Training Activities 
When planning group activities, the first task is to decide how participants are going to be allocated 
into small groups. The easiest solution is to allow participants to form their own groups. However, this 
often means that people who know each other will choose to work together and miss the opportunity of 
working with new people and being exposed to different ideas and experiences. Preferably, small groups 
should be formed by the trainer with the aim of balancing representation of the views and interests.
The groups should be monitored to ensure they are functioning successfully and carrying out the required 
tasks. A checklist for the purpose is given in Box I-3 below. On occasion, there can be personality conflicts 
within small groups. These can be handled by altering the membership of the groups. However, it should 
be noted that this type of situation often occurs in real-life applications in resource management and 
may be used to provide practical lessons and suggest ‘coping’ strategies, such as the use of mediation 
techniques.
Box I-3: Checklist to Facilitate Group Training Activities
1. Ensure that group members understand the purpose of the activity and their role in it
2. Answer group members’ questions
3. Supply information
4. Facilitate the equitable participation of all of the group members
5. Sort out any conflicts within the group and encourage positive group behaviour
6. Move the group along if it is having difficulties with the proposed task, and
7. Ensure that time schedules are kept.
All small group activities should conclude with a general discussion or reporting session (plenary), which 
brings all participants together. The trainer should provide a short debrief of the exercise, drawing out the 
main lessons at the end of the plenary.
3.5.5 Using Case Studies 
Case studies and examples of the use of economic instruments for environmental and natural resource 
management can be an effective training tool. This is most likely when case studies are realistic and 
relevant to local situations and the experience of course participants. In this context, case studies help the 
participants understand why and how certain aspects of economic instruments work well (and others do 
not) in particular environmental and natural resource management situations and the effect this has on 
decision-making and the outcomes of environmental and natural resource management.
Where appropriate, the training course can be based on a detailed case study to exemplify the 
main elements of economic instruments. This practical theme will help to knit together the sessions. 
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world constraints imposed on environmental and natural resource management practice by low budgets, 
limited information and lax administration of procedural checks, or to show what can be achieved through 
use of economic instruments for environmental and natural resource management.
This Manual contains a number of case studies on the use of economic instruments for environmental and 
natural resource management with application to developing countries for use and reference. However, 
the case studies and examples should be reviewed carefully and, if appropriate, adapted to the context 
and purpose of the training. Often, trainers find it difficult to obtain specific local case studies or materials. 
Yet, case studies do not necessarily have to be long or detailed to be effective. When designing a case 
study, trainers can use the template ‘Preparing a Case Study’ provided in section 4.5 in order to compile 
the relevant information.
Short, focused local studies can have practical value and immediate relevance, compared to a more 
extensive case study of a setting that is unfamiliar to the course participants. Useful examples of the use of 
economic instruments for environmental and natural resource management can be sought by contacting 
those who are involved or active locally in environmental and resource management.
General principles to be followed in preparing a case study are developed in Box I-4 below. Case study 
exercises and instructions for trainers are provided in Part III and Part II respectively. 
Box I-4: Principles for Preparing Training Case Studies
General principles for preparing case studies include:
 1. Choose an interesting and appropriate subject 
 2. Define clear training objectives
 3. Provide an overview for other trainers using the case study
 4. Prepare case study information for trainee use
 5. Establish a realistic timetable for carrying out the case study 
 6. Select appropriate group sizes
 7. Provide clear instructions to trainers; set clear tasks for trainees
 8. Place the case study in context
 9. Organize the written presentation of the case study
10. Test the case study before it is finalized.
Source:	Adapted from UNEP (2002)
3.6 Evaluating the Training Course
Informal evaluation should be undertaken on an ongoing basis during presentation of the course. 
Participant feedback can be used to modify and improve the delivery, content and structure of courses.
On completion of the course or programme, an overall evaluation of the training should be undertaken at 
the following levels: activity, topic, course and, where appropriate, overall programme. A training course 
evaluation form provided in Module 11 of Part III can be used for this purpose. It is designed to evaluate 
the success of a course in meeting the needs of participants and can be adapted and applied to specific 
sessions. Ideally, participants should also be followed up after 6 to 12 months to assess the long-term 
benefits of the course.
Where the course is part of a larger training programme, the evaluation should be conducted to identify 
the specific role and contribution of the course in capacity building.
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This section provides various resources the trainer can use for the preparation of the course:
4.1 Discussion Guides 
In this section, a collection of discussion questions grouped by context is given. These questions can be 
used during the training needs workshop to gather information before the course.
4.2 Sample Training Needs Summary 
The results of the training needs analysis workshop can be summed up and distributed to the workshop 
participants using this sample.
4.3 Pre-Course Questionnaire 
Course participants should complete this questionnaire in advance to provide the course designer with 
relevant information about their background and expectations. If possible, the results should feed into the 
training needs analysis workshop, but they can also be incorporated by the trainer at a later stage if they 
are not available at the time of the workshop.
4.4 Session Planning Form 
This template helps planning and keeping track of the course programme and the time allocations for the 
various sessions and activities.
4.5 Preparing a Case Study 
When preparing a case study, this table helps designers to compile and structure information.
4.1 Discussion Guides
The trainer can use the following discussion guides during the training needs analysis as resources for 
gathering information for the training course.
4.1.1 Analysing the Political and Legal Context
1.		Are	 economic	 instruments	being	used	 for	 environmental	 and	natural	 resource	management	 in	 the	
country?	yes/no
2.		Discuss	how	the	following	aspects	of	politics	and	law	influence	the	use	of	economic	instruments:	
	 •	 	Level	 of	 commitment	 to	 democratic	 principles,	 common	 good,	 individual	 and	 collective	
rights	and	responsibilities	
	 •	 Land	tenure	and	ownership
	 •	 Political	will	towards	environmental	and	natural	resource	management
	 •	 Legal/judicial	system
	 •	 Institutional	machinery	of	government,	local	and	regional	issues
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3.		How	can	the	political-legal	system	facilitate	the	use	of	economic	instruments	for	environmental	and	
natural	resource	management?
4.1.2 Analysing the Social Context
1.	 Are	 economic	 instruments	being	used	 for	 environmental	 and	natural	 resource	management	 in	 the	
country?	yes/no
2.	 Discuss	how	the	following	aspects	of	society	influence	the	use	/	non-use	of	economic	instruments	for	
environmental	and	natural	resource	management.
	 •	 Poverty	and	its	causes
	 •	 Literacy	levels	and	access	to	education
	 •	 Culture,	language,	class	structure,	religion
	 •	 	Involvement	 of	 local	 communities,	 minority	 groups,	 indigenous	 people,	 women,	 non	
government	organizations
3.	 Which	strategies	are	appropriate	for	promoting	public	involvement	in	general?
4.1.3 Analysing the Economic Context
1.	 Are	 economic	 instruments	being	used	 for	 environmental	 and	natural	 resource	management	 in	 the	
country?	yes/no
2.	 Discuss	how	the	following	aspects	of	the	economy	influence	the	use	/	non-use	of	economic	instruments	
for	environmental	and	natural	resource	management.
	 •	 Level	of	development	and	infrastructure
	 •	 Macroeconomic/	sectoral	policies
	 •	 Financial-	level	of	debt,	privatisation,	restructuring
	 •	 Development
	 •	 Presence	of	land	use	or	regional	development	planning
3.	 Can	the	economic	context	be	improved	to	stimulate	the	use	of	economic	instruments	for	environmental	
and	natural	resource	management?
4.1.4 Analysing the Environmental Context
1.	 Discuss	the	current	and	potential	major	environmental	problems/pressures	facing	the	country.
2.	 Outline	 the	extent	 to	which	key	environmental	 legislation,	policies	and	regulations	are	 in	place	 (e.g.	
National	Environmental	Action	Plans-NEAPs).
3.	 Outline	whether	there	are	detailed	policies/laws	covering	the	following:
	 •	 International	conventions
	 •	 Pollution	and	control	standards
	 •	 Capacity	to	enforce	regulatory	mechanisms
	 •	 Water	resources
	 •	 Energy	generation	and	transmission
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	 •	 Flora	and	fauna,	endangered	species
	 •	 Natural	resource	management
	 •	 Resource	allocation
	 •	 Land	management
	 •	 Land	use	planning/regional	development
	 •	 Transportation
	 •	 Process	of	jurisdictional	cooperation	and	coordination
4.	 Discuss	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 government	 departments	 in	 all	 sectors	 have	 a	 mandate	 to	 consider	
environmental	issues.
5.	 Discuss	the	types,	sources	and	availability	of	environmental	information	in	the	country.
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4.2 Sample Training Needs Summary
Description of target group
Training needs
Expected benefits
Areas in which depth of training is required
Skills or prerequisites required
Targeted level in organization / group
Approximate numbers requiring training (annually)
Estimated course length
Suggested course name
Priority of training need
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To collect information about the participants’ background, motivation and expectations, a pre-course 
questionnaire could be circulated to the participants prior to the training workshop. The following are 
suggestions for questions that could be included in such a pre-course questionnaire.
Please describe the type of work you do.
What types of problems do you generally deal with? How?
Which problems are the most difficult to deal with? Why?
How familiar are you with economic instruments for environmental and natural resource management?
Have you ever used economic instruments for environmental and natural resource management 
problems?
Why are you attending the training workshop?
What do you hope to gain from it?
What do you think you could contribute to the training?
What skills do you feel you need particular training in? 
Any other ideas or comments?
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The following template will help designers compile the information around which to build a case study. The 
categories on the left hand side should help to focus on the relevant information and highlight information 
gaps. For examples of case studies presented according to this template see Annex IV. For the purpose of 
group work based on case studies during training, provide the case study text in a narrative style – rather 
than as a matrix - to ensure that participants do the analytical work. 
Title 
Country
Problem definition
Environmental impacts
Social impacts
Solution implemented
Summary analysis
Efficacy of existing policy at solving problem
Rationale for success/failure
Unanswered questions
Institutional baseline conditions in country
Legal
Fiscal
Government institutions
Environmental
Details on policy process
History of response
Evaluation of past success/failure
Rationale for using economic instruments
Legal basis for economic instruments
Stakeholder involvement
Lead agencies
Key barriers addressed
Details on policy response
Allocation of initial rights
Ongoing monitoring process
Current successes
Remaining gaps/risks
Source: UNEP (2004)
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0. Preview of Trainer’s Guide
Part II: The Trainer’s Guide provides the trainer with all the information necessary to conduct a training 
course on the use of economic instruments to address environmental and natural resource management 
problems. It gives an overview of the format of the course, a discussion of relevant trainer’s tools, an 
introduction to pre-training activities, as well as instructions on the 11 training modules themselves. 
Material designated to the use by trainers only is included in the text below, while the content of the 
modules and the handouts for the course participants are contained in Part III. Overhead projection cells 
are provided on the CD-Rom that accompanies this Manual. 
The following provides the trainers guidance and tools for use in conjunction with the text and outside 
reading.
0.1 Overall Course Design 
The training manual is organized into eleven modules. The modules each cover a discreet aspect of the 
content. The trainer may choose to organize training sessions to correspond to the modules or to expand or 
contract the information in various modules to fit the overall time available or the needs and interests of the 
participants. Trainers may wish to divide individual modules for use in two or more sessions. Alternatively, 
trainers may want to condense two or more modules into a single session.
Three possible training designs are envisioned in the use of the material:
1.	 A	one	day	overview	session;
2.	 A	three	to	five	day	training	course;
3.	 A	traditional	university	course.
The contents of this manual are best suited to the preparation of a three to five day training course with 
appropriate case studies, exercises, and reading materials in addition to the text for each module. The 
format and instructions of the manual were designed accordingly. The envisioned course would provide 
policymakers, particularly non-economists, with a sound introduction to economic instruments. 
However, to present a shorter course, the trainer would rely heavily on lectures centred on the text of the 
modules themselves. A one-day session could include a small amount of discussion during or after each 
session combined with reference to further reading. The trainer would not use the major exercises and case 
study reviews but could provide the case studies and recommended readings in the training packet.
The manual may also be of use for the development of a traditional university course with each module 
and associated exercises, case studies and reading materials serving as the basis of one or more class 
sessions. 
The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
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0.2 Training Format
The following provides a suggested training format for courses developed from this Training Manual. These 
will vary in length and intensity depending upon the audience and time available to present the material.
Pre-Training Assignments
Prepare Environmental Problem Identification Questionnaire
Module 1: Introduction to Course
Suggested Group Exercise Module 1: Describe Environmental Problems (Based on Environmental Problem 
Identification Questionnaire)
Module 2: Framing the Discussion
Suggested Group Exercise Module 2: Shortage of Clean Drinking Water
Module 3: Policy Constraints
Suggested Group Exercise Module 3: Analyse Policy Context of Identified Environmental Problems 
(This is a follow-up to the exercise in Module 1.)
Module 4: Command and Control Instruments
Suggested Training Activity: Discussion in plenary
Module 5: Introduction to Economic Instruments
Suggested Training Activity: Discussion in plenary
Module 6: Price-Based Instruments
Suggested Training Activity: Discussion in plenary
Module 7: Property Rights Based Instruments
Suggested Training Activity: Discussion in plenary
Module 8: Legal, Voluntary, and Information Based Instruments
Suggested Training Activity: Discussion in plenary
Review Exercise on Modules 5 to 8: Case Studies on the Use of Economic Instruments 
Module 9: Economic Instruments for Global Environmental Problems
Suggested Training Activity: Discussion in plenary
Module 10: Policy Design and Implementation
Final group exercise: Finding Policy Solutions to Address Identified Environmental Problems (follow-up to 
the exercises in Modules 1 and 3)
Module 11: Training Evaluation and Follow-up
Evaluation questionnaire and follow-up discussion
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Annexes 
Seven Annexes at the end of the manual provide detailed information useful as assignments for training 
course participants during the course or for the development of a university course. These Annexes are 
meant for use as an integral part of the training course. The Annexes are: 
I.	 A	comprehensive	glossary	of	terms	related	to	economic	instruments	organized	in	alphabetical	order	
for	general	reference	as	a	companion	to	the	Defining	Terms	section	provided	at	the	beginning	of	each	
module,
II.	 A	Primer	on	Economic	Instruments	summarizing	the	uses	and	benefits	of	economic	instruments	and	
available	for	use	in	training	related	to	Module	5,
III.	 A	matrix	 tool	 for	analysing	 the	 impact	of	economic	 instruments	on	firms	and	 individuals	 for	use	 in	
training	related	to	Module	5,	
IV.	 An	 extended	 analysis	 of	 selected	 economic	 instrument	 cases	 for	 potential	 use	 in	 the	 modules	
introducing	different	types	of	economic	instruments,
V.	 A	template	for	assessing	important	factors	affecting	instrument	choice	for	use	in	training	related	to	
Module	10,
VI.	 A	summary	of	common	applications	of	economic	 instruments	by	 resource	area	 for	use	 in	 training	
related	to	Module	10,	and
VII.	 An	extensive	list	of	references	and	additional	sources	of	information.
0.3 Format of the Modules
Each module generally consists of three parts1: 
0.3.1 The Defining Terms Section at the beginning of each module provides the definitions of 
terms used in the module in the order they appear in the text. The trainer may wish to use these in 
the training presentation or distribute them to participants at the beginning of the session as reference. 
(A comprehensive Glossary of all terms related to the training in alphabetical order is available in Annex I 
of this manual.)
0.3.2 The Main Text provides a brief review of the major concepts under consideration in that module. 
Modules 6, 7, 8 and 9 additionally include short summaries of case studies on the use of different economic 
instruments. The text is intended to help the trainer prepare his/her speaking notes for presentations. The 
main module texts may also be distributed to participants as part of the training packet. 
0.3.3 Participants Involvement Tools Group exercises at the end of Modules 1, 2, 3, 10 and the case 
study exercise following Module 8 are designed to reinforce participants’ appreciation of the concepts by 
application to concrete situations. The trainer may wish to use other examples if they were more relevant 
to the participants in a particular training course. Discussion questions are provided at the end of Modules 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11 of the trainer’s guide to help trainers stimulate discussion among participants on the 
topic of the module. Trainers should use the questions to allow participants to share their experiences.
1 Module 1, 10 and 11 follow a different structure.
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0.4 Trainer’s Tools 
Several tools are available to assist the trainer in presenting material, organizing work groups and 
conducting plenary discussions. These tools include: 
0.4.1 Overhead Projection Cells
They are provided on the CD-ROM that accompanies this manual. The trainer should feel free to copy the 
cells on to transparencies, incorporate them into a Power Point presentation, or merely have them copied 
and distributed to participants so that they can follow along.2 
0.4.2 Charts and Graphs
The main texts of the modules in Part III (particularly Module 2) include a variety of charts and graphs for 
use as instructional aids. The trainer could copy and distribute these to the participants and may want to 
incorporate them into overhead projection or PowerPoint presentations. Trainers, however, should avoid 
both their use in a presentation without distributing them to the participants in addition, as well as the use 
of complex matrices or wordy overheads in presentations in general.
0.4.3 Case Study Summaries
The training materials contain more than a score of specific applications of various economic instruments 
in countries around the world. These case studies can be used as examples to illustrate points in general 
presentations or discussions, as the basis of group work sessions, or as background reading material.
0.4.4 Participants Involvement Tools
The training involves a considerable number of group exercises and plenary discussions. To assist trainers 
and participants in getting the most out of these exercises, this Trainer’s Guide includes:
1.	 Instructions	for	trainers	for	the	organization	of	the	group	exercises,	and
2.	 Discussion	questions	for	use	in	plenary.
The instructions for the group exercises for the participants can be found at the end of the respective 
module texts in Part III. 
0.5 Pre-Training Activities Guide
For the training to be most effective, participants need to come to the training course well prepared. 
Recommended pre-training activities include completion of environmental problem identification questions 
and the completion of assigned reading. 
0.5.1 Environmental Problem Identification Questionnaire 
An environmental problem identification questionnaire offers an excellent opportunity for each participant 
to identify environmental problems in their country or community prior to the workshop. If possible, the 
trainer should send the questionnaire to the participants at least two weeks in advance of the course for 
the participants to complete and return. 
2 For a set of guidelines on how to prepare an effective PowerPoint presentation see www.hsph.harvard.edu/it/slides/
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The questionnaire encourages participants to reflect on environmental conditions in their countries before 
the training and allows the trainer to adjust the training course to reflect the pressing environmental 
problems in the participants’ own areas.
The trainers and participants can then use the identified environmental problems as the basis for exercises 
and presentations. If there is more than one representative from one country, participants coming from one 
country (or community) could jointly identify a problem to work on.
The model Environmental Problem Identification Questionnaire provided at the beginning of Part III offers 
an example of such a questionnaire. 
The problem identified should meet some basic criteria in terms of relevance (i.e., the scope and the 
number of actors involved) and urgency (i.e., magnitude and incidence of the effects and the level of public 
pressure on the government or environmental agency to initiate interventions). The participants should do 
problem identification with as much detail as possible to include at least:
1.	 Nature	of	the	problem:	overuse	of	a	resource	or	pollution.
2.	 Potential	effects	on	human	welfare	and	health,	and	the	environment,	giving	the	temporal	dimension.	
The	latter	becomes	important	if	one	is	interested	in	a	pollutant	that	bio-accumulates	in	the	environment	
or	if	a	natural	resource	is	irreversibly	degraded.
3.	 Scope	of	the	problem:	Geographical	reach	of	the	affected	area,	i.e.	is	it	a	local	or	regional	problem?	
Vertical	dimension	of	the	pollutant,	i.e.	are	the	effects	felt	on	the	surface	or	in	the	upper	reaches	of	the	
atmosphere?
4.	 Number	of	people	 involved:	The	damage	a	pollutant	causes	depends	very	much	on	the	number	of	
people	exposed	 to	 the	pollutant.	Similarly,	 the	magnitude	of	 the	welfare	 losses	associated	with	 the	
degradation	of	a	rangeland	depends	on	the	number	of	farmers	involved.
5.	 Number	 of	 stakeholders	 interested	 in	 a	 solution:	 This	 will	 affect	 the	 design	 of	 the	 implementation	
procedure	for	the	selected	policy	instrument.
6.	 Baseline	conditions	relevant	for	the	design	of	policy	responses	and	policy	implementation.
Depending on the immediate objective of the training and the background of the participants, trainers may 
wish to modify the questionnaire to target specific types of problems or economic conditions. To do so, 
the trainer can use the ‘Template for Assessing Important Factors Affecting Instrument Choice’, (Annex V), 
which provides further clarifying questions and contextual information.
In the exercise in Module 1 each participant will be asked to describe the identified problem and present 
it to the other participants.
0.5.2 Pre-Training Reading Assignment 
To ensure a common understanding of economic instruments it will be useful to give the participants a 
reading assignment for the workshop. It is most effective for the trainer to supply the participants with 
short articles or selected pages copied from books rather than to assign entire books or very technical 
journal articles. This is especially important if the course addresses policy makers, who often have little 
time to prepare for a training course. 
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References to suggested reading assignments are provided below. The choice of the reading assignments 
should be appropriate to the region and overall programme of the training course. 
1.	 Dales,	J.	H.	(1993).	“The	property	interface”,	in	A.	Markandya	and	J.	Richardson	(Eds):	Environmental	
economics:	A	reader.	New	York:	St.	Martin’s	Press,	pp	50	–59.
2.	 Hardin,	Garett.	(1993).	“The	tragedy	of	the	commons”,	in	A.	Markandya	and	J.	Richardson.	Environmental	
Economics:	A	reader.	New	York:	St	Martins	Press,	pp	60-70.
3.	 Pearce,	D.	W.	 and	R.	 Turner	 (1990).	 “Renewable	 resources”	 (chapter	 16),	 in	 Economics	 of	 natural	
resources	and	the	environment.	New	York:	Harvester	Wheatsheaf,	pp	241-259.
4.	 Tietenberg,	 T.	 H.	 (1992).	 “Economics	 of	 the	 environment:	 An	 overview”	 (ch.	 2,	 pp	 18-43)	 and	 
“Economics	 of	 pollution	 control:	 An	 overview”	 (ch.	 14,	 pp	 360-391),	 in	 environmental	 and	 
natural	resource	economics (Third	edition).	New	York:	HarperCollins	Publishers.
39The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
P
A
R
T
 I
I
Trainer’s Guide: The Modules
Module 1 Introduction to Course 
The goal of the first module is to provide an overview of the course and introduce the participants and the 
trainers. It will set the stage for all that is to follow. By the end of this module, participants should have a 
good understanding of the purpose and structure of the course, the value of interactive exercises, and the 
expectations of other participants and trainers. The following is a recommended outline of what to cover 
in the first module.
1.1 Introduction of Trainers and Participants
The trainers should introduce themselves and describe their qualifications. Participants should introduce 
themselves in plenary session, giving their organization and position. (This would be a good time for an 
icebreaker exercise to make the trainees feel more comfortable. Information about icebreaker exercises 
can be found at http://www.mwls.co.uk/icebreak.htm.) 
1.2 Discussion of Participant Expectations
Each participant should describe briefly his or her expectations for the course without going into detail 
about any specific environmental problem that they would like to have addressed in their home country. 
The participants should answer the question: What do I want to learn from this training? This will assist 
the trainers in knowing which elements of the training may need special emphasis or how much detail to 
provide on any given topic. 
1.3 Overview of Course
The trainer should provide an overview of the objectives of the course, the course structure and the topics 
to be covered and define the issues and core concepts to be discussed during the training. Before the 
presentation, trainers should also review the goals of each module as provided in the following:
Module 2 – Framing the Discussion reviews the basic concepts and terminology related to the use of 
economic instruments for environmental and natural resource management. By the end of this module, 
participants should have a good understanding of the basic concepts and terms relating to the use of 
economic instruments for environmental and natural resource management.
Module 3 – Policy Context describes how existing conditions in a country affect the use of environmental 
and natural resource management policy instruments. By the end of this topic, participants will be able to 
analyse the policy context in their own country for the successful application of policy instruments.
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Module 4 – Command and Control Instruments analyzes the three primary command and control 
instruments used for environmental and natural resource management. By the end of this module, 
participants will be able to explain how these instruments help solve environmental problems and to explain 
the reasons for the choice of these instruments.
Module 5 – Introduction to Economic Instruments discusses the three broad categories of economic 
instruments, the functional objectives of economic instruments, and describes the benefits of economic 
instruments. By the end of this module, participants will be able to explain advantages of economic 
instruments and possible objectives that they could achieve. 
Module 6 – Price-Based Instruments presents the theory and application of price-based economic 
instruments such as taxes, fees, and subsidies. Participants will be able to describe price-based instruments 
and the context in which to use them.
Module 7 – Property Rights Based Instruments discusses the importance of property rights in 
environmental policy and the use of various property rights-based instruments such as assignment of 
property rights for protection of the environment and the use of tradable permits. Participants will be able 
to explain property rights based instruments and when they can best be used.
Module 8 – Legal, Voluntary, and Information-Based Instruments presents the key features of 
instruments such as fines, liability, performance bonds, voluntary agreements to reduce pollution, and 
eco-labelling. Participants will be able to explain what legal, voluntary and information-based instruments 
are and when they can be used. 
Review Exercise on Modules 5 to 8: Case Studies on the Use of Economic Instruments provides 
the opportunity to recapitulate the material of Modules 5 through 8 by analysing case studies within groups. 
Each group will analyse one case and report the findings to the plenary. 
Module 9 – Economic Instruments for Global Environmental Problems reviews economic 
instruments for the management of environmental and natural resource problems of a global nature. 
At the end of this module, participants will be able to outline in general terms the application of economic 
instruments to environmental problems of global concern. 
Module 10 – Policy Design and Implementation reviews the main phases of choosing an effective 
environmental policy instrument (or set of instruments) to address a target environmental problem and the 
steps needed to implement that instrument. By the end of this module, participants will be able to outline 
the steps needed to design and implement economic instruments. This module includes a comprehensive 
final group exercise (building on the exercises in Modules 1 and 3) that will allow participants to review and 
apply the material they have learned throughout the course.
Module 11 – Evaluation and Follow-up is a final session to evaluate the course and to consider possible 
uses of the newly learned information in the participants’ home countries. 
41The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
P
A
R
T
 I
I
1.4 Introduction to Interactive Exercises
One of the main features of the training will be interactive exercises in which the participants discuss and 
report on actual cases related to the information presented in each module. In Module 1, the trainer should 
introduce the participants to the purpose and general procedures of interactive exercises. 
The purpose of these exercises is to apply theory and abstract concepts to the real world. The interactive 
exercises are designed to help the participants grapple with real issues that policymakers face and 
apply the concepts to the given situation. The exercises require everyone in the course to think seriously 
about the issue at hand and to be able to articulate their thoughts before the group in some depth. 
The course is using two sorts of group exercises:
Self-Identified Environmental Issues 
These exercises will involve discussing environmental problems identified prior to the workshop. Working 
in groups, participants will choose an environmental issue relevant to the concerns of the members. During 
the training, the group will complete a plan to address the issue using a policy instrument.
The topics covered in the course will provide the building blocks to further analyse and refine the problem 
identified in the pre-training assignment, design an appropriate economic instrument to tackle the defined 
problem and finally, design an appropriate implementation and evaluation strategy for the selected 
economic instrument.
Case Study Exercises 
In these exercises participants apply the concepts covered in the module to an actual case study of 
an environmental problem or group of problems. These exercises help ensure that all of the concepts 
presented in the course are discussed in some detail.
The material to be covered and the relevance of the environmental problems to the participants will 
determine the type of exercise used for each module. 
1.5 Trainer’s Tools
The trainer’s tools for this module consist of: 
•	 Instructions	for	trainers	for	the	organization	of	the	first	group	exercise,
•	 Instructions	for	the	participants	for	the	group	exercise	(Part	III,	handout	provided	at	the	end	of	Module	1),	
•	 A	set	of	overhead	transparency	cells	to	help	the	trainer	walk	through	the	overview	for	the	participants	
(provided	on	CD-ROM).
1.6 Module 1 Group Exercise – Instructions for trainers
At the end of Module 1, the trainer could organize a training exercise during which participants describe 
and present an environmental problem identified by the members of the group. This exercise builds on the 
Environmental Problem Identification Questionnaire used as pre-training activity. 
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Participants should take care in identifying the problem because the proposed exercises for Modules 3 
and 10 will use the problem for study of the policy context and the development of proposed an economic 
instrument respectively. 
Organization of Groups 
The trainer should organize participants into working groups of 3-5 people (depending on total number 
of participants) that will work according to the same instructions. Participants from the same country3 or 
community4 should join one group and decide beforehand on one environmental problem that they want 
to present. 
Duration of Exercise 
The trainer should allow 1½ to 2 hours for the exercise, including presentations by each group.
Resources Required 
The participants will need:
1.	 Sufficient	copies	of	instructions	for	group	work,
2.	 Flipchart	paper	or	overhead	transparencies	to	present	results	of	group	discussion,
3.	 Markers	to	write	on	flipchart	or	transparencies,
4.	 Space	where	groups	can	gather	(best	around	a	table).
Group Work 
The groups should use the following procedures:
•	 Each	 participant	 should	 identify	 a	 critical	 environmental	 problem	 in	 his	 or	 her	 own	 country	 (or	
community).	 If	 possible,	 the	 participants	 should	 select	 problems	 for	 discussion	 during	 the	 training	
from	the	Environmental	Problem	Identification	Questionnaires	submitted	prior	to	training.	(See	0.5	Pre-
training	Activities	Guide.),	
•	 Each	participant	(or	team	from	the	same	country/community)	should	then	present	the	analysis	of	the	
environmental	problem	identified	in	their	country	or	community	to	the	other	members	of	the	working	
group	and	the	group	should	briefly	discuss	the	different	cases.	(Each	member	of	the	group	should	be	
able	to	present	his	or	her	case.),
•	 The	group	should	then	select	one	environmental	problem	for	presentation	 in	the	plenary	and	use	 in	
exercises	throughout	the	training.	Since	there	will	likely	be	multiple	problems	available,	the	group	will	
need	to	choose	the	most	useful	example	for	discussion	during	the	training.	Participants	should	select	
problems	with	enough	scope	and	complexity	 to	allow	extensive	discussion	and	alternative	potential	
solutions,	
•	 The	group	should	describe	 the	selected	problem	 in	as	much	detail	as	possible,	 touching	upon	 the	
extent	of	the	problem,	the	constraints	in	addressing	the	problem,	and	previous	attempts	to	address	the	
problem,	
•	 The	group	should	select	a	speaker	and	jointly	prepare	a	presentation,
•	 During	the	group	work	session,	trainers	should	be	available	to	facilitate	the	group	work	and	provide	
further	information	if	available	and	if	necessary.
3 For the case of an international or regional training workshop that is attended by participants from different countries.
4 For the case of a national training workshop that is attended by participants from different sub-regions or communities.
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Presentation and Discussion of Results 
Following the group work session, participants should meet in plenary to present the results of their 
discussion. Trainers should facilitate the plenary session summarizing the most important points of the 
presentations and focusing on aspects most relevant for the further training.
Note: Participants should only identify the problem in this exercise. They should not recommend any 
solutions at this time.
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Trainer’s Guide: The Modules
Module 2 Framing the Discussion
Module 2 provides the information needed for an understanding of the basic concepts and ideas behind 
the use of economic instruments for environmental and natural resource management. The module lays 
the foundation upon which the remainder of the training rests. As a result trainers should take care to be 
sure that participants have a thorough understanding of the concepts before moving on to the succeeding 
modules.
By the end of the module participants should be able to identify the major concepts and issues that affect 
the implementation of economic instrument policies. 
2.1 Format of Module 2
Modules 2 to 9 all consist of three parts: The defining terms, the main text, and either a group exercise or 
a plenary discussion. 
The main text of Module 2 includes a special section that reviews environmental economics with a series 
of charts and descriptions of their meaning. This section is optional and especially suited for a group of 
participants with some interest in a mathematical and graphical approach to economics. 
The group exercise of this module is designed to reinforce participants’ appreciation of the concepts by 
application to a concrete situation relating to water quality. The trainer may wish to use another example if 
it is more relevant to the participants.
2.2 Trainer’s Tools
The trainer’s tools for this module consist of: 
•	 Instructions	for	trainers	for	the	organization	of	the	group	exercise,
•	 Instructions	 for	 the	 participants	 for	 the	 group	 exercise	 (Part	 III,	 handout	 provided	 at	 the	 end	 of	 
Module	2),	
•	 A	set	of	overhead	transparency	cells	to	help	the	trainer	walk	through	the	overview	for	the	participants	
(provided	on	CD-ROM).
The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
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2.3 Module 2 Group Exercise – Instructions for trainers
At the end of Module 2, a training activity is suggested during which participants apply the concepts 
learned in the session to the problem of a shortage of clean drinking water.
Issue 
A lack of clean drinking water is a common problem in many developing countries. This problem can 
be analysed by using the concepts covered in Module 2 (For purposes of this exercise assume that the 
country could have sufficient clean drinking water for the entire population. In other words, severe drought 
or overpopulation is not a major cause of the lack of clean water.)
Organization of Groups 
The trainer should organize participants into working groups of 3-5 people (depending on total number of 
participants).
Duration of Exercise 
The trainer should allow 1½ to 2 hours for the exercise, including presentations by each group.
Resources Required The participants will need:
1.	 Sufficient	copies	of	the	instructions	for	group	work	(in	Part	III),
2.	 Flipchart	paper	or	overhead	transparencies	to	present	results	of	group	discussion,
3.	 Markers	to	write	on	flipchart	or	transparencies,
4.	 Space	where	groups	can	gather	(best	around	a	table).
Group Work 
The trainer should ask the group to work on the issues of drinking water following the questions suggested 
in the instructions for participants (see Module 2 in Part III). The group should then select a speaker and 
jointly prepare a presentation. 
Presentation and Discussion of Results 
Following the group work session, participants should meet in plenary to present the results of their 
discussion. Trainers should facilitate the plenary session summarizing the most important points of the 
presentations and focusing on aspects most relevant for the further training.
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Trainer’s Guide: The Modules
Module 3 The Policy Context
Policymakers can only deploy economic instruments in the context of existing political, institutional, 
economic, and societal conditions. Module 3, therefore, describes various conditions in a country that 
can affect the performance of economic instruments. By the end of this module, participants should 
be able to analyse the policy context in a country for the successful application of policy instruments. 
The information in this module is not complex. Few ideas will be unfamiliar to the participants. Nevertheless, 
trainers should make clear that they are fundamental to the discussion. No use of economic instruments 
can succeed without careful consideration of the overall policy context. 
3.1 Format of Module 3
After the defining terms section, Module 3 provides a brief review of the major concepts that the 
participants will need to understand about the policy context in which economic instruments are used. 
The group exercise at the end of the module is designed to reinforce participants’ appreciation of 
the concepts by application to a concrete situation relating to the cases identified by the participants 
in Module 1. 
3.2 Trainer’s Tools
The trainer’s tools for this module consist of: 
•	 Instructions	for	trainers	for	the	organization	of	the	group	exercise,
•	 Instructions	for	the	participants	for	the	group	exercise	(Part	III,	handout	provided	at	the	end	of	Module	3),	
•	 A	set	of	overhead	transparency	cells	to	help	the	trainer	walk	through	the	overview	for	the	participants	
(provided	on	CD-ROM).
3.3 Module 3 Group Exercise – Instructions for trainers
At the end of Module 3, a training activity is suggested during which participants apply the concepts 
learned in the session on policy context to the problem identified in Module 1. 
Organization of Groups 
For continuity of the discussion, the participants should work in the same groups as in the exercise in 
Module 1. 
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Duration of Exercise 
The trainer should allow 1½ to 2 hours for the exercise, including presentations by each group.
Resources Required 
The participants will need:
1.	 Sufficient	copies	of	the	instructions	for	group	work	(in	Part	III),
2.	 Flipchart	paper	or	overhead	transparencies	to	present	results	of	group	discussion,
3.	 Markers	to	write	on	flipchart	or	transparencies,
4.	 Space	where	groups	can	gather	(best	around	a	table).
Group Work 
The group should go back to the environmental problem that was selected and presented in Module 1. 
Working in the same groups they should now discuss the policy context that affects the problem in light of 
the presentation on Module 3. The group should select a speaker and jointly prepare a presentation.
Presentation and Discussion of Results
Following the group work session, participants should be asked to meet in plenary to present the results 
of their discussion. Trainers should facilitate the plenary session summarizing the most important points of 
the presentations and focusing on aspects most relevant for the further training.
Note: In this exercise participants should only describe the various elements of the policy context that 
affect the problem identified in Module 1. They should not recommend any solutions at this time.
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Trainer’s Guide: The Modules
Module 4  Command and Control Instruments
Even though the overall training course focuses on the use of economic instruments, Module 4 covers the 
nature and uses of various command and control, because:
1.	 It	 is	 easier	 to	 see	 the	 benefits	 of	 economic	 instruments	 in	 the	 context	 of	 all	 available	 policy	
instruments;
2.	 Command	and	control	instruments	may	be	effectively	used	in	conjunction	with	economic	instruments;	
and,
3.	 Command	and	control	instruments	are	preferable	to	economic	instruments	under	certain	conditions.
By the end of this module, participants will be able to explain how and when to use command and 
control instruments to solve environmental problems and explain the reasons for the choice of instruments 
compared to the use of economic instruments.
4.1 Format of Module 4
Following the defining terms section, the main text of Module 4 provides a brief review of the major concepts 
related to command control instruments and a description of three types of main command and control 
instruments for environmental and natural resource management.
At the end of the module, a plenary discussion will give participants the opportunity to discuss issues 
raised during the presentation and to share their own experiences. 
4.2 Trainer’s Tools 
The trainer’s tools for this module consist of: 
•	 A	series	of	discussion	questions	for	use	in	plenary	(provided	in	section	4.3	below),	
•	 A	set	of	overhead	projection	cells	to	assist	the	trainer	in	presenting	the	material	(provided	on	CD-ROM).
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4.3 Plenary Discussion Questions
For this module, trainers can conduct a plenary discussion with participants discussing their experiences 
with command and control instruments in their own countries. Here are some questions the trainer could 
ask to stimulate discussion:
1. What	environmental	problems	is	your	country	addressing	with	command	and	control	instruments?
2.	 Which	command	and	control	instruments	are	currently	being	used?
3.	 What	are	the	reasons	these	instruments	were	chosen?
4.	 Are	existing	command	and	control	policies	effective?
5.	 Are	there	environmental	problems	not	being	effectively	addressed	in	your	country	for	which	command	
and	control	instruments	might	be	effective	and	why	do	you	believe	they	would	work?
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Trainer’s Guide: The Modules
Module 5 Introduction to Economic 
Instruments
The next four modules will present the various economic instruments available to solve environmental 
problems. By the end of Modules 5-8, participants should be able to identify economic instruments suitable 
for addressing different environmental problems and to provide the defensible reasons for their choice. 
Before discussing the various types of economic instruments in detail, the general benefits and uses of 
economic instruments will be discussed in Module 5. By the end of this module, participants should be 
able to explain the general benefits of economic instruments. 
5.1 Format of Module 5
Following the defining terms section, the main text of Module 5 introduces participants to the three 
broad categories of economic instruments, reviews the functional objectives of economic instruments, 
and describes their benefits. At the end of the module, a plenary discussion will give participants the 
opportunity to discuss issues raised during the presentation and to share their own experiences. The 
module does not include a group exercise since there will be a group exercise after Module 8 covering 
aspects of Modules 5-8.
5.2 Trainer’s Tools 
The trainer’s tools for this module consist of: 
•	 A	series	of	discussion	questions	for	use	in	plenary	(provided	in	section	5.3	below),	
•	 A	Primer	of	Economic	Instruments	(Annex	II)	presents	commonly	used	economic	instruments	grouped	
by	 the	 functional	 objectives	 they	 aim	 to	 achieve.	 It	 also	 introduces	 material	 that	 can	 quickly	 help	
policymakers	narrow	the	range	of	instruments	once	they	have	defined	their	problem,
•	 A	Detailed	Analysis	Matrix	provided	in	Annex	III	shows	the	link	between	policy	objectives	and	market	
incentives	and	identifies	important	factors	for	policymakers	to	consider	when	applying	particular	kinds	
of	instruments,
•	 A	 set	 of	 overhead	 projection	 cells	 to	 assist	 the	 trainer	 in	 presenting	 the	 material	 (provided	 on	 
CD-ROM).
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The Primer and the Detailed Analysis Matrix (Impact of Economic Instruments on Incentives of Firms and 
Individuals) could be useful background reading for trainers in support of their efforts to guide participants 
in finding solutions to their environmental and natural resources management problems. It could also be 
distributed to the participants as a handout.
5.3 Plenary Discussion Questions
For this module, the trainer can lead a plenary discussion with participants to discuss their general 
experiences with economic instruments in their own countries. Here are some questions that the trainer 
could use to stimulate discussion:
1.	 What	functions	could	economic	instruments	have	in	your	country?
2.	 Are	there	problems	with	the	definition	of	property	rights	in	your	country?
3.	 Which	environmental	problems	are	affected	by	property	rights,	if	any?
4.	 How	 can	 economic	 instruments	 promote	 the	 efficient	 allocation	 of	 natural	 resources?	 
Are	there	examples	in	your	country	where	these	might	apply?
5.	 What	 are	 the	 advantages	 of	 economic	 instruments	 over	 command	 and	 control	 instruments?	 
Use	examples	from	your	experience.
6.	 How	can	the	use	of	economic	instruments	promote	transparency?
7.	 Can	 you	 think	 of	 instances	 in	 your	 country	 where	 the	 use	 of	 economic	 instruments	 would	 be	
inappropriate?
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Trainer’s Guide: The Modules
Module 6 Price-Based Instruments
Module 6 presents the key features of price-based economic instruments. Apart from the second half of 
Module 2, this module is perhaps the most challenging of all those in this course and, as such, needs the 
most careful preparation. 
The first section addresses the economic theory that underlies the use of price-based instruments. Sections 
on various charges, taxes, fees and subsidies follow. By the end of this module, participants should be 
able to explain the general characteristics of price-based instruments. 
6.1 Format of Module 6
Following the defining terms section, Module 6 provides a brief review of the major concepts related to 
price-based economic instruments and a description of a variety of those instruments. Nine examples 
from different countries are included to illustrate the application of price-based instruments and facilitate 
a discussion. 
The plenary discussion at the end of the module will give participants the opportunity to discuss issues 
raised during the presentation and to share their own experiences. The module does not include a group 
exercise since there will be a group exercise after Module 8 covering aspects of Modules 5-8. 
6.2 Trainer’s Tools 
The trainer’s tools for this module consist of:  
•	 A	set	of	questions	suitable	for	plenary	discussion	(provided	in	section	6.3	below),
•	 Case	 summaries	 (given	 in	 Part	 III	 at	 the	 end	 of	Module	 6)	 showing	 the	 application	 of	 price-based	
instruments	in	a	variety	of	actual	settings	around	the	world.	(NOTE:	Several	of	the	cases	provided	are	
also	included	in	the	examples	for	the	suggested	Review	Exercise	on	Modules	5	to	8	following	Module	
8	in	Part	III.	These	case	studies	are:	Grassland	Pricing	Reform	in	Philippines,	Bulb	Markets	in	Turkey,	
Reforestation	in	Brazil,	and	Perverse	Incentives	for	Pollution	in	China,	and	Soil	Conservation	Efforts	in	
the	Dominican	Republic).	The	trainer	may	choose	to	use	these	case	studies	at	the	end	of	this	module	
or	save	them	for	the	later	exercise,
•	 A	set	of	overhead	projection	cells	to	assist	the	trainer	in	presenting	the	material	(provided	on	CD-ROM).
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6.3 Plenary Discussion Questions
For this module, the trainer can lead a plenary discussion with participants to solicit an exchange of views 
on the potential uses of price-based instruments in participants’ countries. The trainer may wish to use the 
case examples at the end of the module as a starting point for discussion. Here are some questions that 
the trainer could use to stimulate discussion:
1.	 What	is	a	Pigovian	Tax?	
2.	 What	can	we	learn	from	the	Pigovian	Tax	for	the	use	of	price-based	instruments?
3.	 Name	and	describe	an	input	or	output	tax	in	your	country,	if	any?
4.	 Does	your	government	use	tax	expenditures	as	part	of	environmental	policy?	If	not,	are	there	instances	
where	they	might	be	useful?
5.	 When	is	the	use	of	subsidies	appropriate?
6.	 Does	your	country	have	policies	that	act	as	perverse	incentives?
7.	 Does	your	government	promote	the	use	of	deposit	refunds?	If	not,	where	could	they	be	applied?
8.	 Do	you	have	other	experiences	with	price-based	instruments	in	your	countries?
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Trainer’s Guide: The Modules
Module 7 Property Rights Based 
Instruments
This module presents the key features of property rights based instruments including ways of establishing, 
clarifying, and enforcing property. By the end of the training, participants should be able to explain the 
concepts related to property rights based instruments and how the instruments can best be used.
7.1 Format of Module 7
Following the defining terms section, the main text of Module 7, which provides a brief review of the 
major concepts related to property rights based economic instruments and a description of a variety 
of those instruments. The text also discusses common property rights issues and the use of tradable 
emission permits as a form of property. Seven examples from different countries are included to illustrate 
the application of property rights based instruments and facilitate a discussion. 
The plenary discussion at the end of the module will give participants the opportunity to discuss issues 
raised during the presentation and to share their own experiences. The module does not include a group 
exercise since there will be a group exercise after Module 8 covering aspects of Modules 5-8.
7.2 Trainer’s Tools
The trainer’s tools for this module consist of:
•	 A	set	of	questions	suitable	for	plenary	session	discussion	(provided	in	section	7.3	below),
•	 Case	summaries	(given	in	Part	III	at	the	end	of	Module	7)	showing	the	application	of	property	rights	
based	instruments	in	a	variety	of	actual	settings	around	the	world.	Two	of	the	examples	provided	below	
are	also	included	in	the	examples	for	the	suggested	Review	Exercise	on	Modules	5	to	8	(The	examples	
are	 “Nutrient	Trading	among	Sewage	Plants:	The	State	of	New	South	Wales”	and	“Tenure	Reform:	
Mankote	Mangrove,	St.	Lucia”).	The	trainer	may	choose	to	use	these	case	studies	at	the	end	of	this	
module	or	save	them	for	the	later	exercise,	
•	 A	 set	 of	 overhead	 projection	 cells	 to	 assist	 the	 trainer	 in	 presenting	 the	 material	 (provided	 on	 
CD-ROM).
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7.3 Plenary Discussion Questions
For this module, the trainer can lead a plenary discussion with participants to solicit an exchange of views 
on the potential uses of property rights based instruments in participants’ countries. The trainer may wish 
to use the case examples at the end of the module as a starting point for discussion. Here are some 
questions that the trainer could use to stimulate discussion:
1.	 Are	 there	 environmental	 issues	 in	 your	 country	 that	 could	 be	 improved	 by	 clarifying	 and	 enforcing	
property	rights?	
2.	 Do	you	have	communal	property	rights	issues	in	your	country?	Do	these	involve	ownership	or	tenure?
3.	 How	could	communal	property	rights	instruments	improve	environmental	conditions?
4.	 How	could	the	various	kinds	of	tradable	permits	apply	to	your	country?	
5.	 What	might	be	potential	problems	in	using	property	right	based	instruments?
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Trainer’s Guide: The Modules
Module 8 Legal, Voluntary and 
Information-Based Instruments
The purpose of Module 8 is to present the key features of legal, voluntary and information-based 
instruments for environmental and natural resource management. By the end of this module, participants 
should be able to explain the characteristics and uses of this class of instruments. 
8.1 Format of Module 8
Following the defining terms section, the main text of Module 8 introduces participants to legal, voluntary 
and information-based instruments, reviews the functional objectives of these instruments, and describes 
their strengths and weaknesses. Four brief examples from different countries are included to illustrate the 
application of these instruments and facilitate a discussion. 
The Plenary Discussion at the end of the module will give participants the opportunity to discuss issues 
raised during the presentation and to share their own experiences. The module does not include a group 
exercise since there will be a group exercise after Module 8 covering aspects of Modules 5-8. 
8.2 Trainer’s Tools 
The trainer’s tools for this module consist of:
•	 A	set	of	questions	suitable	for	plenary	session	discussion	(provided	in	section	8.3	below),	
•	 Three	brief	examples	of	application	of	 information-based	 instruments	 (given	 in	Part	 III	at	 the	end	of	
Module	8),
•	 A	 set	 of	 overhead	 projection	 cells	 to	 assist	 the	 trainer	 in	 presenting	 the	 material	 (provided	 on	 
CD-ROM).
8.3 Plenary Discussion Questions
For this module, the trainer can lead a plenary discussion with participants to solicit an exchange of views 
on the potential uses of legal, voluntary and information-based instruments in participants’ countries. The 
trainer may wish to use the case examples at the end of the module as a starting point for discussion. Here 
are some questions that the trainer could use to stimulate discussion:
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1.	 How	can	legal	instruments	be	used	as	economic	instruments?
2.	 Is	liability	used	as	an	economic	instrument	in	your	country?	If	so,	how?
3.	 Do	you	use	performance	bonds?	Are	they	effective?
4.	 What	are	the	benefits	of	voluntary	instruments?
5.	 Do	you	use	voluntary	instruments	in	your	country?
6.	 How	could	disclosure	of	information	improve	environmental	conditions	in	your	country?
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5 This exercise is based on the case studies, which have been compiled for UNEP (2004): The Use of Economic Instruments in Environmental Policy: 
Opportunities and Challenges. 
Trainer’s Guide: The Modules
Review Exercise on Modules 5 to 8
Case Studies on the Use of Economic 
Instruments5 (Instructions for Trainers)
Background 
The Manual includes a set of freestanding case studies covering the full range of economic instruments. 
The trainers may wish to devote an entire session to a group exercise based on these case studies. In 
the context of this training resource manual, they are used as samples for study purposes only and do 
not want to provide any statement on the policies of the countries involved. Trainers are encouraged to 
compile similar case studies, which are adjusted to the specific context of the training course (from a 
specific region, addressing priority problems, involving certain target groups, etc.).
Aim
The aim of the exercise is to enable participants to: 
1.	 Understand	in	which	context	economic	instruments	have	already	been	used;
2.	 Better	understand	 the	process	of	 introducing	 them	as	well	as	 the	possible	benefits	and	 limitations;	
and
3.	 Gain	some	perception	of	what	using	economic	instruments	in	the	participants’	countries	might	involve.
Group Size
Depending on the total number of participants, form groups of 3 to 6 persons, with each group working 
on a different case study. In total, four case studies are available. Choose the ones considered most 
appropriate for the participants of the workshop.
Duration 
Take two to three hours for the exercise, including presentations by participants.
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Preparation
The trainers need time to familiarize themselves with the case studies prior to the training. Trainers might 
identify further relevant information, which could be used to assist the working groups. The following 
material is available in Part III, Review Exercise on Modules 5 to 8 (following Module 8) to be distributed 
to participants: 
•	 Questions	for	group	discussion
•	 Four	case	study	summaries
Resources Required 
1.	 Sufficient	copies	of	the	case	study	summaries	and	questions	for	discussion	(provided	in	Part	III),
2.	 Paper	or	overhead	transparencies	to	present	results	of	group	discussion,
3.	 Markers	to	write	on	flipchart	or	transparencies,	and
4.	 Space	where	groups	can	gather	(best	around	a	table).
Procedures for the Group Work
As an introduction to the exercise, trainers explain objectives and give instructions for group work (Each 
group works on one case study according to the questions provided and prepares a presentation to report 
their results back to the plenary). Trainers divide the participants into groups and distribute the relevant 
case study and questions for group work.
Upon completion of their analysis, groups should meet in plenary to briefly present the results of their 
discussion. Trainers facilitate the discussion summarizing the most important points of the presentations 
and focusing on the lessons learned for the participants’ own country cases. Participants should provide:
1.	 A	brief	description	of	the	country	situation	
2.	 The	main	objective	of	the	economic	instrument	applied
3.	 The	main	factors	for	success	or	failure
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Trainer’s Guide: The Modules
Module 9 Economic Instruments for Global 
Environmental Problems
Module 9 presents information on the use of economic instruments for the management of environmental 
problems of global concern. At the end of this module, participants should be able to describe the 
application of economic instruments to cross-border environmental and natural resource management 
problems.
9.1 Format of Module 9
Like the preceding modules, Module 9 starts with a defining terms section. The Main Text then provides 
a brief review of the major concepts related to economic instruments that nations acting together could 
use to address cross-border environmental concerns such as protecting biodiversity, and controlling 
greenhouse gases. Two brief examples from different countries are included to illustrate the application of 
global economic instruments and facilitate a discussion.
The Plenary Discussion at the end of the module will give participants the opportunity to discuss issues 
raised during the presentation and to share their own experiences.
9.2 Trainer’s Tools 
The trainer’s tools for this module consist of: 
•	 Summaries	 of	 cases	 showing	 the	 application	 of	 cross-border	 economic	 instruments	 in	 actual	 
settings	for	use	in	plenary	discussion	(in	Part	III	at	the	end	of	Module	9),
•	 A	set	of	questions	for	use	in	plenary	discussion	(provided	in	section	9.3	below),
•	 A	 set	 of	 overhead	 projection	 cells	 to	 assist	 the	 trainer	 in	 presenting	 the	 material	 (provided	 on	 
CD-ROM).
9.3 Plenary Discussion Questions
For this module a discussion in plenary can be conducted with participants discussing their view of the 
potential for the use of economic instruments to address global environmental problems and potential 
effects on their countries. 
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The trainer may wish to use the case examples at the end of the module as a starting point for discussion. 
Here are some questions that the trainer could use to stimulate discussion:
1.	 Are	there	any	experiences	in	your	countries	with	direct	financial	transfers	(GEF	projects,	debt-for	nature	
swaps	etc)?	Are	there	any	lessons	learned?
2.	 What	do	you	think	about	international	taxation	for	environmental	protection	(any	opinions)?
3.	 Are	 there	 any	 experiences	 in	 your	 countries	 with	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Kyoto	 protocol	 
mechanisms	(emission	trading,	joint	implementation	or	CDM-mechanism)?
4.	 Do	you	believe	that	transferable	development	rights	could	be	used	in	your	country?
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Trainer’s Guide: The Modules
Module 10 Policy Design and 
Implementation
The purpose of this module is to describe the four main phases of choosing an effective environmental 
instrument to address a target environmental problem. By the end of this module, participants should be 
able to outline the most important steps for designing and implementing an economic instrument. 
10.1 Format of Module 10
Unlike the previous modules, Module 10 does not have a defining terms section since no new terms are 
introduced. The main text details the steps policymakers need to take in choosing and implementing an 
effective environmental instrument that will address the target environmental problems given the existing 
institutional capabilities and environmental policies in the country. 
The final group exercise in which participants will work in small groups serves to develop a strategy to 
address the environmental problems identified in Module 1 and discussed in Module 3. This exercise will 
give participants an opportunity to reflect on all the aspects that have been introduced in the training, 
from functions of economic instruments, over different possible instruments to the necessary steps for 
implementation. 
10.2 Trainer’s Tools 
The trainer’s tools for this module consist of: 
•	 Instructions	for	trainers	for	the	organization	of	the	final	group	exercise,
•	 Instructions	 for	 the	 participants	 for	 the	 group	 exercise	 (Part	 III,	 handout	 provided	 at	 the	 end	 of	 
Module	10),
•	 A	template	assessing	important	factors	affecting	instrument	choice	(Annex	V),
•	 A	summary	of	common	applications	of	economic	instruments	by	resource	area	(Annex	VI),	and
•	 A	set	of	overhead	transparency	cells	to	help	the	trainer	walk	through	the	overview	for	the	participants	
(on	CD-ROM).
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10.3 Module 10 Final Group Exercise – Instructions for trainers
Based on the information provided in all the previous modules, participants should try to find appropriate 
economic policy instruments to address the environmental problem the group has worked on in 
Modules 1 and 3. They should use the steps outlined in the main presentation as a guide to preparing a 
presentation.
Organization of Groups 
For continuity of the discussion, the participants should work in the same groups as in the exercise in 
Module 1 and 3.
Duration of Exercise
The trainer should allow 2 to 2½ hours for the exercise, including presentations by each group. 
Resources Required 
The participants need:
1.	 Sufficient	copies	of	the	instructions	for	group	work	(in	Part	III)
2.	 Flipchart	paper	or	overhead	transparencies	to	present	results	of	group	discussion
3.	 Markers	to	write	on	flipchart	or	transparencies
4.	 Space	where	groups	can	gather	(best	around	a	table)
Presentation and Discussion of Results 
Following the group working sessions, participants should present the results of their discussion in plenary. 
Trainers should facilitate the plenary session summarizing the most important points of the presentations 
and discussion and focusing on the most important lessons learned.
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Trainer’s Guide: The Modules
Module 11 Evaluation and Follow-up
Module 11 will help participants and trainers review the economic instruments course as a whole and 
encourage participants to consider what they can do with the information they have gained. Module 11 will 
also provide trainers and course developers with useful information for future improvements in the training 
course itself.
Each participant should complete an evaluation and follow-up questionnaire at the beginning of the Module 
11 session (see suggestions below) so that participants give their full attention to the task before beginning 
final discussions.
11.1 Format of Module 11
“Evaluation and Follow-up” consists of two parts:
The evaluation section provides advice for trainers on conducting evaluation including a sample evaluation 
form. 
The follow-up section offers advice on leading discussion concerning what the participants plan to do 
when they return home.
11.2 Evaluation
An evaluation session can be valuable for both participants and trainers. For participants the session 
allows time to reflect on what they have learned and what else they would like to learn on specific topics. 
The trainers receive information needed to modify and improve the delivery, content and structure of the 
course. The overall evaluation of the training should be undertaken at the following levels: 
1.	 Content
2.	 Presentation	by	Trainers
3.	 Format	(e.g.	classroom	versus	roundtable,	lecture	vs.	discussion)
4.	 Activities	(e.g.	discussions,	group	presentations,	assignments)
5.	 Physical	Conditions	and	Amenities
6.	 Overall	Utility	of	the	Course	
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The evaluation process should be formal and structured. Too often evaluation amounts to little more than 
checking boxes on a perfunctory form as participants are leaving to go home offering little of substantive 
use to either the trainers or participants.
To structure the process, a carefully designed training course questionnaire should be developed and 
used to gather information for the evaluation. A general example of an evaluation questionnaire is provided 
in Module 11 in Part III. However, this form should be considered a starting point. It is highly recommended 
that the evaluation be customized to suit the particular circumstances of each training course. It is especially 
important to leave room for participants to make specific comments about each session and topic as well 
as the course in general.
If possible and appropriate in the specific context, the trainer could have the results tabulated by the 
participants or an assistant during a break. The summarized results can then be copied or displayed on an 
overhead projection screen to facilitate discussion with the group. 
During the discussion, the trainer could probe for opinions about any category where the scores are 
especially low or high in the overall ratings. For other categories, individuals who have strong feelings 
should be asked to comment. General discussion should be encouraged throughout. 
11.3 Follow-up
The follow-up session brings into focus the participants’ ideas about possible uses of economic instruments 
in their own country. As with the evaluation, the follow-up session should be formal and structured. At the 
end of training session participants should be asked what they could do with what they learned in the 
training and with the material that was provided. 
To facilitate this discussion, the trainer could distribute a form with a few questions to the participants for 
completion at the beginning of the Module 11 session. The questionnaire on possible follow-up activities 
needs to be well prepared but not extensive. 
The participants should take ten to fifteen minutes to reflect on one thing that they would like to do, once 
they come back. This will help participants individually to think about how they could use what they have 
learned rather than leaving the process to a few outspoken members of the group. Following a short phase 
of reflecting individually, the trainer should then ask participants to share their ideas.
11.4 Trainer’s Tools 
The trainer’s tools for this module consist of: 
1.	 A	sample	evaluation	questionnaire	to	be	adapted	to	the	specific	circumstances	of	the	training	(given	in	
Module	11,	Part	III),
2.	 A	set	of	questions	addressing	possible	follow-up	activities	(provided	in	section	11.5	below).
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11.5 Possible Questions on Follow-up Activities
The following set of questions could assist the participants to brainstorm on possible follow-up activities:
1.	 What	could	you	do	immediately	upon	your	return	to	your	country?
2.	 What	activities	could	you	initiate	in	the	near	future?	
3.	 What	resources	would	you	need?	
4.	 What	technical	assistance	would	you	need	and	how	could	you	provide	it?
5.	 What	 single	 problem	 in	 your	 country	 do	 you	 consider	 most	 appropriate	 for	 the	 use	 of	 economic	
instruments?
6.	 What	economic	instruments	seem	most	effective	in	dealing	with	the	problem?	
7.	 What	economic	instruments	may	be	inappropriate	and	why?
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0. Pre-Training Activities
Before the participants arrive at the training session, they are asked to complete and return an environmental 
problem identification questionnaire.
Environmental Problem Identification Questionnaire
1. Name of participant(s):
2. Country:
3. What is a pressing environmental problem in your country?
4. Is the problem identified a resource overuse or a pollution problem?
5. What is the scope of the problem? (i.e. is it a local or regional problem?)
6. What are the potential effect(s) of the problem? 
7. What are the causes of the problem (economic, institutional, social, natural, etc)?
8. How long has the problem been present?
9. Who are the stakeholders involved in the problem?
10. How many people approximately are affected or have been affected by the problem?
11.  Which socio-economic groups in particular are affected by the problem?
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12.  Does your country’s environmental policy explicitly provide for the use of economic
instruments in solving environmental or natural resource management problems?
YES NO
 If your answer to question 12 is YES, which principles does the policy recommend to be followed in the 
application of economic instruments (polluter pays, etc.)?
13.  What are the past interventions taken to solve the problem?
14.  Have the previous interventions had any positive impact on the problem? 
YES NO
Please give some details. (If your answer is YES, please give the reasons why you think the interventions 
succeeded. Likewise, if your answer is NO, please give the reasons as to why you think the interventions 
failed.)
15.  Have you already thought about using an economic instrument to address the problem?
YES NO
 If your answer is YES please recommend the economic instrument you think can be used to solve the 
identified problem. Likewise, if your answer to question 15 is NO, please state why you think economic 
instruments cannot be used to solve the problem.
16.  What could be the initial step(s) in designing and/or improving a future intervention? Who will be 
involved?
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Introduction to the course
G O A L
L E A R N I N G  O B j E C T I V E
Module 1
To provide an overview of the course and introduce participants 
and trainer(s). 
By the end of this module, participants should have a good 
understanding of the purpose of the course, including interactive 
exercises, the agenda, and the expectations of other participants 
and trainers. 
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Module 1  Group Exercise
  
Describe Environmental  
Problems (Handout)
Objective
Describe the environmental problem in as much detail as possible, touching upon the extent of 
the problem, the constraints in addressing the problem, and previous attempts to address the 
problem. 
If you have completed the Environmental Problem Identification Questionnaire prior to the course, 
use this as a basis for discussion.
Remember
In this exercise, you should only select and define the problem. Do not recommend any solutions 
at this time. 
Instructions
1.  First, work on your own case individually or in country or community teams (if there are more 
than one representative from a country or community).
 
2.  Then, present the analysis of the environmental problem identified in your country or community 
to the other members of the working group and discuss the different cases (each member of 
the group should be able to present his/her case).
3.  Select one case in your group to be presented in the plenary.
4.  Jointly prepare a presentation and select a speaker.
5.  Present the selected case in the plenary. 
!
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Framing the Discussion1
1 This Module is based on:
Markandya, A and J Richardson (eds.) (1993). Environmental economics: A reader. New York, St. Martin’s Press,
Pearce, DW and R Turner (1990). Economics of natural resources and the environment. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, and
Tietenberg, T H (1992). Environmental and natural resource economics (Third Edition). New York: HarperCollins Publishers.
Module 2
G O A L
L E A R N I N G  O B j E C T I V E
To provide an understanding of the basic concepts related to 
economic instruments for environmental and natural resource 
management. 
By the end of this module, participants should have a good 
understanding of the basic concepts and ideas behind the use 
of economic instruments for environmental and natural resource 
management. 
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2.1 Defining Terms
Any discussion of environmental and natural resource management requires an understanding of the 
specialized terms used. Some of these may be new while others are common terms with a special 
meaning in this context. 
For ease of understanding, many terms are defined at the relevant place in the text itself. Definition of a 
few basic terms, however, should help begin the discussion. The terms are provided in the order in which 
they appear in the text.
Pollution: Undesirable by-products of human activity. These may be poisonous in themselves (e.g. heavy 
metals) or harmful because of their quantity involved (e.g. raw sewage).
Renewable Resources: Natural resources of economic value (e.g. fresh water, oxygen, forests, wildlife, 
fisheries). Unlike mineral resources, which are mined, the available stock of renewable resources is 
not fixed but can be increased or decreased. It will increase if allowed to regenerate and decrease if 
overexploited.
Absorptive Capacity: The ability of the environment to absorb pollutants. If the emissions load exceeds 
the absorptive capacity, the pollutant poisons the environment.
Public Good: “Good” in this sense means “product or service” rather than “virtue or benefit.” A public 
good is a product or service that is available to the general public - payers and non-payers alike. In 
other words, use of the good by one person does not prevent use by others. Examples include national 
defence, a clean environment, and public fireworks displays. Private businesses cannot sell public goods 
in markets, because they cannot charge a price and keep non-paying people away.
Externality: The consequence of any economic activity that results in costs outside of the activity. The 
intended outcome of burning coal may be to generate electricity. The externality is the resulting air pollution 
that imposes costs on the general public. The negative effects of many economic externalities are often 
borne by the general public and the problems caused can only be addressed by sound public policy.
Economic Instruments: Economic instruments provide market and financial incentives for polluters 
and natural resource users to change their behaviour. The economic instruments incentives include 
such mechanisms as taxes, emission or access charges, marketable permits, and changes to property 
rights.
Polluter Pays Principle (PPP): The principle that costs and responsibilities associated with pollution 
should be borne by polluter as much as possible. This is accomplished through a variety of penalties and 
inducements. (See also Beneficiary Pays Principle in Module 9.)
Command and Control Instruments: The laws and regulation used by governments to directly 
control pollution and manage natural resources. In the application of these instruments, the government 
can stipulate the technologies to be used to curb pollution, determine the maximum amount of 
emissions that can be released into the environment, and regulate the use of natural resources. 
The instruments are enforced directly by the government rather than depending upon the market. 
Flow Resources: Renewable resources like grasslands, forest, water that, if not overused, will naturally 
renew themselves.
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2 This section is based on Tietenberg (1992), pp 361-362.
Fund Pollutants: Wastes for which the environment has some absorptive capacity. Many organic 
pollutants injected into streams or rivers will be transformed by the resident bacteria into less harmful 
organic matter. As long as the emissions rate does not exceed the absorptive capacity of the environment, 
these pollutants do not accumulate to create environmental problems.
Stock Pollutants: Undesirable wastes for which the environment has little or no absorptive capacity. 
Examples of stock pollutants include non-biodegradable bottles tossed by the roadside; lead and other 
heavy metals, which accumulate in the soils near the emissions source; and persistent synthetic chemicals 
such as dioxin. Stock pollutants accumulate over time as the pollutants enter the environment.
Load: The amount of waste products in the environment at any given time. The damage done by the load 
depends on the capacity of the environment to assimilate the waste products. 
Zone of Influence: The geographic area affected by any given environmental or natural resources 
management problem. Policies addressing the damage caused by local pollutants near the source 
of emissions will differ from those for regional pollutants affecting wider areas. The local and regional 
categories are not mutually exclusive; it is possible for a pollutant to be both. Nitrogen oxides released into 
the air, for example, or chemical discharges into rivers can be both local and regional pollutants. 
Surface Pollutants: Substances, which pollute the water, land or air near the earth’s surface.
Global Pollutants: Substances that pollute the upper atmosphere, such as Fluorocarbons affecting the 
ozone layer.
2.2 The Economy and the Environment2
The quality of the natural environment and economic well-being are so closely interwoven as to be invisible 
until a crisis arises. 
Economic activity is a necessary condition for human survival. Yet, all economic activity results in the 
release of pollutants into the environment and economic activity involves the direct exploitation of natural 
resources. Increase economic activity raises living standards but results in increased emissions of 
pollutants and use of natural resources. Thus, the price of economic activity can be steep because a 
healthy environment is equally essential to human existence. 
It is sometimes hard to remember that a healthy environment provides economic services directly to 
consumers. The air we breathe, the soil for our crops, the water we drink, the shelter and clothing that 
protect us all derive from the natural environment. Anyone who has experienced the beauty of wildlife 
parks or a sunset on an unspoiled beach will readily recognize that the environment provides aesthetic 
amenities for which no substitutes exist.
In economics, the environment is viewed as a composite asset that provides a variety of services. It 
sustains our very existence but belongs to no one. It has many uses but can be poisoned by a single 
pollutant. As with other assets, we wish to prevent undue depreciation of this asset’s value so that it may 
continue to provide life sustaining and aesthetic services for the foreseeable future.
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The environment provides the economy with raw materials, which are transformed into consumer products 
by production processes using fuels (wood, oil, gas, nuclear, etc.) drawn from the natural environment. 
These fuels sustain our transport, homes, and offices. But, exploitation of the natural environment creates 
two broad categories of environmental problems: 
1.	 Overuse	of	Renewable	Resources	
2.	 Pollution	of	the	Environment
Overuse of renewable resources and production of excessive waste destroy the economic value of the 
environmental asset. Overuse depletes renewable resources to the point that they are no longer available 
for economic use and pollutants can exceed the absorptive capacity of nature poisoning the air, water 
and land. 
2.2.1 Identifying Environmental Concerns 
Good public environmental policy requires an understanding of the nature of various pollutants, their effects 
on the environment, and their costs. Different pollutants often call for quite different policy responses and 
often require trade-offs between competing public goods. Failure to recognize these policy distinctions 
can lead to policy failure. 
While environmental problems vary in their specific details, they generally involve either overuse of a 
natural resource (e.g. overfishing an open access fishery) or emissions of pollutants (e.g. release of toxic 
chemicals into the water or air). Some environmental problems tend to be specific to either rural areas or 
urban areas, while others are common to both:
Primarily Rural Environmental Concerns
Soil erosion/land degradation/soil nutrient depletion
Mining and minerals development
Agricultural production practices
Forest use and forest management
Rangeland use and rangeland management
Fisheries management
Coastal management
Wetlands draining
Silting up of dams and lakes
Aquifer management and ground water contamination
Discharge of agro-chemical residuals
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Primarily Urban Environmental Concerns
Solid and hazardous waste
Urban development and infrastructure
Transport and communications
Industrial water and air pollution
Noise pollution
Environmental Concerns in Urban and Rural Areas
Climate change
Water supply and quality
Biodiversity and habitat loss
Energy production and consumption
Population growth and distribution
2.2.2 Managing Renewable Resources3
The essential feature of a renewable resource is that, unlike mineral resources, the available amount is not 
fixed but can be increased or decreased. It will increase if the stock is allowed to regenerate and decrease 
if overexploited. 
There is, however, a limit to the increase of any renewable resource called the maximum stock. No 
renewable resource can regenerate to levels above the carrying capacity of the ecosystem in which 
it exists. Therefore, if left alone, blue whales could increase in number, but they would not keep on 
increasing forever.
This potential for increase is important because the increase in the size of the stock can be harvested 
and, provided that certain conditions are met, the stock will grow again, be harvested and the process 
continues. This means that other things being equal, the process of harvesting a renewable resource can 
continue indefinitely. 
Ecosystems are regularly managed to increase the natural resource portion. To boost the sustainable 
harvest rate of timber, for example, the ecosystem is simplified, harming species that are less visible or 
less valuable.
The Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) occurs when the growth rate of the resource reaches a maximum. 
The attraction of maximum sustainable yield should be obvious: if we harvest the renewable resource in 
such a way that we take the maximum sustainable yield from the stock, it will regenerate itself and we can 
harvest the resource repeatedly without danger of depletion of the resource. 
3 This section is based on Pearce and Turner, 1990.
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Maximum Sustainable Yield will occur only if the resource is left to renew itself. If it takes one year to 
regenerate, the maximum sustainable yield can be taken every year. If it takes 20 years, we can harvest 
maximum sustainable yield only once every twentieth year (in practice it is more complex than this because 
populations will be of different ages with some of the resource becoming available every year, but the 
basic idea holds). 
However, the danger of over-harvesting of any renewable resource is always present. It is quite easy to 
make a renewable resource disappear. This will happen if the rate of harvest exceeds the rate of natural 
growth of the resource persistently. It can also happen if the resource population falls below some critical 
level, because of over-harvesting or for some other reason unconnected with the direct use made of the 
resource (e.g., habitat destruction). 
When harvesting exceeds natural self-renewal capacity of a species, the population of that species 
declines towards eventual extinction. When fisheries, for instance, are left unmanaged, fishers all too often 
become engaged in a ‘race for the fish’ until there are no fish left to catch. 
Whether the population will eventually go extinct or not depends on two crucial factors; whether the 
population is depleted beyond the Minimum Viable Population (MVP) level and whether any remedial 
management action is taken upon discovering evidence of resource overuse (assuming that the population 
has not been depleted below the MVP level).
If the population falls below the MVP level, the species is doomed to extinction unless special species 
survival programmes are put in place to save the species. This is presumably what has been happening 
with the management of populations of well-known species like the black rhino and blue whale.
However, if the decline in population is noticed before the MVP is reached, remedial management actions 
– such as imposing a temporary moratorium on fishing - can be taken to redeem the species, so that the 
population can build up once again. 
2.2.3 The Economics of Pollution 
As indicated, economic activity is a necessary condition to human existence, yet it inevitably results in 
pollution and exploitation of natural resources. To maximise human well-being, the optimal compromise 
between economic conservation and exploitation has to be found.
2.2.3.1 Trade-offs Economic activity can easily result in overuse of natural resources and excess 
emissions of pollutants incurring in significant long-term economic costs.
The environmental impact of economic activity is readily apparent in farm runoff and industrial wastes 
from processing facilities, factories, and coal fired power generation plants. Even seemingly harmless 
office work or tourism consume food from the farms, use electricity from the power plants; burn fossil 
fuels for employee transportation; and produce sewage.
Technical change, improved management, and increased knowledge can reduce the tension between 
economic activity and environmental quality. All contribute to declining emissions (in terms of quantity, 
toxicity and persistence) in absolute terms or per unit of economic activity, as well as reductions in the 
cost of pollution controls. 
In economic theory, there is an intriguing way to resolve this apparent incompatibility of environmental 
protection and economic activity, namely by including any externality in decision-making processes.4 
4 Section 2.5 of this module explores this approach of environmental economics in detail. 
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Once we have taken all the externalities into account, for example by determining a damage cost per unit 
of pollution, we have to find the optimal level of pollution that can be determined – the one that maximises 
societal welfare. To do this, economists use a technique called the efficient allocation of pollution. 
2.2.3.2 Efficient Allocation of Pollution When there is competition between equally desirable 
outcomes (e.g. immediate economic growth and a clean environment) the question becomes: How much 
pollution should society be willing to accept? The initial reaction of most observers would be that there 
should be zero pollution. However, in practice there are many circumstances in which zero pollution is not 
desirable. Economists call this trade-off the efficient (or optimal) allocation of pollution. 
We confront this principle every day. Take a non-environmental example: the damage caused by automobile 
accidents, for example. Obviously, a considerable amount of damage is caused by automobile accidents, 
yet we do not reduce the damage to zero because the cost would be too high. 
The point is not that we do not know how to stop automobile accidents. All we have to do is eliminate 
automobiles! Rather, the point is since we value the benefits of automobiles, we take steps to reduce 
accidents (e.g. by improving highway construction, or by requiring drivers training) only to the extent 
that the costs of accident reduction are commensurate with the damage reduction achieved. Thus, the 
efficient level of automobile accidents is not zero.
The second point to be made is that in some circumstances, the optimal level of pollution may be zero or 
close to zero. This situation occurs when the damage caused by even the first unit of pollution is so severe 
that it is higher than the cost of controlling this unit of pollution. An example would be the treatment of 
highly radioactive pollutants such as plutonium.
Since pollution directly affects the economy, the efficient allocation of resources must take this into 
account. The efficient allocation of pollution depends, in part, on the nature of the pollutant:
Allocation of Stock Pollutants: Stock pollutants accumulate in the environment over time and the 
damage caused by their presence increases and persists as the pollutants accumulate. The efficient 
allocation of stock pollutants must take this into account.
By their very nature, stock pollutants create interdependency between the present and the future, since 
the damage imposed in the future depends on current actions. 
Allocation of Fund Pollutants: To the extent that the emission of fund pollutants exceeds the assimilative 
capacity of the environment, they accumulate and share some of the characteristics of stock pollutants. 
When the rate of emissions is low enough, however, the environment can assimilate the discharges with 
the result that the link between present emissions and future emissions is broken. 
2.2.3.3 Minimization of Costs The normal starting point in allocation analysis is minimization of two 
kinds of costs: damage costs (damages society suffer as a result of exposure to pollution) and abatement 
costs (costs society incurs to avoid or reduce the harmful effects of pollution). Damage and abatement 
costs present the fundamental pieces of information in the economics of pollution control. 
To examine the efficient allocation, we need to know something about how damage costs vary with the 
amount of pollution emitted into the environment and how abatement costs vary with the amount of 
pollution emitted into the environment. Though knowledge in these areas is far from complete, economists 
generally agree on the nature of the relationship.
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Generally, the marginal damage caused by a unit of pollution increases with the amount emitted. When 
small amounts of pollutant are emitted, the marginal damage is quite small. However, when large amounts 
are emitted, the marginal unit can cause significantly more damage. 
It is not hard to understand why. Small amounts of pollution are easily diluted in the environment, and the 
body can tolerate small quantities of substances. However, as the amount in the atmosphere increases, 
dilution is less effective and the body is less tolerant. Also, larger levels of pollution can lead to abrupt 
changes in ecosystems. For example, scientists fear the slowdown of the Atlantic Gulf Stream at some 
level of global warming caused by human emission of greenhouse gases. This would lead to immense 
climate changes on the European continent. Small levels of global warming, however, will not significantly 
alter the stream and hence will cause much less damage per unit of greenhouse gases emitted.5
Marginal abatement costs commonly increase with the amount controlled. In other words, the reduction 
of each additional unit of pollution becomes increasingly more expensive. 
For example, suppose a factory tries to cut down on its particulate emissions by purchasing an electrostatic 
precipitator, which captures 80 per cent of the particulates as they flow past the stack. If the source wants 
further control, it can purchase another precipitator and place it in the stack above the first one. 
This second precipitator captures 80 per cent of the remaining 20 per cent, or 16 per cent of the 
uncontrolled emissions. Therefore, the first precipitator would achieve an 80 per cent reduction from 
uncontrolled emissions, while the second precipitator, which costs the same as the first, would achieve 
only a further 16 per cent reduction. Now it should be easy to see that each unit of emissions reduction 
costs more for the second precipitator than for the first.6 Under these circumstances, the optimal level of 
pollution is not zero. 
Additional insights are easily derived from our characterization of efficient allocation. For example, the 
optimal level of pollution generally is not the same for all parts of the country. Areas that have higher 
population levels or are particularly sensitive to pollution should have lower equilibrium levels of pollution, 
while areas that have lower population levels or are less sensitive should have higher equilibrium levels of 
pollution.
Examples of ecological sensitivity are not hard to find. For instance, some areas are less sensitive to 
acid rain than others because the local geographical strata neutralize or moderate amounts of the acid. 
Therefore, the marginal damage caused by a unit of acid rain is lower in those fortunate regions than in 
other less tolerant areas.
2.3 Measuring the Value of Environmental Assets7
Traditional economic analysis measures only the market value of goods and services. Much of what affects 
environmental quality is outside the market but clearly of value to society and the economy. Without a 
means to value environmental assets it is difficult to make any kind of objective assessment of the trade-
offs involved in pursuing different policies. 
5 For more information on the Gulf Stream and related abrupt climate change, visit the webpage of the Ocean and Climate Change Institute at 
www.whoi.edu/occi/
6 From a technical perspective, the use of two electrostatic precipitators in a series is not necessarily an optimal solution to the problem of emissions 
management. The example has just been used to illustrate the shape of the abatement function.
7 For further information on valuation of environmental assets and services, see for example “Nature and the Market Place - Capturing the Value of 
Ecosystem Services” by Geoffrey Heal, Island Press (2000); or also www.natureevaluation.org.
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In current practice, most economists and policymakers continue to compare costs and benefits by way 
of direct monetary effects - cash inflow and cash outflow. Costs and benefits that are more difficult to 
express in monetary terms, or that cannot be quantified at all, tend to be overlooked in decision-making 
despite their considerable value. This is particularly so if they have long-term implications. 
2.3.1 Value and the Functions of the Environment
The natural environment has a variety of functions of value to individuals and society. In other words the 
natural environment does certain very valuable work – e.g. provides breathable air – that is usually not 
expressed in money terms. Pollution and the depletion of natural resources prevent the natural environment 
from performing these functions.
Determining the value of the natural environment requires an understanding of these functions. The first 
step in a valuation exercise is to identify the functions of the particular part of the environment under 
consideration. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment8 classifies four major functions of service provided 
by the environment; these are described below. 
Provisioning functions: The ways in which the natural environment provides resources essential to 
human life (food, fresh water, wood, fibre, minerals, and fuel).
Regulating functions: The capacity of nature to regulate essential ecological processes and life support 
systems (e.g. climate regulation, flood abatement, disease prevention, and water purification).
Supporting functions: Underlying activities that support all other environmental functions (e.g. nutrient 
cycling, soil formation, primary production).
Cultural functions: Factors that contribute to human well-being by their importance to religion, culture, 
or individual well-being (aesthetic, spiritual, educational, recreational).
2.3.2 Stakeholders and Value 
Different stakeholders often make different and competing claims to various functions of the environment. 
Different stakeholders also assign different value to the different functions. These competing claims and 
values can be highly contentious since protection of one function (e.g. production of timber) may eliminate 
another function (e.g. protection of habitat). 
The combination of the various functions and the stakeholders for whom those functions are relevant 
determines the total economic value of various aspects of the environment. The economic value assigned 
to the various functions areas thus depends on the groups of people or stakeholders that exert the claim, 
and is inherently highly subjective by nature.
For these reasons determining the value of environmental assets is not a simple matter. Nevertheless, the 
more rational the process, the better the decisions will be. 
2.3.3 The Use of Valuation Techniques 
To include values other than strictly monetary ones, techniques have been developed by environmental 
economist to find the proper valuation of the positive and negative aspects (benefits and costs) related to 
clean air, potable water, forests, wetlands, biodiversity or other types of environmental assets. By applying 
8 For more information see: Ecosystems and Human Well-being - Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005).
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these environmental economic valuation techniques, the components of environmental assets that have 
not been considered before can find their way into decision-making. 
In that sense, valuation is a support tool but should not be seen as replacing decision-making responsibility. 
The application of valuation techniques contributes to improving transparency, not only for decision-
makers themselves but also for all stakeholders involved in the decision. 
Policy decisions, of course, are not made on grounds of measurable value alone; political inertia, self 
interest, short-term gain vs. long term value and ethical concerns may play a large role as well. Such 
considerations help frame the debate about a given environmental or natural resource management 
policy.
These debates will be better informed if policy advocates are able to identify what it is that is of value a 
proposal seeks to protect or remedy. To determine what is of value requires proponents to analyse and 
describe the valuable economic and social functions that are affected by the problem in question.
2.4 Typical Failures Leading to Environmental Problems9
The problems of resource overuse and pollution described above are the result of human activities, which 
an economist in broad terms sees as fundamentally being influenced by cost-benefit considerations. As 
long as the expected benefit from an activity exceeds the cost of the activity, an individual will decide to 
carry out the activity. 
These considerations usually fail to take into account the full costs or benefits of environmental assets 
since determining the monetary value of intangible goods and services provided by the environmental 
assets is not easy. The cost that the activity imposes on others or the society at large (the externality cost), 
thus, is not part of the individual calculation.
2.4.1 Market Failure 
Market failure occurs when the markets are not able to reflect all the functions of the environment, and it 
leads to situations in which the cost of an environmentally damaging activity is not fully covered.
As indicated above, when determining the economic value of a certain environmental asset, decision 
makers use the easily quantifiable – i.e. financial - costs and benefits related to goods and services traded 
on the market to determine the value of the asset. 
However, there are numerous functions of nature for which markets malfunction, are distorted, or simply 
do not exist. Economists refer to this as market failure. Markets only exist for some of the functions of 
nature, such as for timber, minerals, and grazing lands. 
Furthermore, the market price of a particular good may not reflect all the costs involved in producing that 
good. There may be benefits or costs enjoyed or borne by others not directly involved in the production of 
a good. Economists refer to these costs or benefits as externalities.
9 This section is derived from: “Economic Valuation of Forests and Nature - A support tool for effective decision-making”, Henk Lette and Henneleen 
de Boo, June 2002, Theme Studies Series 6, Forests, Forestry and Biodiversity Support Group, International Agricultural Centre (IAC), Wageningen, 
National Reference Centre for Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries (EC-LNV), Ede, The Netherlands.
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2.4.2 Policy Failure
Where markets fail, government policy can act to change market conditions – e.g. by imposing taxes on 
polluters thereby raising their costs of production - to protect the interests of society as a whole. However, 
it often happens that the government does not step in to correct damage done by market failures. Such 
inability or unwillingness to act is called policy failure. 
In some cases, governments even contribute to keeping the cost of an environmentally damaging activity 
artificially low by providing perverse incentives, e.g. through subsidies on carbon fuels leading to inefficient 
use or financing the extension of fleets leading to overfishing. 
Policy failure can also result from the inability or unwillingness of the government to act on or even 
investigate market failures. There are numerous reasons for this lack of action. The government may be:
•	 Overly	influenced	by	pressure	groups,	
•	 Unable	to	obtain	accurate	information,
•	 Lacking	the	resources	to	pay	for	needed	environmental	programmes,
•	 Subject	to	widespread	political	corruption,	
•	 Unable	to	overcome	entrenched	bureaucratic	interests,	
•	 Unable	to	co-ordinate	the	actions	of	its	ministries	and	agencies.
2.4.3 Institutional Failure 
Even where the government has the will, it may not have the wherewithal to implement environmental 
policies because of institutional failures. Environmental policy instruments rely on clear and secure property 
rights and functioning administrative, tax, legal or fiscal systems. If the institutional capabilities needed to 
promulgate and enforce the instruments in a fair and unbiased manner are lacking the performance of the 
instruments will suffer.
 
Institutional failure may also result from the fact that environment ministries or agencies often have far less 
political power than do finance or trade ministries, or leaders of the executive and legislative branches, all 
of whom may try to use the power of government to appease or compensate particular constituencies at 
the expense of environmental quality. 
Policymakers need to assess their relative power accurately and plan how to address their weaknesses. 
For example, approaches that generate revenues and solve environmental problems can bring in allies in 
the fiscal ministries that would otherwise not come forward.
Institutional failure may also arise from the fact that a country has a weak base of civil society organizations 
devoted to environmental protection. These organizations often play a critical role in balancing the debate 
between traditional vested interests and environmental concerns.
Where the government has the will, means and capacity to address environmental problems, it will still 
need to find and use appropriate policy tools to address the problem at hand. The general nature of these 
tools is described in the following section. 
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2.5 Reconciling Economy and Environment
The preceding sections provide the information needed to understand ways of reconciling economic activity 
and environmental protection, which constitute the very basis of the field of environmental economics.
In the science of economics, economic activity and growth are desirable because they increase overall 
human well-being.10 More market activity means more goods and services being consumed, which 
entails a higher level of welfare. A conventional measure for this market activity that is often used is the 
gross domestic product, or GDP.
As we have seen in the section on market failures, positive and negative externalities are usually not taken 
into account in decision-making processes, and they are also not reflected in the GDP. If we succeed in 
using valuation techniques and economic instruments to incorporate them, we can get a more accurate 
and holistic framework of ongoing market activities.
Take, for example, a developing country that suffers from water scarcity. There are very few fresh water 
resources, yet a company plans to build a chemical processing plant next to one of the few rivers, which 
would severely deteriorate the downstream water quality.
Looking at this from conventional economics, the factory would definitely create economic activity and 
increase welfare by creating new jobs, raising income and producing goods. Externalities for downstream 
communities are not taken into account.
Taking the stance of environmental economics, we first need to find the value of the river’s freshwater 
flow for downstream users, and by how much its value would change with the installation of the new 
factory. An optimal policy decision now compares the damage done to downstream users to the benefits 
stemming from the new factory. On the one hand, the factory increases economic growth as described 
above, but on the other, downstream users have less pure water to consume, or they consume an inferior 
product – polluted water. This represents a negative economic growth. Taking all this into account, we can 
decide what the best option is in terms of economic growth and increasing human welfare: no factory at 
all, a factory with pollution control, or the factory without pollution abatement.
An overview of policy tools to deal with environmental problems is given below. The tools will be discussed 
in more depth in the following modules of this Manual.
2.6 Policy Tools
The policies available to redress environmental problems fit into two broad classes: command and control 
instruments and economic instruments. Both types of instruments are briefly introduced below. They will 
be studied in greater detail in succeeding sessions of the training.
2.6.1 Purpose of Environmental Instruments 
Both command and control and economic instruments attempt to shift the costs and responsibilities 
associated with pollution or over exploitation back to the polluter or users in what is called the Polluter 
Pays Principle (PPP). By pushing the environmental costs back to those causing the damage, these 
policies use economic competition to force polluters and natural resource users to address the problems 
10 This discussion does not include distributional issues of wealth within a society.
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they cause, if only to save costs. The differences between the two policy types, however, are significant 
in terms of cost and effectiveness. 
2.6.2 Command and Control Instruments
As the name implies command and control instruments are the laws and regulation used by governments 
to directly control pollution and manage natural resources. In the application of these instruments, the 
government stipulates the technologies that must be used to curb pollution, determines the maximum 
amount of emissions that can be released into the environment, and regulates the use of natural 
resources. 
Command and control laws and regulations must be observed uniformly as stipulated by all. Polluters 
have little or no flexibility in the application of command and control instruments. To ensure compliance, 
the government must police the enforcement and prosecute offenders in a court of law. Such policing 
usually requires detailed information about regulated industries, since the government must understand 
the details of industrial technologies. 
2.6.3 Economic Instruments
Economic instruments provide market and financial incentives for polluters and natural resource users 
to change their behaviour and try to consider the three main failures described above. The economic 
instruments incentives include such mechanisms as taxes, emission or access charges, marketable 
permits, and changes to property rights. Economic instruments, therefore, encourage reduced emissions 
and aim to reduce pressure on natural resources.
In economic terms, economic instruments internalise externalities – environmental costs - through 
increasing the prices that individuals and industries must pay to use resources or to emit pollutants. 
As such they address the market failure. As pollution or the use of natural resources become more 
expensive, polluters and consumers have strong financial incentives to reduce such activities through 
conservation, substitution of materials, or rationalizing consumption.
  
Economic instruments possess a number of inherent advantages over command and control instruments 
for many problems. They are generally more:
1.	 Affordable,	
2.	 Flexible,	
3.	 Responsive,	and	
4.	 Encouraging	to	technology	innovation.	
The more efficient policy options offered by economic instruments reduce the cost of environmental 
controls for industry relative to alternative policies and have less detrimental effect on the competitive 
relationship of domestic industries compared to international competition. Similarly, economic instruments 
can generate technological innovations in the areas of pollution control that offer the potential for the 
creation of new domestic industries. 
In addition, although economic instruments cannot overcome a corrupt or weak political structure, they 
can help make moderately functioning governance structures work more effectively. As such they try to 
minimize possible policy and institutional failures.
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2.6.4 Benign Policy Fusion
In practice, economic instruments are used together with command and control instruments to 
increase policy efficiency, and achieve environmental targets at a lower cost. Economic instruments can 
complement rather than fully replace command and control policies, offering many potential applications 
even in countries with substantial policy constraints.
In such situations, command and control regulations can be used to set the broad parameters (e.g., total 
emissions, total number of licenses) under which economic instruments can be used to obtain a more 
efficient allocation of responsibility and compliance across firms, as for example in the application of 
tradable emissions permits (see Module 7). 
2.6.5 Potential Conflict Among Instruments 
However, it is important to note that although policy elements are routinely combined to address real world 
problems, these elements can also sometimes work at cross-purposes. Policy instruments must therefore 
be combined carefully. When this is not done, administrative costs rise and the impact on environmental 
quality becomes neutral or even negative.
Before proceeding to a comprehensive study of command and control and economic instruments for 
environmental management, it is important to take cognisance of the fact that these instruments function 
within a given political, economic, and social context. The purpose of Module 3 is to develop a deeper 
understanding of this policy context.
2.7 Charting Environmental Economics11
This section demonstrates how problems of exploitation of renewable resources and pollution are 
addressed in environmental economics using graphs and mathematical formulations for illustration of 
basic concepts. 
2.7.1 The Environment as an Economic Asset 
As described before, in economics, the environment is viewed as a composite asset that provides a 
variety of services. It is the most fundamental economic asset since it provides the life support systems 
that sustain human existence. As with other assets, the goal is to prevent undue depreciation of the value 
of this asset so that it may continue to provide life sustaining and aesthetic services in continuity. 
The environment provides the economy with raw materials. Ultimately, these raw materials and energy 
return to the environment as waste products. In addition, exploitation of renewable resources of raw 
materials can deplete them entirely (see Figure III-2-1).
Defined broadly, the relationship between the environment and the economic system can be considered 
as a closed system. For these purposes, a closed system is one in which no inputs (energy or matter) are 
received from outside the system and no outputs are transferred outside the system. An open system, by 
contrast, is one in which the system imports or exports matter or energy.
11 While it can be extremely useful to understand economic mechanisms from a mathematical and graphical perspective, the charts and graphs are not 
absolutely necessary to understand the basic concepts. Section 2.7 is therefore optional. This section is based on Tietenberg (1992), pp 19-21, and 
Pearce and Turner (1990), pp 241-261.
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If we restrict our conception of the relationship in Figure III-2-1 to our planet and the atmosphere around 
it, then clearly we do not have a closed system. We derive most of our energy from the sun, either directly 
or indirectly. Nonetheless, historically speaking, for material inputs and outputs (excluding energy from the 
sun), this system can be treated as a closed system because the amount of exports (such as abandoned 
space vehicles) and imports (moon rocks, for example) are negligible. Whether the system remains closed 
depends on the degree to which space exploration opens up the rest of our solar system as a source of 
raw materials.
The treatment of our planet and its immediate environs as a closed system has an important implication, 
which is summed up in the first law of thermodynamics - “energy and matter cannot be created nor 
destroyed”.12
Figure III-2-1: The Economic System and the Environment
The law implies that the mass of materials flowing into the economic system from the environment has 
to either accumulate in the economic system or return to the environment as waste. When accumulation 
stops, the mass of materials flowing into the economic system is equal in magnitude to the mass of waste 
flowing into the environment. 
To understand how these general economic concepts relate to renewable resource management and 
pollution control, it is necessary to turn to the specifics of these topic areas.
2.7.2 Renewable Resources Growth Curves
To illustrate the concepts related to natural resources management, we can observe how a single species 
grows and the limits to that growth. The simple message is that growth of species is limited by important 
threshold population levels. If its population reaches the maximum that the ecosystem can support, further 
growth cannot be achieved. 
Firms Households Production Consumption
 Sun
Natural Life Support System
Air, Water, Wildlife, Energy, Raw Materials, Amenities
“Asset”
“Residuals”“Extraction”
Economic System
Outputs
Inputs
12 There is yet another law of thermodynamics called the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which has important implications for natural resource 
economics (for a brief review, see Tietenberg, 1992 pp 20-21).
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On the other hand, if the population falls below the minimum critical or threshold level, the species could 
be driven to extinction. Between these two critical levels, the growth rate of species increases as the 
population or stock increases up to a certain level where growth slows down as competition for food, 
space and other resources intensifies. The graphs, moreover, show the sustainable rates at which the 
species could be harvested.
Consider a single fish species; then its stock (or biomass) may exhibit growth through time as shown in 
Figure III-2-2. The curve shown is a logistic function: at low levels of stock the fish multiply, but as they 
begin to compete for food supplies, their rate of growth slows down and eventually the stock converges 
asymptotically on some maximum level, the ecosystems’ carrying capacity for that species. Note that 
we have also drawn the curve as beginning at the minimum stock; this is the critical minimum level of 
population. If the numbers go below this level the species is driven to extinction. 
For our purposes, it is useful to look at the information in a slightly different way. Figure III-2-3 plots the 
same information but shows the growth of the stock on the vertical axis and the level of the stock on the 
horizontal axis. 
Figure III-2-2: Logistic Growth Curve of a Renewable Resource
Figure III-2-3 shows that the rate of growth of the stock is negative below the MVP and positive thereafter. 
It reaches a maximum and then declines as the stock gets bigger. If we leave the resource alone, starting 
at a population greater than the MVP, it will grow in size until it reaches the carrying capacity of its 
environment, Xmax. If we leave it alone at a stock smaller than the MVP, it will decline until the stock 
reaches zero.
Figure III-2-3 permits us to identify the maximum sustainable yield (MSY), which occurs when the growth 
rate of the resource reaches a maximum. The apparent attraction of MSY should be obvious: if we harvest 
the renewable resource in such a way that we take the MSY from the stock, it will regenerate itself and we 
can take MSY again next time round ad infinitum. 
Stock (X)
 XMAX
 
MVP, XMIN
Xo
91The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
P
A
R
T
 I
II
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Note that this can only happen if we leave the resource to renew itself. If it takes one year to regenerate, 
MSY can be taken every year. If it takes 20 years, we must only take MSY once every twentieth year. (In 
practice it is more complex than this because the population will be of different ages, but the basic idea 
is correct.)
Figure III-2-3: Pure Compensation Growth Curve
2.7.3 The Rate of Resource Exploitation 
We can now introduce the level of exploitation or harvest or yield of the resource (Equation 2.2). The 
simplest hypothesis is to use the rather self-explanatory fact that the effort expended on harvesting, E,	is 
proportional to the amount of harvest H, while inversely proportional to the stock size X.
 (2.1)
X
HE =
      
That is, if the harvest	H is to be increased at constant stock level X we need to increase the effort level. Or, 
if we want to harvest the same amount but have a higher stock, we need less effort.
Equation 2.1 can alternatively be written as:
XEH ⋅=  (2.2)
Equation 2.2 enables us to show the rate of harvest in our basic diagram. If we assume the effort as given 
at a certain level E, the harvest H is determined by the current stock size X. Note that this is a simplification. 
For example, fishermen would adjust their effort level to the current stock level to maximise their profit and 
minimise their effort cost. Even though we will not incorporate profit maximisation into our analysis the 
main results are still valid.
Figure III-2-4 shows three different straight lines, each representing one choice of effort level. Dependent 
on this effort level, the population will reach a different equilibrium level. For effort E, the arrows indicate 
the equilibrium. If effort E is chosen, the stock will be depleted until it vanishes.
Time
MSY = Maximum Sustainable Yield
MVP = Minimum Viable Population
Rate of 
Growth (Y)
MVP, XMIN
Stock (X)XMAX
MSY
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Rate of 
Growth (Y),
Harvest (H)
The dynamic evolvement toward the equilibrium is explained in Box III-2-1: The Logic Behind the Effort-
Growth Diagram.
Figure III-2-4: Effort-Growth Equilibrium
Box III-2-1: The Logic behind the Effort-Growth Diagram
The following will walk you through the processes that lead to an equilibrium stock using the fishery 
example.
1.	 The	fishermen	choose	an	effort	 level,	 let’s	say	 it	 is	E.	This	puts	us	on	 the	H=E·X	 line	 in	 the	
diagram.
2.	 Assume	the	initial	fish	stock	is	a	bit	left	of	XEQ.
3.	 	At	this	 initial	stock,	we	can	now	read	the	growth	rate	Y	off	the	growth	curve,	as	well	as	the	
harvest	H	off	the	harvest	line	H=E·X.
4.	 We	see	that	to	the	left	of	XEQ,	the	growth	rate	Y	is	higher	than	the	harvest	rate	H.
5.	 Therefore,	we	have	an	increased	population	in	the	next	period.
6.	 This	repeats	itself	until	we	reach	XEQ.
7.	 If	we	start	to	the	right	of	XEQ,	the	harvest	level	exceeds	the	growth	level,	and	the	population	is	
reduced	in	the	next	period,	thus	approaching	XEQ	again	over	time.
XEQ
H=E·X
H=E’·X
H=E’’·X
XMAX
Stock (X)
MSY
MVP, XMIN
93The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
P
A
R
T
 I
II
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
8.	 This	makes	XEQ	a	stable	equilibrium.	To	the	right,	the	population	shrinks,	to	the	left,	it	grows.	
(The	other	intersection	of	H=E·X	with	the	growth	curve	is	not	a	stable	equilibrium:	If	we	are	a	
bit	to	the	right,	the	population	grows,	if	we	are	to	the	left,	it	shrinks	because	of	higher	harvest	
than	growth.	Thus,	we	always	move	away	from	this	point.)
9.	 If	fishermen	choose	effort	E’	we	get	a	somewhat	smaller	equilibrium	stock.	If	they	choose	effort	
level	E’’	the	population	is	always	driven	to	extinction.
10.	 No	matter	which	effort	level	is	chosen,	the	stock	will	be	extinct	if	the	initial	stock	is	below	the	
MVP.
 Note:	In	a	model	closer	to	the	real	world,	fishermen	would	adjust	their	effort	level	in	order	to	maximise	the	income	from	harvest	minus	
the	expense	for	effort.	If	fishermen	are	organised	in	a	group,	they	may	try	to	keep	fishing	at	a	sustainable	level	in	order	to	ensure	the	
future	income	stream.	If	fishermen,	however,	are	competing,	they	might	all	try	to	catch	as	much	fish	as	possible	before	others	do	so,	
which	can	result	in	the	extinction	of	the	stock.	This	is	an	example	of	the	Tragedy	of	the	Commons	(see	Module	7).
2.7.4 Resource Overuse 
It is conceptually possible to have circumstances where the level of effort exerted on a fishery is so high 
that the harvest function lies everywhere above the pure compensation curve, as shown in harvest level 
E	.X	 in Figure III-2-4. Here, the rate of harvest is much higher than the natural self-renewal capacity of 
the species, with the consequence that the population of the species begins to decline in the direction of 
extinction). 
This is the classical case where the fishery is left unmanaged, and the fishers are engaged in a ‘race for the 
fish’. Whether the population will eventually go extinct or not would seem to depend on two crucial factors; 
whether the population is depleted beyond the Minimum Viable Population (MVP) level and whether any 
remedial management action is taken upon discovering evidence of resource overuse (assuming that the 
population has not been depleted below the MVP level).
If the population is depleted below the MVP level, the species is doomed to extinction unless special 
species survival programmes are put in place to salvage whatever is possible. This is presumably what 
has been happening with the management of populations of well-known species like the black rhino and 
blue whale. 
However, if the decline in population is noticed before the MVP is reached, there are several remedial 
management actions that can be taken to redeem the species, including a temporary moratorium on fishing 
so that the population can build up once again. Note that flow resources like fisheries can sometimes be 
boosted through migration. If this migration were regular and predictable, it would influence the minimum 
viable population level.
2.7.5 The Taxonomy of Pollutants13
Pollution control requires a different theoretical framework than natural resources management. Excessive 
wastes depreciate the environmental asset when they exceed the absorptive capacity of nature. The 
taxonomy (discussed and defined at the beginning of this Module) includes: stock pollutants, fund 
pollutants and pollutants classified by their zone of influence: local pollutants, regional pollutants, surface 
pollutants  and global pollutants.
13 This section is based on Tietenberg (1992), pp 361-362.
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A review of the taxonomy of pollutants is important since the appropriate policy response depends on the 
type of pollutant. The taxonomy helps in designing responses to the various types of pollution problems. 
Each type of pollutant requires a unique policy response. The extent of the problem – local, national, 
global – shapes the policy response as well. The failure to recognize these policy distinctions leads to 
counterproductive policy.
The amount of waste products emitted determines the load upon the environment. The damage done by 
this load depends on the capacity of the environment to assimilate the waste products (Figure III-2-5). We 
call the ability of the environment to absorb pollutants its absorptive capacity. If the emission load exceeds 
the absorptive capacity, then the pollutant accumulates in the environment.
Given an understanding of the taxonomy of pollutants, the next question is: How much pollution should 
society accept? 
Figure III-2-5: Relationship of Emissions to Pollution Damage
2.7.6 Efficient Allocation of Fund Pollutants 
This discussion is focused on fund pollutants, because for fund pollutants effects of current pollution 
on the environment in the future can be neglected – at least if the pollution level is smaller than nature’s 
absorptive capacity. Efficient allocation of stock pollutants can also be determined, but this requires 
techniques of intertemporal optimisation, which would be beyond the scope of this manual.
In section 2.2.3.3 we have already discussed the trade-off between damage and abatement costs when it 
comes to the reduction of pollution caused by fund pollutants. Figure III-2-6 gives a graphical interpretation 
of the previously presented results. 
The per unit (or marginal) damage cost increases as the total amount of pollution increases. The reason is 
that with a higher concentration of pollution, the damage increases disproportionally, and abrupt changes 
in ecosystems become more likely. This is represented in the diagram by the upward-sloping marginal 
damage cost line. 
The marginal control cost line is downward sloping. If a lot of pollution is emitted, the cost to reduce 
pollution by one unit (marginal control cost) is small, while it is large if pollution is already reduced very 
much. The relevant example given in section 2.2.3.3 is the case of the two electrostatic precipitators.
 
Figure III-2-6 uses these two pieces of information on the shapes of damage costs and abatement costs 
to derive the efficient allocation of pollutant. 
Pollution
Damage Pollutant
Accumulation
Emissions Load
Absorptive Capacity of the 
Environment
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A movement from right to left refers to greater control and less pollution emitted. A movement from left to 
right refers to less control and more pollution damage. The efficient allocation is represented by Q*, the 
point at which the damage caused by the marginal unit of pollution is exactly equal to the cost of abating 
that unit of pollution. The following gives an intuition for why Q* is indeed the efficient level.
Points to the left of Q*, which involve greater degrees of control, are inefficient because the total abatement 
costs exceed the total damage costs. The amount of money being spent to avoid (or repair) the damage 
from pollution is more than the value of the damage caused by the pollution. In other words, by not abating 
another unit of pollution, the polluter could pay for the extra damage caused by this unit and would still 
have money left over. 
For points to the right of Q*, the total value of the damage attributed to pollution is higher than the amount 
of money being spent to avoid (or control) the pollution damage. If an extra unit of pollution is being 
reduced, those who suffer from the pollution have such a high reduction in damage cost that they could 
pay the polluter his costs to abate the unit and still have money left over.
The efficient level of pollution is therefore at Q*, where marginal damage cost and marginal control cost are 
equal. Moving to the right or to the left would both increase the total cost (damage plus control) incurred 
by society as a whole.
Figure III-2-6 suggests that, under the described circumstances, the optimal level of pollution is not zero. 
If you find this disturbing, remember that we confront this principle every day. In section 2.2.3.2 we gave 
the example of damage caused by automobile accidents. Obviously, a considerable amount of damage 
is caused by automobile accidents, yet we do not reduce the damage to zero because the cost of doing 
so would be too high.
Another example is the lawn on soccer fields. To have good playing conditions for a soccer match, we 
want the lawn to be in perfect shape. Yet, this would imply that very few matches could be played per year. 
We might hence decide to limit the frequency of use of the soccer field to a certain amount of trainings 
per week and prohibit the use of the field while it is raining. The general condition of the lawn will not be 
perfect any more, but the benefits from allowing frequent trainings outweighs the damage incurred by 
poorer lawn quality on players’ performance. Again, we have to find the efficient level of use (pollution) that 
equalises marginal control cost to marginal damage. This level would most probably be sustainable, i.e. 
the lawn regenerates at the same rate it is damaged.
In section 2.2.3.2 we also noted that in some instances, when the damage cost of the first unit of pollution 
is extremely high, the efficient level of pollution is zero, or close to zero. We would represent this in Figure 
III-2-6 by shifting the damage cost left (or up, this yields the same result). The intersection of the two 
curves can then be at Q*	=	0 or close to that. A good example for such a scenario is the case of highly 
radioactive waste such as plutonium as mentioned previously.
The effect of area-specific damage costs has also been discussed in section 2.2.3.2. To represent different 
regional sensitivity, we have to draw a graph like Figure III-2-6 for every region, taking area-specific damage 
costs into account. The result is that Q* varies among regions. For example, area with higher population 
levels or areas that contain endangered species might exhibit particularly high damage costs and hence 
a low efficient level of pollution. Another example, given in section 2.3.2.3 is the sensitivity of a region to 
acid rain. 
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In practice, it is often far from easy to draw a diagram like Figure III-2-6. Asked by the government for 
their marginal pollution control cost function, firms are prone to over-report. The government would then 
calculate a Q* that is too high and exert less force on the firms to reduce pollution. Those who suffer from 
pollution tend to over-report their damage cost hoping for compensation or a reduced level of pollution. 
It is thus often very difficult and costly to exactly determine the efficient level of pollution, and estimates 
based on the information available have to be used.
Figure III-2-6: Efficient Allocation of a Fund Pollutant
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Module 2  Group Exercise
  
Shortage of Clean Drinking Water (Handout)
Objective
Use the concepts of market failure (externalities), policy failure (the case of subsidies), and 
institutional failure (case of property rights) to analyse the shortage of clean drinking water.
Issue
A lack of clean drinking water is a common problem in many developing countries. This problem 
can be analysed by using the concepts covered in Module 2 (For purposes of this exercise 
assume that the country could have sufficient clean drinking water for the entire population. In 
other words severe drought or overpopulation are not major causes of the lack of clean water.) 
Instructions
1. Form groups of 3-5 people 
2. Use your existing knowledge and information
3. Include factors that lead to water shortage directly and indirectly
4. Cite specific cases where possible
5. Jointly prepare a presentation and select a speaker
6. Present in the plenary
Questions
1. How can market failures (externalities) cause water shortage?
2. How can policy failures, e.g. subsidies cause water shortage?
3.  How can institutional failures, e.g. the lack of well-defined and secure property rights cause 
water shortage?
!
?
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Policy Context1
1 The Module is based on UNEP (2004): The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental Policy: Opportunities and Challenges. 
Module 3
G O A L
L E A R N I N G  O B j E C T I V E
To describe various existing conditions in a country that can 
affect the performance of environmental and natural resource 
management policy instruments.
By the end of this module, participants should be able to analyse 
the policy context in a country for the successful application of 
policy instruments.
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3.1 Defining Terms
Governmental Authority: The ability of the government to enforce laws and to effectively implement 
programmes throughout its area of jurisdiction. Neither economic nor command and control instruments 
policies can be implemented without sufficient government authority.
Property Rights: The right to ownership and use of both tangible (land, buildings, etc.) and intangible 
(patents, trademarks, copyrights, etc.) property. To be meaningful, such rights must not be able to 
be revoked without clear transparent legal procedures and proper compensation for the value of the 
property. 
 
Fiscal Systems: Governmental policies, procedures, and agencies necessary to collect and disperse 
taxes, fees, etc. The integrity of such systems is vital to the success of all environmental policies whether 
they use command and control or economic instruments.
Rule of Law: A situation in which a stable, transparent, and impartially administered legal system prevails. 
Established courts make decisions that are based on written law and open to all parties. Court decisions 
are not arbitrary, capricious, determined by corrupt practices (bribery, nepotism, etc.), or directed by 
outside forces (political rulers, vested interests, etc.).
Vested Interests: Those who have a direct financial interest in the content and enforcement of particular 
laws, regulations, and policies. They are often more organized and vocal than those without a direct 
financial interest.
Stakeholders: Those who have an interest (or stake) in particular laws, regulations, or policies. These may 
be companies, individuals, social groups, environmental organizations, or public agencies. They include 
but are not limited to those who have a vested interest (see above) in the situation.
Cultural Values: The beliefs, habits, and traditions of a group or an entire society that determine the 
relative worth of ideas, economic activities, types of property, or uses of property. Such values can be of 
equal or greater importance to policymaking than those of vested interests, and other more immediate 
stakeholders.
Demographic Conditions: The size, growth rates, and makeup (by age, sex, and ethnicity) of the general 
population that can affect environmental policy.
3.2 Baseline Legal and Administrative Conditions
Economic instruments do not exist in a vacuum; there is always an existing legal, political, economic, and 
social framework that shapes the process. The nature and extent of the environmental or natural resource 
issues themselves are part of this policy context.
Certain baseline legal and administrative conditions are critically important to the success of any public 
environmental initiatives. If a government cannot enact, administer, and enforce binding legislation it has 
little hope to establish effective environmental protection and natural resource management policies. 
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Specifically, the baseline conditions necessary for the successful application of command and control and 
economic instruments are:
•	 Effective	governmental	authority	
•	 An	impartial	legal	system
•	 Clear	and	consistent	property	rights
•	 Effective	and	consistent	fiscal	systems.	
These are not absolute conditions for success. Each of these legal and administrative conditions can 
range from nonexistent to very effective. But without these elements in place at some level, environmental 
protection policies will fail regardless of the specific instruments put forward. 
Policy makers take such baseline conditions into account to obtain a realistic evaluation of policy options. 
Under any given baseline conditions, certain environmental and natural resource management policies 
may be more effective than others. To the extent that instrument choice can offset identified weaknesses 
in baseline conditions, this should be done. 
3.2.1 Governmental Authority 
All environmental instruments require a government with effective authority. The government must have 
resources and the will to consistently penalize violators and provide incentives. This, in turn, requires a well 
functioning set of political institutions. 
For command and control environmental laws, the government must be able to set and monitor appropriate 
standards based on technical assessments rather than purely political ones (though politics will often play 
some role). 
For many economic instruments the government must have functioning tax and budgetary systems in 
place to be able to provide economic rewards and penalties. Weak or corrupt government institutions 
quickly render market-based instruments worthless if companies discover that they can continue operating 
without paying environmental taxes or buying permits. 
Even moderate levels of non-compliance undermine compliance by the remaining parties both 
psychologically and economically, since non-complying private institutions will have lower operating 
costs. 
3.2.2 The Rule of Law 
Effective environmental policies rest on the foundation of a stable, transparent, and impartially administered 
legal system. The rule of law varies widely among countries. In some cases, laws may exist, but are not, 
or cannot be, consistently enforced. Nothing defeats the effectiveness of any policy more than arbitrary or 
corrupt enforcement of law. 
Companies and individuals abhor uncertainty in economic decisions. If polluters or resource users are 
uncertain whether their activities will be legal or if they see that the law is unevenly or corruptly enforced, 
they are unlikely to respond to economic incentives or even invest in the economy at all.
The legal system must operate at both the symbolic - what the courts, or ministries say they are doing 
- and the instrumental - what they are actually doing - levels. While no country, in either the developed 
or developing world, has a perfectly fair and open legal system, litigants and defendants must have the 
normal expectation that they will receive a reasonably fair and unbiased hearing. 
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Widespread bribery and other forms of corruption not only undermine the legal system but subvert 
environmental and natural resource management policies as well. There is ample evidence to suggest that 
the higher the level of corruption, the lower the level of environmental sustainability.
3.2.3 Property Rights 
Within the larger legal system, the enactment and consistent enforcement of property rights for all members 
of society constitutes an economic instrument in its own right. 
Economic instruments rely on the operation of market incentives operating within a system of effectively 
enforced property and contractual law. Without such a system all incentives provided by economic 
instruments evaporate. The system needs to be transparent, uniform for all property holders, and provide 
equitable compensation when property is taken for whatever purpose. 
Secure property rights are especially important for the institution of pollution taxes or marketable permits. If 
the legal system cannot enforce property rights, then using permits to curb emissions or restricting access 
rights to indigenous people to discourage unfettered access are not feasible.
Property Rights vs. Wealth Ensuring property rights is not the same thing as protecting wealth. It should 
be made clear that respect for property rights does not imply the automatic granting of protection to the 
property of the rich over the poor or simply adopting the status quo. It is up to society and its government 
to determine the rules and procedures for allocating property rights. 
In the normal course of events, society may redefine and adjust property rights. When doing so, 
policymakers should make every effort to buffer any social impacts that may occur, especially those that 
affect the poor. However, once property rights are defined, property owners should feel assured that they 
will not be subject to arbitrary or capricious expropriation of their legally held property or the rights to the 
use or income from it. 
Public Ownership Challenges Where the government rather than the private sector owns natural 
resources, action by environmental ministries against the commercial activities of other branches 
of government can be particularly difficult. Often, national or regional policy priorities lie outside the 
environmental realm, and environmental agencies may not have sufficient political clout to bring about 
meaningful policies of any type. 
For economies transitioning from state ownership of property to a market economy, the government will 
need strong fiscal oversight ministries to: 
1.	 Manage	privatisation	effectively,	
2.	 Assign	initial	property	rights	fairly,	
3.	 Distribute	economic	instrument	subsidies	with	equity	and	efficiency,	and
4.	 Represent	the	public	interest	against	powerful	factional	opponents.	
3.2.4 Fiscal Systems 
A strong fiscal capability – the ability to collect taxes and allocate revenue – must be the norm especially for 
economic instruments such as pollution tax and user-fee-based systems to have any chance of success. 
 
It is common for environmental incentives to come into conflict with fiscal policies that have the effect of 
subsidizing greater emissions and resource extraction (in the name of economic development, for instance). 
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Even where political factions or powerful vested interest preclude true subsidy reform, identification and 
publication of existing perverse subsidies is an important step in achieving better decisions.
Removal or mitigation of such ‘perverse’ incentives should be an integral part of any policy package. 
Effective economic instruments require consistency in incentives to avoid offering such conflicting economic 
incentives. 
Owing to their dependence on fee collection or permit sales, many economic instruments rely more on 
functioning markets, tax collection, and fiscal payment systems than command and control instruments.
3.3 Nature and Extent of Environmental Problems
The first step in addressing any problem is to understand it. All too often policymakers rely on anecdotal or 
other informal information to understand the problem. This can be a serious mistake since precious public 
resources may be spent to address a minor problem instead of a much more severe problem. The nature 
and severity of the problem should determine the policy response to it. 
3.3.1 Evaluating Environmental Problems 
To determine the most appropriate instruments to address the environmental problems, policymakers 
must first determine the nature and extent of the problem. What is, for instance, the:
1.	 Nature	of	the	problem.	Is	it	overuse	of	a	resource	or	a	pollutant	problem?
2.	 Potential	effect	on	human	welfare	and	the	environment	including	the	nature	of	the	problem	over	time.	
(The	passage	of	time	becomes	important	if	one	is	interested	in	a	pollutant	that	bio-accumulates	in	the	
environment	or	if	a	natural	resource	is	irreversibly	degraded.)
3.	 Geographical	reach	of	the	affected	area.	Is	the	problem	a	local	or	regional	problem?	
4.	 Vertical	dimension	of	the	pollutant.	Are	the	effects	felt	on	the	surface	or	 in	the	upper	reaches	of	the	
atmosphere?
5.	 Number	of	people	 involved.	(The	damage	a	pollutant	causes	depends	very	much	on	the	number	of	
people	exposed	 to	 the	pollutant.	Similarly,	 the	magnitude	of	 the	welfare	 losses	associated	with	 the	
degradation	of	a	natural	resource	depends	on	the	number	of	people	involved.)
6.	 Number	 of	 stakeholders	 interested	 in	 a	 solution.	 This	 will	 affect	 the	 design	 of	 the	 implementation	
procedure	for	the	selected	policy	instrument.
3.3.2 Policy Implications
The nature and extent of environmental problems themselves place distinct policy constraints upon 
decision makers in a variety of ways. For instance:
•	 Economic	instruments	that	may	work	for	one	set	of	environmental	problems	in	one	country	may	not	be	
sufficient	to	address	a	more	severe	problem	in	another.	
•	 A	 less	developed	country	with	severe	environmental	problems	will	naturally	 face	greater	constraints	
than	a	developed	country	with	more	resources	and	fewer	problems.	
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•	 A	country	that	is	economically	dependent	upon	a	marginally	profitable	and	polluting	industry	will	have	
fewer	policy	options	than	countries	with	more	diverse	and	profitable	industries.	
•	 Policymakers	often	have	to	make	choices	among	which	environmental	problems	to	address,	because	
the	resources	are	not	available	to	address	all	of	the	issues	at	one	time.
3.4 The Economy, Culture and Population
Environmental problems can only be understood and addressed in the context of the larger economy and 
society. The state of economic development, cultural values, and population pressures, often constrains 
the options available to address environmental problems.
3.4.1 Economic Conditions 
The nature of a nation’s economy has a major impact on both the environmental problems and the policy 
responses available and required. Economic conditions provide the basic framework for all environmental 
protection and natural resources management policy. 
The level of economic development determines the type of environmental issues to be addressed and the 
effectiveness of the various environmental protection instruments available. Low levels of development will 
likely mean greater rural than urban environmental concerns. 
Less developed countries also have fewer available instruments to use. They have less tax base to enforce 
environmental protections laws and a restricted range of economic instruments that they can use. 
The industrial makeup of the economy is another critical factor in environmental policy. Many countries 
depend on one or a few major industries. Others have a diverse economic base. These conditions greatly 
impact the type of environmental instruments needed for environmental protection and natural resources 
management. Here are some examples of the environmental issues faced by differing industries:
Agriculture – Soil erosion, irrigation issues, groundwater pollution or depletion, loss of biodiversity, 
pesticide and herbicide build-up.
Mining – Destruction of habitat, water and air pollution, defacement of natural beauty.
Forestry or Fisheries – Depletion of resources, soil erosion, habitat destruction.
Heavy Manufacturing – Air and water pollution, health issues.
Tourism, Services, and Light Manufacturing – air pollution caused by auto emissions, water pollution 
caused by untreated sewage, and loss of natural beauty and recreational assets (beaches, wildlife parks, 
forest and mountain scenery, skiing facilities).
Rapid Economic Growth – while desirable for general welfare reasons, can obviously have harmful 
effects on the environment and natural resources. The policy constraint here is that neither government 
officials nor the general public are likely to support policies that appear to threaten economic growth. 
In section 2.5, we have already discussed ways to reconcile environmental protection efforts and economics 
growth by taking externalities into account. This is often called environmental accounting.2
2 For more information see Handbook of National Accounting: Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting – An Operational Manual, UNEP 
and UNSD (2001). 
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3.4.2 Vested Interests 
Just as weak governance institutions can reduce the likelihood of achieving sound environmental policies, 
so too can the presence of strong well-organized opposition with a vested interest either in the status quo, 
or in a specific pathway for the projected change. Evaluation should take place of which groups are most 
powerful and what their primary goal is likely to be. 
The pressures on policy makers from special interests can be immense. Whether they are small subsistence 
farmers or multinational corporations these groups will seek to protect their interests against any perceived 
or actual threat to their livelihoods or profits. 
The opportunities for corruption are great and, in the absence of effective government, those affected may 
simply choose to ignore environmental laws. The ability to work with interest groups and stakeholders in 
shaping and enforcing environmental policies is critical.
Groups with existing rights, whether actual or implied, often have considerable political power and will use 
it to fight changes to existing policies unless they can be convinced or compensated. 
However, many of these stakeholders have legitimate interests that should not be ignored. Any environmental 
authority will need an ability to work with various stakeholders to ensure that they receive a fair hearing.
3.4.3 Cultural Values 
Core cultural values often come into conflict with environmental protection and responsible natural resource 
management. If the owning of cattle, for instance is the key to individual wealth and social standing then 
regulating the number of cattle or where they can graze may meet strong opposition no matter what 
instruments are used to protect the environment or natural resources. 
The same is true for dietary preferences (e.g. eating hamburgers, whale meat, or certain species of fish). 
Despite the environmental damage, the market will remain strong because of such preferences. 
External demand for local products – rhinoceros horn, ivory, tropical hardwoods – that result from 
foreign cultural preferences and provide substantial income for local people, also impose constraints on 
environmental policy.
Such deeply felt values can undermine any efforts. Cultural constraints are not insurmountable but must be 
addressed with care and sensitivity. A mix of education, economic incentives, and command and control 
instruments are often required to address these constraints. 
3.4.4 Demographic Conditions 
Rapid population growth or sustained high levels of population, especially in rural areas, offer an especially 
difficult challenge to environmental policymakers. Certain economic activities – farming, fishing, forestry, 
charcoal manufacture etc – that are sustainable at lower levels can become unsustainable as population 
grows and as a consequence the level of economic activity increases. 
Problems include soil erosion, destruction of natural habitat, population crashes among exploited fish 
species or wildlife, and increases in stock pollutants beyond the carrying capacity of the environment.
Population pressure is a particularly thorny issue for environmental policymakers. Again, there is no single 
policy or instrument that can solve the problem. Family planning education, economic instruments to 
encourage alternative, less polluting economic development, and direct economic incentives to protect 
endangered areas or species may be used in combination to overcome this constraint.
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Module 3  Group Exercise
Analyse Policy Context of Identified Environmental  
Problems (Handout)
Objective
For the environmental problems identified by the group exercise in Module 1, describe how the 
various elements of policy context would affect the problem. 
Instructions
•	 Return	to	groups	formed	in	Module	1.
•	 	Discuss	the	policy	context	of	the	environmental	problem	identified	by	your	group	in	Module	1,	
addressing the questions provided below.
•	 Jointly	prepare	a	presentation	and	select	a	speaker.
•	 Present	your	results	in	the	plenary.
Questions for Group Discussion
What are the baseline legal and administrative conditions in the country?
What is the economic context of the problem?
Who are the main stakeholders? What are their interests? 
What is the role of vested interests?
Do special cultural and demographic conditions affect the problem?
!
?
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Command and Control Instruments1
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1 This Module is based on Sterner, T (2003). Policy Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management. Washington DC: Resources for 
the Future, World Bank and FAO, pp. 74-81.
Module 4
G O A L
L E A R N I N G  O B j E C T I V E
To review the three main command and control instruments for 
environmental and natural resource management.
By the end of this module, participants should be able to explain 
how command and control instrument(s) could be used to help 
solve environmental problems and explain the reasons for the 
choice of instrument(s).
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4.1 Defining Terms
Public Good: A product or service that is available to the general public - payers and non-payers alike. 
(“Good” in this sense means “product or service” rather than “virtue or benefit.”) Use of the good by one 
person does not prevent use by others – e.g. national defence, a clean environment, and public fireworks 
displays. Private businesses can’t sell public goods in markets, because they cannot charge a price and 
keep non-paying people away. 
Technology: Any method of performing a task. There are technologies for the generation of electricity, 
making charcoal, fishing and all other economic activities. Technology regulation may cover both the 
equipment and processes used for any economic activity. The regulation of technology is one means of 
controlling pollution or overuse of natural resources. 
Regulation of Technology: Bans or restrictions on specific technologies that cause pollution or deplete 
natural resources (e.g. ban on the production and use of unleaded petrol). 
Zoning: Regulation of the uses of real property to achieve environmental protection in specific locations. 
Zoning designates permitted uses of land based on mapped zones, and hence can restrict certain types 
of economic activity in specific zones, for example because of noxious emissions, destruction of natural 
scenery, high noise levels, etc.
Regulation of Performance: Command and control policies that impose directly enforced limits on 
the quantity of emissions or harvest of a renewable resource for each individual or firm. The resulting 
performance standards target individual levels of emissions or natural resource exploitation rather than 
requiring or prohibiting particular technologies. 
Transferable Emission Permits: Tradable permits specifically designed to reduce polluting emissions.
Tradable Permits: Economic instruments used to address environmental problems by requiring each 
polluter or resource user to obtain permits for the amount of pollution he or she releases. Permits are 
issued in units of pollutants or rights to harvest a natural resource and may be bought and sold in an 
open market. The government sets the total number of permits at a level to reduce pollution or protect 
sustainable levels of a renewable resource. Permit holders have an incentive to reduce emissions or curb 
harvesting in order to sell excess permits. 
4.2 Direct Provision of Public Goods
The purpose of the direct provision of public goods is to maintain environmental or natural resource quality 
through direct public expenditure. In this context “good” means “product or service” rather than “virtue or 
benefit.” A public good is one that is difficult to keep non-payers from consuming, and use of the good by 
one person does not prevent use by others. 
4.2.1 Examples of Public Goods Provided 
Examples include national defence, universal public education, and a clean environment. Private businesses 
can’t sell public goods in markets, because they cannot charge a price and keep non-paying people away. 
Public goods are paid for by governments because there is no way a private business can profitably 
produce them. For efficiency, governments usually pay for public goods through taxes or fees.
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In the environmental arena, the government (e.g. through its environmental protection agency) takes direct 
responsibility for solving a particular environmental or natural resource management problem for which the 
market cannot successfully provide a universal solution. Examples include:
•	 Street	cleaning
•	 Disease	vector	(e.g.	mosquito)	control	
•	 Maintenance	of	urban	water	and	sewer	systems
•	 Maintenance	of	natural	parks	and	nature	preserves
Such activities, of course, can also be carried out by private companies but only at the behest of the 
government or quasi-government organization (e.g. a homeowners association), which becomes the sole 
customer for the service.
4.2.2 Potential Drawbacks of Direct Services
Direct government provision of environmental services is susceptible to the usual problems that confront 
the provision of public goods. In particular, because the government is providing a public good, it is likely 
to under supply, more so in countries with weak governance structures and low tax bases. Also, free 
provision of some public goods such as fresh water will result in overuse by consumers and can lead to 
exploitation of valuable resources. 
Since provision of public goods is often done by political agents allocating public tax money to specific 
projects, politicians may seek to expand the definition of public goods to subsidize particular constituencies. 
In addition, political access and power influences which of the many possible projects get funded, and how 
quickly. The projects of greatest need from a social or environmental point of view may differ markedly from 
those with the strongest political constituencies or greatest political return for the public official.
Nevertheless, for many problems the direct provision of public goods for the protection of the environment 
and natural resources is unavoidable.
4.3 Regulation of Technology
At base a technology is any method of performing a task. There are technologies for the generation of 
electricity, making charcoal, fishing and all other economic activities. The regulation of technology allows 
governments and their environmental agencies to ban or restrict specific technologies that cause pollution 
or deplete natural resources. Conversely they may require the use of technologies that reduce emissions 
or prevent overuse of natural resources. 
4.3.1 Designating Technologies 
Through the regulation of technology, the government attempts to choose the optimal production or 
abatement technology as its policy instrument. By designing a standard, the regulator (typically the 
government through its environmental protection agency) can prescribe the technology that firms and 
households have to use, prevent their use altogether, or prescribe the conditions under which a polluting 
technology can operate. Regulations may require the use of the “best available” or “state-of-the-art” 
technology to ensure that polluters adopt improvements as technology changes. 
In certain cases, it is appropriate for the government to designate specific technologies. The government 
can charge polluters with using ‘unnecessarily’ polluting technology. In such cases the concern is not only 
the pollution as such but the comparison with other industries or an alternative proven technology. 
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For example, consider the case where public service minibuses are emitting a lot of smoke yet simple 
observation may show that other minibuses do not emit as much smoke. The regulator can therefore 
require the polluting minibus to cut down on its smoke emissions using available cleaner technology.
This approach has a number of variations as indicated by their names:
•	 Best	Practical	Technology	(BPT),
•	 Best	Available	Technology	Not	Entailing	Excessive	Cost	(BATNEEC),
•	 Best	Available	Control	Technology	(BACT),	or	simply
•	 Best	Available	Technology	(BAT).
4.3.2 Zoning 
In some cases, governments or its environmental agencies may restrict the location of the use of technology. 
To do this they use zoning laws to regulate where firms may use certain technologies because they 
generate excess noise, odours, or potential exposure to hazardous materials in populated areas. On the 
other hand, these same technologies may be zoned for use in areas where the effects can be absorbed 
without excessive damage to the environment or natural resources. 
4.3.3 Uses of Technology Regulation 
Technology standards have been employed for a whole range of purposes including:
Automobile Emissions Control where mandatory installation of catalytic converters on new cars is now 
almost universal.
Regulation of Nuclear Power where damages from accidents would be high. Here, the goal is zero 
emissions. Plants are regulated not only by being given maximum emission levels (zero); they usually must 
comply with more detailed and specific technology requirements, such as multiple control systems and 
specific kinds of hazardous material containment.
Natural Resource Management where in fishing, for example, the use of cyanide and dynamite are 
banned. Similarly, in agriculture and forestry, examples of technology regulation include the banning of 
certain pest control techniques or mandating replanting trees after harvest. Regulations can also require 
the construction of soil bunds and terraces to prevent soil erosion, or the use of fallow periods or tillage 
technology.
The regulation of technology through design standards is particularly appropriate under the following 
conditions:
•	 Technical	and	ecological	information	about	the	environmental	problem	to	be	resolved	is	complex.
•	 Crucial	knowledge	is	available	at	the	government	rather	than	at	the	firm	level	so	that	the	overall	impact	
of	the	regulation	can	be	estimated	but	not	the	effect	at	the	individual	or	firm	level.
•	 Firms	are	unresponsive	to	price	signals	(e.g.,	a	firm	could	be	operating	in	a	non-competitive	setting),	or	
investments	to	improve	environmental	practices	are	large	and	have	little	benefit	to	the	individual	firm.
•	 Standardization	of	technology	could	hold	some	major	advantages	for	both	producers	and	the	general	
public	as	in	the	case	of	catalytic	converters.
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•	 One	design	or	technology	is	definitely	superior	to	others	available,	making	its	mandated	implementation	
the	best	alternative.
•	 Monitoring	costs	are	high	so	that	monitoring	emissions	is	more	difficult	than	monitoring	technology.
4.3.4 Attraction of Technology Regulation 
Mandatory technology design standards are the most commonly used environmental control instruments 
because they have an intuitive simplicity and they appeal to the desire of policymakers to quickly address 
(if not solve) the problem at hand. 
Use of technology regulation - in appropriate circumstances- can provide clarity of choice, economy of 
administration, effective control, and ease of monitoring. Design standards are also useful in circumstances, 
where considerations other than efficiency (e.g., ease of inspection and estimation of effects) may be of 
overriding concern. 
Finally, both regulators and polluters often prefer the use of technology regulation because it is easier 
to understand and comply with than more indirect methods of pollution control or natural resource 
management. Such regulation seems intuitively fair because everyone engaged in a certain activity is 
required to use (or is prohibited from using) the same technology. 
4.3.5 Potential Drawbacks of Technology Regulation 
One drawback of technology regulation is its inflexibility. Since it is not possible for the regulator to have 
information about individual abatement levels or appropriate technologies for each firm, the government 
will designate a standard technology for all polluters (e.g., catalytic converters, filters or chimneys). 
The regulations usually prevent a given firm or individual from using an alternative technology even though 
it may be more effective in a given circumstance. As a result, firms have little incentive to develop better 
technology. Further, the “Best Available Technology” concept may tend to encourage ‘end of the pipe’ 
solutions.
4.4 Regulation of Performance
Regulation of performance imposes directly enforced government limits on the quantity of emissions or 
harvest of a renewable resource for each individual or firm. The resulting performance standards target 
individual levels of emissions or natural resource exploitation rather than requiring or prohibiting particular 
technologies. 
4.4.1 Performance Standards
In establishing performance standards, the regulator chooses the maximum allowable emissions or 
harvest for each firm or individual polluter. As such, performance standards are significantly different from 
technology regulation because they give firms flexibility in the choice of abatement method by which to 
meet the mandated goal. They also leave the firm a choice between reducing output levels and increasing 
abatement level per unit of production. They may also allow trade-offs between polluting units within 
a firm.
Experience has shown that the regulation of performance can lead to increasingly effective solutions to 
environmental problems. For example, technology for removing effluent gases from motor vehicle exhausts 
as government emission performance standards have tightened over time. 
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4.4.2 Tradable Emissions Permits 
Tradable emission permits (discussed in detail in Module 7), are a variant of the performance standards 
instrument. In this situation, the regulator sets a cap on the maximum amount of emissions for all firms 
and households - which is a command-and control approach - and then issues permits for a set number 
of emissions units to each firm or individual. These permits can then be traded in the open market, 
using tradable permits as an economic instrument. Likewise, in fisheries management, a variant of this 
instrument is also used to set a cap on the maximum amount of fish that can be removed from a fishery 
in total and by individual license amounts.
4.4.3 Zero Emissions 
One particular type of performance standard that deserves special attention is zero emissions or total 
bans. Such bans may be called for since any level of a given substance may be harmful to human health or 
harmful to endangered species. Ease of monitoring may explain the popularity of total bans, even in cases 
where some level of emission or harvest might be possible. Total bans are most often used for radioactive 
materials, dangerous pesticides, heavy metals (cadmium, lead) and toxic chemicals as well as the trade 
in ivory and endangered species.
4.4.4 Potential Problems with Performance Regulation
One problem with controlling individual emissions rates such as those set for new cars is that they do not 
imply full control on total levels of pollution or ambient pollution levels. This is because total pollution levels 
depend both on the output for each agent and the number of agents operating in the economy. 
Even if each polluter produces no more than the permitted amount of pollutant, the total pollutant load 
will exceed desirable levels when there are too many individual polluters. The same is true with natural 
resources management where the total harvest (e.g. grazing level, fish catch, tree cutting) can become 
unsustainable if there are too many harvesters, even though each harvester only extracts his or her 
permitted amount of the resource. 
Another problem issue associated with performance regulation is that regulation of individual performance 
can be costly because every individual polluter or user must have his or her emissions or usage 
inspected.
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1 The Module is based on UNEP (2004): The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental Policy: Opportunities and Challenges. See also Annex II of 
this manual for A	Primer	on	Economic	Instruments.
Introduction to Economic Instruments1
Note: The	next	four	modules	will	present	the	various	economic	instruments	available	to	solve	environmental	problems.	
After	Module	8,	a	case	study	group	exercise	is	suggested	to	review	the	material	covered	in	Modules	5	to	8.	At	the	end	
of	Module	10,	participants	will	have	another	review	opportunity	in	a	final	group	exercise	building	on	the	exercises	of	
Modules	1	and	3.	Participants	will	be	expected	to	present	the	economic	instrument(s)	that	could	be	applied	to	solve	
an	environmental	problem	and	the	reasons	for	their	choice.
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Module 5
G O A L
L E A R N I N G  O B j E C T I V E
To introduce the three broad categories of economic instruments, 
review the functional objectives of economic instruments, and 
describe the benefits of economic instruments.
By the end of this module, participants should be able to explain 
certain advantages of economic instruments and possible 
objectives that they could achieve. 
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5.1 Defining Terms
Price-Based Instruments: Special government taxes, charges, or fees designed to raise the price of 
polluting the environment or exploiting natural resources. These policies attempt to set the price for users 
of environmental and natural resources ‘right’ to cover the excess social and environmental costs caused 
by the economic activities of polluters or natural resource users. 
Pollution and overuse of renewable natural resources impose costs on society, which are not borne by 
the private firms and individuals that cause them and which the market does not account for. These costs 
are a type of externality. Appropriate pricing of resources through price-based instruments sends a more 
accurate signal to users encouraging more appropriate resource consumption and conservation. 
Subsidies: Payments or other economic incentives (e.g. tax breaks) to individuals or firms to compensate 
expenses incurred through environmentally friendly behaviour, thus encouraging this behaviour.
Perverse Subsidies: Payments such as those that promote certain kinds of economic development 
or support specific industries (fishing, forestry, etc.) that cause environmental damage. Removal of such 
subsidies constitutes an economic instrument for environmental and natural resource protection.
Property Rights Based Instruments: Policy instruments that define, adjust, or create property rights 
to ameliorate environmental damage. They define the basic enforceable law for ownership and use of 
both tangible (e.g. land) and intangible (e.g. permits) property. More specific instruments include tradable 
emission permits in pollution management, individual transferable quotas in fisheries management, 
transferable grazing rights in range management, and transferable development rights in property 
management. 
Legal Instruments: Policy instruments that hold individuals and organizations liable for environmental 
damage they cause. Legal instruments include criminal penalties, fines, civil liability statues, and performance 
bonds.
Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Formal negotiated agreements between companies or groups 
of companies and the government (or on some occasions nongovernmental environmental groups) to limit 
pollution or the overuse of natural resources. Such agreements allow the parties to avoid specific legislation 
or intrusive government regulation or legislation and provide the flexibility that comes with negotiated 
agreements. Such agreements are backed by the threat of government sanctions if the parties do not 
adhere to the agreements.
Information-Based Instruments: Methods of informing the public about how eco-friendly a product is. 
This can be done by labelling, rating, or other techniques. Information-based instruments may also include 
widespread public education programmes on anti-littering or energy conservation or other high profile 
campaigns.
Internalising Externalities: Raising the internal costs to the producer to cover the external costs to 
society of pollution or natural resource exploitation.
Self-Enforcement: A situation in which those regulated by a policy have an interest in seeing that the 
laws and regulations are enforced. For example, groups given communal property in perpetuity have an 
incentive to ensure that other people do not encroach on the land, and assets are managed for the long 
term.
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Transparency: A situation in which information about decisions and actions of the government and those 
regulated is available to the general public. Transparency is essential for the functioning of most economic 
instruments.
Compliance Costs: The costs for the polluter or natural resource user of complying with an environmental 
policy. Such costs need to be factored in when determining cost effectiveness of a policy instrument.
Cost Effectiveness: A situation where the environmental benefit of an economic instrument exceeds the 
overall cost of managing or enforcing the policy.
5.2 Types of Economic Instruments
Economic instruments provide financial incentives for polluters and natural resource users to reduce 
output of pollutants and unsustainable use of natural resources. There are three basic types of such 
instruments:2
Price-Based Instruments. These instruments raise the price of pollution and use of natural resources. 
They include direct taxation, input and output taxation, emission or access charges, refunded emissions 
payments, deposit refunds, subsidies and removal of perverse subsidies. 
Property Rights Based Instruments. These instruments define, adjust, or create property rights to 
ameliorate environmental damage. They define the basic enforceable law for ownership and use of both 
tangible (e.g. land) and intangible (e.g. permits) property. More specific instruments include tradable emission 
permits in pollution management, individual transferable quotas in fisheries management, transferable 
grazing rights in range management, and transferable development rights in property management.
Legal, Voluntary and Information-Based Instruments. Legal instruments hold individuals and 
organizations liable for environmental damage they cause. They include criminal penalties, fines, civil 
liability statues, and performance bonds. Voluntary and information-based instruments include voluntary 
environmental agreements, information campaigns, eco-labelling, and other certification. 
In economic terms, economic instruments internalise externalities (environmental costs) through increasing 
the prices that individuals and industries must pay to use resources or to emit pollutants. As pollution or the 
use of natural resources become more expensive, polluters and consumers have strong financial incentives 
to reduce such activities through conservation, substitution of materials, or rationalizing consumption.
5.3 Functions of Economic Instruments3
Every tool has its use. A hammer is good for driving nails but not for swatting flies. The same is true with 
economic instruments. The function of each instrument – how it works - will determine its best use, alone 
or in combination with other policy tools.
2 Different classifications of economic instruments are available. Some authors differentiate market creation (e.g. tradable permits), fiscal instruments 
(taxes and tax breaks), liability systems, self-regulation and persuasive instruments; see Panayotou (1998): Instruments of Change, Motivating and 
Financing Sustainable Development. Earthscan.
3 Annex III provides detailed descriptions of the various functions of economic instruments and their impact on incentives of firms and individuals. 
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The range of possible economic instruments available is large and potentially confusing for policymakers. 
Familiarity with the functions of different instruments helps policymakers identify those appropriate for a 
given environmental problem. 
Economic instruments are basically structured to achieve some mixture of three main functions:
•	 Redressing	 problems	 with	 property	 rights	 that	 contribute	 to	 pollution	 or	 poor	 stewardship	 of	
resources;	
•	 Establishing	and	enforcing	prices	for	resources	consumed	and	environmental	damage	associated	with	
production;	and	
•	 Subsidizing	the	transition	to	preferred	behaviours.
5.3.1 Establish, Clarify or Improve Property Rights 
Property rights are society’s way of spelling out who may do what with which resources during a certain 
period of time. Property rights may be assigned by tradition, force or impartial law. The first is vague, the 
second unjust, and the third essential to the functioning of economic instruments. Property rights laws, 
openly arrived at and fairly enforced, serve essential functions in the management of the environment. (See 
Module 3 for a detailed discussion of need for property rights law.)4 
Property rights-related economic instruments establish, clarify, and improve rights to the ownership and 
use of property. By using such instruments society is assured that it will have fundamental control of 
natural resources and environmental assets. Property rights may be individual, corporate, or communal. 
(Communal property rights can provide secure tenure to impoverished indigenous population groups.)
In general, property rights-related economic instruments allow owners to invest in resources and to extract 
or harvest them at a sustainable rate. Owners can also be held accountable for pollution created on their 
property. More specifically, property rights related instruments have four major functions. These are to:
Establish property rights where none existed before. This enables the government to establish clear 
rules for access to resources and to control overuse. 
Clarify rights among competing claims for the same property. Ensuring that property rights are clear 
to all parties adds security and flexibility to the management of natural resources by removing pressures to 
‘get what you can’ while it is still there.
Modify existing property rights to protect resources and the environment; and
Create the conditions for the trading of intangible property, e.g. through the use of tradable permits. 
This creates markets for un-priced natural resources and environmental services providing incentives for 
sustainable management and use (for further detail see row 1 of Annex III).
Note that in economic terms, the existence of clearly defined property rights is necessary to achieve 
efficiency. In contrast, how the property rights are assigned is a question of distribution. Establishing 
property rights increases efficiency and therefore overall wealth; allocating property rights distributes 
property and hence wealth. Policy makers can take use of the independence of these two functions, 
especially when issues of poverty matter in environmental decision making.
4 Having laws on the books is necessary but not sufficient in itself. Arbitrarily promulgated and enforced laws are the same as the rule by naked force. In 
either circumstance economic instruments for the management of the environment and natural resources will be difficult to apply.
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5.3.2 Finance Costs of Pollution and Resource Use
Fees and taxes are the public sector’s version of prices. Their function is the same: to recover the cost of 
providing goods and services from the groups that use them. In case of economic instruments the costs 
being recovered are the costs of environmental damage or exploitation of natural resources. 
Some fees and taxes are intended to raise the price high enough to discourage pollution and overuse of 
natural resources (taxes on smokestack emissions, grazing fees). Other taxes and fees are set at a level 
high enough to cover the direct cost of providing an environmental service (e.g. provision of clean water 
supply and sewage treatment).
The most efficient solutions in an economic sense occur when fees function to recover both the direct 
government services costs and the environmental costs associated with producing and using a particular 
product or asset. However, political realities often prevent this outcome and measures with more limited 
functions must be adopted. The following are some price-based functions and the instruments associated 
with them: 
5.3.2.1 Recovery of the Costs of Government Provided Services. Public sector environmental 
services providers often fail to recover the basic costs of providing their services. Users then come to 
expect drinking water, sewage treatment or electricity to be heavily subsidized or free. User fees set to 
recover the full costs of providing a service can correct this problem. 
Certainly, governments should take care to design rate schedules to ensure that the poor have continued 
access to life sustaining services. But there is little economic or environmental logic in subsidizing all 
customers (for further detail see row 2A of Annex III).
5.3.2.2 Assurance of Adequate Return on Sale or Lease of Public Assets. When governments 
choose to sell or lease assets, be they oil reserves in the ground, expansive government owned enterprises 
(e.g. electrical generating stations or oil refining facilities) or leased grasslands, it is crucial that these sales 
earn appropriate returns on invested public capital, or on the sale of limited resources. 
When proceeds are earmarked at least in part to environmental protection measures, the environmental 
benefits can be further expanded. Unfortunately, such sales or leases have all too often been used as 
financial payoffs to political supporters (for further detail see row 2B of Annex III).
5.3.2.3 Compensation for Environmental Damage. Pollution taxes, fees, security bonds, and deposit 
refund systems all function to ensure that polluters bear the costs for polluting the environment. These 
economic instruments amount to a charge for the use of the public resource of environmental quality (for 
further detail see row 2C of Annex III).
5.3.3 Subsidize Sustainable Alternatives
Economic instruments can be used to subsidize environmentally superior alternatives to current practice, 
which are not – or not yet – competitive in the market. If done properly, such efforts can accelerate the 
development of these alternatives. However, great care is needed to ensure that subsidies are appropriately 
targeted, only applied in the short-term, and don’t end up making the problem worse instead of better 
(for further detail see row 3 of Annex III).
The table Annex III, to which the above sections refer, offers a detailed listing of the functions of economic 
instruments, their impact on the incentives or firms and individuals, examples of instruments for each 
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function, and factors to be considered in using the different economic instruments to serve a given 
function.
5.4 Benefits of Economic Instruments
Economic instruments possess a number of inherent advantages over command and control instruments 
for many problems. Compared to command and control instruments, they generally provide more:
1.	 Cost-effectiveness	and	flexibility,	
2.	 Incentives	to	use	innovative	abatement	technologies,
3.	 Allocation	of	natural	resources	to	parties	who	value	them	most,
4.	 Self-enforcement	by	aligning	public	and	private	interests,
5.	 Transparency,	and
6.	 Cost	recovery	for	publicly	provided	services.
Although economic instruments cannot overcome a corrupt or weak political structure, they can help 
make moderately functioning governance structures work more effectively.
5.4.1 Cost-Effectiveness and Flexibility
Economic instruments can reduce the overall cost of achieving emissions reduction and protection of 
natural resources because they are less expensive to administer and more flexible in application than 
command and control instruments. In short, they can offer outstanding gains in cost-effectiveness when 
compared to command and control instruments.
Empirical studies from the United States (US) have shown that the efficiency gains associated with using 
economic instruments have been substantial. Tietenberg suggests, for instance, that command and 
control cost approaches to regulate air pollution were as much as 22 times more expensive than the least 
expensive economic instruments. For the eleven applications studied, command and control approaches 
were on average six times as expensive. 
Similarly, Anderson et	 al	 estimated that as of 1992, economic instruments for air, water and land 
pollution within the US had saved more than $11 billion (US) relative to a command and control baseline.5 
Assessments of economic instruments in multiple countries by the Organisation of Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) also form strong evidence of cost savings.6
5 For further information see: Hahn, Robert (1999). The impact of Environmental Policy, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working 
Paper 99-4.
6 For further information see: OECD (1997). Evaluation Economic Instruments for Environmental Policy. The OECD analysed numerous empirical studies 
on the efficiency gains associated with economic instruments, finding fairly strong evidence of beneficial impacts. The gains associated with any specific 
economic instrument, however, would be highly influenced by the specifics of the tool applied and the political context in which it was used.
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The cost savings of economic instruments comes, in part, from their more flexible nature, which allows 
firms to decide on the timing and magnitude of abatement measures. Rather than forcing every firm to 
meet specific and rigid emissions levels, economic instruments can ensure that the overall economy hits 
a particular pollution level, while allowing the market to determine which specific firms control how much 
pollution.
 
This flexibility encourages industries in which emissions reductions are less costly to cut emissions more 
than required, reducing the economy wide cost of meeting a specific target level. 
With economic instruments, compliance costs usually continue to fall over time. This is a result of improved 
incentives for polluters or natural resource users to monitor the compliance of others, and also of incentives 
to invest in and test new control technologies. 
These savings, in turn, make higher levels of environmental protection more affordable. This means that 
for a given environmental budget, economic instruments can buy more environmental protection than 
command and control instruments. 
Flexibility in implementation extends to the timing of upgrades as well. The ability to purchase emissions 
credits, for instance, or to pay pollution taxes as an alternative to controlling emissions directly allows firms 
to coordinate their compliance more closely with the normal capital replacement cycle of the plant. This 
reduces premature capital equipment replacement and additional plant shutdown time. 
In reducing the cost of environmental controls for industry relative to alternative policies, economic 
instruments have a less detrimental effect on the competition of domestic industries with international 
firms, and allow domestic firms to respond more flexibly to such competition.
Governments enjoy more flexibility with economic instruments as well. If the market does not sufficiently 
reduce emissions or control overuse of natural resources, government can adjust economic instruments 
by either increasing fees or decreasing permits. Such a process is generally much easier than legislating 
changes to command and control regulatory standards. 
Box III-5-1 gives a worked out example on the algebra of the cost effectiveness of economic 
instruments.
5.4.2 Incentives to Use Innovative Abatement Technologies
Because firms can exceed targeted pollution levels by paying extra taxes or fees,7 they face much lower 
risk from trying emerging technologies that may not work perfectly at first and miss the target control level. 
However, over a longer period of time, these unproven techniques often lead to more effective and less 
expensive control approaches. 
Since excess reductions in emission or use of resources through improved technologies have financial 
value (e.g. revenues from selling emission permits to others or lower pollution tax bills), firms have a 
continued incentive to innovate even if they are already in compliance.
An additional benefit of innovation is that when environmental technology innovations in the areas of 
pollution control reach profitability they offer the potential for the creation of new domestic industries. 
7 Under certain economic instruments, polluters pay for every unit of pollution emitted into the environment. Consequently, a polluter who wishes to 
pollute beyond his/her current level is free to do so, as long as extra units of pollution are paid for.
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5.4.3 Efficient Allocation of Natural Resources 
Economic instruments that auction access to publicly-owned resources - oil, minerals, timber, grazing 
land, etc. - enable those who value the resources most to obtain them. If structured properly, auction-
based economic instruments encourage more sustainable use of flow resources (such as grasslands and 
water) and more careful use of stock resources (such as oil and coal), in addition to raising revenues for 
the government. In contrast, command and control instruments often allocate resources uniformly without 
consideration of their relative value to different groups.
One important concern regarding market-based transfers is that if they are structured improperly (such as 
when assets are transferred in rigged auctions or other corrupt methods at a fraction of true value; or when 
bonding for post extraction remediation is not done), resource depletion can actually be accelerated.
5.4.4 Self-Enforcement by Aligning Public and Private Interests
Economic instruments that align public and private interest provide strong incentives for self-enforcement. 
Firms and individuals are given a vested interest in the proper use of resources and in emitting only as much 
pollution as allowed. The effect is to create a more decentralized enforcement system for environmental 
policies, therefore reducing the enforcement burden to the state.
For example, firms that wish to sell excess pollution rights will actively market to firms that need to buy 
rights. Similarly, groups given communal property in perpetuity have a greater incentive to ensure that 
other people do not encroach on the land, and to manage assets for the long term, if only to protect the 
lease or sale value of these rights. 
5.4.5 Increased Transparency
Command and control instruments often generate complex permit and reporting requirements. The 
government and regulated firms too often hold this information closely and make it difficult for outside 
parties to obtain the information and analyse the effectiveness of the programmes. 
In contrast, the information associated with many economic instruments (pollution taxes, marketable 
permits) is more visible through openly reported trading levels, prices, and fee receipts. As a result, 
evaluating investment trade-offs is easier to do, and lobbying for special privileges or exceptions becomes 
difficult. 
5.4.6 Cost Recovery for Publicly-Provided Services 
Publicly owned or delivered resources such as drinking water or oil-drilling rights can be sold at market 
prices, or at least at levels that recover the full cost of providing them. Such sales generate revenue that can 
be used to finance continued provision of government services and encourage increased conservation. 
Cost recovery policies sometimes require subsidies to mitigate the impact of charges on the poor or other 
adversely affected parties. However, even given such subsidies, well managed cost recovery for public 
services can help finance expansion of public services - such as delivery of clean water - to areas without 
adequate services.
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Box III-5-1: The Algebra of Cost-Effectiveness
This example gives insight in the mathematical calculations that lie behind cost- 
effectiveness. It requires, however, some knowledge of calculus.
Suppose that two firms can control emissions at the following marginal costs: MC1	=	$200q1 and 
MC2	=	$200q2, where q1 and q2 is, respectively, the amount of emissions reductions by the first and 
second firm. Suppose that with no control at all, each firm would be emitting 20 units of emissions 
or a total of 40 units for both firms. Suppose the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) now 
demands that the two firms together should only emit 19 units of emissions in total (i.e., a reduction 
of 21 units of emissions is necessary).
One way to achieve this reduction is for the EPA is to require the two firms to share the burden of 
pollution reduction equally in the mould of a command and control. That is to say, each firm reduces 
emissions by 10.5 units. Calculating the total cost of this allocation of abatement responsibility is a 
simple problem of algebra.
We know from the theory of the firm that the total cost to firm 1 [and likewise to firm 2] is calculated 
by integrating their respective marginal cost functions. Thus:
This means that the total cost of equal reductions would be $ 16,537.50.
Alternatively, the EPA can tell the two firms ‘all I want is a total reduction of 21 units of emissions. 
How you share this reduction among the two of you is your problem’. In this case, the two firms will 
take advantage of the knowledge that firm 2 can abate pollution much cheaper than firm 1 in sharing 
abatement responsibility. It would make economic sense for firm 2 to do more abatement than firm 
1, on the understanding that firm 1 would compensate firm 2 for doing the extra abatement. 
To see this point, suppose that firm 1 abates a marginal unit of pollution at $ 200 whereas firm 2 
abates the same unit at $ 100. It is clear that firm 2 would accept to abate a unit of pollution from 
firm 1 for any amount strictly greater than $ 100. Likewise, firm 1 would be willing to pay firm 2 any 
amount strictly less than $ 200 to abate that unit of pollution. It follows that there is scope for trade 
in emissions reductions between the two firms by the use of economic instruments. With this in 
mind, how can one compute the cost effective allocation of abatement responsibility?
A fundamental result in pollution economics states that cost-effectiveness is achieved when firms 
equalize their marginal abatement costs [on this, see Tietenberg (1992), pp. 369-376]. Thus, the 
two firms would have to jointly solve the following problem:
$200q1 = $100q2 [Equal marginal cost condition]
q1 + q2 = 21 [The two firms together must abate 21 units of emissions]
MC1 =$200q1 => TC1 = TC1 = ∫
0
10.5
 (200q1)dq1 = 100q	12 0
10.5 = $11,025.00
MC1 =$200q1 => TC1 = TC1 = ∫
0
10.5
 (100q2)dq2 = 50q22 0
10.5 = $5,512.50 
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Solving the second equation for q2 and substituting this expression in the first equation, we get 
an equation with q1 as the only unknown. This gives us q1 = 7, which we can use in the second 
equation to obtain q2=14. Hence, at the cost-efficient allocation, firm 1 would abate 7 units of 
pollution while firm 2 would abate 14 units of pollution. The total cost incurred by firm 1 would 
be $4,900 and that incurred by firm 2 would be $9,800. The total cost of pollution abatement to  
the economy is $14,700. These numbers can be calculated by replacing the upper boundary of 
10.5 with 7 for firm one and with 14 for firm two in the integral expression above.
Conclusion: By using economic instruments, the economy saves a total of $1,837.50 in pollution 
abatement costs.
Source:	Tietenberg, T. (1992), p. 389.
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1 This module is based on Sterner, T (2003): Policy instruments for environmental and natural resource management. Washington DC: Resources for 
the Future, World Bank and FAO, pp. 94-108.
Price-Based Instruments1
Module 6
G O A L
L E A R N I N G  O B j E C T I V E
To present the key features of price-based instruments. 
By the end of this module, participants should be able to define 
price-based instruments and tell when to use them. 
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6.1 Defining Terms
Price-Based Instruments: Special government taxes, charges, or fees designed to raise the price of 
polluting the environment or exploiting natural resources. These policies attempt to set the price for users 
of environmental and natural resources ‘right’ to cover the excess social and environmental costs caused 
by the economic activities of polluters or natural resource users. 
Pollution and overuse of renewable natural resources impose costs on society, which are not borne by 
the private firms and individuals that cause them and which the market does not account for. These costs 
are a type of externality. Appropriate pricing of resources through price-based instruments sends a more 
accurate signal to users encouraging more appropriate resource consumption and conservation. 
Pigovian Tax: A tax levied to correct the negative externalities of a market activity (after the economist 
A. C. Pigou). This can be for example an environmental tax or a sin tax (taxes on alcohol or cigarettes). A 
true Pigovian tax would charge polluters precisely the cost their pollution imposes on society. 
Pollution Taxes and Charges: Levies on pollution that seek to internalise externalities of pollution by 
increasing the price of a polluting activity. They intend to shift the costs of pollution that would otherwise 
be borne by society back to the polluter. Governments can apply taxes and charges in cases where they 
are able to monitor and tax the polluting activity (e.g. sewage effluent or smokestack emissions).
Natural Resource Use Fees: Price-based instruments such as mining royalties, stumpage fees, user 
fees, and land taxes used for natural resource management. Governments impose these fees and taxes 
to correct market failures (any externalities related to resource use) or institutional failure (the absence of 
property rights). 
Rent: An economics term meaning profit in excess of what would be possible under a perfectly competitive 
market. (Not to be confused with what an apartment dweller pays a landlord). Monopolies are able to 
charge rent prices because they have no competition. Government regulation and legislation can protect 
rent prices for designated beneficiaries as well.
Scarcity Rent: A form of rent income (excess profit) that accrues to an owner of a natural resource just 
because the resource is scarce. In the absence of property rights – i.e. of private ownership - there is 
no owner to claim the scarcity rent, and the resource is exploited because its price does not reflect the 
scarcity. In those cases, price-based instruments such as mining royalties (a payment to the state for the 
right of use of a state’s mineral resources), stumpage fees (a fee typically charged by the government to 
logging companies for the right to harvest lumber from public land), or user fees (fees charged to users of 
goods or services provided by the government) can be used as payments for a scarcity rent. This ensures 
that the resource user pays for the opportunity costs which society incurs when the resource is exploited 
today and thus will not be available in the future.
Input and Output Taxes: Levies on some input or output that can be easily monitored and that serves as 
a good indicator or proxy for the regulated pollution. They are often used in cases where the monitoring of 
emissions is impossible, difficult or costly, so that the government cannot directly tax the polluting activity. 
Gasoline taxes and vehicle weight charges are examples that are introduced based on the assumption 
that the ones paying will also be responsible for car emission and thus cause the environmental harm.
Tax Expenditures: A loss of potential tax revenue resulting from an exemption, credit, or refund of taxes 
for polluters that have introduced abatement or clean technology.
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Subsidies: Payments or other economic incentives (e.g. tax breaks) to individuals or firms to compensate 
expenses incurred through environmentally friendly behaviour, thus encouraging this behaviour.
Perverse Subsidies: Payments such as those that promote certain kinds of economic development 
or support specific industries (fishing, forestry, etc.) that cause environmental damage. Removal of such 
subsidies constitutes an economic instrument for environmental and natural resource protection. 
Deposit Refund Systems: A system involving a charge on some particular item and a subsidy for its 
return. Deposit Refund Systems are combined instruments of charge and subsidy used to encourage 
environmentally appropriate recycling. Recycling beverage bottles and cans are the most well known 
example but the principal applies to anything (automobiles, chemicals, fluids) that can cause environmental 
damage if not recycled. 
Refunded Emission Payments (REP): A combined economic instrument that uses both charges and 
subsidies. A REP is a charge imposed on polluting firms, the revenues of which are returned to the same 
group of polluters, not in proportion to the payments made but in proportion to another measure such as 
output. The individual firm pays a tax on emissions and receives back a share of the total fees collected 
based on output. The net effect of the payment and refund is that firms with above average emissions 
make net payments to the firms that are cleaner than average. 
6.2 Introduction to Price-Based Instruments
Price-based instruments are special government taxes, charges, or fees designed to raise the price of 
polluting the environment or exploiting natural resources. These policies attempt to set the price for users 
of environmental and natural resources ‘right’ to cover the excess social and environmental costs of 
caused by the economic activities of polluters or natural resource users. 
Pollution and overuse of renewable natural resources impose costs on society, which are not borne by 
the private firms and individuals that cause them and which the market does not account for (market 
failure). These costs are a type of externality. Appropriate pricing of resources through price-based 
instruments sends a more accurate signal to users encouraging more appropriate resource consumption 
and conservation.
6.3 Price-Based Instrument Theory
In economic theory, taxes that are levied to correct negative externalities resulting from a market failure 
are called Pigovian taxes (after the economist A. C. Pigou). Environmental taxes to collect money from the 
polluter to cover the cost society suffers from it constitute one example of Pigovian taxes. Another would 
be sin taxes raised on alcohol and cigarettes. 
An environmental Pigovian tax is set equal to the marginal social damage at the optimal level of pollution, 
and as such is – under a range of circumstances and from a broad perspective2 – a full solution to the 
problem of negative externalities. It compensates society for the damage or use of each unit of environment 
or natural resources by internalising externalities to the point where pollution reaches an “optimal” level.
In other words, Pigovian taxes discourage firms and individuals from generating excess pollution (since 
pollution and resource use become more expensive through the taxes or charges) and at the same 
2 Such an ideal state of affairs would include having fully informed, honest, welfare-maximising regulators and appropriate concepts of property rights.
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time provide the revenue to cover the costs of cleaning up the environmental damage, restoring natural 
resources, and compensating victims of pollution.
The concept of a Pigovian tax is a somewhat theoretical construction used more for analysis than for direct 
policy application. In an ideal world the government would be able to determine the marginal damage and 
the marginal abatement or control cost curves for each pollutant and then set the tax or charge equal to 
marginal damage at the optimal level of pollution, as shown in the graph Figure III-2-6 in Module 2. 
This graph in Figure III-2-6 shows how the intersection of marginal damage and abatement (control) cost 
curves determines the optimal level of pollution. The government can now set the per unit tax on pollution 
equal to the marginal cost of both curves at their point of intersection, which the polluting firm will be 
required to pay for each unit of pollutant that it emits. The firm will then produce up to a level at which the 
gain from emitting an extra unit of pollution equals the tax the firm has to pay on than unit (this is the last 
profitable unit). Since the gain is simply the abatement cost saved, this level will be the optimal level of 
pollution. In reality, no government or private organization can have all the data needed to know exactly 
what an appropriate tax would be. So, one cannot find real world applications where the tool is applied 
as prescribed by the theory. In real world applications, governments adjust pollution taxes, charges, and 
fees by trial and error to obtain an approximate solution.3 
In the practical policy development, medical practitioners, ecologists or environmental engineers (rather 
than economists) recommend target levels of pollution or natural resource use without an economic 
analysis of the marginal costs of the environmental damage. The government then negotiates actual 
taxation among various interests and imposes them through the political process. Nevertheless, the 
theory has real value for policymakers in understanding the use of taxes to control pollution and protect 
natural resources. 
6.4 Taxing Natural Resources
In natural resources management, governments use price-based instruments such as mining royalties, 
stumpage fees, user fees, and land taxes as variants of Pigovian taxes. They impose fees and taxes 
as part of natural resource management policies to correct market failures (any externalities related to 
resource use) or institutional failure (the absence of property rights). 
As such, natural resource use fees help reduce and compensate for negative effects - loss of natural 
resources and inherent pollution caused by mining, forestry, and fishing - and impose a scarcity rent 
(See Defining Terms) when there is no effective owner who can claim such a rent (as for fish stocks for 
instance). Fees charged for natural resources use are a considerable source of revenue in low-income 
countries.
6.5 Pollution Taxes and Charges 
Following the concept of the Pigovian tax, taxes and charges on pollution try to “internalise the externalities” 
by increasing the price of a polluting activity. They intend to shift the costs of pollution that would otherwise 
be borne by society back to the polluter. Governments can apply taxes and charges in cases where they 
are able to monitor and tax the polluting activity (e.g. sewage effluent or smokestack emissions).
3 Sterner (2003), pp. 96-97 gives an overview of how one can go about this iterative – trial and error – process and of possible problems that may 
occur.
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Governments can then set aside the revenue raised for addressing the specific problem caused by the 
activity subject to the tax. Applications of this instrument include effluent charges, pollution taxes, and 
noise charges. 
The taxes or charges are supposed to be set based on the amount of directly measurable pollution 
though this is usually just an approximation. In fact, policymakers often use other criteria such as budget 
requirements or political considerations. 
6.5.1 Taxes vs. Charges 
Although practitioners sometimes use the terms taxes and charges interchangeably, taxes refer to 
politically rather than administratively decided fees that typically go to the general treasury rather than 
being set aside for local or sectoral use. On the other hand, sectoral agencies levy, appropriate, and use 
environmental charges. 
Governments may also impose hybrids of taxes and charges such as politically decided taxes earmarked 
for environmental funds and locally decided charges paid to the general treasury. Earmarking environmental 
tax revenues for environmental purposes may be a controversial issue, especially in developing countries 
were public funds are often scarce. If the environmental tax itself gives enough incentive to reduce pollution 
or resource overuse sufficiently, the tax benefits may be diverted to the general treasury. If on the other 
hand the tax does not give enough incentive to fully solve the environmental problem (which is often 
the case) it may be argued that tax revenues should be earmarked for environmental purposes such as 
publicly financed abatement (e.g. sewage treatment).
6.5.2 Potential Problems of Application 
Taxes can have some disadvantages. The relatively complex legal process involved in passing and 
modifying tax laws makes them difficult to be adjusted to changing conditions. Further, when revenues go 
to the general treasury rather than to a specific trust fund, the effect of the tax instrument in addressing 
the specific problem is often lost. Local or industrial sector charges (over which polluters or resource 
users have some influence) are typically more readily acceptable since the money stays within the sector 
or the region.
6.6 Input and Output Pollution Taxes
In cases where the monitoring of emissions is impossible, difficult or costly, the government cannot 
directly tax the polluting activity. To overcome this problem, the government can levy taxes on some input 
or output that can be easily monitored and serve as a good indicator or proxy for the regulated pollution. 
Gasoline taxes are a good example. The relationship between gasoline consumption and the environmental 
damage caused by vehicle emissions is far from simple and valuing and monitoring each vehicle is too 
complex to be practical. Therefore, regulators choose gasoline taxes as a proxy even though unused and 
contained gasoline itself is not a pollutant. 
Another application is differentiated vehicle weight charges, where the amount of tax charged on a vehicle 
depends on its weight. The government bases such charges on the presumption that heavier vehicles are 
more damaging than the lighter ones.
Economists sometimes refer to input and output taxes as presumptive taxes because, in the absence of 
direct monitoring, the government presumes that the agent that uses a certain input or produces a certain 
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output is polluting. Some researchers favour the use of presumptive taxes in developing countries where 
monitoring individual emissions is often impossible.
6.6.1 Tax Expenditures 
The government can exempt polluters that demonstrate abatement or clean technology from taxes or 
refund presumptive taxes to them. This removes the burden of proof from the government and places it 
on to the firm. If the output of a firm closely correlates to the regulated pollution, then even a reduction of 
a regular product tax for this firm may be justified, given it has proven its abatement efforts. 
For example, consider a firm that produces hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), which are damaging to 
the ozone layer. An output tax would be about the same as a tax on ozone depletion, but there could be 
a deduction for HCFCs that are recycled or collected in closed systems.
Presumptive taxes, therefore, can provide an incentive for clean firms to disclose their technology if they 
can thereby reduce their fee burden. A Swedish tax levied on the sulphur content of fuels provides a 
good example. The government rebates tax upon proof of abatement. This instrument amounts to a 
tax expenditure, i.e. an exception to taxation that provides an implicit subsidy for proactive abatement 
activity.
6.6.2 Combining Instruments 
Presumptive taxes alone may not be sufficient to address the issue at hand. In the case of gasoline taxes, 
input taxes do not provide incentives for technical progress or substitution that could help in abatement. 
Therefore, governments find it advantageous to combine gasoline taxes with other instruments such 
as mandatory catalytic converters or even subsidies for such abatement technology. This policy offers 
an example of combining economic instruments and command and control instruments in managing 
pollution.
6.7 Subsidies and Subsidy Removal
In addition to input and output taxes, governments can use subsidies to raise the relative price for polluters 
compared to non-polluters, e.g. by offering subsidies, refunds and other positive payments for improved 
environmental practices, or by removing perverse subsidies (i.e. those that promote environmentally 
unsound practices).
Government subsidies can compensate for the cost of environmentally friendly production and consumption 
behaviour, and thereby encourage such behaviour. Subsidies are especially desirable in situations where 
polluters cannot be easily identified but where non-polluters will come forward to receive their subsidy. 
A subsidy can be either a direct repayment of abatement costs or a fixed payment per unit of emissions 
reduction. In the latter case, the subsidy serves as a kind of negative tax. 
The removal of perverse subsidies – i.e. subsidies that promote economic development and stimulate 
unsound environmental practices – can also have a direct impact on environmental quality. 
6.7.1 Varieties of Subsidies
If the polluting company is out of business, bankrupt or unidentifiable (as is the case with some historic 
cases of pollution, particularly in developing or formerly planned economies), then the public sector may 
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have little choice but to finance cleanup with public funds or subsidize other companies to do the cleanup. 
As such, subsidies can be a practical alternative, particularly when other instruments or incentives to clean 
up the environment are not feasible.
Situations where the polluter expressly owns the property rights to a certain resource that society wants 
(for example, oil discovered below a private property) can also warrant subsidies. 
Subsidies are also useful where the government wishes to protect privately owned environmental assets 
(e.g. land, forests, and waterways) without assuming full ownership or eliminating all private uses. Here are 
some further broad examples where this tool finds some empirical applications:
•	 Subsidized	public	provision	of	health,	energy,	transport,	clean	water,
•	 Subsidized	protection	of	urban	greenery,	watershed	protection,	biodiversity	protection,
•	 Subsidies	to	encourage	a	shift	to	preferred	products	or	productive	methods,
•	 Tax	breaks	for	the	purchase	of	pollution	control	equipment.
The subsidy instrument does not fulfil the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) and is, partly for that reason, 
popular with polluters and owners or potential buyers of polluted property whose activities did not cause 
the pollution. 
6.7.2 Perverse Subsidies 
Some subsidies, such as those that promote economic development or support specific industries 
(fishing, forestry, etc.) can cause environmental damage. These are known as perverse incentives. Many 
observers see removal of perverse subsidies as a far more important issue than providing of subsidies 
to improve the environment. Such inappropriate subsidies promote rather than prevent wasteful and 
environmentally destructive behaviour. 
Governments usually provide such subsidies in an effort to achieve some other desirable societal good 
such as economic development, job creation, protection of a way of life, or relief for the poor. From the 
environmental economics perspective, it is important to stress that any perverse subsidy distorts markets 
and hence creates inefficiencies. This leaves a society as a whole with fewer resources to address 
its problems, no matter which ones are the most pressing. Most perverse subsidies are maintained 
not because they are the only way to promote a certain policy goal, but rather because the benefiting 
stakeholders have strong vested interests and prevent changes.
Examples of perverse subsidies include:
•	 Subsidies	to	keep	energy	prices	artificially	low,
•	 Subsidies	found	in	the	fishing	and	forestry	industries.
Perverse baseline subsidies can severely undermine the efficacy of any and all economic instruments for 
environmental protection. 
Thus, governments should carefully examine the removal of existing perverse subsidies prior to instituting 
new subsidies, aimed at accomplishing the same purpose. Governments offer perverse subsidies so 
commonly that observers often classify subsidy removal as an environmental policy instrument itself.
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The removal of perverse subsidies is always warranted from an environmental perspective and may 
even be achieved by offering subsidies to discontinue formerly subsidized but environmentally unsound 
practices (e.g. generous unemployment payments to fisher folk who will lose their jobs as a result of 
fishing bans) if this is the only politically feasible way.
6.7.3 Combined Instruments 
Subsidies combined with other price-based instruments can be quite effective for environmental and 
natural resources management. For instance, the government can combine quantity restrictions with 
a small subsidy for over-compliance or with high fees for pollution emitted above a certain level. Such 
combinations may serve as a safety valve if regulators are not sure of the optimal pollution pricing level. 
They may also provide a way to collect information on abatement costs.
6.7.4 Potential Problems of Application 
There are two primary problems associated with subsidies as an economic instrument: 
Subsidies can be too expensive as a policy instrument especially in developing countries where the 
opportunity cost4 of public funds is high. Removal of perverse subsidies is often politically complicated 
because subsidies often go to powerful vested interests.
6.8 Deposit Refund Systems 
Deposit refund systems involve a charge on some particular item and a subsidy for its return. As such, 
they are combined instruments of charge and subsidy used to encourage environmentally appropriate 
recycling. Recycling beverage bottles and cans are the most well known example but the principal applies 
to anything (automobiles, chemicals, fluids) that cause environmental damage if not recycled.
 
6.8.1 Rationale for Deposit Refunds 
Deposit refunds, and similar systems, operate on the assumption that the consumer or firm will pollute 
in the absence of the system; for instance, that people will not recycle bottles without financial incentive 
to do so.
In cases where disposal harms the environment, the deposit refund becomes a tax expenditure on 
inappropriate disposal. The polluters (those who do not return the item) pay a charge, whereas those who 
return the item collect a refund and therefore pay nothing. 
The distinguishing feature of the deposit refund scheme is that it has a disclosure mechanism; the 
government or firm pays the refund when the potential polluter demonstrates compliance by returning the 
item that carries the refund, therefore reducing the need for monitoring of illegal disposal.
The government’s role is to require firms to offer the deposit refund system and it may provide a tax 
credit or deduction for each refund paid as well. Firms not required by governments to do so tend to offer 
refunds to customers if the tax savings plus reuse and other values are larger than the costs involved.
6.8.2 Potential Advantages of Deposit Refund Systems 
There are several potential advantages for firms involved in refund systems. The products (such as used 
newspapers) might have some reuse value. The offer may be part of a marketing deal to get consumers 
4 The opportunity cost of funds is the cost ‘incurred’ by foregoing potential benefits from an alternative use of the fund, i.e. the cost from an opportunity 
forgone.
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to buy a new model, as is common with cars and trucks. Returned products reduce the firm’s taxes if it 
receives a tax credit or deduction for each refund paid.
As indicated, deposit refund systems usually apply to final outputs such as beverage bottles and cans. 
However, firms may set up such systems for reasons other than environmental. Firms may simply want to 
reduce raw materials costs by recycling the product back into new products at a discount to the price of 
new materials. Refund programmes have spread widely in both developing and developed countries in 
recent years. In the developed world, the system has very wide applications. For example, Sweden has 
instituted a deposit refund scheme on scrap vehicles to prevent their abandonment in the woods to rust. 
It is conceivable that governments could use similar instruments to recover other polluting inputs, such as 
cadmium or mercury.
6.8.3 Potential Problems with Deposit Refund Systems 
The setting up of the deposit refund fee, especially in developing countries where there is no information 
on the possible reactions of consumers or the environmental impact of some of the wastes, is an iterative 
process - you have to keep trying to get the deposit refund high enough to stimulate use of the system. This 
means that it is not possible to know in advance whether a particular fee structure would be successful 
or not.
6.9 Refunded Emissions Payments
Another combined instrument using charges and subsidies is the Refunded Emissions Payment (REP). 
An REP is a charge imposed on polluting firms, the revenues of which are returned to the same group of 
polluters, not in proportion to the payments made but in proportion to another measure such as output. The 
individual firm pays a tax on emissions and receives back a share of the total fees collected based on output. 
The net effect of the payment and refund is that firms with above average emissions make net payments 
to the firms that are cleaner than average. In the application of this instrument, the firms with high ratios 
compensate firms that have a low ratio of emissions to output.
Refunded emissions payments can improve pollution control and provide incentives for the adoption 
of cleaner technology in situations where the government lacks adequate political authority to enforce 
compliance. Such systems make it easier for politically powerful polluters to comply with environmental 
regulations. The incentives for abatement with this instrument are essentially the same as with a Pigovian 
tax, as long as the number of firms is large enough and individual firm’s market shares are small.
  
However, REPs are effectively a market-distorting subsidy, and can even be a perverse subsidy. In the first 
stance, firms pay for the pollution they produce, which is a pollution charge or tax. In the Pigovian sense, 
it corrects for negative externalities caused by the pollution. In the second stance, the raised money is 
returned to the industry, which is basically a general subsidy for this industry and gives it a comparative 
advantage with respect to other industries.
Take, for example, the industry that produces electricity from coal. A REP system could raise money by 
imposing a tax per unit of carbon dioxide emitted. The money would then be returned to the power plants 
according to their share of output of electricity. While this gives incentives to the electricity providers 
to improve their carbon efficiency, it also subsidises the coal electricity industry in general, giving it a 
comparative advantage over renewable energy sources, which might not receive any compensation for 
not emitting any carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Thus, the price for electricity generated from coal in 
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the market will be artificially lowered and renewable energies have a competition disadvantage. The main 
policy advantage of REPs – and of tax-subsidy schemes in general - over taxes relates to the distribution 
of cost. Because all firms will pay less and some firms even make money in a REP scheme, it will not 
create the same kind of resistance (and lobbying) from polluters as taxes often do.
The use of refunded emission permits, however, is a relatively new concept and there is little empirical 
experience around the world.
Price-Based Instruments Cases
Case 1 - Korea Adopts a Massive Deposit Refund System
Korea uses an extensive waste disposal deposit refund system which covers food, beverages, liquor 
bottles and containers, batteries, tyres, lubricating oil, electric home appliances (and any other item that 
generates toxic waste), bulky or heavy commodities that require treatment, non-degradable materials and 
harmful household commodities that should not be mixed with the general waste stream. The manufacturer 
is required to deposit a certain amount for each unit sold, refundable upon collection and treatment.
Source:	Panayotou, T. (1998). Box 4-2, p. 56.
Case 2 - Seed Capital: Externally Financed Development of Premium Flower Bulb Markets in 
Turkey
Transitional subsidies work best when the need really is short term, and the newer approaches are quickly 
shown to be viable in the marketplace. Indigenous propagation of threatened Turkish bulbs provides 
one such example. To offset an accelerating loss in national wild stocks, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 
decided to fund demonstration projects on the propagation of domestic bulbs as a substitute.
The WWF project also benefited immensely from the fact that domestic bulbs were increasingly being 
specified in international trade contracts as the knowledge about dwindling wild stocks grew. Using 
contracts with growers, plus capitalization funding to finance the initial purchases of plant stock for the 
participating families, the Fund was able to jump-start a more sustainable domestic industry. 
In this situation, project returns were sufficient to make the enterprises viable. In addition, adoption of 
the new approach was widespread because it required little change in existing routines of participating 
families and increased their economic gains. 
Source: UNEP (2004).
Case 3 - Sweden Offers Sulphur Tax Rebates for Abatement
In Sweden a substantial tax is levied on the sulphur content of fuels (over $4 per kg of sulphur) but this 
is rebated for large emitters who can prove how much sulphur emission they have abated. For large 
emitters, therefore, the effect of the sulphur tax is precisely the same as the emissions tax; for everybody 
else the tax on the sulphur content of fuels provides incentives to switch to low-sulphur fuels and to 
reduce energy use overall. 
The tax has been extremely effective as it is relatively simple to implement because it can be levied at 
wholesale level. The national target for sulphur emissions was met several years ahead of the schedule, 
and the revenue from the tax was actually lower than projected, as a result of the extensive fuel-switching 
and emission reductions that followed introduction of the tax. 
Source:	Panayotou T. (1998). Box 4-2, p. 53
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Case 4 - Grassland Pricing Reforms in the Philippines
Pasture Lease Agreements (PLAs) for ranchers to graze cattle on public lands have existed for decades 
in the Philippines. The lease lasts 25 years, and is renewable for another 25. Prices for these rights have 
been extremely low (roughly US$0.30/hectare/year). As a result, a relatively small group of people has 
gained control over much of the public grasslands for the 50-year lease period.
The ability to shift cattle to new pastures they control has also reduced the incentive for sound management 
of the pastureland, and led to land degradation in many parts of the country. Although existing rules require 
ranches to file annual operating plans as well as a management plan every eight years, there is virtually 
no government follow-up to ensure plans are actually being implemented. This is the result of insufficient 
funding as well as difficult terrain to oversee.
To improve land management, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) has been 
working for years to raise the fee to a more reasonable level. The target fees were estimated based on a 
study of the market value of grazing rights, and finally implemented in 2001. The target fees were set in 
three tiers, reflecting differing grassland quality, with the lowest being 24 times the current fee.
Despite some evidence that even this fee was too low, and the fact that 80 per cent of the surcharge 
could be used to correct degradation on the leases, the ranchers have fiercely resisted the increase. A 
number have refused to pay the higher rates, a situation the DENR had not been prepared for. As a result, 
fee collection has stopped entirely on these parcels. Also, a top government official, without any advance 
consultation with the DENR, pledged to cut the grazing fees sharply during a visit to the region. This 
pledge triggered suspension of the fee pending further clarification from the DENR.
Though the rationale for charging market rates for grazing makes a great deal of economic and environmental 
sense, DENR has been unable to overcome local political opposition. As a result, the grasslands remain 
under great threat, and additional resources that the higher fees would have brought in are not available to 
stem the damage. Existing ranching practices are unsustainable, and current regulations on management 
reporting and planning by ranchers are not enforced. In the face of such opposition regarding fee levels 
and enforcement, auctioning of rights could have offered a better solution. 
Source:	UNEP (2004).
Case 5 - Botswana Proposes Reform of Forest Management Fee System 
Alarming deforestation rates were evident in some parts of the forest reserves in Botswana, owned 
commonly by the State. Existing command and control approaches were not working. These included 
restrictions on any cutting in forest reserves without prior permission, the use of local committees to 
develop conservation-minded use plans, and the ability of the Ministry of Agriculture to declare regions 
“planning areas,” thereby instituting cutting restrictions. 
A payment scheme, including payment of fees and royalties, was also of limited success. Fees were set at 
a flat rate, regardless of the diameter of the trunk (i.e., no linkage to value or board feet). This encouraged 
harvesting of the oldest trees first, removing many of the large anchor trees that help maintain biodiversity 
and wildlife habitat, and that should normally be left even after cutting. Trees less than 35 centimetres in 
diameter had no royalties at all, also contributing to excessive removal. Royalties were paid only on the 
tree trunk, valuing other parts of the tree effectively at zero.
Widespread over-harvesting has led to increased tree litter and fire risks. The tree litter problem is 
compounded by the high damage rates and inefficient processing associated with inexpensive stumpage 
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(overall yield is only 18 per cent). Finally, elephant herds in some forests such as the Chobe knock down 
many trees, exacerbating the fire risk. With prime wood so inexpensive, there has been little incentive to 
spend time on salvage.
Fee reforms have been proposed to address most of these problems. Fees would be higher, recovering a 
fuller set of the costs associated with timber activities, including government oversight and fire suppression/
prevention. The royalty rate for damaged stock is lower, to encourage salvage harvests, though it is not 
clear from existing data how the government will ensure honest reporting on this issue. 
In addition, the royalty rate will cover the entire tree, not just the trunk, to encourage better usage. Finally, 
to curb problems of trying to oversee many small cutters, concessions have been limited to large firms. 
The reforms make sense in terms of the type of incentives they provide to wood harvesters. Unfortunately, 
available information does not provide details on whether even the new, higher fees are sufficient to 
change behaviour, nor on how the government will enforce the new charges. 
Finally, one critical aspect of resource extraction does not seem to be addressed: how reforestation and 
sustainable cutting practices will be encouraged. 
Source:	UNEP (2004) and Fidzani N.H. (2000) in Rietbergen-McCracken and Abaza (2000).
Case 6 - Reforestation Effort in Brazil
In an effort to encourage good reforestation practices, timber policies in Brazil charge a tax on wood 
consumption except when the harvesting is offset by equivalent reforestation. Recognizing that there are 
insufficient resources to oversee reforestation directly, Brazil has chosen to forego revenues from timber 
sales so long as the cuts are properly replanted. 
 
However, the programme has generally failed. The tax on wood consumption is set too low to make it 
worthwhile for the foresters to replant. In any event, the programme is poorly enforced so that foresters 
rarely pay the tax at all. Monitoring is difficult especially in frontier regions. Those forestry fees that were 
collected usually go to pay administrative costs rather than support the environmental purposes for which 
they had originally been intended.
This is clearly a case of where a lack of institutional capacity resulted in neither the environmental nor the 
fiscal goals being met. 
Source:	UNEP (2004).
Case 7 - Dominican Republic Conserves Soil
In the El Naranjal watershed in the Dominican Republic, US AID funds provided subsidized credit to 
participating farmers adopting soil conservation measures. Initial adoption rates were quite high (90 per 
cent in 1985), yet by 1990, only half of the farms continued to practice the conservation measures, as the 
subsidies had stopped. As further subsidies were expected, farmers actually delayed rational conservation 
measures in order to wait for the payment. 
The follow-on project of US AID recognized that the farms were already receiving tremendous benefits 
in the form of subsidized irrigation water. This second project tied continued access to subsidized water 
to proper adoption of soil conservation measures. The result has been substantial use of conservation 
techniques without additional direct subsidies. 
Source:	UNEP (2004).
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Case 8 - Perverse Incentives for Pollution in China
In an attempt to curb pollution from factories, the government set up an emissions fee. These fees 
constituted business expenses under Chinese law, and were deductible from taxes. Given common 
Chinese corporate tax rates of 33 per cent, this means that for each dollar in fees, roughly one-third 
remained in the firm as a tax-shield, reducing taxes that would have been paid on other net income. Thus 
lowering emissions had a direct effect on profits.
In addition, in an effort to accelerate installation of pollution controls, the Chinese government set up a 
rebate system, whereby 80 per cent of the fee collected would be returned to the enterprise for investment 
in pollution controls. Thus, from this original dollar in fees, 33 cents comes back through reduced tax 
burden and 80 cents comes back in a rebate, for a total of US$1.13. Thus, paying the pollution fees offered 
a net gain of roughly 13 per cent. In other words, it was more profitable – by 13 cents on the dollar - to 
continue polluting than to reduce emissions.
This perverse incentive made firms not wish to invest in pollution controls, lest they lose the privilege of 
paying emissions fees to earn a quick 13 per cent return on their money. The ability to do so was the result 
of a lack of political will or capability to ensure rebated fees were invested in pollution controls as required 
rather than spent elsewhere in the business. 
In an attempt to solve the problem, the government replaced fee rebates with loans; however, enforcement 
has been weak. In addition, the funds from the 20 per cent of fees not returned to the enterprise goes to 
the local environmental authorities, and this has supposedly given them an interest in maintaining funding 
through maintaining emissions. Had rebates actually been put to use in upgrading pollution controls, this 
may not have been such a bad policy. 
Source:	UNEP (2004).
 eludoM hcae ot yltcerid og ot thgir eht ot sbat eht no kcilC

12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
P
A
R
T
 I
II
137The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
1 This section is partly based on Sterner (2003). Policy Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management, pp 109-114.
Property Rights Based Instruments1
Module 7
G O A L
L E A R N I N G  O B j E C T I V E
To present the key features of property rights based instruments.  
By the end of this module, participants should be able to explain 
what property rights based instruments are and when they can be 
used.
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7.1 Defining Terms
Tradable Permits: Economic instruments used to address environmental problems by requiring each 
polluter or resource user to obtain permits for the amount of pollution he or she releases. Permits are 
issued in units of pollutants or rights to harvest a natural resource and may be bought and sold in an 
open market. The government sets the total number of permits at a level to reduce pollution or protect 
sustainable levels of a renewable resource. Permit holders have an incentive to reduce emissions or curb 
harvesting in order to sell excess permits.
Tenure: The right to hold and use property and its resources under defined conditions. Tenure differs 
from outright ownership in that the tenured property cannot usually be bought and sold although tenure 
rights in the form of tradable permits may be bought and sold. 
Tragedy of the Commons: A metaphor describing the mechanism leading to the overexploitation of 
common resources. Each individual involved has an incentive to increase his or her own benefit from the 
resource before others do so. The result is an overuse that may be unsustainable and can lead to the 
extinction of the resource.
Prisoner’s Dilemma: A parable used to show the game theoretic aspect of the tragedy of the commons 
(see above). Two prisoners have both the choice of testifying against each other or keeping quite. If both 
did the latter they would get a light sentence, but the game theoretic analysis shows that, in the particular 
setting, their preferred strategy is to betray their fellow prisoner. The result is the worst possible for them 
– a tough sentence for both prisoners.
Communal Tenure: The right of a group, usually traditional users from one ethnic or social group, to hold 
and use property. Traditional tenure is often ill-defined. Serving as an economic instrument, communal 
tenure can be created or clarified under conditions requiring the protection of the environment. Communal 
tenure is not granted to individuals in the group and cannot usually be bought and sold in the market. 
Common Property Rights: Similar to communal tenure with the exception that the land or property in 
question may be bought and sold by the group. As an economic instrument common property rights can 
be granted or clarified to encourage protection of the environment or natural resources.
Emission Reduction Credit: Credits given to those firms that reduce emissions more than required. 
Firms can either sell them to firms whose emissions are above the statutory minimum or bank for their 
own use in the future.
Ambient Permit Trading: A variant of tradable emission permits in which the value of emission 
reduction credits differs from region to region depending on the relative ambient concentrations so as 
to discourage development of ‘hot spots’.
Output Based Allocation: The initial allocation of pollution permits based on relative output levels of 
existing firms.
Cap and Trade Programmes: An economic instrument by which the government sets the total allowable 
pollution or resource harvest units in a given area and over a given time period (the ‘cap’) and then leaves 
polluters or resource users to trade this total among themselves using the market. 
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7.2 Introduction to Property Rights Based Instruments 
The purpose of using property rights based instruments is to manage the environmental assets by creating, 
clarifying, and enforcing rights to specific property. Some property rights based instruments define rights 
to ownership of existing property. Others create property in the form of tradable permits to use resources 
or emit pollutants.
Both of these instruments give the authorized parties a direct financial stake in the renewable natural 
resources and environment in general. This, in turn creates self-interest for reducing pollution, for 
maintaining sustainable harvest rates, and for the direct monitoring and control of illegal activities.
During the 20th Century, particularly since the end of World War II, international political organizations 
such as the United Nations (UN) have played an active role in defining rights to the environment. The UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights2 first established the right to the protection of property rights. 
This Declaration was followed by many more property rights related declarations, treaties, conventions, 
agreements and protocols that span the spectrum of environmental and natural resources (desertification, 
migratory species, biological diversity, wetlands, endangered species, hazardous wastes and disposal).3 
Some of the more important environment-related agreements that have been adopted in recent years 
include:
•	 Rio	Declaration	on	Environment	and	Development	(June	1992),
•	 UN	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	(May	1992),
•	 Montreal	Protocol	on	Substances	that	Deplete	the	Ozone	Layer	(Sep.	1987),
•	 United	Nations	Convention	on	the	Law	of	the	Sea	(through	which	coastal	countries	receive	extended	
property	rights	to	adjacent	portions	of	the	ocean).
7.3 Establishing, Clarifying and Enforcing Property Rights
Property rights are the societally sanctioned rights to ownership and use of both, tangible (e.g. land) 
and intangible (e.g. patents) property. Clearly defined and enforced property rights are the foundation of 
all markets.
Property rights provide policy makers with two separate tools. First, their establishment gives the incentive 
to use existing resources sustainably and efficiently. Second, policy makers can decide how they want 
to distribute the rights. Taking use of the latter aspect can often help in getting support for suggested 
policies, for example by assigning property to the poor, to traditional users, or to important stakeholders.
Property rights are generally established in three ways: tradition, force of arms, and legal regulation. The 
first is often vague. The second is disruptive and unjust. The third - legal regulation - is the only way that 
property rights can be securely defined, that markets function efficiently, and that the environmental 
assets can be protected. 
2 United Nations (1948).
3 Some national governments have gone further. In Kenya, for instance, the Environmental Management and Coordination Act of 1999 gives citizens 
the property rights to a clean environment.
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Using legal regulation, the government can establish property rights by defining and allocating existing 
property rights and by creating new forms of property (tradable licenses to fish or to emit pollutants) to 
which rights may be assigned. This process of establishing and clarifying property rights can be seen as 
an economic instrument in itself. 
The pressure to establish or clarify property rights, generally, increases as the supply of a given type 
of property decreases due to resource depletion or increases in pollution even as the demand remains 
steady or grows. 
Conditions such as traditional but vaguely documented claims to ownership or free use of land, water, 
etc, or widespread absentee ownership of land with uncertain tenure for users of the land often lead to 
overuse of resources and uncontrolled environmental pollution. 
In addition, as pressure grows on the use of scarce resources the threat of violence among competing 
claimants, public corruption, and extreme poverty increase. Under these circumstances, clearly defined 
property rights provide incentives to control pollution impacting the property or to ensure a sustainable 
use of renewable resources.
Empirical evidence demonstrates that individuals or groups with secure property claims have greater 
economic incentives to long-term protection of the property’s natural resource and environmental assets. 
On the other hand, those who have no clear property rights and who rely on traditional or vague claims to 
the use of common resources, often have strong incentives to maximize use of the resources - to avoid 
letting others gain the benefits at their expense. They also do not have much incentive to protect the 
property from environmental pollution. Two terms that are commonly used to describe this situation are 
given in Box III-7-1.
Box III-7-1: Tragedy of the Commons and Prisoner’s Dilemma
Tragedy of the Commons This metaphor relates to common grazing lands shared within village 
communities in former times. Locals were entitled to put animals on the ‘common’ for grazing. 
Without a clear regulation, each farmer had the incentive to increase his number of animals on the 
commons, because the extra damage caused by overgrazing was marginal but his gains were 
significant. While this logic works for each single farmer, the overall result was intense overuse of 
the pasture which could render the commons useless for grazing, reducing everyone’s benefits. 
This metaphor shows how the lack of clearly assigned property rights can lead to inefficiency and 
disadvantages for everybody.
Prisoner’s Dilemma This term is related to the game theoretic aspect of the tragedy of the 
commons. Imagine two prisoners who are suspected to have committed a crime together. They are 
interrogated separately, and each is informed that if he testifies against his colleague, he himself will 
get away without punishment and his colleague gets a heavy sentence. They also know that if they 
both keep quiet, their guilt cannot be proven and they will face a very light sentence. If both testify 
against each other, the punishment will be medium. Each prisoner faces the dilemma between 
trusting his colleague and betraying him. A game-theoretic analysis shows that if both prisoners 
only care about their own benefit, they will choose to testify. The dilemma can be resolved by giving 
the prisoners an incentive not to betray each other. In the case of the commons, this is done by 
assigning clear property rights.
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The establishment (including definition, granting or allocation), and clarification of property rights include 
a variety of policies that facilitate improved stewardship of the environment, such as:
•	 The	granting	of	communal	tenure	in	the	use	of	public	property	by	local	communities	under	conditions	
that	promote	sustainable	use	of	natural	resources	and	the	reduction	of	pollution.	
•	 Permanent	transfer	of	tenure	rights	or	ownership	from	large	absentee	owners	or	the	government	to	
those	who	actually	farm	the	land	or	use	the	resources.	These	are	sometimes	called	“land	to	the	tiller”	
programmes.
•	 Transfer	of	public	enterprises,	which	have	weak	incentives	to	maintain	environmental	quality,	to	private	
individuals	or	organizations	to	which	strong	incentives	may	be	applied.	(Obviously,	transfer	from	public	to	
private	ownership	without	economic	or	regulatory	incentives	does	little	to	help	the	environment.)
7.3.1 Common Property Rights and the Environment 
In the context of natural resource management in developing economies, common property resource 
management (CPR) is particularly important. In developing economies the right to use common property 
(grazing lands for example) is usually established by tradition, and the resource can be freely used by 
anyone. Such a system naturally encourages each user to maximize their amount of use.
The very act of defining the right to use common property (who, when, how much, under what conditions) 
creates an economic instrument to manage the use of natural resources and control of the pollution of 
common property. Using this economic instrument, it becomes possible for the first time to overcome the 
tragedy of the commons and rationally manage the use of common property. The common property may 
still belong to everyone in society but the use of it is regulated to prevent abuse.
Sterner gives a detailed review of the ecological conditions that require improved CPR management (e.g., 
when the resources of an ecosystem are erratic, caused, for example, by unreliable rainfall), as well as 
possible problems, such as the desire of each user to maximize their own use, which will eventually lead 
to the degradation of community property resources. 
The literature recognizes three strategies that countries can use to address such overuse of common 
property resources. These are: 
1.	 ‘Perfect’	government	control,	
2.	 Privatisation,	and
3.	 Cooperative	management	with	local	enforcement.
The latter is considered the superior alternative in many settings. Using such a strategy requires that seven 
essential conditions be met for stable common property resource management. These are:
•	 Boundaries	are	clear	and	outsiders	can	be	excluded,
•	 Rules	are	adapted	to	site-specific	conditions,
•	 Decision-making	is	participatory	(democratic),
•	 Locally	designated	agents	monitor	resources,
•	 A	local	court	or	other	arena	is	available	to	resolve	conflicts,
•	 Graduated	sanctions	are	used	to	punish	infringements,
•	 Outside	government	respects	the	CPR	institutions.
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7.3.2 Potential Problems with Common Property Solutions 
There are many problems associated with the definition and management of common property rights. 
These include cases where: 
•	 A	lack	of	trust	among	the	actors	can	lead	to	poor	results	(e.g.	traditional	users	of	grazing	lands	do	not	
trust	government	representatives	from	the	capital).
•	 It	is	difficult	to	create	communal	property	rights	(e.g.,	global	warming	or	ozone	layer	depletion).
•	 The	creation	of	property	rights	disenfranchises	the	poor	and	therefore	contributes	to	worsening	poverty	
(e.g.	where,	“squatters”	or	subsistence	users	lose	traditional	but	informal	rights	to	use	property).
7.4 Tradable Permits
The second type of property right is the right to limited use of public assets such as the right to emit 
pollutants, to take fish from public waters, or graze livestock on public lands. As economic instruments, 
these property rights take the form of tradable permits.4
7.4.1 Establishing Tradable Permit Systems 
In order to create a tradable permit system, the government:
1.	 Determines	the	total	amount	of	a	resource	to	be	used	or	pollutant	to	be	emitted,	
2.	 Issues	individual	permits	to	use	some	part	of	the	total	limit,	and	then
3.	 Allows	the	permits	to	be	bought	and	sold.	
For the system to work the total number of permits should not exceed the estimated capacity to assimilate 
pollutant loads without deteriorating environmental quality, or, in the case of renewable resources, the 
yield or harvest that can be taken without a decline in the stock size.
The use of tradable permits regulates the total amount of resources that can be extracted or pollution 
emitted but leaves it to the market to determine who will extract the resources or emit the pollution and 
at what price. 
In using this instrument, the decision maker says in effect “in the next ten years, we will only allow a total 
of X tons of pollutant to be released into the atmosphere” or “for the next ten harvest seasons, the total 
amount of tilapia to be harvested from Lake Victoria is X tons per season” to be consistent with sustainable 
management of the environment or the resource base. 
The government has the option of auctioning the permits, or of distributing them for free. Auctioning will 
ensure that the market value of the permit is raised by governments. It is often applied when permits are 
to be given to larger, profit-oriented companies. If issues of poverty are a major concern, or if resistance 
among participating stakeholders against auctioning is insurmountable, permits can also be given out for 
free. In both cases, a permit allows its holder to emit a certain amount of pollutant or to harvest a certain 
amount of a resource in a specified period of time. 
4 As an economic instrument tradable permits differ from licenses – e.g. for hunting or fishing – which also seek to regulate the total take, in that the 
licenses cannot be traded and have little associated economic incentives other than the cost of the licenses, which is usually small.
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After the allocation of permits (through auctioning or free distribution) a firm wishing to emit or harvest 
beyond what their permits allow can only do so at the expense of another firm. This is possible since it is 
feasible for a firm to emit less pollutant or harvest less than the permits it holds allow. The permits that are 
not needed can then be sold to another firm. For example, a firm in a fishery can choose to harvest fewer 
fish than its allowable quota and sell the extra permits to another firm.
Essentially, this system creates property rights to the environment, therefore removing the public goods 
character of the environment. These property rights internalise externalities and create incentives for 
resource protection and the resource in question will have a good chance of being put into the most 
economically efficient use. 
For such a scheme to work efficiently, the allocated permits must be transferable to new as well as existing 
holders of permits. A permit holder must be able to sell his permits if he or she is making losses and 
wishes to exit from the market. A new firm that wants to enter the market can only do so by purchasing 
rights from a firm already operating in the market. 
7.4.2 Types of Tradable Permits 
Tradable permits are issued under a number of names depending on the issue to be addressed 
including:
•	 Tradable	Emission	Permits	in	pollution	management
•	 Individual	Transferable	Quotas	in	fisheries	management
•	 Transferable	Grazing	Rights	in	range	management
•	 Transferable	Development	Rights	in	property	management.
7.4.3 Empirical Applications 
Thus far, the most successful permit-trading programmes include:
Emission Reduction Credit Programmes: A firm that reduces emissions more than required gets 
credit for the extra reduction, which the firm can either sell to firms whose emissions are above the 
statutory maximum, or can bank for its own later use.
Ambient Permit Trading: A variant of tradable emission permits in which the value of emission reduction 
credits differs from region to region depending on the relative ambient concentrations so as to discourage 
development of ‘hot spots’.
Output Based Allocation: This is used for the initial allocation of pollution permits, based on relative 
output levels of existing firms.
Cap and Trade Programmes: In this instrument, the government sets the total allowable pollution or 
resource harvest in a given area and over a given time period (the ‘cap’) and then leaves polluters or 
resource users to trade this total among themselves using the market.5
5 Please also see Module 4, chapter 4.4.2.
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7.4.4 Potential Problems of Application 
Several conceptual and practical problems must be overcome in the application of tradable permits. 
These include:
•	 For	 the	 permits	 or	 quotas	 to	work,	 they	must	 acquire	 the	 characteristics	 of	 other	 property	 rights,	
such	as	permanence	and	reliability.	The	defining	feature	of	traditional	property	rights	is	that	they	are	
perceived	to	be	permanent.	It	is	this	permanency	that	gives	owners	the	confidence	and	incentive	to	
make	long	term	and	costly	productive	investments	in	their	properties.	
•	 If	permits	or	quotas	are	not	seen	as	a	 real	 title	 for	property,	 the	market	 for	 them	will	 not	develop.	
Without	a	market	their	worth	as	an	economic	instrument	is	nil.	In	addition,	potential	buyers	of	permits	
need	to	understand	the	market,	which	may	require	considerable	public	education.	
•	 In	the	case	of	natural	resource	management,	a	lack	of	knowledge	among	users	of	the	resource	about	
the	underlying	ecosystems	and	 lack	of	agreement	about	how	they	should	be	managed	can	create	
major	difficulties.	Policymakers	need	to	ensure	that	all	stakeholders	have	a	common	agreement	about	
the	essential	facts	and	trust	in	the	research	that	produced	them.
•	 Many	features	of	permit	systems	(i.e.	the	definition,	number,	duration,	and	temporal	and	spatial	validity	
of	the	permits	and	the	proposed	method	of	their	allocation)	cannot	be	decided	using	only	ecological	
and	technical	calculations.	At	bottom,	these	become	political	decisions.	These	decisions	are	crucial	
for	 the	performance	of	 the	programme	but	can	entail	 immense	political	pressure	because	permits	
transfer	valuable	property	rights	and,	potentially,	substantial	wealth.
•	 Finally,	there	is	the	problem	of	thin	markets	and	transaction	costs.	If	a	permit	system	is	established	
but	very	few	people	are	willing	to	trade,	this	constitutes	a	thin	market,	and	the	market	will	not	develop	
properly.	The	same	is	true	if	traders	of	permits	incur	high	transaction	costs,	for	example	if	the	trading	
process	is	 lengthy	and	complicated	or	 involves	fees.	Designers	of	tradable	permit	systems	need	to	
make	sure	that	the	permit	market	is	sufficiently	big	to	allow	for	multiple	trades,	and	they	need	to	find	
ways	to	keep	transaction	costs	low.
For tradable permits to work properly, prescribed targets for total use of emissions must be responsive 
to changes as the operating environment changes, for example as abatement technology improves. For 
instance, if a standard abatement technology commonly used by all companies used to have 60 per cent 
efficiency in eliminating pollutants but now has 80 per cent efficiency. 
This means that most firms would have extra credits to sell or bank leaving few potential buyers and little 
incentive to reduce pollution. In such a situation, the total permitted pollutants would need to be reduced 
again creating the scarcity required for a market to work.
Property Rights Based Instruments Cases
Case 1 - Tenure Reform: Mankote Mangrove, St. Lucia 
A common property rights economic instrument proved ideal in the efficient management and sustainability 
of the Mankote mangrove forest ecosystem in the Caribbean nation of St. Lucia. 
The Mankote forest comprises the largest contiguous tract of mangrove in St. Lucia and 20 per cent of the 
total mangrove area in the country. The government had traditionally prohibited exploitation of the publicly 
owned forest but allowed open access. The prohibitions proved ineffective. Widespread and uncontrolled 
charcoal harvesting threatened to destroy the entire forest. 
145The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
P
A
R
T
 I
II
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
The imminent destruction of the forest, in turn, greatly endangered the many ecosystem services the 
mangrove forest provides, including maintaining coastal stability, preserving water quality, serving as a fish 
breeding and nursery ground, trapping silt, and providing an important bird habitat.
Most of the charcoal was harvested by extremely poor subsistence harvesters who had no legal right to 
any use of the publicly owned mangrove resources. The harvesters had no ready alternative employment 
should their access to the mangroves be cut off due to either resource depletion or effective policing.
To protect the mangrove as both an ecological and economic resource, the government organized the 
subsistence users into a collective and granted clearly defined communal tenure rights for charcoal 
extraction. For the first time, the harvesters had a direct stake in the sustainability of Mankote resources. 
Communal tenure also gave each individual harvester an incentive to monitor his peers and ensure 
mangrove cutting regimes were properly followed. 
Technical training on effective ways to manage cuts was provided, as well as periodic monitoring of the 
overall mangrove health (as measured by tree size and number of new stems). Longer-term efforts to 
reduce the economic pressure on the mangrove were implemented using job training programmes and 
the attempted development of a hardwood forest outside of the mangrove. (This last element has been 
of limited success). 
As part of the programme, Mankote was established as nature reserve. Thus, not only did the programme 
secure the tenure of the charcoal harvesters, it worked successfully to prevent threats to the Mangrove 
from large-scale development or fishing.
By modifying property rights, St. Lucia (in large part due to efforts of the Caribbean Natural Resources 
Institute, a regional NGO) has been able to protect the Mankote Forest and all its ecosystem services. 
Mangrove depletion has stopped and tree cover is now increasing, all without displacing jobs.
 
Despite the overall success, the case does have some problems that should serve as a caution to users 
of this model: 
The process has taken more than 15 years. Many resources at risk elsewhere would not survive such a 
long policy gestation period. 
The harvesters’ tenure may not be secure. The tenure is granted through a letter from the Deputy Chief 
Fisheries Officer; it is not clear how much legal protection such a letter provides. Threats from outside 
developers remain, and challenging the validity of the tenure rights would seem an obvious tactic. 
Intensive development at the borders of Mankote could fragment ecosystems sufficiently to reduce the 
viability of the area.
Finally, there is little information on how the new tenure holders will constrain internal growth of their group 
to ensure harvest pressures remain sustainable.
These continuing issues indicate that no environmental programme - even when using highly effective 
economic instruments - is ever really finished. Nevertheless, the St. Lucia experience provides an outstanding 
example of how property rights measures can be used to address difficult environmental issues. 
Source:	UNEP (2004). 
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Case 2 - The Botswana Tribal Grazing Land Policy 
In the early 70s in Botswana, the number of cattle herds expanded rapidly due to increased use of veterinary 
medicine and a breakthrough in water technology, which allowed the drilling of new wells. Increased 
herds, under a system of uncontrolled grazing, caused serious overgrazing around villages, surface water 
sources and bored wells. This led to soil erosion and bush encroachment, further reducing the amount 
of grazing land available and putting a serious risk to the life stock sector’s long term sustainability and 
economic viability. The effects were worst for small cattle owners, whose herds grazed in or near their 
villages, contributing the problems of inequity and social tensions to the environmental and economic 
damage. 
To encourage individual herders to behave in a socially optimal manner (and internalise the externalities), 
it was suggested to privatise part of the rangelands - a prescription supported in Botswana and other 
countries by international and bilateral agencies - through a programme entitled “the Tribal Grazing Land 
Policy” (TGLP). The stated objectives of the policy were to: 
•	 Facilitate	the	introduction	of	improved	management	practices	and	range	conservation;	
•	 Increase	productivity	through	the	use	of	high	off-take	rates	(This	is	the	ratio	of	animals	being	slaughtered	
over	a	year	to	the	total	herd	size	in	that	year);	and	
•	 Upgrade	rural	living	standards	by	reducing	the	income	gap	between	the	rich	and	poor.
The reasoning behind using privatisation to achieve the first objective was that exclusive rights over land 
would give farmers an incentive to control livestock numbers and improve range conservation. This would 
then lead to the second objective, namely to double the productivity of the rangelands. The third objective 
was to be achieved by moving the big herders away from the concentrated areas, thereby creating space 
for the poor to expand their herds. 
To achieve these objectives, the TGLP subdivided the rangelands into three zones, with each zone meeting 
the needs of particular groups of livestock owners: 
Commercial Zones in which private farms would be given exclusive property rights. Farms in these 
zones would be commercially managed using modern techniques such as water distribution through 
pipeline systems, fencing and high off-take rates. Rent was also to be paid and the revenue to be put into 
developing the communal zones. 
Communal Zones where the majority of small farmers would keep their cattle, with a restriction on the 
maximum number of animals for any individual or family. The construction and use of new and existing 
private water supplies was restricted and new privately owned boreholes would only be permitted if they 
were used for watering small numbers of livestock and for purposes of crop cultivation. 
Reserved Zones for future use by those with no cattle at the time and by future generations. They were 
to be used for wildlife, mining and arable agriculture. 
This change in land tenure - a property rights based economic instrument - was combined with 
two complementary price-based economic instruments. Those who were allocated land had to pay 
a yearly rent for the use of the farms. The exclusive right holders also received interest subsidised loans and 
a 60% subsidy from the government for drilling and equipping boreholes.
Once the government decided to go ahead with the implementation of the policy, a major public education 
programme was launched to ensure the people had a full understanding of the policy and the reasoning 
behind it. The public education programme took the form of a nation-wide campaign by cabinet ministers 
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addressing village-level public meetings, government officials leading seminars and formation of radio 
learning groups at the village level.
An evaluation of the TGLP that was done about ten years later showed that the objective of doubling 
productivity of the rangelands was not achieved (the output per head remained approximately the same 
for both privatised ranches and communal ranges). Granting exclusive rights did not result in better range 
management on most ranges. Mismanagement on private farms again led to overstocking, overgrazing, 
inefficient utilization of rangelands and poor performance. 
To make matters worse, when their ranges became overgrazed politically influential TGLP holders were 
allowed to move their cattle off their own ranches into communal razing lands. These “dual rights” 
exacerbated the problem of equity that the policy was meant to address and contributed to further damage 
to communal grazing land. Thus, the policy that was supposed to enhance the definition of property rights 
actually clouded them further by allowing cattle owners to claim both private ownership and communal 
property rights. 
The failure of the TGLP can be largely attributed to the fact that false assumptions were made from the 
beginning. These included:
•	 Land	was	 not	 set	 aside	 for	 the	 proposed	 reserved	 zones	 since	 the	 amount	 of	 available	 land	 had	
been	overestimated.	Most	of	the	land	thought	available	was	found	unsuitable	or	already	populated	by	
hunters	and	gatherers,	which	resulted	in	a	legal	battle	over	whether	the	nomads	have	legal	rights	to	
the	land	in	totality	or	just	for	the	purpose	of	hunting.	
•	 The	policy	failed	to	take	baseline	administrative	and	political	conditions	into	account.	It	was	assumed	
that	it	would	be	feasible	to	apply	compulsory	stock	control	regulations	without	political	interference.	
This	turned	out	not	to	be	the	case.
•	 The	land	set	aside	for	privatisation	was	undervalued.	The	charges	levied	for	exclusive	rights	were	too	
low	and	grossly	underestimated	the	value	of	the	land.	This	attracted	the	participation	of	speculators	
not	interested	in	raising	livestock	but	in	simply	reselling	the	grazing	rights.	
•	 The	 valuation	 failed	 to	 take	 into	 account	 damages	 suffered	 by	 indigenous	 Bushmen	 and	 wildlife	
displaced	through	the	establishment	of	the	ranches.	A	proper	valuation	taking	this	into	account	would	
have	increased	rents	at	least	one	hundred-fold.	
Source:	Fidzani, N. H (2000) in Rietbergen-McCracken and Abaza (2000), pp. 19-30.
Case 3 - Wildlife User Rights in Zimbabwe 
In the late 1980s Zimbabwe recognized the need to halt the decline of wildlife resources in communal 
areas and to create alternative benefits for the local communities. Wildlife populations in communal areas 
had been declining for two reasons: Rapid population growth, requiring more land for agriculture and 
livestock; and the perception of local people that wildlife is a nuisance rather a resource, since they suffer 
net costs - such as crop destruction - from the presence of wildlife. 
To halt the decline in wildlife resources, Zimbabwe initiated the Communal Area Management Programme 
for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) to:
•	 Conserve	the	environment	and	sustain	economic	viability	through	wildlife	utilization;
•	 Reduce	conflicts	between	wildlife	and	agricultural	development	by	fencing;
•	 Increase	rural	employment	and	incomes;	and,
•	 Create	local	institutions	for	indigenous	resource	management.
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The main economic instrument used in the CAMPFIRE programme is a property rights regime that 
decentralized wildlife user rights. With respect to the revenues generated, the following secondary 
economic instruments were used: 
1.	 Auctioning	of	user	rights;	
2.	 A	net-revenue	sharing	formula	to	cover	resource	maintenance,	administrative,	and	monitoring	costs;	
3.	 Flexible,	locally	determined	distribution	of	local	revenues;	and	
4.	 Compensation	for	wildlife	damage.
The implementation of these policies was expected to lead to a reversal in the trend of wildlife decline in 
communal areas and an increase in wildlife-related benefits for the local population. 
In the past, wildlife conservation relied heavily on regulations and because of enforcement problems there 
was a vacuum in resource management. Under the new approach the government legislated that wildlife 
users rights be decentralized to councils and communities in CAMPFIRE areas. 
Under the scheme, the central government delegates wildlife user rights to district councils subject to a 
number of conditions. The district councils are required to develop a management plan and an institutional 
plan outlining decentralization to the local communities and the approval of all quotas by the Wildlife 
Department. The District Councils can then delegate the rights to local communities that apply to be part 
of the programme. 
Annual wildlife counts user quotas are set by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management 
for each community involved in the programme. With assistance from the government and some NGOs, 
communities prepare the required annual plans to utilize the wildlife resources. 
Basic uses are hunting and game viewing. Additional revenue may be obtained through wildlife processing 
activities, such as the processing of wildlife skins. Communities may either manage the wildlife resources 
themselves, or as is more commonly the case, lease out the rights to a private management company. A 
revenue sharing formula ensures that sufficient funds are available for both resources management and 
the local communities. International donors have subsidized the overhead costs of CAMPFIRE projects. 
CAMPFIRE has been successful in:
•	 Raising	revenue,	with	90	per	cent	of	the	revenue	coming	from	hunting;
•	 Gaining	wide	acceptance,	as	evidenced	by	the	increased	participation	of	local	communities;	and,	
•	 Changing	 people’s	 perception	 of	 wildlife,	 from	 seeing	 it	 as	 a	 nuisance	 to	 seeing	 it	 as	 a	 valuable	
resource.
Other positive factors of the programme include: 
•	 The	revenue-sharing	formula	appears	to	have	good	compliance	rates.
•	 Compensation	to	people	for	crop	and	animal	losses	by	wildlife	is	paid	from	the	allocation	to	the	local	
population.
•	 The	 ability	 of	 communities	 to	 agree	 on	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 local	 revenue	 enhances	 household	
security	and	local	development.	(During	droughts,	for	instance,	a	large	part	of	the	revenue	is	given	to	
households).
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There is limited quantitative data on the environmental impact of the programme, though some research 
reports indicated that wildlife resources had stabilized in CAMPFIRE areas after a few years. Nevertheless, 
there have been concerns about the sustainability of the programme: 
•	 There	is	a	risk	of	over-hunting.	Since	revenues	are	mostly	from	hunting,	in	particular	of	elephants	and	
buffalo,	there	is	always	a	temptation	to	allow	over-hunting.	Furthermore,	pressure	for	higher	quotas	
is	likely	to	increase	if	economic	hardship	persists	or	wildlife	resources	decline.	To	avoid	over-hunting,	
quotas	must	be	rationally	set,	impartially	administered,	and	rigorously	enforced.	
•	 The	future	of	the	wildlife	resource	in	communal	areas	is	determined	by	a	number	of	factors,	many	of	which	
are	beyond	the	control	of	the	local	communities	(including	population	growth	and	resettlement).
•	 Programme	 revenues	 have	 become	 an	 important	 source	 for	 district	 councils.	 To	 avoid	 councils	
appropriating	an	excessive	share	of	the	revenue,	the	formula	for	revenue	sharing	needs	to	be	strictly	
applied.	
Source:	Arntzen,	J	W	(2000)	in	Rietbergen-McCracken	and	Abaza	(2000),	pp	46-53.
Case 4 - Transferable Quotas for International Fisheries Protection 
Fisheries have long been a “commons” problem, since fish dwell in unmanaged ecosystems accessible 
by many countries. Historical controls to address this problem have focused on restricting access.
Nationalization of 200 miles of coastline by most countries helped reduce fishing pressure for a while, 
by curbing access of foreign fleets to domestic waters. However, even with such restrictions, problems 
remained. Two main economic counter currents undermined the effect of restricted access to the 
fisheries.
These were:
•	 Continual	technical	improvements	in	fleets	that	made	each	boat	a	more	efficient	vessel	for	harvesting	
fish	and,
•	 Large	subsidies	of	fishing-related	operations	and	capital	equipment	(e.g.,	subsidized	loans	for	boats)	
created	a	massive	overcapacity	 of	 vessels.	 The	World	Bank	has	 estimated	 that	 during	 the	1990s,	
annual	subsidies	were	equal	to	between	20	and	25	per	cent	of	global	fishery	revenues.	
The combination of these two developments has depleted many fisheries to the point of total collapse of 
the fishery. 
Using transferable quotas over the past 30 years, many countries have implemented market-based 
approaches to ration access to fisheries and manage both local and international fisheries. Variously 
called Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) or Individual Fishery Quotas (IFQs), the rights allow the holder 
to catch a specified proportion of the total allowable catch each year. The total catch represents the central 
government’s estimate of how many pounds of a particular fish species can be sustainably harvested.
The theory of ITQs is clear. Where there once was unlimited and free access to fish, users must now be 
licensed. This has a number of advantages:
•	 With	quotas	users	can	space	out	their	catch	more	regularly	without	fearing	that	others	will	overuse	the	
resource,	enabling	them	to	fish	more	when	prices	are	high,	increasing	their	profits.	
•	 The	aggregate	catch	of	the	vessels	is	limited,	ensuring	sufficient	fish	survive	to	rebuild	stocks.
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•	 Each	license	holder	has	an	incentive	to	ensure	other	vessels	do	not	fish	illegally,	since	this	reduces	the	
available	catch	for	license	holders	and	depresses	the	value	of	the	licenses	on	the	spot	market,	which	
existing	quota	holders	can	sell.
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has reviewed 31 fisheries across 
six countries using some variant of this approach and concluded that catch levels were maintained at or 
below catch limits in 24 cases. In 23 cases, the permits also improved the cost-effectiveness and profits 
of the fishery. While overall employment generally fell, part-time and seasonal jobs were often replaced by 
more stable, year-round work.
The success of the programmes seems to be dependent upon some key criteria: 
Accurate Estimates of Sustainable Catch. If the total catch values are too high, transferable permits 
have the perverse effect of increasing the cost-effectiveness of the unsustainable exhausting the resource. 
OECD noted that there were at least temporary declines in fish stocks within 24 fisheries. This seems to 
have been caused by a basic problem in the way total catch was calculated, and that the error eliminated 
many of the environmental and ecological benefits of the economic instrument.
Consistent Administration. In the Netherlands (sole and place fisheries) and Norway (cod fishery), ITQs 
failed to halt the increase in catch because license holders found that the state was shutting entire fisheries 
down even if individual quota holders had not yet met their quotas. As a result, quota holders continued 
to have a “race to fish” to exhaust their catch limits first before access was closed off. 
Resistance to Political Pressure. Errors in total catch values may not all be technical. Regulators in 
South Africa have been under continued and intense political pressure to increase total catch figures, 
irrespective of the environmental cost of doing so. Such pressure exists in most countries, but total catch 
figures are most likely to be manipulated for private gain where institutions are weak or corruption is 
widespread. 
Correct and Complete Information. Catch quotas are often based on landing statistics. Many 
fishermen destroy catch at sea to produce acceptable landing numbers making it impossible to reconcile 
the landing statistics with the actual pressure placed on marine ecosystems. It has been suggested that 
a post-landing spot market for ITQs, allowing fisherman to purchase excess quotas, may alleviate this 
pressure to some degree. 
Avoidance of High Grading. In a practice called “high grading” fishing crews discard smaller fish (that 
often die) at sea in order to maximize the value of the catch that is officially landed. Differential landing 
taxes, with higher levies on bigger fish, in theory could make fishermen neutral with regards to the maturity 
of their catch. However, the cost of monitoring needed to accurately set and implement such taxes 
could be quite large. 
Thus far, fisheries managers have steered clear of multi-catch fisheries because of the complications 
involved. The programmes have instead been targeted to single species. While bundled ITQs 
covering common mixtures of species could be created, implementing it in practice is difficult as by-catch 
(i.e. the catch of unwanted species) is likely to vary by region. 
Source:	UNEP (2004). 
Case 5 - Transferable Fisheries Quotas – The Chilean Case 
The case of Chilean fisheries illustrates the role special interest politics can play in regulating fisheries. 
The country has three main fishery interest groups: northern fishermen, southern fishermen, and artisanal 
fishermen (who use small boats and stay close to shore). 
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Political manoeuvring of the northern and southern fishery corporations focused on access to the initial 
fishing rights, and ways to use this property for competitive advantage. The artisanal interests have 
opposed the ITQs with the argument that the small boats, and the communities they support, would be 
frozen out of their livelihood. 
The ultimate decision to auction long-term fishing rights helped ensure more access to outside parties 
but still allow unregulated open access for artisanal interests. This free access to fisheries may be one 
reason that the number of artisanal vessels grew by 27 per cent between 1994 and 1998. Efforts to set 
up a separate class of ITQs for the artisanal fishermen are now under consideration.
Overall, use of the ITQs in Chile has remained small, with applications to only four fisheries covering 
roughly one per cent of total landings. The rest remain under a complicated and not particularly effective 
system of access controls, fleet limits, and equipment restrictions. 
Ownership of ITQs is highly concentrated (two groups control 75-90 per cent of the northern harvest) and 
there have never been fines levied for infractions of the ITQ rules. There has also been some evidence of 
pricing collusion stemming from the small number of dominant actors in the market.
These factors underscore the need for credible monitoring and enforcement even for economic 
instruments, as well as addressing baseline issues such as market power. 
Nonetheless, the programme does incorporate a number of useful elements, including caps on ITQ 
ownership by any single party and a 10 per cent annual depreciation of quotas, ensuring there will be 
regular auctioning and pricing of the rights. Some Chilean fisheries have undergone stock recoveries. 
Many fishing operators say they have been able to improve the quality of their final products, plan more 
effectively to meet higher price demand periods, and reduce social conflict with their workers by offering 
more regular work schedules.
Source:	UNEP (2004). 
Case 6 - Nutrient Trading at Sewage Plants 
The state of New South Wales, Australia has achieved cost efficiency by using nutrient (the organic 
components of untreated sewage) trading to allocate responsibility among three sewage treatment firms. 
The savings came primarily through capital cost savings achieved by concentrating investments to curb 
nutrients in one or two plants instead of all the three. This way, upgrades could more closely be timed 
to coincide with normal capital investments than would have been possible under a uniform standards 
approach. 
When nutrients are discharged en masse to waterways, they generate algae blooms which, in turn, use up 
all of the oxygen in the water killing other life. As a result, treatment of nutrients is a central job of sewage 
treatment plants before the wastewater can be released to the surrounding environment. 
Beginning in 1996, three sewage treatment plants owned by the Sydney Water Corporation in the South 
Creek area of the Hawkesbury-Nepean River initiated a nutrient trading system. 
Under the regime, the three plants are allowed to trade portions of their nutrient discharge allocations, 
so long as the aggregate loading limit is not exceeded. The process of intra-firm trading within a set 
geographic area is called a “bubble,” since a single limit or bubble applies to the river, rather than 
to a single plant. The trading scheme set target reductions by 2004 of 83 per cent of the phosphorous 
and 50 per cent of the nitrogen previously discharged. Oversight is provided by the local regulatory 
body. 
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Capital investments to curb nutrients can be concentrated in one or two plants, versus all three; and 
upgrades can be more closely timed with normal capital replacement than would have been possible 
under a uniform standards approach. 
The programme is generally considered a success. After three years, there were substantial reductions in 
nutrient loadings, at a much lower cost. The cost savings, estimated at 37 per cent as compared to each 
plant meeting uniform requirements, come primarily through capital cost savings. 
In addition, plans to expand the trading system to more parties and to non-point sources of nutrients as 
well, have been under discussion for some time, but have not been implemented yet.
However, the most recent research report on the programme does not provide monitoring data, nor does 
it estimate the overall impact of the programme on environmental quality in the receiving waters. This is 
an important data gap since detrimental effects of excessive loadings can be localized within receiving 
waters (causing “hot spots” of environmental damage). 
This case illustrates that applications of tradable permits of any type needs to evaluate the likelihood and 
impacts of such hot spots in order to be sure that the overall environmental objectives of the programme 
are met. 
Sources:	UNEP (2004) and Kraemer, Interwies, and Kampa (2002).
Case 7 - Leaded Gasoline Trading in the USA 
A system of trading designed to reduce gasoline lead to 0.1 grams per gallon over five years was used to 
phase out leaded gasoline in the US. The system allowed refiners and importers to trade lead reduction 
credits. 
During the 1980s, restrictions to the use of lead additives in petrol were set up in the US, with the ultimate 
aim of phasing out use of leaded petrol entirely. To ease the process of adjusting to the more stringent 
standards, especially for smaller suppliers, a lead trading system was instituted in 1983. 
The programme was slated to operate during the five-year transition period to the new lower limit of 0.1 
grams per gallon. The lead reduction credits were created when suppliers of leaded petrol achieved 
lead levels lower than those required by the new limits. The system allowed for both internal “trading” 
(i.e. flexibility) for an individual supplier, as well as external trading between suppliers. Beginning in 1985, 
refineries were allowed to “bank” lead credits for use in future years. 
The general consensus is that this programme performed successfully, reducing costs by approximately 
US$ 250 million per year. No leaded gasoline is now sold in the United States. Among the factors to which 
its success has been credited are:
•	 A	clear	definition	of	rights	and	obligations;	
•	 A	predefined	time	over	which	the	programme	would	operate;	
•	 A	homogeneous	product	with	a	clear	definition	for	all	market	participants;	and	
•	 Low	transaction	costs	in	implementing	trades.
Sources:	UNEP (2004) and OECD (2001). 
P
A
R
T
 I
II
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1 This module is based on Sterner, T (2003). Policy instruments for environmental and natural resource management. Washington DC: Resources for 
the Future, World Bank and FAO, pp 115-126.
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Legal, Voluntary and Information- 
Based Instruments1
Module 8
G O A L
L E A R N I N G  O B j E C T I V E
To present the key features of legal, voluntary and information-
based instruments for environmental and natural resource 
management.
By the end of this module, participants should be able to explain 
what legal, voluntary and information-based instruments are and 
when they can be used.
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8.1 Defining Terms
Legal Instruments: Policy instruments that hold individuals and organizations liable for environmental 
damage they cause. Legal instruments include criminal penalties, fines, civil liability statues, and 
performance bonds.
Liability: Legal obligation to pay for damages caused. A law, for instance, may permit an activity (oil 
drilling) but require the company to bear all the costs of environmental damage caused by the activity.
Performance Bonds: A form of insurance required to ensure that the company will be able to pay for 
any environmental damage caused by its activities.
Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Formal negotiated agreements between companies or groups 
of companies and the government (or on some occasions nongovernmental environmental groups) to 
limit pollution or the overuse of natural resources. Such agreements allow the parties to avoid specific 
legislation or intrusive government regulation or legislation and provide the flexibility that comes with 
negotiated agreements. Such agreements are backed by the threat of government sanctions if the parties 
do not adhere to the agreements.
Information-Based Instruments: Methods of informing the public about how eco-friendly a product 
is. This can be done by labelling, rating, or other techniques. Information-based instruments may also 
include widespread public education programmes on anti-littering or energy conservation or other high 
profile campaigns.
Labelling (Environmental): The use of product labels to inform consumers that a product has been 
manufactured, mined, or harvested in accordance with certain environmental standards or practices (e.g. 
organically grown). The intention is to allow consumers to purchase products that were produced with the 
least harm to the environment.
Environmental Certification: A process by which the manufacturing or harvesting process is inspected 
and certified to be consistent with certain environmental practices. 
ISO 14000: International Standards Organization rules for environmental practices and for independent 
verification of those practices. The ISO 14000 family of standards is primarily concerned with what an 
organization does to minimize harmful effects on the environment caused by its activities, and to achieve 
continual improvement of its environmental performance. Governments may require ISO 14000 certification 
for government contractors to promote environmental protection.
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS): Voluntary instrument introduced in 1995 in the 
European Union, which acknowledges organizations that improve their environmental performance on a 
continuous basis. EMAS registered organisations are legally compliant, run an environment management 
system and report on their environmental performance through the publication of an independently verified 
environmental statement. They are recognised by the EMAS logo, which guarantees the reliability of the 
information provided.
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8.2 Legal Instruments
Many economic instruments are enforced, in part, through the awarding or withholding of economic 
benefits and are, to some extent, self-enforcing. However, all economic instruments require at least some 
penalties to ensure full compliance. 
Legal instruments are designed to ensure the enforcement of rules by increasing the economic cost of 
non-compliance. These economic penalties remove the competitive advantage that the firm would gain 
through non-compliance. Most enforcement relies on three types of legal instruments imposing economic 
penalties: fines, liability and performance bonds.
8.2.1 Fines 
When a firm has knowingly violated environmental or health laws to make a profit, fines are commonly 
imposed by the government. Fines are relatively easy to impose and can often be assessed on the spot. 
In some cases special administrative procedures and courts are established to allow more efficient use 
of fines as an economic instrument. The use of fines to ensure compliance, however, requires that the 
government has sufficient police or inspectors, appropriate legal staff, and a functioning legal system. 
From an economic perspective, the penalty imposed by fines must be large enough to actually deter 
undesirable behaviour. Small fines may be seen as merely a cost of doing business. Not only the amount 
of the fine itself is important, but also the probability of being caught when violating an environmental law. 
Companies will have an economic incentive if their expected cost from a violation, namely the probability 
of being caught multiplied with the level of the fine, is higher than the benefit they expect from bypassing 
the rules. 
8.2.2 Liability 
Under liability sanctions, an accused violator may be taken to court – by either the government or private 
plaintiffs - to compensate for the cost of environmental damage. Liability sanctions are usually easier to 
enforce and much more costly to the violator than are fines. They do, however, require a fully functioning 
legal system and, even then, may involve prolonged litigation. 
Companies could be strictly or partially liable for damages caused and this may have important implications 
for their behaviour. Negligence or fault-based liability (forms of partial liability) implies that the person injured 
has the right to compensation only if the party causing the injury has taken less than due precautions. 
Strict liability means a right to compensation irrespective of precautions. 
Both principles should lead to the same level of care, but under partial liability the violator could rely on 
the experience that many people that suffer injury never litigate. Suing a large firm or government agency 
is risky and expensive, and many individuals do not have the necessary resources to hire a lawyer and 
proceed with a lawsuit. Strict liability gives more rights to the injured individuals and can be seen as the 
ultimate policy instrument that promotes the internalisation of all environmental damages and risks.
8.2.3 Performance Bonds 
Governments often require that firms have special insurance, known as a performance bond, to ensure 
that they have the wherewithal to actually pay for the environmental damages they cause. 
An economic deterrent effect for potential violators is the increased cost for future performance bond 
insurance – or the inability to obtain such insurance at all - if the firm needs to use the insurance to cover 
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environmental damage liabilities. In addition, firms will not be able to purchase performance bonds if 
bonding companies deem them likely to violate environmental regulations in the future.
Performance bonds have the advantage that they make it relatively certain that governments or private 
plaintiffs can recover damages. The fact that insurers are assessing the risks of non-compliance increases 
the effectiveness of environmental policies.
However, the use of performance bonds is usually restricted to industries with a greater than average risk 
of causing significant environmental damage – oil transport, forestry, mining, heavy industry – where the 
additional cost of the bond insurance is commensurate with the risk. 
8.2.4 Use of Legal Instruments 
The character of economic penalties applied to environmental problems depends on how much a firm or 
individual can be held responsible for causing the environmental damage - the degree of causality. For a 
new environmental problem – where the polluter could not have anticipated the hazard - the regulators 
often offer information about causes of the problem and suggest technical solutions in combination with 
a threat of penalties for future non-compliance.
With environmental problems where casual relations are more established, the choice and level of 
legal penalties will depend upon the exact level of abatement required as well as the timing, location 
and character of emissions. Fines may be sufficient for relatively minor violations but legal liability or 
performance bonds required for potentially major problems. 
The effect of liability will be felt seriously when the level of damage reaches a level sufficient to justify lengthy 
and often complex legal proceedings. (It is not uncommon for firms to sue each other in determining the 
party responsible, or most responsible, for the damages.) As indicated the requirement of performance 
bonds is usually limited to relatively high-risk activities where the potential damage may be extremely 
large.
When the offence causes serious damage to human health or death administrative and financial sanctions 
are often not sufficient. In such circumstances, the responsible managers or employees may be punished 
under the criminal law system. 
8.2.5 Potential Problems with Legal Instruments 
The empirical application of these instruments may be difficult in those developing countries where the 
judicial systems are weak. Specific problems with the use of legal instruments include the very high costs 
of litigation, lack of information about liability, and poorly or incompletely defined property rights making 
responsibility for damages uncertain and the imposition of penalties impossible.
8.3 Voluntary Environmental Agreements
Voluntary environmental agreements are agreements among private firms, government agencies, and/or 
nongovernmental organizations designed to encourage voluntarily investment, clean-up, or other changes 
to reduce negative environmental impacts. The incentives for such agreements include subsidies, favours, 
positive publicity or good relationship with the government.
In recent years, ‘voluntary agreement’ has become a popular catchphrase among environmental policy 
experts. Such agreements are promoted as a useful instrument for policy making. According to the US 
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government (1998), more than 13,000 US firms, nongovernmental organisations and local agencies were 
estimated to be involved in voluntary government initiatives in 2000. 
8.3.1 Nature of Voluntary Agreements 
Voluntary agreements are more complex than the name might imply. They are usually neither entirely 
voluntary nor precisely agreements among equal parties. 
The word voluntary implies that the polluters are not coerced. Yet if the agreement were purely voluntary 
on the part of polluters or resource users, it would not be considered a public policy instrument. In fact it 
would be more proper to call them negotiated agreements among the various parties. 
Similarly, the word agreement suggests more than a purely autonomous decision by the polluter. In fact, 
the agreement is usually more a form of a verifiable contract between environmental regulators and 
polluting firms. 
To serve as an economic instrument the agreement needs to produce a level of abatement beyond 
the one achieved without government involvement. For these reasons, voluntary agreements are often 
organized and facilitated by the government rather than arising from within the regulated industries.
8.3.2 Characteristics of the Agreements 
Under voluntary agreements firms agree to invest, clean up, or undergo changes to reduce negative 
environmental effects. In exchange, the firms may receive subsidies or other benefits. Most agreements 
also have some or all of the following characteristics. 
They:
1.	 Forestall	more	intrusive	government	legislation.
2.	 Allow	the	polluters	to	adopt	cleaner	technology	in	exchange	for	more	lenient	regulation.
3.	 Offer	at	least	some	official	protection	against	civil	liability	lawsuits.
4.	 Allow	all	industry	stakeholders	to	assume	similar	costs	giving	no	firm	a	cost	advantage.
5.	 Facilitate	agreement	within	an	industry	on	technology	to	be	used	or	prohibited	to	abate	pollution	or	
protect	natural	resources.	
6.	 Operate	under	waivers	 from	antitrust	and	other	regulations	to	allow	cooperation	among	competing	
companies.
7.	 Include	subsidies	for	firms	that	abide	by	the	terms	of	the	agreement.
8.	 Produce	some	positive	outcome	 for	 the	firms	such	as	good	publicity,	a	good	 relationship	with	 the	
government,	and	perhaps	speedier	and	less	formal	treatment	of	other	environmental	controls.
In developing agreements the government agency may negotiate an agreement with a single firm (especially 
if it is a large firm with a major impact on the environment) or with multiple firms represented by a trade 
association or other intermediary organizations.
8.3.3 Perceived Benefits 
The relative benefit of voluntary agreements over command and control instruments or the more measurable 
benefits of most economic instruments may be as much a cultural or a psychological one as one of effect. 
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It has been suggested that the ‘covenanting process’—that is, the dialogue itself, rather than the formal 
agreement—has been touted as the main feature that makes voluntary agreements successful.
8.3.3.1 Benefits to Firms. Voluntary agreements allow firms to save face before their stockholders 
while accepting the fact that they must spend company funds to reduce emissions or curtail exploitation 
of natural resources. As a matter of corporate image and public relations, firms may prefer a new label 
on what is essentially the same old negotiation with an environmental protection agency. The proactive, 
voluntary approach may be a good way not only of building public image but also of pre-empting effort 
by the government. 
By taking the initiative in some areas, a firm may be able to divert attention from other areas and be able 
to set a level of environmental standard closer to its preference. By winning the public relations war, a firm 
may be able to focus on issues and solutions of its own choosing. 
8.3.3.2 Benefits to Government and Society. The government and society receive benefits for 
voluntary agreements as well:
1.	 A	government	regulatory	agency	can	improve	its	image	with	the	public,	elected	officials	and	the	general	
business	community	by	presenting	itself	as	open-minded	and	reasonable	in	its	dealings	with	the	private	
sector	rather	than	inflexibly	bureaucratic.
2.	 Since	firms	have	signed	the	agreements	voluntarily,	they	are	more	likely	to	comply	with	the	measures	to	
which	they	agreed.	
3.	 The	public	nature	of	the	agreement	also	improves	the	chances	of	compliance	by	firms	wishing	to	avoid	
public	embarrassment.	
4.	 The	agreements	provide	the	benefit	of	reduced	government	regulatory	costs	insofar	as	the	agreements	
are	self-policing.	
There may be genuine altruism or at least enlightened self-interest considerations by the firm entering into 
voluntary agreements. However, some firms may voluntarily participate only to the point at which marginal 
abatement costs are equated with their own intangible costs (or “secondary loss effects”) of causing 
environmental damage such as a negative reputation that could mean lost sales, and strained relations 
with neighbours, workers and customers.
8.3.4 Applications 
Voluntary agreements are popular in cases where firms are in some way rewarded for engaging in 
more abatement than would normally be required. Voluntary agreements are most promising when the 
opportunity for technical abatement is good while imperfections (in the product or technology markets) 
make the use of conventional instruments such as taxes difficult. In addition, voluntary agreements are an 
alternative to taxes when emissions verification is problematic.
From the government perspective, voluntary agreements may be most attractive in cases where the 
government does not have sufficient power to coerce the polluter. In contrast, firms may be more inclined 
to voluntary agreements when the state has sufficient power to enforce its will without an agreement, 
because then, firms will be motivated to negotiate the best conditions possible. 
The notion that voluntary agreements work best against a backdrop of tougher instruments is illustrated 
by the case of the voluntary banning of chlorine from paper bleaching in Sweden. The companies stopped
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using chlorine, although their response was a reaction to plans to introduce an environmental tax on 
chlorine. Presumably, the demand for ‘green’ labels on paper products also contributed to this shift.
As the Swedish government and parliament were drafting the laws, industry decided to be a ‘first mover’ 
and voluntarily ban chlorine. In this way, they avoided the tax payment, gained good publicity, and set a 
precedent for future battles concerning environmental legislation.2 
8.3.5 Potential Problems with Voluntary Agreements
A weakness of voluntary agreements is that they depend on other tougher instruments to function. Strong 
environmental lobbies that stimulate firms to acquire ‘green’ labels and therefore voluntary agreements 
moreover are often lacking in developing countries. This means that the potential for voluntary agreements 
in such countries appears to be weak.
8.4 Information-Based Instruments
All policy instruments require information to function, but public disclosure of information can be an economic 
instrument in its own right. As an economic instrument, public disclosure can change environmental 
behaviour of polluters and consumers by directly influencing the market. The instrument is used to publicize 
those firms or products that meet certain standards in the way they are produced or harvested.
Information-based instruments are becoming increasingly popular among theorists and in real world 
applications. Information provision has been referred to as the ‘third wave’ of environmental policy making 
(presumably after command and control instruments and economic instruments), and its popularity can be 
explained by the changing costs of providing, processing and disseminating relevant information. 
Information disclosure as an instrument for pollution management is particularly promising in situations where 
administrative costs of more traditional policies are excessive.3 In addition, there is growing acceptance 
of public disclosure for natural resources management in both industrialized and less developed countries 
(e.g., organic farming, forest certification programmes). 
8.4.1 Forms of Disclosure 
Information disclosure can take a number of forms, depending on the degree of interpretation and 
aggregation of information and on the character of the organization that is responsible for certification.
Forms of information disclosure include:
Labelling, in which products are directly labelled as being environmentally friendly or meeting certain 
criteria (e.g. low energy usage, organic).
Public Disclosure, in which comparative information about the environmental practices or violations of 
environmental law of different companies is made available to the public. Product by product comparison 
can also be provided.
Ratings or rankings provide information about the environmental impact of a product or the environmental 
performance of a firm on the relative scale (e.g. Grade 1, 2, or 3). The advent of the internet has made such 
information easy to access and increasingly powerful.
2 Sterner (2003), pp 119-122, provides a more detailed discussion on the potential and scope of voluntary agreements for enhanced environmental 
management.
3 Sterner (2003), pp 122-126, gives a number of applications of this tool, especially in northern Europe.
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Environmental certification of firms, which use a fixed system of certification within some predetermined 
bounds such as ISO 14000 or EMAS standards.4 These systems are usually oriented towards the 
management structures of firms, and not towards compliance with environmental standards or 
environmental performance	per	se. 
8.4.2 Categories of Disclosure 
Direct disclosure programmes fall into three categories: 
Type 1 relies on voluntary certification that companies can apply for. Independent agencies set criteria 
and evaluate the products and applications. The certification is often conducted by independent non-
governmental organizations. Environmental certifications of firms by ISO 14000 or EMAS standards are 
Type 1 disclosures that provide information about a firm’s procedures and management processes that 
affect environmental quality. Reviews for these certifications are conducted by independent international 
organizations using trained inspectors.
Type 2 relies on the producers’ claims (set in-house) without fixed criteria or independent outside review. 
The carmaker Volvo, for instance, provides detailed environmental data and evaluates its performance 
according to several criteria and its own internal goals. The results are published in environmental 
reports.
Type 3 labelling is the provision of raw data, without interpretation or judgment, which is sometimes 
done in the form of a life-cycle analysis (LCA). As such, Type 3 provides qualified product information - a 
description of individual effects - but without outside evaluation.
One example of a Type 3 labelling programme is the US Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), a programme 
for public disclosure of information in which the industry using toxic substances provides raw data to 
public authorities5. One criticism of the TRI is that the public cannot interpret such information. However, 
experience has shown that, building on such information, other rating and evaluation programmes have 
sprung up. 
An example of such an evaluation programme is the one run by the US based organisation called 
SCORECARD6, which provides summarized information to nongovernmental organisations, investors, 
neighbours of emitting firms and others. SCORECARD provides detailed maps of the US that can be 
zoomed in to the street level to provide all TRI data as well as other information (such as health effects) in 
a format that is relevant for local decision makers. 
8.4.3 Targets of Disclosure 
Disclosure programmes may also be categorized by the item certified (the target): they can provide 
information about products, the firms themselves, or their processes and management procedures.
8.4.3.1 Products. Product labelling programmes have been around for decades. In recent years, 
however, the number of product labelling programmes has been increasing rapidly. Examples include:
4 EMAS: Eco-Management and Audit Scheme of the European Union and ISO 14000: International Standards Organization rules for environmental 
practices (for more information see http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/emas/index_en.htm and http://www.iso.org/iso/en/iso9000-14000/index.
html.
5 The TRI is designed purely to provide information to the public about releases of toxic substances, most of which are not subject to standards or 
regulation. The TRI states that firms with 10 or more full-time employees that also use 10,000 pounds or more of a listed chemical per year or import, 
process or manufacture 25,000 pounds or more of chemical of a listed chemical per year must file an annual report on each of the chemicals in the 
plant.
6 www.scorecard.org.
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•	 ‘Organic’	certification	of	food,	which	is	widespread,	and	probably	one	of	the	oldest	programmes.	
•	 Type	1	 ‘green’	 labelling	of	products,	which	has	become	popular	 in	 northern	Europe.	The	German	
Blue	Angel,	started	in	1977,	was	the	first	national	eco-labelling	programme.	In	Scandinavia,	the	Nordic	
Council	of	Ministers	started	the	Nordic	Swan	in	1989,	and	in	Sweden	the	Swedish	Society	for	Nature	
Conservation	(a	nongovernmental	organisations)	runs	the	Environmental	Choice	independent	labelling	
programme.	
•	 Certification	 programmes	 such	 as	 the	 Canadian	 Environmental	 Choice,	 the	 US	 Green	 Seal,	 the	
Japanese	ECO	MARK	and	the	French	NF	Environment	(OECD,	1997).	Further,	the	Eco-tourism	Society	
of	Kenya	(ESOK)	is	working	on	an	eco-labelling	programme	for	the	eco-tourism	sub-sector.	
8.4.3.2 Firms or Plants. Some programmes rate firms or plants rather than products, and often have a 
government ministry rather than a nongovernmental organisation as their rating or certifying agent. Similar 
to public disclosure programmes for products, these programmes can use rankings and ratings such as 
the Programme for Pollution Control Evaluation and Rating (PROPER) that was temporarily introduced in 
Indonesia. PROPER is a system for emission reporting, evaluation and control of emissions reports and 
ratings as well as assistance and advice to the firms. Each industry is graded, and ratings are based on 
several parameters in the reports. 
8.4.3.3 Processes and Management Procedures. This kind of certification – such as ISO 14000 and 
EMAS certifications - evaluates the internal environmental policies and practices of firms. The administrative 
routines and administrative structures of firms (or other organizations) are certified, not the environmental 
standards or performance as such.
ISO 14000 certification requires adoption of an environmental management system and specifies 
requirements for establishing an environmental policy, determining impacts of products or services, and 
planning and meeting environmental objectives through measurable targets. 
Companies are required to organize credible procedures for environmental management and to aim at 
continually improving their environmental management. In return, companies are certified, which at least in 
some markets adds value to the firm by boosting its credibility. ISO 14000 certification may be particularly 
useful to those firms contracted by governments if the government restricts itself to only contracting firms 
that meet environmental management standards.
8.4.4 Potential Problems with Information-Based Instruments
Problems with the use of information-based instruments include:
1.	 Low-income	levels	in	developing	countries	may	prevent	the	majority	of	people	from	being	able	to	make	
consumer	choices,	which	are	necessary	for	information-based	instruments	to	be	effective.	
2.	 Agents	may	use	‘green’	and	‘eco’	labels	as	mere	mantras	without	necessarily	adequately	protecting	
the	environment.	One	area	where	this	seems	to	be	prevalent	is	in	‘eco-tourism’.
3.	 There	may	be	inadequate	knowledge	or	concern	about	the	advantages	of	green	products.
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Legal, Voluntary and Information-Based Instruments Cases
Case 1 - Performance Bonds for Forest Management
In its efforts to promote sustainable forest management, the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources of the Philippines introduced a new type of forest lease agreement, known as the Industrial 
Forest Management Agreement (IFMA). Under the agreement, private concessionaries are assigned 
responsibility for management of not only production forests but also protection forests and industrial 
plantations in deforested land, all within a single unit.
IFMAs are awarded not to the highest bidder, but to the concessionaire who is prepared to post the highest 
performance guarantee bond – called the Forest Guarantee Board (FGB) - to ensure that all obligations 
under the lease would be discharged. The FGB is in effect a refundable deposit with the government. 
The form of FGB is left unspecified and most IFMA holders opt to post a surety bond obtained from a 
bonding company in exchange for collateral and annual premium payments, rather than a cash bond 
deposited in one interest-bearing account. This system has demonstrated the scope of innovative 
market-based instruments to internalise the benefits (or costs) of good (or bad) management in the form 
of capital costs. 
Source:	Panayotou, T. (1998). 
Case 2 - Nordic Eco-Labelling 
In 1989, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden introduced the Nordic Eco-labelling programme, the first 
harmonized voluntary multinational eco-labelling programme. The objectives of the programme are to 
guide consumers in choosing the least environmentally harmful products, to encourage the development 
of environmentally friendly products and to tap market forces to reinforce the effect of environmental 
legislation. 
The programme is operated by the national boards in each member country, which establishes specific 
criteria and award labels. The criteria are based on life cycle analysis of products, including consumption 
of natural resources and energy and generation of air and water emissions and solid waste. 
Source:	Panayotou, T. (1998). 
Case 3 - Eco-Labelling in Developing Countries
Several developing countries, including China, Korea, Peru and Costa Rica are beginning to introduce eco-
labelling programmes. Following the Rio Summit, the Chinese government introduced the ‘Ten Points for 
Environment and Development’, which designates the development of environmentally friendly products 
as one of the country’s priorities. 
In 1993, the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) established the National Environmental 
Labelling Programme, and in 1994 established the China Committee for Environmental Labelling to 
administer the Programme, select product categories, set criteria, and approve certifications. 
Source:	Panayotou, T (1998). 
Case 4 - Voluntary Agreements in India
The government of India has launched a campaign to encourage the industry (especially small and medium 
scale firms) to organize itself in Waste Minimization Circles. Each Circle brings together representatives 
of industries related either by process, product or location, to exchange information on waste reduction 
approaches and experiences. With leadership from within the group and technical assistance from a 
resource person from universities or technical institutions, each group meets periodically to discuss 
action-oriented ways to minimize waste. 
Source: Panayotou, T. (1998).
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Modules 5 to 8  Review Exercise
Case Studies on the Use of Economic 
Instruments1 (Handouts)
Instructions for Group Discussion
1. Read the case study individually
2. Discuss the questions within your group
3. Elect a speaker
4. Prepare a presentation to report back
Questions for Group Discussion
1. What is/are the environmental problem(s) described in the case study? 
2. What are the baseline conditions in the country (legal, fiscal, government)?
3. What is / are the economic instrument(s) chosen? What is / are its / their objective(s)?
4. Who are the main stakeholders involved?
5. What are the main factors for success or failure?
6. What message can you take for your own country case? 
Report Back
The report back to the plenary should include:
•	 A	brief	description	of	the	country	situation	
•	 The	main	objective	of	the	economic	instrument	applied
•	 The main factors for success or failure
!
?
1 The case studies used in this exercise are based on UNEP (2004).
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Case Study 1
Recovering Reasonable Fees from Resource Users
The public sector invests hundreds of millions of dollars to bring services to the populace of many developing 
countries: electricity, drinking water, and wastewater treatment are examples. Similarly, government owned 
natural resources comprise an asset of the state, owned by its citizens. There are strong arguments to 
be made for supporting cost recovery from beneficiaries for both consumptive (e.g., harvesting firewood, 
grazing) and non-consumptive (e.g., recreation) use. Despite the logic behind cost recovery, there is a 
widely held belief that many of these municipal services should be free. 
An Example from the Country C
Pasture Lease Agreements (PLAs) for ranchers to graze cattle on public lands have existed for decades in 
Country C. The lease terms last 25 years, and is renewable for another 25. Grazing fees were first imposed 
in 1961 through Administrative Order 08 at an average rate of less than US $0.01/hectare per year. An 
initial fee increase was authorized in the Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement of 1982. Fees were raised 
again in 1991 to the current rate of US $0.30. 
Compliance with the fees has generally been quite high given the still very low rate. The low rates also led 
to a relatively small group of people gaining control over much of the public grasslands for the 50-year 
lease period. The ability to shift cattle to new pastures they control has also reduced the incentive for 
sound management of the pastureland, and led to land degradation in many parts of the country.
Although existing rules require ranches to file annual operating plans as well as a management plan every 
eight years, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) has lacked resources to 
oversee management plans. This is the result of insufficient funding as well as difficult terrain to oversee.
To address the problem, DENR’s Ecosystems Research Development Board (ERDB) evaluated what the 
true economic rent should be, accounting for the cost of various measures to rehabilitate existing damages, 
and the economics of alternative land uses. 
While more than 10 times higher than the prior charge, the new rates were still believed to be only slightly 
more than half the lowest economically justifiable rent on the land. In addition, the charge had a five-year 
phase-in period. To support the transition, the policy included increased technical assistance as well as fee 
reductions for sound land management.
Rights have continued with existing holders, with the price of those rights (through an annual rental fee) set 
by statute. The fee adjustment was authorized by Department Administrative Order 2001-05, which took 
effect in August 2001.
Despite some evidence that even this fee was still low, and the fact that 80 per cent of the surcharge could 
be used to correct existing damage on the grassland the ranchers have fiercely resisted the increase. A 
number have refused to pay the higher rates, a situation the DENR had not been prepared for. 
There had been a series of public hearings run by ERDB to discuss existing and proposed grazing fees. 
Ranchers were already well organized as a stakeholder group, and strongly opposed rate increases. They 
argued that the government should view their presence on the land as a benefit in that it curbed squatting 
165The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
P
A
R
T
 I
II
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
by migrants. They also mobilized strong political actions against the ERDB and DENR to oppose the rate 
increases.
As a result, DENR ended up collecting nothing from them mainly due to its little capability to carry out full 
enforcement. Furthermore, during a trip to the region in early 2002, a top government official promised to 
reduce the fee substantially “to encourage breeding and create 60,000 jobs”. This statement undermined 
current efforts to collect the higher fees, and led DENR to suspend its collection pending formal clarification 
on how to proceed. 
DENR has been unable to overcome local political opposition. As a result, the grasslands remain under 
great threat, and additional resources that the higher fees would have brought in are not available to 
stem the damage. Existing ranching practices are unsustainable, and current regulations on management 
reporting and planning by ranchers are not enforced. As a result, ranchers continue to have low cost, long-
term access to public grazing lands with little incentive for proper land management. 
In the face of such opposition regarding fee levels and enforcement, auctioning of rights could have offered 
a substitute for a user fee. Although auctions will not work for cost recovery on government owned or built 
infrastructure, they can be very helpful for applications where there is little fixed infrastructure and the users 
can be quickly changed. 
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Case Study 2
Limiting Access to Publicly Owned Resources
Overuse of natural resources through open and unrestricted access by many parties is a recurring 
environmental problem, often referred to as the “tragedy of the commons” (See Module 7). The policy 
challenge is not only to constrain resource use, but also to do so in a way that does not require an 
unreasonable level of government oversight.
An Example from Country D
The Mankote Mangrove comprises the largest contiguous tract of mangrove in Country D, and 20% of the 
total mangrove area in the country. 
Country D’s Forest, Soil and Water Conservation Ordinance of 1946 and its Wildlife Production Act of 1980 
gave the government a legal framework for regulating harvesting activities on public lands. However, little 
was actually done to regulate or control the harvesting of charcoal using mangrove wood and Country D’s 
natural resource management agencies remained perpetually underfunded. 
As a result, charcoal harvesting from the trees was widespread and uncontrolled and put the mangroves 
into severe environmental decline. Charcoal was harvested by local subsistence populations that were 
extremely poor and had no legal right to any use of the publicly owned mangrove resources. They did not 
have obvious alternative employment should their access to the mangroves be cut off due to resource 
depletion or degradation. 
The local population already allowed time for the trees to regenerate before returning and left species 
that did not make good charcoal to provide cover and impede evaporation of the swamp. Nevertheless, 
the loss of Mangrove posed a significant threat to the many ecosystem services that mangroves provide, 
including maintaining coastal stability and water quality, serving as a fish breeding and nursery ground, 
trapping silt, and providing important bird habitat.
To address the problem, subsistence users were organized into an informal cooperative (ACAPG Aupicon 
Charcoal and Agricultural Producers Group) and given communal legal and exclusive rights to harvest the 
charcoal. Initial rights were given for free to members of ACAPG. Since they were subsistence harvesters, 
securing their tenure increased their interest in sustainable management of the resource. 
In addition, they became involved with a joint monitoring programme with a regional NGO, the Caribbean 
Natural Resources Institute (CANARI), to obtain accurate and timely information on the overall health of the 
mangrove resource (as measured by tree size and number of new stems). 
The group committed to a set of rules for sustainable use of the mangrove. These included a ban on cutting 
any trees that lined the waterways, the preservation of large trees, and cutting on a slant to preserve the 
tree’s stump. 
Cutting rights were also organized, with each charcoal producer getting access to one area for a season, 
and rotating to a different area the next season. Cutting areas are well known to avoid conflicts between 
cutters and encourage monitoring of compliance behaviour by other members of the cooperative. 
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Technical training in effective ways to manage cuts was provided. Longer-term efforts to reduce the economic 
pressure on the mangrove were implemented using job training programmes and the development of a 
hardwood forest outside of the mangrove. 
In 1996, the Department of Fisheries, which oversees the reserve, formalized the long-standing de facto 
agreement under which ACAPG members got exclusive rights to the use of timber resources from within 
the grove. 
By clarifying charcoal harvesting rights, Country D has been able to protect the Mankote Mangrove and 
all the ecosystem services it provides. Mangrove depletion has been stopped and tree cover is now 
increasing, all without displacing jobs. 
The approach made sense because the subsistence harvesters were the primary cause of the problem. 
With no formal rights to the resource, they had little incentive to invest in longer-term resource management. 
Prior to the establishment of ACAPG there was no effective control at all on charcoal production. Self-
monitoring of cutting by different members of the cooperative (each protecting their individual interests) has 
made enforcement of the agreement both easier and less expensive.
Finally, in addition to securing the tenure of the charcoal harvesters, the programme worked to prevent 
threats to subsistence harvesting from large-scale development or fishing by establishing Mankote as a 
nature reserve.
Despite the overall success, the case does have some problems. The process has been extremely long, 
taking more than 15 years. Many resources at risk would not survive such a long policy gestation period. 
 
Efforts to shift from mangrove to hardwood from plantations near Mankote have had limited success, 
partly due to the lack of experience the producers have with agriculture and marketing.
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Case Studies 3
Reducing Pollutant Loadings to the Environment
Although pollution to air, water, and land occurs in many industries, pollution intensity (emissions per 
unit produced, or per dollar of sales) varies widely. Even within a single industry, there are widely varying 
emissions levels depending on the technology employed and the sophistication of management. 
An Example from a Province in Country A
When nutrients are discharged en masse to waterways, they generate algae blooms, which, in turn, 
use up all of the oxygen in the water killing other life. As a result, treatment of nutrients is a central job of 
sewage treatment plants before the wastewater can be released to the surrounding environment. 
To limit the nutrients discharged to waterways, the Province in Country A had command and control 
regulations in place and combined those with a new approach. Beginning in 1996, three sewage treatment 
plants owned by the Water Corporation in the South Creek area of the River initiated a nutrient trading 
system. 
Under the regime, the three plants are allowed to trade portions of their nutrient discharge allocations, 
so long as the aggregate loading limit is not exceeded. The process of intra-firm trading within a set 
geographic area is called a “bubble,” since a single limit or bubble applies to the river, rather than to a 
single plant. 
The trading scheme set target reductions by 2004 of 83 per cent of the phosphorous and 50 per cent of 
the nitrogen previously discharged. The local regulatory body provided oversight. 
After three years, there were substantial reductions in nutrient loadings, at a relatively low cost. The 
cost savings, estimated at 37 per cent as compared to each plant meeting uniform requirements, come 
primarily through capital cost savings. 
Capital investments to curb nutrients could be concentrated in one or two plants, versus all three; and 
upgrades can now be more closely timed with normal capital replacement than would have been possible 
under a uniform standards approach. 
However, monitoring data was not complete in the review, and the overall impact of the programme 
on environmental quality in the receiving waters was not available. This is an important data gap since 
detrimental effects of excessive loadings can be localized within receiving waters (causing “hot spots” of 
environmental damage). 
Applications of tradable permits of any type need to evaluate the likelihood and impacts of such hot spots 
in order to be sure that the overall environmental objectives of the programme are met. In addition, plans 
to expand the trading system to more parties, and to non-point sources of nutrients as well, have been 
under discussion for some time, but have not been implemented yet.
An Example from Country B
In an attempt to curb pollution from factories, the government of Country B set up an emissions fee. These 
fees constituted business expenses, and were deductible from taxes. Given common corporate tax rates 
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in Country B of 33 per cent, this means that for each dollar in fees, roughly one-third remained in the firm 
as a tax-shield, reducing taxes that would have been paid on other net income. 
In addition, in an effort to accelerate installation of pollution controls, Country B’s government set up a 
rebate system, whereby 80 per cent of the fee collected would be returned to the enterprise for investment 
in pollution controls. Thus, from this original dollar in fees, 33 cents comes back through reduced tax 
burden and 80 cents comes back in a rebate, for a total of US$1.13. Thus, paying the pollution fees offered 
a net gain of roughly 13 per cent. 
This perverse incentive made firms not wish to invest in pollution controls, lest they lose the privilege of 
paying emissions fees to earn a quick 13 per cent return on their money. The ability to do so was the result 
of a lack of political will or capability to ensure rebated fees were invested in pollution controls as required 
rather than spent elsewhere in the business. 
In an attempt to solve the problem, the government replaced fee rebates with loans; however, enforcement 
has been weak. In addition, the funds from the 20 per cent of fees not returned to the enterprise goes to 
the local environmental authorities, and this has supposedly given them an interest in maintaining funding 
through maintaining emissions. Had rebates actually been put to use in upgrading pollution controls, this 
may not have been such a bad policy. 
 eludoM hcae ot yltcerid og ot thgir eht ot sbat eht no kcilC
170 The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
Case Studies 4
Subsidizing Transition to Sustainable Alternatives
Encouraging environmentally sustainable practices and technologies through government subsidies is 
commonly raised as a suggestion. There are many options for how subsidies can be provided, ranging 
from direct grants to low interest loans, from government indemnification to tax subsidies. The instrument 
that is chosen, as well as the behaviours for which the subsidy is earned, have important implications for 
the types of behaviour that is encouraged. 
The case studies below illustrate some of the complexities associated with trying to accelerate transition 
to environmentally preferable alternatives. 
An Example from Country x 
In an effort to encourage good reforestation practices, timber policies in Country X charge a tax on wood 
consumption, except when the harvesting is offset by equivalent reforestation. Recognizing that there are 
insufficient resources to oversee reforestation directly, these countries have chosen to forego revenues 
from timber sales so long as the cuts are properly replanted. 
The programmes have generally failed due to fees that are very low and poorly enforced. Especially in 
frontier regions, monitoring is difficult. A lack of institutional capacity and/or will yields a situation where 
neither the environmental nor the fiscal goals are being met. Forestry fees that were historically collected 
in Country X were often completely used up to finance administrative overhead in the oversight agencies 
rather than the environmental purposes for which they had originally been intended. 
An Example from the Country Y
In an important watershed in Country Y, Technical cooperation funds provided subsidized credit to 
participating farmers adopting soil conservation measures. Initial adoption rates were quite high (90 per 
cent in 1985), yet by 1990, only half of the farms continued to practice the conservation measures, as the 
subsidies had stopped. As further subsidies were expected, farmers actually delayed rational conservation 
measures in order to wait for the payment. 
The follow-on technical cooperation project recognized that the farms were already receiving tremendous 
benefits in the form of subsidized irrigation water. This second project tied continued access to subsidized 
water to proper adoption of soil conservation measures. The result has been substantial use of conservation 
techniques without additional direct subsidies. 
An Example from Country Z
Country Z’s bulbs were threatened at some point of time. To offset the accelerating loss in national wild 
stocks, a large environmental NGO decided to provide some seed capital to fund demonstration projects 
on the propagation of domestic bulbs. The Fund financed the initial purchases of plant stock for the 
participating families and established contracts with the growers.
As the knowledge about dwindling wild stocks grew, the NGO project also benefited from the fact that 
domestic bulbs were increasingly being specified in international trade contracts. Under this condition, 
project returns were sufficient to make the enterprises viable. In addition, adoption of the new approach 
was widespread because it required little change in existing routines of participating families and increased 
their economic gains. 
The Fund was able to jump-start a more sustainable domestic industry and the new approach was shown 
to be viable in the marketplace. 
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Economic Instruments for 
Global Environmental Problems1
171The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
1 This module is based on Panayotou, T. (1998): Instruments of Change, Motivating and Financing Sustainable Development, Earthscan/UNEP, 
pp 86-101.
Module 9
G O A L
L E A R N I N G  O B j E C T I V E
To review economic instruments for the management of 
environmental and natural resource problems of a global nature. 
By the end of this module, participants should be able to outline 
in general terms the application of economic instruments to 
environmental problems of global concern. 
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9.1 Defining Terms
Financial Exchanges: Arrangements whereby a country or a nongovernmental environmental organization 
provides financial incentives to developing countries, local jurisdictions, or other groups to engage in 
environmentally friendly practices (discontinue destroying tropical forests, reduce polluting emissions, 
etc.). These incentives may involve direct grants, debt relief, or trade concessions.
Beneficiary Pays Principle: The inverse of the polluter pays principle (see Module 2). In this case those 
who benefit pay for maintenance of environmental quality. This has particular application when developed 
countries are paying for global environmental benefits supplied by low-income developing countries (e.g. 
protection of rain forests which store greenhouse gasses).
Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A financial exchange whereby a developing nation’s monetary debt to another 
country is reduced in return for improvements in environmental protection in the developing country. The 
debt relief is given as a compensation for the developing nation forgoing income that it would receive for 
licensing environmental destructive practices (e.g. mining, logging rainforests).
Bioprospecting: Collection of biological samples in living things that will have some medical or commercial 
use (plants, animals, micro-organisms) and the collection of indigenous knowledge related to these 
resources. Bioprospecting has to be allowed by the biodiversity-rich country and must benefit it (and the 
communities that traditionally use these resources) as well as the corporations (usually from developed 
countries) or universities collecting the resource. Bioprospecting must follow the rules of international 
treaties and national laws.
Transferable Development Rights (TDR): A mechanism that allows landowners to sell their development 
rights to other property owners. In TDR schemes, development per area is restricted by legislation, and 
can even be completely prohibited in some designated areas whose preservation is in the public interest. 
Landowners not wishing to, or not being allowed to, take use of their development rights can sell them on 
the market to others who thus expand their original development restriction level.
Internationally Transferable Emission Permits: Cross-border tradable permits to emit pollutants, which 
have been included as instrument under the Kyoto Protocol. These permits are similar to domestically 
tradable emission permits but are established by an international agreement. The Kyoto Protocol allows 
Annex I countries (mainly developed countries) to acquire units from other Annex I countries and use them 
towards meeting their emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol. This enables countries to make use 
of lower cost opportunities to reduce emissions, irrespective of the country in which those opportunities 
exist.
 
Kyoto Protocol: International agreement concluded to at Kyoto Japan where it was adopted by the 
Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
It became effective in 2005 and is a first step toward setting binding obligations on countries to reduce 
pollutants. 
The Protocol establishes binding commitments for countries specified in Annex I of the protocol (mostly 
developed countries) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and allows trade of emission permits among 
them. (It has several “Annexes” making separate provisions for developed, and developing countries, and 
countries in transition in addressing global environmental problems). The full name is The Kyoto Protocol 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
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Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): An instrument authorized by the Kyoto Protocol that enables 
both the private and the public sectors of Annex I countries (mostly developed countries) to invest in projects, 
which result in emission reduction undertaken in non-Annex I countries (mostly developing countries and 
countries in transition). The investing (Annex I) country receives credits against its Kyoto Protocol emission 
reduction commitments for some of the resulting reductions in the non-Annex I country.
joint Implementation (jI): A provision of the Kyoto Protocol that allows Annex I countries to implement 
projects that reduce emissions, or remove carbon from the atmosphere, in other Annex I countries, in 
return for emission reduction units. The investing Annex I country can then count the carbon benefits 
towards meeting its emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol. 
9.2 Global Reach of Economic Instruments
Environmental resources and environmental problems are distributed unequally among countries. Some 
countries have large, but threatened rain forests which serve as a sink for global greenhouses gases; 
others have critical but endangered spawning grounds for the world’s fisheries. The same holds true of 
various pollutants. These are issues of national but also global concern. Similarly, emission of pollutants 
into air and water varies among countries, but in the end the pollutants know no boundaries. 
This leads to a situation where some countries contribute disproportionately – either per capita or by total 
volume - to global environmental degradation. Fortunately, the scope of economic instruments can be 
extended beyond the management of domestic environmental problems to issues of the global commons: 
conservation of forests and marine resources, the preservation of biodiversity, and protection of the global 
air supply, climate and ozone layer. 
Just as the environmental problems are spread unevenly, the cost of controlling global pollutants and 
conserving natural resources of global importance varies significantly among countries. This variation 
provides favourable grounds for the application of economic instruments, such as direct financial exchanges 
and tradable permits.
9.2.1 Role of Developing Countries 
Over the last several decades, the demand for global environmental action has come mainly from the 
developed countries, which have sufficiently high incomes to be concerned with environmental amenities 
and distant threats to their life and health. However, many of the best opportunities for addressing global 
environmental issues are to be found in developing countries, e.g. by virtue of their greater biodiversity, 
the sheer biomass needed to serve as the sink for greenhouse gases, and lower energy efficiency (e.g. 
widespread use of wood for fuel) and therefore greater scope for efficiency gains. 
Under these circumstances equal or proportional emission reductions or conservation by all countries 
would be excessively costly, if not totally unacceptable to developing countries. Nor would such 
proportional reductions supply the optimum benefits, which are disproportionately available from developing 
countries. 
In this situation, economic instruments can allow countries that can supply environmental amenities to 
meet global demand on behalf of others at lower cost and still gain from it. In terms of efficiency, the 
cost of global environmental improvement can be minimized (cost-effectiveness). In terms of distribution, 
the wealthy beneficiaries would pay and the poor countries would benefit (equity) along the lines of the 
Beneficiary Pays Principle (BPP).
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In the absence of a global government with taxation power, the willingness by developed countries to pay 
for conservation could be captured through new innovative trading arrangements between developed and 
developing countries. Developing countries need financial resources and efficient technology to pursue 
sustainable development. In exchange they can offer:
•	 Unmatched	biological	diversity	which	can	best	be	preserved	on	site,
•	 Forests	of	global	significance	in	terms	of	their	impact	on	global	atmospheric	balance	and	biodiversity	
habitat,
•	 Environmental	amenities	which	include	wildlife	and	other	natural	assets	of	recreational,	educational	and	
scientific	value,
•	 Low	cost	reduction	of	carbon	emissions.
9.2.2 Ownership vs. Development Rights 
For developing countries the global nature of environmental problems can be a problem. Developing 
countries often perceive the pressures from developed countries to protect environmental and natural 
resources of global importance as a challenge to their ownership and sovereignty over their own resources. 
Much of the conflict between developed and developing countries over conservation arises from a failure 
to distinguish between ownership and the spatial exercise of development rights. 
The first step in using economic instruments to address international environmental issues is, therefore, to 
recognize the developing countries’ ownership of their resources and their right to develop them in order 
to maximize their own benefits. This will set a solid foundation for the use of economic instruments. With 
recognition of their ownership rights, developing countries with globally important resources could offer to 
trade environmental conservation permits for financial and technological resources. 
9.3 Mechanisms for Global Environmental Protection
While there is a well-developed global market for financial and technological resources, there is no such 
market for the conservation of biological or protection of environmental assets. This is due to the nature 
of these resources (global externalities), the lack of well-defined (and fully recognized) property rights and 
the difficulty of enforcing contracts across borders in the absence of a ‘global authority’, which would 
supersede national sovereignty. Moreover, the object of conservation and exchange is difficult to define 
and monitor. Despite these difficulties, some exchanges of this nature have taken place.
9.3.1 Direct Financial Exchanges 
One approach to facilitating cross border environmental protection is to provide money or financing in 
direct exchange for development rights. Examples include:
•	 Debt-for-nature-swaps,	
•	 The	Global	Environmental	Facility	(GEF),2 
•	 Bioprospecting	rights	purchased	by	the	Merck	Pharmaceutical	Company	in	Costa	Rica,	and	
•	 The	EcoFund	in	Poland	created	through	debt-conversion	by	Paris	Club	countries.3
2 The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) was established in 1999 with an initial budget of USD 1.3 billion to provide grants and concessional funds over 
a three-year pilot phase. It is now an established institution receiving regular capital replenishment, with contributions mainly coming from developed 
countries. The facility assists developing countries to address four areas of global environmental concern: global warming, loss of biodiversity, pollution 
of international waters and depletion of stratospheric ozone.
3 For more information on the EcoFund, visit the website	 www.ekofundusz.org.pl; More information on the Paris Club can be found at 
www.clubdeparis.org.
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These international financing mechanisms rely largely on voluntary contributions by nations, and as such 
they face the risk of unstable resource flows for international environmental investments.
9.3.2 International Environmental Taxation
International environmental problems such as global warming, biodiversity loss and ozone depletion can 
be described as global public good problems that call for global environmental taxation. Similar to public 
goods at national level, where taxes are used to ensure their supply, international environmental taxation 
could be used to increase the price of the good and generate revenue for its sustainable provision. This 
however would require sovereign nations to yield their sovereign powers of taxation to a supranational 
authority. Three such taxes have been proposed in the past:
•	 An	international	foreign	exchange	transaction	tax	(known	as	Tobin	Tax),
•	 An	international	carbon	tax	on	energy	fuels,
•	 An	international	airport	tax.
The Tobin Tax would generate the largest revenues but has no direct positive environmental effects (the 
revenues, however, could be earmarked for environmental protection purposes). 
While the debate on these instruments of international taxation is on-going, little progress has been made 
towards serious consideration of any of them, largely because of the reluctance of sovereign nations to 
yield taxation powers to a supranational authority. 
In the absence of the political will among governments to do so, alternative actions have been proposed such 
as the harmonization of national taxes through international agreements and non-sovereign international 
taxes along the lines of the European Union taxes. Those involve minimal delegation of sovereignty by 
member states that are allowed to keep percentages of the tax revenues for their own use.
9.3.3 Transferable Development Rights 
To help developing countries maximise benefits while still protecting the environment, it is possible to 
completely separate development rights from ownership rights, through the instrument of transferable 
development rights (TDRs). Such rights can be bought and sold in the open market without affecting the 
underlying ownership of property.
The basic mechanism of TDRs functions in the following way: Legislature defines a certain amount of 
development that is granted to owners of property. In addition, certain zones may be established in which 
the use of these development rights is not permitted. Property owners outside these zones, if they want 
to exceed their pre-assigned development permissions, can buy additional development rights from other 
landowners, especially from those who are not entitled to the use of their rights.
Alternatively, if the government is not concerned about the protection of specific areas but only wants to 
limit the amount of total development, it can confine itself to restricting the development rights per area 
in general without defining specific zones of protection. The market will then efficiently allocate the total 
allowable amount of development.
To make a market for TDRs work, the government needs to create sufficient scarcity of development rights. 
Then, those who are not entitled to take use of their property rights (for example because their land is part 
of a nature reserve) can recover the value of their rights by selling them. A TDR scheme can significantly 
reduce the pressure on valuable ecosystem areas by putting them on equal footing with development 
areas. Owners of such property can recover the full market value of their unused development rights.
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Transferable development rights have been used extensively in the conservation of historical buildings, 
archaeological sites, cultural heritage, wetlands and coastal areas.
The classical example of TDRs is air rights in New York City. The height of buildings in New York City is 
limited by legislation to a certain amount of storeys. In addition, historical buildings and parks are protected 
by prohibiting the use of the air rights on those areas. Investors who want to exceed the maximum building 
height on their property may do so by purchasing air rights from other areas. In November of 2005, Christ 
Church of Manhattan sold its unused air rights for $30 million, transferring them to a site close to Central 
Park where a taller tower can now be built.4
The concept of TDRs makes possible the creation of conservation areas without the need for assessment 
of land values and compensation: it simply creates a market with the demand and supply of development 
rights that results in an equilibrium price at which exchange or transfers take place. The use of TDR 
schemes is today under consideration by a number of countries as an instrument for the conservation of 
their own greenbelts, forests and their biodiversity. 
In principle, there is no reason why transferable development rights could not be used internationally as an 
instrument of payment by the developed countries for conservation and supply of environmental services 
by the developing countries. Tropical countries could set aside habitats for biodiversity conservation and 
divide each habitat into a number of TDRs, corresponding into an area unit, say, a hectare. Each TDR 
would state the location, condition, diversity and degree of protection of the habitat and any special rights 
that it conveys to the buyer/holder. TDRs could then be offered for sale both locally and internationally at 
an initial price offer that fully covers the opportunity cost of the corresponding land unit (i.e., the net present 
value of the income stream of the foregone development opportunity). 
It would be preferable to start at a relatively high price to test the market, since under-valuation is irreversible 
following sale while over-valuation is reversible. If the price turns out to be too high to clear the market 
(i.e., to exhaust the supplied TDRs for a particular habitat), the price can be lowered to attract additional 
demand. Alternatively, the quality of the TDRs can be enhanced by enlarging the area to include additional 
biodiversity values or by improving its protection and management.
The potential buyers of international TDRs include local and international environmental organizations, 
local and international foundations and corporations, developed country governments, chemical 
and pharmaceutical companies, scientific societies, universities and research institutions, and even 
environmentally minded individuals from developed countries. The motivation for purchasing TDRs will 
naturally vary among prospective buyers. Some may be interested in research, others in conservation and 
others may speculate on an increase in value over time.
Despite the variety of benefits that TDRs may confer to prospective buyers and holders, it is unlikely 
that there will be sufficient demand to preserve all habits that are worth conserving. However, one great 
advantage of these mechanisms for the conservation of tropical forests and biodiversity is that they 
provide developing countries with substantial transfer in financial resources without compromising national 
ownership or sovereignty over tropical forests.
9.3.4 Internationally Transferable Emissions Permits 
International transferable emissions permits are an application of the same principles embodied in 
international transferable development rights and domestic emission permits. The total allowable level 
4 See “$430 a Square Foot, for Air? Only in New York Real Estate” in New York Times, November 30, 2005.
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of emissions for the world could be established and then permits issued to each country on the basis 
of specific criteria such as population. The permits could be traded among countries or by firms within 
countries.
Emission permits are potentially in high demand in developed countries. Conversely, developing countries 
have a comparative advantage in supplying emission rights in exchange for financial and technological 
resources. For example, while reductions in CO2 emissions in Japan and the European Union may cost 
over US$ 50-100 per ton, they might cost under US$ 20 per ton in developing countries such as India and 
China (assuming that energy efficiency is lower leaving still more room for improvement).
If “CO2 emission reductions” were a conventional commodity, developed countries would seek to obtain 
their supplies from developing countries where they can be obtained at lower cost.As with transferable 
permits traded within a country (see module 7), allowing emissions trading across nations would obtain a 
given reduction of emissions at the lowest possible cost. It would also encourage technology transfer and 
flow of financial resources from developed countries to developing countries in the interest of both, the 
protection of global climate and sustainable development. 
For developing countries, transferable emission permits would provide a strong incentive to become more 
efficient in order to save emission permits which they could sell to other countries or which they could use 
for their own industrial expansion. 
A global emission trading system promises huge economic and environmental benefits. There are, however, 
two major obstacles that stand in the way. First, there needs to be a binding obligation of countries to 
contain their emissions. In addition, global emission trading faces a whole range of technical and political 
problems.
9.3.5 Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol5
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted in December 
1997 by the Conference of the Parties of the Climate Convention and entered in force in 2005) is a first 
step in the direction of setting binding obligations for the reduction of pollutants. It established binding 
commitments for countries specified in Annex I of the protocol (mostly developed countries) to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and allows trade among them.
9.3.5.1 Emissions Trading. The Kyoto Protocol allows Annex I countries to acquire units from other 
Annex I countries and use them towards meeting their emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol. 
This enables countries to make use of lower cost opportunities to reduce emissions, irrespective of the 
country in which those opportunities exist. Transfers and acquisitions of these units are to be tracked and 
recorded through a registry system. Governments may also authorize legal entities (e.g. businesses, non-
governmental organizations and other entities) to participate, under their responsibility, in the emissions 
trading. 
The Kyoto Protocol further introduced Joint Implementation Projects (JI) and the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) to facilitate trade between developed countries and countries with economies in 
transition, and between developed countries and developing countries. 
9.3.5.2 joint implementation. The Protocol allows Annex I countries to implement projects that reduce 
emissions, or remove carbon from the atmosphere, in other Annex I countries, in return for emission 
5 For more information on the Kyoto protocol, see: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_mechanisms/items/1673.php.
 eludoM hcae ot yltcerid og ot thgir eht ot sbat eht no kcilC
178 The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
reduction units. Unlike the CDM, the Joint Implementation Mechanism does not create additional emission 
permits, but constitutes a transfer of the carbon benefits of the implemented project from the host country 
to the investing country. This mechanism allows Annex I countries with high emission reduction cost to 
meet their reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol in a more cost effective way, namely by investing in 
countries with relatively low per unit reduction costs. 
A JI project might involve, for example, replacing a coal-fired power plant with a more efficient combined 
heat and power plant. Most JI projects are expected to take place in the Annex I countries with economies 
in transition in Eastern Europe. JI projects must have the approval of all countries involved, and must 
lead to emission reductions or removals that are additional to any that would have occurred without the 
project.
9.3.5.3 Clean Development Mechanism. This instrument enables both the private and the public sectors 
of Annex I countries to invest in projects undertaken in non-Annex I countries (mostly developing countries 
and countries in transition), which result in emission reduction, and to receive credits for some of these 
reductions against their commitments.
Such project activities are to assist the developing host countries in achieving sustainable development 
and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Climate Convention. 
A Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project activity might involve, for example, a rural electrification 
project using solar panels or the installation of more energy efficient boilers. The CDM is expected to 
generate investment in developing countries, especially from the private sector, and promote the transfer 
of environmentally friendly technologies in that direction.
Economic Instruments for Global Environmental Problems Cases
The following case studies offer an opportunity for participants to discuss cases where global environmental 
problems are being tested. They are provided so that participants may understand the issues and difficulties 
in using this type of instrument. 
Case 1 - Biodiversity Conservation on the Akamas Peninsula, Cyprus – Proposed Transferable 
Development Rights
The Akamas Peninsula has an area of 250 square kilometres and is situated in the northwest of Cyprus; 
it is considered to be the last virgin territory in the eastern Mediterranean. This unique area has remained 
almost untouched by development despite the quadrupling of the number of tourists who have visited the 
island in the last ten years alone.
Due to the variety of its geomorphological features and the microclimate of its individual localities, Akamas 
displays a large concentration of biotopes, making up a unique ecosystem. The area supports an indivisible 
natural resource base comprising a rich flora and fauna, beautiful beaches and landscape, and interest ing 
historical, archaeological and cultural heritage.
The flora of Akamas includes at least 20 endemic rare species. About 14 different kinds of orchids and 
the Tulipa cypria (a rare endemic species) are also found in the area. Akamas also hosts the loggerhead 
turtle (Caretta caretta) and the green turtle (Chelonia mydias), both under threat of disappearing from the 
Mediterranean, as well as a rare species of vulture (Griffon vulture), a fresh water crab (Potamion potamios) 
and endemic species of birds and butterflies. In addition, the area is used as a temporary stopover by a 
multitude of birds when migrating from one continent to another.
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The remarkably rich natural resources of Akamas are undergoing severe pressures and are threatened 
with degradation from a variety of sources including:
•	 Day	visitors	in	the	area	destroying	flowering	plants,	forests,	and	animal	species;
•	 Property	owners	putting	pressures	on	the	government	to	open	up	the	area	for	tourist	development;	
and	
•	 Inhabitants	in	nearby	villages	demanding	some	kind	of	development.
The government has responded by zoning part of the Akamas area as a non-devel opment area, stopping 
short of declaring it a national park. This response has intensified the conflict. On one side, local and 
international environmental groups such as the Friends of Akamas and Greenpeace find this response 
inadequate protection for the last unspoiled part of the island and demand stricter policies and the 
declaration of the area as a national park.
In the opposite camp are the inhabitants of villages surrounding Akamas, who own land in the area. 
They are demanding that the government provide them with roads and other infrastructure for tourist 
development as it has in the rest of the island. Being among the poorest people on the island, they see 
tourist development as their only chance for a better life. They have allied themselves with developers 
in lobbying the government to open the area to tourist development, and they are especially distressed 
because the prices of their land have dropped significantly following the government restrictions on 
development.
Government appropriation of the land with compensation is not possible because of the high cost of 
paying for the land at its market value (as coastal property suitable for tourist development). 
The result of these unresolved conflicts is that Akamas is neither a protected national park nor a managed 
tourist development zone. The stalemate neither protects biodiversity nor allows development to proceed. 
This uncertain situation is open to pressures for readjustments, exemptions and relaxations, which prey on 
nature in a silent but equally destructive way.
A resolution of these conflicts - which are not unique to Akamas but arise throughout the island - could be 
a transferable development rights scheme proposed by the Enallon Environmental Management Centre. 
The concept of transferral of development rights would ensure that areas of natural beauty be preserved in 
their natural state. It has been introduced in Cyprus for the first time in recent legislation for the preservation 
of buildings of unique cultural and historical value. It is proposed that sites of natural beauty or those that 
are rich in ecological and biological resources could also be preserved through the use of this mechanism, 
without depriving their owners of their development rights and without paying compensation. 
The coastal area and, in fact, all of Cyprus would be divided into development areas and conservation 
areas. Landowners in conservation areas would retain their rights but they would not be allowed to exercise 
them on the site. They would instead be allowed to sell or transfer these rights to property in development 
areas, thus sharing in the benefits of development without actually developing their own land, which would 
remain in their hands in a natural state. 
It is estimated that the net present value (NPV) of preservation benefits in terms of improved quality of 
tourism in the development areas combined with ecotourism on the conservation area would exceed the 
net present value of forgone earnings from not developing Akamas into a mass tourism area like other 
parts of the Island.
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Unfortunately, even though a transferable development rights scheme had been suggested as early as 
1994, up to today such a proposal has still not been adopted. Other initiatives to protect the Akamas 
peninsula have also failed so far and the peninsula remains under threat. 
Sources: Panayotou, T. (1998) and http://www.conservation.org.cy/akamas/akamas.htm.
Case 2 - The Costa Rican Environmental Service – Payments Scheme and Certified Tradable 
Offsets
In an effort to halt deforestation and encourage reforestation, in the 1980s the Costa Rican government 
introduced tax credits incentives for landowners maintaining forests on their lands. To allow smallholders, 
who usually paid no taxes, to benefit from the scheme, the government allowed the reforestation tax 
credits to be traded. This created the first rudimentary market for environmental services in the country. 
In the 1990s, this scheme was reformed and expanded into a comprehensive system of payments for 
environmental services, both local and global. The government identified four sets of services, which are 
provided by forested private lands that are external to the owner and for which he/she receives no payment 
and therefore faces inadequate incentives to provide them:
•	 Watershed	protection	services	(local/national);	
•	 Ecotourism	attraction	(local/national);	
•	 Biodiversity	conservation	(global);	and	
•	 Carbon	sequestration	(global).
The government sought both instruments for internalising these values to the landowners (i.e. instruments 
for effecting commensurate payments) and financial resources to finance these payments. It was recognized 
that at a minimum, farmers must be compensated for the opportunity costs (forgone benefits from current 
land uses, mainly cattle ranching) estimated around $30 per ha per year. This set the lower bound for the 
payments. 
The upper bound was set by the value of the environmental services provided to both the local/national 
economy and to the global community. This value was conservatively estimated to be in the range of $40-
60 per ha per year (more generous estimates put the value of environmental services of forests in Costa 
Rica in the range of $100-200 per ha per year). The government settled on an incentive payment of $50 
per ha per year, higher than the average opportunity cost and lower than the ‘value’ of environmental 
services provided.
Funding for the payment of environmental services contracts is obtained from a sales tax on fossil fuel 
and from the Carbon Fund, which serves as a depository for revenues obtained from carbon sales to the 
international community. The Carbon Fund buys environmental services from farmers and resells them to 
beneficiaries. 
The Carbon Fund has established Certifiable Tradable [Greenhouse Gas] Offsets or CTOs, which is a 
financial instrument for transfer (sale) of carbon offsets in the international market. CTOs are pre-approved, 
transferable and guaranteed by Costa Rica for 20 years. The first CTOs for 200,000 tons of carbon were 
sold in July 1996 to Norway for $2 million. The Centre for Financial Products purchased 1000 CTOs for 
resale in secondary financial markets. The Centre has an exclusive contract to broker 4 million tons of 
Costa Rican Carbon over the next 20 years with a floor price of $10 per ton generating at least $40 million 
in revenues. Costa Rica expects to eventually supply 15 million tons of carbon to world markets. 
Sources:	Panayotou,	T.	(1998)	and	Castro	et	al	(2000).
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1 This Module is based on UNEP (2004): The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental Policy: Opportunities and Challenges.
Policy Design and Implementation1
Module 10
G O A L
L E A R N I N G  O B j E C T I V E
To describe the four main phases of choosing an effective 
environmental policy package to address a target environmental 
problem.
By the end of this module, participants should be able to outline 
the most important steps for designing and implementing an 
economic instrument. 
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10.1 Introduction to Policy Design and Implementation
While an understanding of the theoretical benefits of particular economic instruments can be useful, 
practical consideration of the status quo in a country, including institutional strength, existing policies, and 
stakeholder power dynamics, will have enormous influence in deciding the most viable policy approach. 
The purpose of this module is to assist policymakers in choosing an effective environmental policy 
package that will address the target environmental problems given the existing institutional capabilities 
and environmental policies in the country. 
Policy choice and implementation encompasses four main phases. 
•	 Phase 1: Conduct Policy Analysis.	 The	 first	 step	 in	developing	effective	policy	entails	 a	careful	
analysis	of	the	perceived	problem,	a	review	of	the	instruments	available	to	address	the	problem,	the	
conditions	under	which	these	instruments	will	be	used,	and	the	likely	effect	of	various	instruments	or	
combinations	of	instruments	on	the	problem.	This	phase	is	usually	concluded	with	the	drafting	of	initial	
policy	recommendations.
•	 Phase 2: Engage Stakeholders. Phase	 2	 brings	 in	 stakeholders	 for	 feedback	 on	 initial	 policy	
recommendations	and	collects	important	information	on	how	to	refine	these	to	increase	their	likelihood	
of	success	or	 to	gauge	any	major	 resistance.	This	 input	 is	 then	 fed	back	 into	 the	 information	bank	
developed	in	Phase	1.
•	 Phase 3: Finalize Policy.	Phase	3	takes	the	general	information	assembled	in	Phase	1	and	2	and	
uses	it	to	develop	final	policy	proposals.	
•	 Phase 4: Implement and Evaluate. This	involves	gaining	political	support,	passage	of	any	necessary	
legislation,	 establishing	 regulations,	 and	 establishing	 administrative,	 monitoring,	 enforcement,	 and	
evaluation	procedures.	Once	legislation	is	enacted	a	strict	timeline	for	implementing	the	chosen	policy	
package	should	be	prepared.	Similarly,	additional	work	on	any	measures	needed	to	assess	impacts	of	
the	change	on	poverty	or	international	competitiveness	may	also	be	required.	
 
The following sections describe the requirements of each of these phases in more detail. Some key 
questions to ask are presented, including a sample “Policy Ranking Template” (table III-10-1) aiming 
to organize the data in a way that makes the choices, information gaps and trade-offs clear to see. A 
complete ‘Template for Assessing Important Factors Affecting Instrument Choice’ summarizing the main 
issues, clarifying questions and implications on policy choice and application of economic instruments 
is provided in Annex V. Annex VI provides a list of common applications of economic instruments by 
resource area.
10.2 Phase 1 - Conduct Policy Analysis
Poor planning and programme design are major causes of programme failure. If the problem is not fully 
understood, if stakeholders do not have ownership, if institutions are not up to the task, if alternatives are 
not carefully considered, or if the programme design is too complex the economic instrument will most 
likely not do what it was intended to do. 
The first phase involves finding and organizing all the relevant information available on the problem to be 
solved. Careful consideration regarding problem definition and the interests of various stakeholder groups 
can prove very valuable. 
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10.2.1 Establish and Use Data Systems 
Good public policy rests on a solid foundation of scientifically collected and verified data about the 
environment and natural resources of the country or region where environmental programmes are to be 
implemented. 
Policymakers should make sure that appropriate agencies continually collect and organize data into time 
series to document changing conditions. Without consistent and reliable information it is difficult to set 
rational priorities, to choose appropriate policy instruments, to address perceived problems, or to measure 
progress once such policies are in place. 
Thus, if functioning systems do not already exist for the collection and analysis of information on ambient 
air and water quality, effluent levels and sources, soil conditions, stocks and loads of natural resources, 
sustainability of fisheries, grasslands, and forests, etc., they need to be established. 
While certain environmental problems – polluted air and water, devastated forests, declining fish catches, 
– may be apparent to all, the nature, extent, and causes of the problems are usually not so apparent. 
Good environmental data will identify industries, firms and communities complicit in the environmental 
degradation. The use of economic instruments further requires reliable information on governmental tax 
collection and expenditures as well.
Any data set to be used in the policy development should be assembled and published so that 
stakeholders can evaluate and comment on its validity. After final comments and any needed changes to 
the data, the government should give public notification of its findings. All further policy pronouncements 
and papers should clearly identify the sources, means of collection, and other relevant information 
about the research used as a basis for policy recommendations.
In some instances, it may not be possible for the policymaker to wait until perfect data sets are available. 
In the real world, there will be many gaps in the information needed and much information will be sketchy 
at the outset. Nonetheless, policy planners should make every effort to use the best available information 
and continuously work to improve data sources and collection methods. 
Of course, having such information and not using it systematically is the same as not having the information 
in the first place. Each step in the policy development, implementation, and evaluation stages should rest 
on the best data available. Each proposal – whether to set priorities, to define problems, to propose 
solutions, or to establish evaluation criteria – should derive from objective information that all parties can 
use with confidence. 
Good data, however, is no substitute for good policy. Policy planners need to avoid the common temptation 
to pick and choose which data to use. Too often policymakers will allow their use of data to be driven by 
ideology or unspoken assumptions.
Even with good data and its appropriate use, there can still be honest disagreement about the meaning 
of the information on a given problem and the measurable effect of any given proposal. At some point the 
making of policy will become a matter of judgment. Nonetheless, informed judgment is invariably better 
than uninformed judgment. 
10.2.2 Set Priorities 
When faced with multiple environmental problems, the policymaker should make conscious and 
well-reasoned choices about the order of priority with which to address them. The criteria should not only 
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rank the problems from the most to least serious but also take into account those that are most tractable 
to solution. 
A minor problem with an easy solution may move to the head of the priority queue for example. Information 
and justification for priorities chosen should be made generally available to allow all stakeholders to 
understand the reasoning and supporting evidence behind the decision.
10.2.3 Define Problem Clearly 
There is an old saw that says: “If you don’t know where you are going you won’t be happy when you get 
there.” Spend the necessary time clearly defining the problem. This requires identifying special interests, 
and evaluating past attempts to address the problem as well defining the actual environmental issue. 
If the description of the problem is overly general (air pollution vs. air pollution caused by automobile 
emissions), vague (poor air quality), or ambiguous (polluted air except that caused by certain industries), the 
resulting policy will likely miss the mark. Be especially careful of terminology. Too often different observers 
have a different definition for the same term. (Do you want clean water for fishing or for drinking?). Avoid 
such misunderstanding with clear and unambiguous definitions.
Incorporate realistic assessments of the limitations not only of the policy instruments themselves but of 
the underlying political, social and economic conditions, and of the institutions that will be executing the 
policies as well. 
Define environmental problems in measurable terms. Without measurement there is no way of knowing 
the extent of the problem or how well any programme is addressing the problem once the programme is in 
place. In defining environmental problems one needs quantifiable measures to describe the existing natural 
resources base, sources of the environmental damage, and measures to describe how the costs of that 
damage are spread among other users and the surrounding population. 
Quantifiable measures of the anticipated improvement and optimal environmental conditions should also 
be identified. The measure of these optimal conditions and the measures used to define the problems 
should be the same. 
10.2.4 Clarify Policy Goals 
Decide what you want to achieve – in measurable terms - over specific time periods. For a variety of 
reasons, the goal of a given programme will not always be a complete solution to the problem. The 
extent of remediation expected should be clearly-stated. Goal definition should include a primary goal, 
e.g., to curb over-fishing to ensure future catches are sustainable, and any secondary goals that may be 
relevant. Secondary goals in this case might include protecting subsistence fishermen or coastal fishing 
communities. 
While primary goals are generally related to human health and environment, secondary goals often relate 
to poverty reduction, job protection/creation, or preserving culture or community. In some circumstances, 
secondary goals can be cleanly blended into policy. Most times, however, trade-offs are needed.
10.2.5 Determine Baseline Conditions 
The appropriate policy response hinges on a clear and realistic understanding of baseline conditions. 
Sometimes this may mean a less effective policy on a theoretical basis is actually the most appropriate 
one given institutional capabilities. If limitations are not recognized, there is strong likelihood that new 
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instruments will fail, leaving the underlying environmental problem unsolved. While improvement in the 
structure or performance of institutions can improve over time, it is unwise to depend on them in the short 
run.
Though every country wants to portray an image of clean and efficient governance, few nations can truly 
boast such systems. The level of competence and honesty of any institution that will be used to develop, 
promulgate, monitor or enforce the policy in question needs to be realistically assessed. Policy analysts 
should evaluate the following areas critical to the success of any environmental initiative.
10.2.5.1 Governmental Capacity. Many economic instruments depend on functioning tax, legal and 
fiscal systems. Economic instruments may be efficient in theory, but if the institutional capabilities needed 
to promulgate and enforce the instruments in a fair and unbiased manner are lacking, the performance of 
the instruments will suffer. 
Policymakers should be aware of the fact that command and control policy instruments usually rely on 
the same functioning tax, legal or fiscal systems as economic instruments. Policy comparisons should 
therefore take common weaknesses into account when evaluating options. 
Weak institutions may be simply unable to carry the load of a proposed policy. In such cases it is best 
to choose economic instruments that can be adapted to, or that compensate for identified institutional 
weaknesses, if possible. 
If existing institutional or economic weaknesses preclude any policy solution, there may be no alternative 
but to implement institutional reforms, particularly if the environmental problems are severe. Such reforms 
would obviously require a broader coalition than just environmental interests.
10.2.5.2 Environmental Agency Power. Many environmental protection packages originate with 
environment ministries, which generally have far less political power than the finance or trade ministries. 
Powerful leaders of the government’s executive and legislative branches may try to use the power of the 
government to appease particular constituencies at the expense of environmental quality.
Environmental policymakers need to assess their relative power accurately and plan how to address their 
weaknesses. For example, approaches that generate revenues as well as address environmental problems 
can bring in allies in the fiscal ministries that would otherwise not come forward.
10.2.5.3 Fiscal Cash Flow Implications. Analysing cash flows associated with a policy can be helpful 
in making realistic assessments of existing institutional leverage. If revenues are to be collected, how are 
fees to be set? Who will collect the money, and do they have appropriate experience? Will the revenues be 
linked to solving the environmental problem, or simply diverted to the general treasury? 
Where the promulgating or implementing agencies control neither the budget nor the revenues derived 
from the instruments used, overcoming powerful opponents could be quite difficult. On the other hand, 
solutions that generate new revenues or that establish new markets (such as permits) where polluters must 
compete against each other rather than requiring extensive ministry oversight can be helpful in gathering 
support of fiscal agencies.
10.2.5.4 Social, Cultural, and Demographic Implications. Environmental policies may affect 
strongly held social and cultural beliefs or practices. As an example, restricting the ownership of cattle in 
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culture where cattle are a sign of wealth and status will require special efforts to show the benefits of the 
restrictions. Similarly, population pressures may be a direct cause of a given environmental problem – 
especially where land ownership is undefined. Addressing the environmental problem will mean addressing 
the population and land use issues as well.
10.2.5.5 Economic Conditions. Since all environmental and natural resource management problems 
stem from economic activities, it is imperative that there be a clear understanding of the economic 
implications of proposed policies. The level of dependence of the society and economy on the economic 
activity causing a problem will greatly influence the ability to execute a policy. 
Execution will be easier if the economic activity causing the environmental problem is marginal to the 
overall economy and society than if it affects a basic source of livelihoods of the country or region. In the 
latter situation, it may not be possible to adopt an ideal, but highly disruptive, policy instrument and longer 
term less intrusive policies may need to be adopted. On the other hand, economic instruments may be 
able to draw people and organizations away from the activity causing the problem.
10.2.6 Evaluate Trade-offs in Choosing Instruments 
All policies involve trade-offs. For example, losses in the efficiency of an instrument must be balanced 
against the ease and timeliness of implementation given social and political realities. Similarly, in order to 
make packages acceptable to key parties, transitional subsidies are sometimes included, even if not all are 
targeted to the most vulnerable populations affected.
Carefully consider more than one alternative measure to address identified problems and determine the 
tradeoffs involved. Even if environmental policies often increase overall welfare, they usually imply short-
term social costs or negative influence on economic indicators, not to mention the fiscal impact on the 
government’s budget. These aspects need to be balanced against the benefits expected. 
Try to answer the questions: Which option gives the greatest amount of environmental benefit with the 
least amount of economic or social costs? Do the proposed policies yield any long-term benefits that may 
promote economic growth and social development? If there are weaknesses in baseline institutions, then 
implementing command and control instruments may have the same problems as economic instruments. 
In such circumstances, economic instruments that can operate at a more decentralized level may be 
preferable. 
Describing these trade-offs for a particular situation is useful to ensure full consideration of the implications 
of a decision and the implicit compromises they contain. Similarly, evaluating alternative solutions is 
important. For example, rather than providing subsidies to affected sectors, a gradual phase-in of policies 
can also reduce the transition costs without public expenditure. The following criteria should be assessed 
for the different policy options:
10.2.6.1 Environmental Effectiveness. Although some compromises may be necessary, the key criteria 
when determining which options are acceptable should still be how well the proposals achieve the primary 
environmental objective. Periodic re-evaluation is needed, as strong lobbying efforts can sometimes quietly 
supplant secondary or tertiary objectives for the core environmental one, eroding the effectiveness of the 
policy over time.
10.2.6.2 Availability of Policy Windows. Existing laws and regulations often have entrenched supporters, 
and getting rid of these laws and regulations entirely is not likely to happen. Similarly, the time necessary 
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to create entirely new regulatory systems and programmes may be too long to affect critical environmental 
problems. Thus, policymakers should look for ways to apply economic instruments within the context of 
existing rules. There are three main windows of opportunity:
•	 Improving	the	efficiency	and	flexibility	of	existing	regulations;
•	 Improving	cost	recovery	(e.g.	making	sure	associated	revenues	go	to	the	environmental	programme	
they	are	meant	to	support	rather	than	to	the	general	treasury);	and	
•	 Amending	existing	regulations	to	address	new	problems.
While these solutions may be less effective than if policy responses could be designed from scratch, 
the windows approach reflects political realities and provides a foothold for more effective environmental 
protection. In many cases, demonstrating success for economic instruments at the margin can generate 
the political will to expand their role over time.
10.2.6.3 Ease of Introduction. Even without constraints posed by existing environmental legislation, 
environmental controls are often broadly opposed by various interest groups. Extensive conflict can greatly 
water down initiatives and long gestation periods can allow environmental damage to occur unchecked in 
the interim. 
In many cases, the opposition interests actually grow more organized and powerful during the delays, 
undermining any change in policy. Choosing policies that achieve somewhat less, but are acted upon more 
quickly, may therefore be the better choice. 
Economic instruments have the advantage that they can be incrementally made more stringent over time 
(e.g., in the case of tradable permits, by removing some of the existing permits). One strategy is to have 
them less stringent initially to reduce opposition, but becoming more restrictive automatically over a 3-5 
year period.
A longer phase-in can also help keep implementation costs lower. Gestation periods can be quite long, 
generally due to attempts to resolve political disagreements. Thus, even a 5-year delay may be shorter 
than the time needed to move through the political process if it is a contentious one.2
10.3 Phase 2 – Engage Stakeholders
Anyone with an interest – a stake - in the outcome of the policy is a stakeholder. Consulting with stakeholders 
- whether they have an interest in the status quo or in promoting change - is vital to the success of any 
environmental policy. 
Stakeholder input serves two main functions: it provides an important factual input into policy design and 
implementation; and it provides a venue for affected parties to speak about what are often contentious and 
even quite emotional issues. 
Stakeholders are likely to have valuable information. They can suggest useful insights and effective solutions 
to environmental problems. Consulting stakeholders can also reveal the source and depth of potential 
opposition by identifying which parties are harmed by changing the status quo. 
2 One caveat: the stronger interest groups will often try to slow or eliminate the increased stringency before it takes effect. Initial policies need to 
anticipate this pressure and deal with it from the outset. 
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This type of information enables policymakers to make realistic assessments of the political barriers to 
action and the social implications of policy proposals.3 If key stakeholders are not consulted they can often 
destroy the chances of a policy’s success. It is important to approach the engagement of stakeholders as 
an integral and well-organized part of the policymaking process.
10.3.1 Identify Stakeholders 
The identification of stakeholders is the starting point for any efforts to engage relevant groups in a process 
of evaluating and refining an initial list of policy choices. Although stakeholders will differ by country and 
problem area, they will generally involve industry and economic interest groups, government, workers, 
social and environmental welfare organizations, as well as ordinary, and often voiceless, citizens. These 
groups will need to have some general acceptance of the policy path, though full consensus need not be 
the goal.
Organized groups – governmental agencies, corporations, nongovernmental environmental organizations, 
trade associations, unions, etc. – are the most likely to make their voices heard. But it should not be forgotten 
that ordinary citizens, especially the poor who are less likely to be organized, constitute stakeholders as 
well. 
In identifying stakeholders policymakers should evaluate the relative power of different groups as well as 
what the primary concerns of each are likely to be. In many cases, the stakeholders’ concerns will revolve 
around protection of jobs, short-term profits, or access to valuable natural resources. For groups with 
these concerns environmental quality may be a low priority in comparison. 
Who to Consult? Most environmental problems will have three main stakeholder interests:
1.	 Those	responsible	for	the	problem;	
2.	 Those	affected	by	the	problem;	and	
3.	 Those	affected	by	the	proposed	solutions.
The identification process will also need to take into account the relative organization and influence of 
various stakeholders including:
1. The Well Organized and Economically Powerful who tend to have direct and concentrated 
interests in either keeping things as they are (e.g., companies that do not want to reduce their emissions) 
or in modifying regulation in a specific manner (e.g., companies making pollution control equipment who 
would benefit from more stringent regulations). 
2. The Unorganised, Uneducated, and Poor within Society who may be affected by proposed 
policies but who have neither the financial resources nor the skills to carefully evaluate planned government 
actions. Often they are fragmented and powerless, unable to play a role in the evolution of the policy 
package without explicit government effort. Yet, these are generally the very same groups most affected 
by the lack of environmental controls or by the planned policy changes.
3. Those Secondarily Affected by the Proposed Solutions. These stakeholders may be unaware 
that they will be affected at all and are easily overlooked in the policy development process. These could 
include low skilled workers who could be thrown from work as environmental controls take effect or 
3 This assessment process is sometimes called factional	analysis. 
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population centres near inefficient plants where pollution levels could actually rise as inefficient plants 
purchase emissions credits.
4. The Full Range of Business Interests. A few very large firms tend to be more powerful in opposition 
to change than a large number of small businesses. If people with ties to the government control the firms, 
the potential for them to alter or block the policy direction will be even larger. The challenge in addressing 
the concerns of the more powerful groups is to ensure that they will not derail the policy entirely through 
influencing the structure of the rules or instruments or by perpetual delaying tactics. 
Among any of these stakeholders, groups with existing rights (whether actual or implied) will usually have 
the greatest interest in fighting changes to existing policies. They will need to be balanced against other 
groups with interests in change or at least with a more disinterested view of the situation.
10.3.2 Organize Stakeholder Input 
Soliciting stakeholder input is not as simple as calling a meeting and collecting comments. The process 
will need to be carefully organized. The process of organizing stakeholder involvement will vary with the 
country in question and its cultural traditions and political climate. However, the following guidelines will 
assist the policymaker in organizing stakeholder input: 
1. Use a Variety of Outreach Methods. Stakeholder engagement can be organized through formal 
meetings, and such meetings can play an important role in allowing affected parties to air their concerns 
publicly. However, more frequent, less formal contacts and briefings may be more effective as an 
information gathering tool, keeping the process moving forward and facilitating iterative policy refinements. 
Less formal contacts also allow people to provide information more anonymously, which can encourage 
more forthright sharing of views.
2. Solicit Input Early and Often. Stakeholders will need to be consulted frequently throughout the policy 
development and implementation process. They need to feel that they are being heard from beginning 
to end. Involving stakeholders early in the process is helpful, even if these contacts are informal. This 
sends an important signal that the government officials will make decisions in an informed and unbiased 
manner.
3. Set and Keep to a Clear Schedule. A carefully organized process with a pre-set timeline for 
sharing information and comments ensures both fairness and the appearance of fairness (which is just 
as important). It gives all stakeholders a clear understanding of when and how to make their voices 
heard. Unless both data and comment deadlines are strictly enforced, stakeholders will not take them 
seriously, and the process risks manipulation by vested interests. Stipulating deadlines for particular input 
also assures that the policymakers retain control of the process. Here are a few suggestions about input 
schedules:
•	 The	timetable	should	allow	enough	time	for	all	parties	to	provide	input	while	providing	discipline	needed	
to	complete	the	work	efficiently.	
•	 The	process	should	provide	that	any	relevant	data	be	submitted	by	clearly	established	and	reasonable	
deadlines.	 Such	 data	 should	 include	 any	 information	 relevant	 to	 the	 magnitude	 of	 the	 problem,	
the	 impact	 on	 various	 parties,	 and	 the	 impacts	 of	 potential	 solutions	 (especially	 on	 the	 choice	 of	
instruments).	Data	not	provided	by	the	set	deadlines	should	be	ignored.	
•	 Subsequent	to	the	release	of	policy	options	for	comment,	there	should	be	a	relatively	short	window	for	
comments	after	which	a	final	policy	package	would	be	chosen.	
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•	 Government	officials	and	agencies	should	be	bound	by	the	deadlines	and	not	be	allowed	to	go	outside	
of	the	process	to	solicit	information	or	comments	after	the	deadlines	are	passed.	Applying	the	same	
requirements	to	the	government	as	to	private	individuals	and	groups	sends	a	strong	signal	in	terms	of	
equitable	treatment	for	all	parties	in	the	process,	as	well	as	allowing	for	a	more	rapid	process	of	policy	
development.
4. Be Clear About How Information will be Used. It is not enough to talk to stakeholders. If their 
advice is never taken, they will likely oppose any resulting policy. The stakeholder consultation is a means 
of coming to informed decisions, not necessarily as a way to reach a complete policy consensus. Any 
requirement for complete consensus among all parties can easily become an opportunity for affected 
parties to delay action indefinitely. 
Making it clear that the goal of stakeholder consultation is information gathering rather than complete 
consensus building will help avoid unnecessary bottlenecks. Rather than full consensus, defining zones of 
agreement between parties, and clarifying the trade-offs among various options, may be sufficient to gain 
broad support for the final policy recommendations. 
5. Operate Transparently. Openly publish and widely distribute all policy proposals in an easily accessible 
format. Provide lists of all meetings regarding the proposals, and distribute comments received to all 
parties. This helps stakeholders know that they will be heard fairly and that any efforts to influence the 
process by dishonest means are likely to become public. Because the environmental authorities often have 
less power than many of the affected industries or their political partners, built-in transparency protects 
them from pressure tactics used by companies or other ministries. 
 
6. Publish Participant Lists. While individual conversations can be private, policymakers should always 
publish a list of all groups and individuals with whom they speak. This spotlights situations where parties 
with vested interests may flood the process with their representatives. The list should also be reviewed 
for the opposite problem - who is missing - to ensure that all important stakeholder interests have been 
heard. 
7. Explain Decisions. As decisions will always go against the wishes of some stakeholders, it is important 
that policymakers state publicly why particular decisions were reached and why they went against the 
stated interests of a particular stakeholder group. The process of simply acknowledging the opposing 
positions can do much to ameliorate resentment by these parties, as they can see that their views were 
considered.
8. Avoid Seizure of the Process by Stakeholders. Care should be taken to avoid a situation in which 
the better organized interests seize control of the stakeholder input process. This can cause unnecessary 
delays and drive the process toward solutions that serve the interests of special interests but not the 
general public. Two techniques in particular can help prevent stakeholder seizure of the process:
•	 Obtain	 reliable	 and	 independently	 derived	 data	 on	 the	 sources	 of	 environmental	 damage	 to	 avoid	
depending	on	organized	interests	for	information,	which	can	distort	the	policy	process	in	their	favour.
•	 Expand	outreach	by	financing	participation	in	meetings,	providing	public	access	to	Internet	facilities	and	
visiting	geographic	areas	where	the	voiceless	are	concentrated	to	keep	these	parties	abreast	of	the	
process	or	involve	them	in	decisions	and	emerging	issues.	Since	many	of	the	poor	are	concentrated	
within	particular	geographic	areas,	simply	walking	around	and	talking	to	people	can	be	a	valuable,	low-
cost	way	to	gather	and	share	information.	
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10.3.3 Use Stakeholder Input to Refine Policy Options 
As policymakers gather information from stakeholders it can be fed back into the information gathered 
earlier allowing a more refined understanding of the problem. This allows refocusing the policy options, 
narrowing the choices, and identifying the appropriate flanking measures to implement, with particular 
economic instruments to address the social or political barriers. (Flanking measures commonly involve 
exemptions, deferrals, or transitional subsidies to help those groups -often the poor- most adversely 
affected by a policy change). 
Issues regarding international competitiveness provide an example of how stakeholder input can positively 
affect policies. Domestic industries may be concerned that they will be harmed by environmental controls 
not faced by their international competitors. Understanding the dynamics of the specific markets and 
industries affected can expand the range of choices. For example, rather than exempting large domestic 
industries from important environmental policies as is often done, a solution might be to try to establish 
parity by ensuring imported products meet similar standards. 
10.4 Phase 3 - Make Policy Choices
The purpose of assembling information in Phase 1 and engaging stakeholders in Phase 2 is to help 
policymakers develop policy options. Moving to make concrete policy choices is not always easy. Because 
every situation is different, it is difficult to offer specific guidance on how to do this. However, some general 
guidelines can help policymakers to choose the most appropriate options for further consideration. These 
include specifically the recognition of policy trade-offs and realistic assessments of policy limitations.
10.4.1 Choose the Simpler Approach
Policy design should be commensurate with the problem to be solved. Avoid overly complicated policies; 
the simpler solution is almost always the best. 
If the problem is local, local solutions may be best. If the problem involves a handful of industries with 
similar production processes, establishing a national trading system probably does not make sense as 
costs of control will be similar across plants.
Simple easy to administer solutions, however, are often more difficult to arrive at, or even imagine, but they 
are almost always more efficient and effective.
10.4.2 Match the Policy to the Problem 
In the end, actual reduction of pollution or conservation of natural resources depends upon choosing the 
right policy instruments given baseline conditions, the problem to be solved, and stakeholder feedback. 
A wide range of factors influence the choice of effective policy instruments including environmental laws 
already in place, the power and technical capability of ministries involved, and the broad economic 
conditions within the country.
Obviously, the option with the highest efficacy, lowest side-effects and greatest feasibility given existing 
power and institutional dynamics would be best. However, it is unlikely that any option will score the 
highest for each category, so trade-offs will be needed. Unfortunately, there is no formula for finding 
the right balance. Box III-10-1 presents some common problems and economic instruments useful in 
addressing them.
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Box III-10-1:  Common Environmental Problems and Useful 
Policy Responses
Overuse of Natural Resources. Property rights-oriented approaches, such as granting or selling 
the rights to access or develop particular resources to specific groups, can work well in situations 
where current use patterns are depleting the resource base. Where informal access patterns by 
local users are codified, subsistence livelihoods can be protected while concurrently providing much 
improved direct incentives to manage the resource for the long-term. 
Even in more international markets, permits that differentiate commercial and subsistence users 
can help achieve a balance between resource protection and employment. If consumption must be 
curbed, buy-out or phase-out of the existing de facto rights is a possibility.
Industrial Pollution - Disparate Technologies. Where emissions of pollutants come from 
many industrial sources, there is likely to be widely varying costs to abate the pollution. In these 
circumstances, there are often large efficiency gains from imposing pollution taxes, fees, or tradable 
permits relative to mandatory standards under a command and control regime.
Industrial Pollution - Standard Technology, Few Producers. Where there are few producers, 
all relying on similar production technologies, disparities in control costs are generally much lower. 
These circumstances suggest minor gains from trading alongside potentially large oversight costs to 
create a market. Command and control regulatory approaches may be the more efficient option.
Known Damage Thresholds. Where regulators have a good sense of the point at which emissions 
will cause health problems or ecosystems begin to fray, tradable permits are often the best choice. 
Caps on emission/extraction can be set in advance, either based on absolute values (e.g., tons of 
salmon that can be caught) or on relative values (e.g., percent of total allowable catch), allowing 
markets to allocate the rights efficiently. Policy adjustments should be made on a regular basis to 
adapt to changing conditions or errors in the initial caps.
Publicly Provided Services. The objective of policies affecting publicly owned service 
organizations (e.g. water, sewer, or electrical utilities) is to institute pricing that achieves full recovery 
of costs through user fees, but with a rate design that protects the poor. Attempts to cover costs of 
the enterprises often bring to light their inefficiencies, increasing pressure for improved management 
and governance structures.
  
The combination of revenue collection and increased organizational efficiency can be a powerful 
help to governments. Improved cost recovery can make system upkeep easier, with resultant 
improvements in efficiency of resource use, and more feasible system extensions, often with 
associated equity benefits such as providing electricity or sewage services to poorer regions for 
the first time.
Highly Politicised Government Enterprises. Influencing government-owned enterprises, 
especially in highly politicised natural resource extraction areas (e.g. oil, natural gas, and other 
minerals), presents special challenges. Such enterprises face difficult obstacles in preventing 
corruption given large cash flows and poor transparency and therefore in instituting appropriate 
environmental controls (government litigation against itself being uncommon).
193The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
P
A
R
T
 I
II
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
10.4.3 Mitigate Hardships 
Policy proposals should include appropriate measures to ameliorate negative impacts, for example 
transitional support for displaced individuals or poor segments of society. 
Where policy implementation is anticipated to cause undue hardships on segments of the population, 
transitional measures need to be built into the initial policy package. Possibilities include phasing in 
limits slowly to avoid sudden changes in prices or access rights; exemptions for groups who face high 
compliance costs but are minor contributors to the problem; or transitional subsidies to highly affected 
groups. 
Solutions that mitigate hardships should adhere to the polluter pays principle as closely as possible, 
resisting the inevitable efforts by industry groups to have their entire transition costs shifted to the taxpayer. 
Aside from the reduction in hardship, the flanking measures play an important role in mitigating political 
opposition to the new policy. 
In such cases, most experts believe that both the fiscal and environmental well-being of the country 
can be served through privatising the enterprise if not ownership of the resource itself. This can 
be done either through a direct sale, or by floating a portion of the company in international stock 
markets. Stock market listing requirements provide important leverage to facilitate disclosure and 
transparency, and to overcome special interests benefiting from the status quo.
Transitioning to New Technology. Moving an existing market structure to one that includes 
more environmentally-friendly approaches involves multiple challenges: developing a technology 
that works; convincing firms to use the technology; and ensuring that the final product can actually 
be sold. 
 
Some market shifts that mostly require changes in management (e.g., soil conservation on farms) 
can often be accomplished by making the continuation of existing subsidies contingent on the 
adoption of sustainable practices. 
Where new equipment must enter the marketplace but is still more expensive, policies should reward 
initiatives once they are sold. Therefore, rather than subsidizing research and development (R&D) or 
plant construction for wind power, a subsidy per unit of wind power purchased in the market would 
be provided. 
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10.4.4 Avoid Inappropriate Use of Economic Instruments 
Understanding the conditions when economic instruments are not appropriate is equally important. 
Box III-10-2 identifies specific conditions where the use of economic instruments may not achieve the 
desired environmental and economic objectives.
Box III-10-2: When not to Use Economic Instruments
Emergency Conditions. When problems have severe implications, emergency conditions arise, 
and behaviour needs to stop immediately, directive bans may be more appropriate. Property rights 
or licensing approaches could work where some activity, albeit a much lower level, would be 
acceptable.
Excessive Monitoring Costs. Where monitoring costs are too high to achieve a specific 
environmental outcome, as when there are a large number of very small transactions (e.g., emissions 
trades), command and control instruments may be a better fit. Similarly, where there are a very small 
number of homogenous parties, emissions trading would not have an effective market and few 
efficiency gains would be achieved through trading. Monitoring and oversight costs would exceed 
the benefit of economic instruments.
Fragmented Oversight Authority. Where authority to set and enforce regulations for the 
implementation of economic instruments is highly fragmented across institutions, effective oversight 
of market-based instruments might become impossible. In such cases, command and control 
instruments tailored to the existing oversight authorities might be more efficient.
Social Stigma. Societal factors can also make market-based approaches more difficult. For 
example, communal societies may not adapt well to individual members of the society holding 
particular rights or paying particular fees. In other societies, the activities that would be affected by 
the economic instruments may have a close link to social status, generating strong resistance to 
change. 
An example is the loss of cattle (and with it prestige) if market-based individual grazing rights policies 
are attempted in some cultures. However, in these circumstances, economic instruments might 
work when applied at the community level since the communal decision-making can maintain the 
existing social hierarchy as access rights are granted.
Insurmountable Opposition. Where political power and interest group factions remain strong, 
policymakers need to judge the most prudent course. Political power can be used when establishing 
economic instruments to generate loopholes, exemptions or windfalls, in exactly the same way as 
this power is applied in command and control instruments. Privatisation can be used as a front for 
corrupt sales to transfer state-owned assets to private parties with no gain to the public.
High Level of Dislocation. Where large numbers of people will be displaced or unemployed as a 
result of economic instruments and there is little that can be done to mitigate hardships, caution is 
required.
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10.4.5 Use Subsidies Carefully 
In attempting to mitigate hardships, or to achieve political consensus, it is quite common to offer subsidies 
to affected parties. However, providing temporary or transitional subsidies to facilitate changes should be 
used sparingly since any subsidy distorts markets and makes them less efficient. In addition, they are often 
very difficult to end once started. 
Rather, subsidies should focus on protecting the poorest sectors of society from any severe impacts of 
the change. This could be done with:
•	 Payments	to	affected	poor	individuals	for	transitional	assistance,	e.g.:
- For the introduction of environmentally sound technologies.
-  In situations where social benefits greatly exceed private benefits (e.g. the reduction of overgrazing 
among traditional herders).
-  In situations where payments can be decoupled from any activities causing environmental damage, 
and limited in time.
•	 Pricing	mechanisms	-	offering	subsidies	flowing	only	to	basic	 foodstuffs	-	 in	societies	where	central	
governments	cannot	be	relied	upon	to	provide	direct	subsidies	to	the	poor.	
•	 Support	for	subsistence	sectors	decoupled	from	environmentally	damaging	production	and	shifted	to	
subsistence	consumption.	
10.4.6 Prioritise Options 
Table III-10-1: Policy Ranking Template provides a simple template that can be used to compare the final 
options across key criteria. The use of a matrix ensures that important data and impact categories are 
compared for each option. Each separate option generates two columns in the table. The first, “Option 
Review” will provide very brief text summaries of the policy alternative. 
The second, “Ranking”, provides comparative rankings that will make policy comparisons easier to do. 
Ranking methods can be changed to suit needs and preferences (e.g. use of numbers rather than high, 
medium low; or by weighting some criteria more than others). 
Similarly, evaluation criteria can be modified as well to better reflect the objectives of policymakers. This 
type of comparison can be helpful in trying to decide amongst the final slate of options.
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Table III-10-1: Policy Ranking Template
Policy parameter Option review* Ranking* (H,M,L)
Description
Main policy
Choices re: distribution of initial rights, 
ability to transfer, duration and caps
Performance
Environmental efficacy
Complexity
Cost of implementation and operation
Anticipated side-effects
Social: highly impacted groups (expo-
sure, job loss, increased poverty)
Short-term economic impacts
Long-term economic impacts
Trade and competitiveness impact
Proposed flanking measures
Feasibility
Institutional capability to implement?
Powerful opposition?
Other factors of interest/concern
* Each of the final policy options should have its own review and ranking columns. 
10.4.7 Finalize Policies
Once the general policy principles and instruments have been accepted, policymakers must refine the 
policy to make it a workable legislative or regulatory proposal. It is necessary to determine how the policy 
is to be implemented. There must be clear rules for compliance and enforcement, consistent monitoring of 
progress, and clearly established evaluation criteria. These are discussed below:
1. Ensure Predictability. Policy proposals should have clear rules for their application. The goal is to 
establish a predictable and transparent set of controls for market participants and citizens alike. This 
facilitates long-term planning and investment, increasing the efficiency of the rules. Because knowledge 
about the environmental and health risks of particular activities will continue to grow, provision should be 
made in the final legislation to allow modification to incorporate new information.
2. Establish Transparent Regulatory Procedures. Most environmental programmes will require the 
adoption of specific regulations following the adoption of any legislation incorporating the final policy 
proposals. Such regulations are the crux of what polluters and resource users need to do to comply with 
the law. The process of adoption and execution of regulations must be transparent and include sufficient 
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time for review, comment, and explanation of government decision on issues raised before final adoption 
of any implementing regulations.
3. Determine Methods of Reliable Enforcement. Any law or regulation that lacks provision for effective 
enforcement is bound to be ineffective. Even for economic instruments that rely on the market to provide 
solutions, proper auditing of the use of emission permits and punishment of transgressors, for instance, 
will be needed to ensure that the system will be effective. The policy proposal needs to specify the manner 
and methods through which the policy will be enforced and specify the responsible agency. It is useful to 
estimate budget authorization levels needed to enforce the proposed policy. 
4. Ensure Objective Dispute Resolution. Coupled with enforcement, dispute resolution procedures 
prevent abuse of government power, misunderstandings about the meaning of regulations, liability, and 
other issues. Dispute resolution procedures may include recourse to civilian courts, to administrative law 
courts, to arbitration or to some combination of these. The exact procedures need to be carefully spelled 
out in the final policy proposal.
5. Build in Monitoring Procedures. The policy proposal should have a built in system of continuous 
oversight and monitoring, preferably with public reporting, to ensure that the instrument is doing what it 
should or to find out when alternatives are needed.
6. Establish Rigorous Evaluation Criteria. Policymakers are sometimes uncomfortable with adopting 
serious, scientific evaluation of programmes for fear of finding problems that might embarrass the 
government or a specific agency. However, rigorous openly reported evaluation has many benefits. It can 
help bring attention to the successes of the programme rather than to isolated anecdotal problems which 
inevitably occur.
 
The last point of the above needs particular attention. In addition to regular monitoring, rigorous evaluation 
gives policymakers information needed to continuously improve environmental management. Some 
programmes will need more support. Others - temporary subsidy programmes for example - may need to 
be terminated as their usefulness ebbs. 
Economic instruments are often easier to measure than command and control instruments, since simple-
to-gauge metrics such as price of a pollution permit, tax levels, presence of performance bonds, etc., are 
clearly visible. Policymakers should plan to track relevant parameters over time and to make them public. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has developed useful guidance 
on evaluative criteria for economic instruments, which are given in Box III-10-3. A comprehensive set of 
criteria needs to be established before project implementation to avoid that only those criteria are tested 
that can easily be met.
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Box III-10-3: Evaluating Economic Instruments4
Environmental Effectiveness: Are emissions levels or resource depletion rates falling? Are 
ambient concentrations in the surrounding environment declining? (These are critical metrics to 
establish both baseline values and measurements over time. Unfortunately, even this basic data is 
often lacking). 
Economic Efficiency: Are costs of emissions rights stable or declining? Are they less expensive 
than projected in advance? (Falling values normally indicate that businesses are finding more 
efficient abatement methods.) Are new abatement technologies entering the market? Are trades 
being used? (Falling values with declining trades suggest either that new non-polluting options 
have emerged or that polluters are not purchasing required permits).
Administration and Compliance Costs: Has the public sector implemented an effective 
administrative oversight programme for the policies? How expensive is this to run relative to the 
value of trades occurring, emissions reductions realized, or anticipated cost of command and 
control programmes? How expensive are the administrative costs to the private sector relative to 
those normally incurred under a command and control approach? Are institutions cooperating to 
achieve the policy objective, or are efforts being blocked? 
Revenue Generation: Are user fees sufficient to cover the full costs of providing particular public 
services? Are fees appropriately levied on different user groups? Are environmental taxes high 
enough to trigger appropriate price increases in the products/production processes of concern? 
Are revenues retained to support additional environmental protection efforts or diverted to the 
general treasury?
Wider Economic and Social Effects: Are there noticeable (positive or negative) effects on 
employment, poverty, trade, competitiveness, growth, or rates of innovation that can be reasonably 
attributed to the environmental policies being evaluated? Where these impacts are negative, are 
they transitory or permanent? Can policy modifications mitigate the transitional dislocations?
Anticipate the Need for Long-Term Funding: External resources (e.g., from non-governmental 
organisations or international agencies) can support policy research, initial implementation or staff 
training for economic instruments-based programmes. However, such organizations should not be 
relied on to support ongoing operations as the entire effort will be at risk when funding priorities 
change. 
A long-term plan for implementing and overseeing the policy should be considered at the outset. 
Because different policy options can place very different long-term monitoring and enforcement 
responsibilities on the government, advance attention can ensure a more robust policy solution in 
the long-term, rather than one for which adequate funding will be a perpetual problem.
4 OECD, (1997) Evaluating Economic Instruments for Environmental Policy, pp. 91-99.
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Because many economic instruments also raise revenue through licensing fees or permit sales, 
such programmes have the potential to be self-sustaining. However, diversion of collected funds for 
other purposes (such as to general government spending) can negate this policy benefit. 
Prepare a Well-Reasoned Report on Policy Recommendations: Policy recommendations 
should be presented in clear language accessible to non-experts along with an analysis of their 
strengths and weaknesses. The resulting report should include options that have the most 
reasonable chance of success given the existing baseline conditions and the seriousness of the 
environmental or natural resource depletion problem. Further refinement and finalization of policy 
recommendations will: 
•	 Incorporate	relevant	stakeholder	feedback,	
•	 Address	the	concerns	of	government	officials	responsible	for	adopting	and	implementing	the		
	 policy,	and	
•	 Adopt	additional	design	elements	related	to	the	practical	execution	of	the	policy.	
The preparation of a closely reasoned and substantiated policy options paper represents a great 
improvement over unsubstantiated guess work that too often drives policy solutions. 
10.5 Phase 4 - Implement and Evaluate
The policy implementation and evaluation phase involves moving from outreach and data gathering to 
choosing and implementing a final policy package. If the earlier phases have been completed well, a good 
deal of the rationale for the policy choice, and the outreach to affected parties, will already have been 
done. Important aspects of policy execution are discussed below: 
10.5.1 Reach Political Agreement 
Never underestimate the challenge of reaching political agreement. Having a good policy is just the 
beginning and must compete with other government priorities and the influence of opposing political 
interests. 
The process of attaining political agreement needs to be managed strategically to defuse potentially fatal 
opposition. Political agreement, however, does not necessarily require general consensus; only enough 
political support to execute the policy. 
Political acceptability can be enhanced if policies have an easy-to-understand technical basis, the 
oversight agency demonstrates adequate capabilities to perform required monitoring and evaluation, and 
credible financial penalties and sanctions are introduced. Stakeholder support can be especially helpful 
in negotiating the political terrain. 
10.5.2 Enact Legislation 
It is not enough to have prepared excellent policy proposals. It is critical that legislation be drafted to 
fully reflect the final policy proposals and be enacted without deletion of key provisions or dilution of the 
economic instruments being proposed. Similarly, monitoring of the legislative process can help prevent 
debilitating amendments. Again, stakeholder support can be critical to ensure passage of effective 
legislation.
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10.5.3 Provide Resources 
A programme without necessary funding is no programme at all. In gaining political support, it is therefore 
critical that government officials with budgetary authority understand and accept the programme and 
ensure sufficient funding to operate. Even economic instruments that generate funds from dedicated fees 
or taxes will need initial funding to establish the programme.
10.5.4 Promote Collaboration 
Instrument choice will influence which relationships are most critical to establish and maintain. Economic 
instruments that bring in public revenues or solve problems for other ministries as well as protecting the 
environment offer immediate allies. Strong existing relationships between the government and certain 
stakeholders may support execution of the programme. 
10.5.5 Market the Programme 
To gain widespread acceptance, programme administrators must explain the policy being implemented, 
why it was chosen, and what steps are taken to ensure that this decision makes sense and incorporates 
the feedback from the various stakeholder groups. The basic explanation should be concise, easy to 
understand, and released at the same time as the policy package choice. Where decisions go against 
the expressed position of stakeholder groups engaged in Phases 2 and 3, it is important to recognize this 
disparity and to explain the reasons for the decisions being made. Follow-up is also needed to address 
questions and to provide continued updates of progress or resistance to the policies. 
10.5.6 Continuously Monitor and Evaluate 
It is not enough to have a monitoring and evaluation system on paper. It must be rigorously implemented 
from the beginning of the programme. In this regard, measurement is essential. Total quality management 
expert W. Edward Deming noted that if “we can’t measure it, we can’t manage it.” Measurement is needed 
to evaluate progress, to determine when policy modifications are needed, and to learn from the existing 
applications so new applications are easier to accomplish. 
Both the environmental problem and the baseline conditions change over time; this can change the 
incentives faced by firms and resource owners. The more complicated a programme is to monitor and 
enforce, the less likely it is to succeed, especially in the developing world.
The details of monitoring and enforcement needs will be shaped by the specific programme. These 
components need to be included in the management process from the outset. Often data on the severity 
of baseline environmental damages or emissions can strengthen the power of the environmental interests 
to prevent policy derailment. 
Maintaining strict control of the input process and timeline during the evaluation phase is a central part of 
this process, signalling that the ministry is open to outside information but will control how this information 
is being used. Do not let anyone fudge the numbers and stick to the evaluation criteria that have been 
defined beforehand (see section 10.4.7).
10.5.7 Enforce the Law 
Establishing policy credibility is critical if the affected parties are to take it seriously. Credible and strong 
enforcement actions from the point of implementation are also critical. As with inviting information 
during policy development, the strong enforcement actions should also be supported with outreach and 
compliance support to help industries having trouble complying. However, unless violators are brought to 
task for failing to control their resource use or emissions, credibility for the programme and possibly the 
ministry overall can decline rapidly.
201The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
P
A
R
T
 I
II
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
10.5.8 Stay on Course 
Political challenges will almost certainly continue even after policy instruments have been chosen. Imposing 
realistic tax rates or fee levels on established resource users or polluters can be most difficult. Such matters 
are at the heart of nearly all political processes. 
Political patience may also be tested when the economic instrument involves the creation and support of 
new markets (e.g., for pollution permits), especially where there is no history of strong markets in other 
commodity areas. Public officials expect immediate results from policy initiatives and need to be realistically 
informed about the time required to build successful markets.
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Module 10 FinalGroup Exercise on Identified Environmental Problems
  
Finding a Policy Solution  
(Handout)
Objective
Based on the previous Modules, try to find a policy solution for the environmental problem that you 
have worked on in Modules 1 and 3.
Instructions
Work in the same groups as in the exercises in Modules 1 and 3.
Make a plan for designing an economic instrument to address the previously identified 
environmental problem.
•	 Specify	the	information	and	analysis	you	would	need
•	 Specify	relevant	stakeholders	and	mechanisms	of	involving	them
•	 	Propose	economic	instrument	or	set	of	instruments	that	could	address	the	problem	and	explain	
your choice
•	 Identify	prerequisites	for	implementing	an	economic	instrument
Steps of the Exercise
•	 Discuss	the	above	points	in	your	group
•	 Jointly	prepare	a	presentation	addressing	the	above	points
•	 Select	a	speaker
•	 Present	your	case	in	the	plenary
!
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Course Evaluation and Follow-up
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Module 11
E V A L U A T I N G  T H E  T R A I N I N G C O U R S E
An evaluation session can be valuable for both participants and 
trainers. For participants the session allows time to reflect on 
what they have learned and what more they would like to learn on 
specific topics. The trainers receive information needed to modify 
and improve the delivery, content and structure of  
the course. 
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Training Course Evaluation Form (Handouts)
The following form is provided as an example only and should be modified by the trainer to fit the needs of 
the actual course agenda being used. 
Name of training course:
Dates of training course:
Name of trainer:
Presentation of Individual Topics: Which topics were the most interesting or useful and which were the 
least? Could you please make a brief comment explaining your reason?
 most interesting  least interesting
Comments:
Are there any topics that you might think could be added to, or deleted from, the course?
Impressions of Training Course as a Whole 
Tick the circle that best describes your assessment about the training course
1. Course overall
 
 boring interesting
2. Understandability
    
 poor good
3. Coverage of subject 
 
 poor good
4. Information content    
 Not informative informative
5. Relevance to my needs
 Not relevant  very relevant
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6. Pre-training assignment 
 Inadequate very adequate
7. Organisation of training 
 
 Not well organized well organized
8. Trainer knowledge of
 subject material   
 Poor very good
9. Background information
 Insufficient about right too much 
 
 Too general about right too specific
10. Comments
11. How could the training course be improved?
12. Will the participant handbook be useful to you in the future?
13. What follow up activities or materials would be useful for you?
 eludoM hcae ot yltcerid og ot thgir eht ot sbat eht no kcilC
208 The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
Course Administration and Facilities 
Tick the circle that best describes your feelings about the course administration and facilities.
14. Course administration 
 Poor good
15. Course facilities
   
 Poor good
16. Accommodation
   
 Poor good
17. Meals and refreshments
   
 Poor good
18. Comments:
Optional
19. Your professional background:
20. Your organization/agency/institution:
21. Your position/function:
22. Your first language:
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Comprehensive Glossary of Terms Related 
to Economic Instruments
Annex I
Any discussion of environmental and natural resource management 
requires an understanding of the specialized terms used. Some of 
these may be new while others are common terms with a special 
meaning in this context. 
For ease of understanding, many terms are defined at the 
beginning of the relevant training module or in the text itself.
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Annex I 
Comprehensive Glossary of Terms  
Related to Economic Instruments
Absorptive Capacity: The ability of the environment to absorb pollutants. If the emissions load exceeds 
the absorptive capacity, the pollutant poisons the environment.
Ambient Permit Trading: A variant of tradable emission permits in which the value of emission reduction 
credits differs from region to region depending on the relative ambient concentrations so as to discourage 
development of ‘hot spots’.
Ambient Standards: Legal ceilings placed on the concentration level of specific pollutants in the air, soil, 
or water.
Asset: An entity that has value and forms part of the wealth of the owner.
Beneficiary Pays Principle (BPP): The inverse of the polluter pays principle. Those who benefit pay for 
maintenance of environmental quality. This has particular application when developed countries are paying 
for global environmental benefits supplied by low-income developing countries (e.g. protection of rain 
forests which absorb greenhouse gasses). 
Benefit: In public policy a benefit may include many different - and sometimes conflicting – outcomes. 
These may include financial gain for private corporations, increases in tax revenues for governments, 
reduction in pollution, protection of natural resources, or general voter approval. Similarly short term 
benefits may be outweighed by long term costs and vice versa. Policymaking requires balancing benefits 
among themselves as well as against measured costs.
Benefit-Cost Analysis: An exercise which attempts to quantify both the benefits and costs in comparable 
terms in order to compare them.
Bioprospecting: Collection of biological samples in living things that will have some medical or commercial 
use (plants, animals, micro-organisms) and the collection of indigenous knowledge related to these 
resources. It is often argued that bioprospecting has to be allowed by the biodiversity-rich country and 
must benefit it (and the communities that traditionally use these resources) as well as the corporations 
(usually from developed countries) or universities collecting the resource. Bioprospecting must follow the 
rules of international treaties and national laws.
Cap and Trade Programme: An economic instrument by which the government sets the total allowable 
pollution or resource harvest units in a given area and over a given time period (the ‘cap’) and then 
leaves polluters or resource users to trade this total among themselves using the market. (See Tradable 
Permits).
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): An instrument authorized by the Kyoto Protocol that enables 
both the private and the public sectors of Annex I countries (mostly developed countries) to invest in projects, 
which result in emission reduction undertaken in non-Annex I countries (mostly developing countries and 
countries in transition). The investing (Annex I) country receives credits against its Kyoto Protocol emission 
reduction commitments for some of the resulting reductions in the non-Annex I country.
Command and Control Instruments: The laws and regulation used by governments to directly control 
pollution and manage natural resources. In the application of these instruments, the government can 
stipulate the technologies to be used to curb pollution, determine the maximum amount of emissions 
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that can be released into the environment, and regulate the use of natural resources. The instruments are 
enforced directly by the government rather than depending upon the market.
Carrying Capacity: The level of population of any species that a given habitat can sustain indefinitely.
Common Pool Resource: A resource which is available to everyone and which cannot be divided among 
users (e.g. clean air).
Common Property Regimes: A property rights system in which resources are owned and managed 
collectively by a group rather by individuals.
Common Property Rights: Similar to communal tenure with the exception that the land or property in 
question is owned rather than leased by the group. As an economic instrument common property rights 
can be granted or clarified to encourage protection of the environment or natural resources.
Communal Tenure: The right of a group, usually traditional users from one ethnic or social group, to hold 
and use property. Traditional tenure is often ill-defined. Serving as an economic instrument, communal 
tenure can be created or clarified under conditions requiring the protection of the environment. Communal 
tenure is not granted to individuals in the group and cannot usually be bought and sold in the market.
Compliance Costs: The costs for the polluter or natural resource user of complying with an environmental 
policy. Such costs need to be factored in when determining cost effectiveness of a policy instrument.
Cost Effectiveness: A situation where the benefits of a policy instrument exceed the overall cost of 
managing or enforcing the policy. 
Cultural Values: The beliefs, habits, and traditions of a group or an entire society that determine the 
relative worth of ideas, economic activities, types of property, or uses of property. Such values can be of 
equal or greater importance to policymaking than those of vested interests, and other more immediate 
stakeholders.
Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A financial exchange whereby a developing nation’s monetary debt to another 
country is reduced in return for improvements in environmental protection in the developing country. The 
debt relief is given as a compensation for the developing nation forgoing income that it would receive for 
licensing environmental destructive practices (e.g. mining, logging rainforests).
Demographic Conditions: The size, growth rates, and makeup (by age, sex, and ethnicity) of the general 
population that can affect environmental policy.
Deposit Refund Systems: A system involving a charge on some particular item and a subsidy for its 
return. Deposit Refund Systems are combined instruments of charge and subsidy used to encourage 
environmentally appropriate recycling. Recycling beverage bottles and cans are the most well known 
example but the principal applies to anything (automobiles, chemicals, fluids) that can cause environmental 
damage if not recycled.
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS): Voluntary instrument introduced in 1995 in the 
European Union, which acknowledges organizations that improve their environmental performance on a 
continuous basis. EMAS registered organisations are legally compliant, run an environment management 
system and report on their environmental performance through the publication of an independently verified 
environmental statement. They are recognised by the EMAS logo, which guarantees the reliability of the 
information provided.
Economic Instruments (EI): Economic instruments provide market and financial incentives for polluters 
and natural resource users to change their behaviour. The economic instruments incentives include such 
mechanisms as taxes, emission or access charges, marketable permits, and changes to property rights.
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Emission Charge: A fee, tax or financial penalty levied on emitters for each unit of a pollutant emitted into 
the air or water.
Emission Reduction Credit: Credits given to those firms that reduce emissions more than required. 
Firms can either sell them to firms whose emissions are above the statutory minimum or bank them for 
their own use in the future.
Emission Standard: A legal limit placed on the amount of a pollutant an individual source may emit.
Enforceability: The degree to which it is possible to enforce a law or to protect a right. In discussion of 
property rights, it is the degree to which owners can protect legally held property from involuntary seizure 
or encroachment from others. 
Environmental Certification: A process by which the manufacturing or harvesting process is inspected 
and certified to be consistent with certain environmental practices. 
Externality: The consequence of any economic activity that results in costs outside of the activity. The 
intended outcome of burning coal may be to generate electricity. The externality is the resulting air pollution 
that imposes costs on the general public. The negative effects of many economic externalities are often 
born by the general public and the problems caused can only be addressed by sound public policy. (See 
Internalise Externality). 
Financial Exchanges: Arrangements whereby a country or a nongovernmental environmental organization 
provides financial incentives to developing countries, local jurisdictions, or other groups to engage in 
environmentally friendly practices (discontinue destroying tropical forests, reduce polluting emissions, etc). 
These incentives may involve direct grants, debt relief, or trade concessions.
Fiscal Systems: Governmental policies, procedures, and agencies necessary to collect and disperse 
taxes, fees, etc. The integrity of such systems is vital to the success of all environmental policies whether 
they use command and control or economic instruments.
Flow Resources: Renewable resources like grasslands, forest, water that, if not overused, will naturally 
renew themselves. (See also Renewable Resources and Fund Pollutants).
Free Rider Effect: A situation in which some users enjoy the benefits of goods or services purchased 
by others without paying anything themselves (e.g. countries that decide not to take any steps to control 
global warming can “free ride” on the steps to reduce greenhouse gases taken by others).
Fund Pollutants: Wastes for which the environment has some absorptive capacity. Many organic 
pollutants released into streams or rivers will be transformed by the resident bacteria into less harmful 
organic matter. As long as the emissions rate does not exceed the absorptive capacity of the environment, 
these pollutants do not accumulate to create environmental problems. 
Global Environmental Facility (GEF): A global fund, established in 1991, managed by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the World 
Bank. GEF helps developing countries fund projects and programmes that protect the global environment, 
including projects related to biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land degradation, the ozone 
layer, and persistent organic pollutants.
Global Pollutants: Substance that pollutes the upper atmosphere, such as fluorocarbons affecting the 
ozone layer. 
Governmental Authority: The ability of the government to enforce laws and to effectively implement 
programmes throughout its area of jurisdiction. Neither economic nor command and control instruments 
policies can be implemented without sufficient government authority.
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Government Failure: The inability or unwillingness of government to redress environmental imbalances.
Greenhouse Gases: Global pollutants (e.g. carbon dioxide, methane) which contribute to climate 
modification (global warming) by absorbing the long-wave (infrared) radiation, thereby trapping heat which 
would otherwise radiate into outer space. 
Information-Based Instruments: Methods of informing the public about how eco-friendly a product is. 
This can be done by labelling, rating, or other techniques. Information-based instruments may also include 
widespread public education programmes on anti-littering or energy conservation or other high profile 
campaigns.
Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ): A means of protecting a fishery and the income derived from it 
by limiting the number of fish caught through the use of tradable permits. Individual fishers are allocated 
quotas that entitle them to portions of the authorized total allowable catch. These quotas can be used, or 
kept for later use, or sold to other fishers. 
Input and Output Taxes: Levies on some input or output that can be easily monitored and that serves 
as a good indicator or proxy for the pollution that is to be regulated. They are often used in cases where 
the monitoring of emissions is impossible, difficult or costly, so that the government cannot directly tax 
the polluting activity. Gasoline taxes and vehicle weight charges are examples that are introduced based 
on the assumption that the ones paying will also be responsible for car emission and thus cause the 
environmental harm.
Institutional Failure: A situation where the government does not implement environmental policies 
because of an inability or unwillingness of its agencies or institutions to operate functioning administrative, 
tax, legal or fiscal systems. To the extent that institutional capabilities needed to promulgate and enforce 
the policy instruments effectively are lacking, the performance of the instruments will suffer.
Internalising Externalities: Raising internal production costs to cover the external costs to society of 
pollution or natural resource exploitation.
Internationally Transferable Emission Permits: Cross-border tradable permits to emit pollutants, which 
have been included as instrument under the Kyoto Protocol. These permits are similar to domestically 
tradable emission permits but are established by an international agreement. The Kyoto Protocol allows 
Annex I countries (mainly developed countries) to acquire units from other Annex I countries and use them 
towards meeting their emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol. This enables countries to make use 
of lower cost opportunities to reduce emissions, irrespective of the country in which those opportunities 
exist. 
ISO 14000: International Standards Organization rules for environmental practices and for independent 
verification of those practices. The ISO 14000 family of standards is primarily concerned with what an 
organization does to minimize harmful effects on the environment caused by its activities, and to achieve 
continual improvement of its environmental performance. Governments may require ISO 14000 certification 
for government contractors to promote environmental protection.
joint Implementation (jI): A provision of the Kyoto Protocol that allows Annex I countries to implement 
projects that reduce emissions, or remove carbon from the atmosphere, in other Annex I countries, in 
return for emission reduction units. The investing Annex I country can then count the carbon benefits 
towards meeting its emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol.
Kyoto Protocol: International agreement concluded to at Kyoto Japan where it was adopted by the 
Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
It became effective in 2005 and is a first step toward setting binding obligations on countries to reduce 
pollutants. The Protocol establishes binding commitments for countries specified in Annex I of the protocol 
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(mostly developed countries) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and allows trade of emission permits 
among them. (It has several “Annexes” making separate provisions for developed, and developing 
countries, and countries in transition in addressing global environmental problems.) The full name is The 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Labelling (Environmental): The use of product labels to inform consumers that a product has been 
manufactured, mined, or harvested in accordance with certain environmental standards or practices (e.g. 
organically grown). The intention is to allow consumers to purchase products that were produced with the 
least harm to the environment. 
Legal Instruments: Policy instruments that hold individuals, firms, and organizations liable for 
environmental damage they cause. Legal instruments include criminal penalties, fines, civil liability statues, 
and performance bonds.
Liability: Legal obligation to pay for damages caused. A law, for instance, may permit an activity (oil 
drilling) but require the company to bear all the costs of environmental damage caused by the activity.
Load: The amount of waste products in the environment at any given time. The damage done by the load 
depends on the capacity of the environment to assimilate the waste products.
Marginal: Small, literally at the margin or edge, as in a small change, commonly interpreted as a one-unit 
change.
Marginal Cost: The extra cost of producing one more unit of a good.
Market: Any arrangement whereby goods and services are freely exchanged between buyers and sellers 
based on agreed-upon prices and without coercion.
Market Failure: An inability of the market to compensate for the costs to society – the externalities - of 
pollution or loss of natural resources. Market failure occurs because the market does not require companies 
or individuals to internalize externalities.
Maximum Sustainable Yield: The maximum harvest that can be sustained indefinitely from a renewable 
resource.
Minimum Viable Population: The level of population of a species below which regeneration is negative, 
leading ultimately to extinction. 
Natural Resource Use Fees: Price-based instruments such as mining royalties, stumpage fees, user 
fees, and land taxes used for natural resource management. Governments impose these fees and taxes 
to correct market failures (any externalities related to resource use) or institutional failure (the absence of 
property rights).
Net Benefit: The excess of benefits over costs.
Nonpoint Sources: Diffuse sources such as runoff from agricultural or developed land.
Non-renewable Sources: Finite resources, such as iron ore or oil, that cannot be renewed.
Open Access Resources: Resources which anyone may use without payment to any owner or 
government entity.
Opportunity Cost: The cost of choosing one thing over another where doing one thing prevents doing 
another. If a family buys an expensive house they may have to forego eating out to make the mortgage 
payments. Not being able to eat out is the opportunity cost. The ultimate source of opportunity cost is 
scarcity (unlimited wants and needs, but limited resources). 
217The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
A
N
N
E
x
E
S
Output Based Allocation: The initial allocation of pollution permits based on relative output levels of 
existing firms.
Performance Bonds: A form of insurance required to ensure that the company will be able to pay for any 
environmental damage caused by its activities.
Perverse Subsidies: Payments such as those that promote certain kinds of economic development 
or support specific industries (fishing, forestry, etc.) that cause environmental damage. Removal of such 
subsidies constitutes an economic instrument for environmental and natural resource protection.
Pigovian Tax: A tax levied to correct the negative externalities of a market activity (after the economist A. 
C. Pigou). This can be for example an environmental tax or a sin tax (taxes on alcohol or cigarettes). A true 
Pigovian tax would charge polluters precisely the cost their pollution imposes on society.
Point Sources: Sources of pollution that discharge effluent through a readily identifiable emission point 
such as a discharge pipe. (Most industrial and municipal sources are point sources).
Policy Failure: The inability of unwillingness of government to address problems resulting from the failure 
of the market to address externalities such as pollution or loss of natural resources (See Market Failure, 
Institutional Failure, and Internalize Externalities definitions.)
Pollution: Undesirable by-products of human activity. These may be poisonous in themselves (e.g. heavy 
metals) or harmful because of the quantity involved (e.g. raw sewage).
Polluter Pays Principle (PPP): The principle that costs and responsibilities associated with pollution 
should be borne by the polluter as much as possible. This is accomplished through a variety of penalties 
and inducements. (See also Beneficiary Pays Principle)
Pollution Taxes and Charges: Levies on pollution that seek to internalise externalities of pollution by 
increasing the price of a polluting activity. They intend to shift the costs of pollution that would otherwise be 
borne by society back to the polluter. Governments can apply taxes and charges in cases where they are 
able to monitor and tax the polluting activity (e.g. sewage effluent or smokestack emissions).
Price-Based Instruments: Special government taxes, charges, or fees designed to raise the price of 
polluting the environment or exploiting natural resources. These policies attempt to set the price for users 
of environmental and natural resources ‘right’ to cover the excess social and environmental costs caused 
by the economic activities of polluters or natural resource users. 
Pollution and overuse of renewable natural resources impose costs on society, which are not borne by 
the private firms and individuals that cause them and which the market does not account for. These costs 
are a type of externality. Appropriate pricing of resources through price-based instruments sends a more 
accurate signal to users encouraging more appropriate resource consumption and conservation.
Prisoner’s Dilemma: A parable used to show the game theoretic aspect of the tragedy of the commons. 
Two prisoners have both the choice of testifying against each other or keeping quite. If both did the latter 
they would get a light sentence, but the game theoretic analysis shows that, in the particular setting, their 
preferred strategy is to betray their fellow prisoner. The result is the worst possible for them – a tough 
sentence for both prisoners.
Property Rights Based Instruments: Policy instruments that define, adjust, or create property rights to 
ameliorate environmental damage. They define the basic enforceable law for ownership and use of both 
tangible (e.g. land) and intangible (e.g. permits) property. More specific instruments include tradable emission 
permits in pollution management, individual transferable quotas in fisheries management, transferable 
grazing rights in range management, and transferable development rights in property management.
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Property Rights: The right to ownership and use of both tangible (land, buildings, etc.) and intangible 
(patents, trademarks, copyrights, etc.) property. To be meaningful, such rights must not be able to be revoked 
without clear transparent legal procedures and proper compensation for the value of the property. 
Property Rules: Legal rules that govern the initial allocation of entitlements to property including intangible 
property such as tradable permits. Valuation of the property is left to the market.
Public Good: “Good” in this sense means “product or service” rather than “virtue or benefit.” A public 
good is a product or service that is available to the general public - payers and non-payers alike. In other 
words, use of the good by one person doesn’t prevent use by others. Examples include national defence, 
a clean environment, and public fireworks displays. Private businesses cannot sell public goods in markets, 
because they cannot charge a price and keep non-paying people away.
Refunded Emission Payments (REP): A combined economic instrument that uses both charges and 
subsidies. A REP is a charge imposed on polluting firms, the revenues of which are returned to the same 
group of polluters, not in proportion to the payments made but in proportion to another measure such as 
output. The individual firm pays a tax on emissions and receives back a share of the total fees collected 
based on output. The net effect of the payment and refund is that firms with above average emissions 
make net payments to the firms that are cleaner than average.
Regional Pollutants: Air or water borne pollutants that can cause damage beyond the immediate vicinity 
of an emission source.
Regulation of Technology: Bans or restrictions on specific technologies that cause pollution or deplete 
natural resources (e.g. ban on the production and use of unleaded petrol).
Regulation of Performance: Command and control policies that impose directly enforced limits on 
the quantity of emissions or harvest of a renewable resource for each individual or firm. The resulting 
performance standards target individual levels of emissions or natural resource exploitation rather than 
requiring or prohibiting particular technologies. 
Renewable Resources: Natural resources (e.g. fresh water, oxygen, forests, wildlife, fisheries). Unlike 
mineral resources, which are mined, the available stock of renewable resources is not fixed but can be 
increased or decreased. It will increase if allowed to regenerate and decrease if overexploited.
Rent: An economics term meaning profit in excess of what would be possible under a perfectly competitive 
market. (Not to be confused with what an apartment dweller pays a landlord). Monopolies are able to 
charge rent prices because they have no competition.
Rule of Law: A situation in which a stable, transparent, and impartially administered legal system prevails. 
Established courts make decisions that are based on written law and open to all parties. Court decisions 
are not arbitrary, capricious, determined by corrupt practices (bribery, nepotism, etc.), or directed by 
outside forces (political rulers, vested interests, etc.).
Scarcity Rent: A form of rent income (excess profit) that accrues to an owner of a natural resource just 
because the resource is scarce. In the absence of property rights – i.e. of private ownership - there is no 
owner to claim the scarcity rent, and the resource may be exploited because its price does not reflect the 
scarcity. In those cases, price-based instruments such as mining royalties (a payment to the state for the 
right of use of a state’s mineral resources), stumpage fees (a fee typically charged by the government to 
logging companies for the right to harvest lumber from public land), or user fees (fees charged to users of 
goods or services provided by the government) can be used as payments for a scarcity rent. This ensures 
that the resource user pays for the opportunity costs which society incurs when the resource is exploited 
today and thus will not be available in the future. 
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Self-Enforcement: A situation in which those regulated by a policy have an interest in seeing that the 
laws and regulations are enforced. For example, groups given communal property in perpetuity have an 
incentive to ensure that other people do not encroach on the land, and assets are managed for the long 
term.
Stakeholder: Those who have an interest (or stake) in particular laws, regulations, or policies. These may 
be companies, individuals, social groups, environmental organizations, or public agencies. They include 
but are not limited to those who have a vested interest in the situation.
Stationary Source: An immobile pollution source (e.g. factories as opposed to automobiles. See Point 
Source).
Stock Pollutants: Undesirable wastes for which the environment has little or no absorptive capacity. 
Examples of stock pollutants include non-biodegradable bottles tossed by the roadside; lead and other 
heavy metals, which accumulate in the soils near the emissions source; and persistent synthetic chemicals 
such as dioxin. Stock pollutants accumulate over time as the pollutants enter the environment.
Stock Resources: Resources, like minerals, that once used cannot be renewed.
Subsidies: Payments or other economic incentives (e.g. tax breaks) to individuals or firms to compensate 
expenses incurred through environmentally friendly behaviour, thus encouraging this behaviour. (See also 
perverse subsidy)
Surface Pollutants: Substances, which pollute the water, land or air near the earth’s surface.
Tax Expenditures: A loss of potential tax revenue resulting from an exemption, credit, or refund of taxes 
for polluters that have introduced abatement or clean technology.
Technology: Any method of performing a task. There are technologies for the generation of electricity, 
making charcoal, fishing and all other economic activities. Technology regulation may cover both the 
equipment and processes used for any economic activity. The regulation of technology is one means of 
controlling pollution or overuse of natural resources. 
Tenure: The right to hold and use property and its resources under defined conditions. Tenure differs from 
outright ownership (see property rights) in that the tenured property cannot usually be bought and sold 
although tenure rights in the form of tradable permits may be bought and sold.
Total Allowable Catch (TAC): The total tonnage of particular fish species that is deemed sustainably 
harvestable based on monitoring of fishery health and thus is set as the quota. 
Tradable Permits: Economic instruments used to address environmental problems by requiring each 
polluter or resource user to obtain permits for the amount of pollution he or she releases. Permits are 
issued in units of pollutants or rights to harvest a natural resource and may be bought and sold in an 
open market. The government sets the total number of permits at a level to reduce pollution or protect 
sustainable levels of a renewable resource. Permit holders have an incentive to reduce emissions or curb 
harvesting in order to sell excess permits. 
Tragedy of the Commons: A metaphor describing the mechanism leading to the overexploitation of 
common resources. Each individual involved has an incentive to increase his or her own benefit from the 
resource before others do so. The result is an overuse that may be unsustainable and can lead to the 
extinction of the resource.
Transferable Development Rights: A mechanism that allows landowners to sell their development 
rights to other property owners. In TDR schemes, development per area is restricted by legislation, and 
can even be completely prohibited in some designated areas whose preservation is in the public interest. 
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Landowners not wishing to, or not being allowed to, take use of their development rights can sell them on 
the market to others who thus expand their original development restriction level.
Transferable Emission Permits: Tradable permits specifically designed to reduce polluting emissions.
Transferability: The right of owners to voluntarily sell or donate property rights.
Transparency: A situation in which information, decisions, and actions of the government and those 
regulated are available to the general public. Transparency is essential for the functioning of most economic 
instruments.
Uniformly Mixed Pollutants: Air pollutants that are not harmful locally because they are uniformly mixed 
with the ambient atmosphere but cumulatively can cause harm for the entire planet. (Examples include 
ozone-depleting gases and greenhouse gases).
Vested Interests: Those who have a direct financial interest in the content and enforcement of particular 
laws, regulations, and policies. They are often more organized and vocal than those without a direct 
financial interest. 
Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Formal negotiated agreements between companies or groups 
of companies and the government (or on some occasions nongovernmental environmental groups) to limit 
pollution or the overuse of natural resources. Such agreements allow the parties to avoid specific legislation 
or intrusive government regulation or legislation and provide the flexibility that comes with negotiated 
agreements. Such agreements are backed by the threat of government sanctions in case the parties do 
not adhere to the agreements. 
Zone of Influence: The geographic area affected by any given environmental or natural resources 
management problem. Policies addressing the damage caused by local pollutants near the source of 
emissions will differ from those for regional pollutants affecting wider areas. The local and regional categories 
are not mutually exclusive; it is possible for a pollutant to be both. Nitrogen oxides released into the air, for 
example, or chemical discharges into rivers can be both local and regional pollutants. 
Zoning: Regulation of the uses of real property to achieve environmental protection in specific locations. 
Zoning designates permitted uses of land based on mapped zones, and hence can restrict certain types 
of economic activity in specific zones, for example because of noxious emissions, destruction of natural 
scenery, high noise levels, etc.
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1Adapted from UNEP (2004): The Use of Economic Instruments in Environmental Policy: Opportunities and Challenges.
A Primer on Economic Instruments1
Annex II
This Annex provides a brief overview of the structure and 
application of common economic instruments. As outlined in the 
text, the instruments are usually implemented to achieve one of 
a handful of objectives: establishing property rights, recovering 
revenues, ensuring fair returns on asset sales, protecting against 
environmental damages from activities, or subsidizing the transition 
to cleaner alternatives. The sections below provide more detail on 
each area, including how the policy instruments work and what 
parameters can be altered in order to modify the policy impact. 
One perhaps obvious, but nonetheless important caveat is that 
these descriptions are generalizations of policy approaches. Where 
social, political, or economic pressures on people are severe  
(e.g., populations facing starvation or corrupt regimes seeking to 
sell national assets), environmentally-detrimental behaviour is likely 
to dominate regardless of what policy constraint is supposedly 
in place. However, under a range of more normal conditions, 
economic instruments can be extremely effective tools.
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Annex II 
A Primer on Economic Instruments2
1. Establishing, Clarifying or Improving Property Rights
A range of instruments including permits, quotas, licensing or concessions, and litigation rights aim to 
achieve this policy objective. Owners tend to take more care to protect their resources than do users who 
have no stake in the long-term productivity of the resource. Owners are also more willing to invest money 
to improve these assets, believing they will achieve higher long-term returns, and can use these assets as 
collateral for loans with which to finance resource management or upgrades. 
With a well-functioning legal system, clear property rights also empower owners to enforce contracts 
against vendors or subcontractors who have not properly protected resources during extraction activities. 
Owners are not necessarily sole individuals: community or corporate ownership is also included. 
 
An important limitation of property-rights is that they work less well when the property is less tangible 
(e.g., air pollution versus grazing rights) or more widely dispersed (e.g., local air emissions versus global 
emissions). In addition, market allocations may sometimes need to be constrained by governments 
to protect the resource base or to avoid “hot spots” where trades concentrate emissions within sub-
populations or ecosystems.
a. Variations in Property Rights 
Depending on how property rights are assigned, allocated, and transferred, owners will face very different 
incentives, and governments can experience very different costs.
Initial Allocation Options. Rights can be given for free or auctioned. Auctions raise revenues for 
governments and provide better price signals. Give-aways are sometimes justified on the ground that 
they reduce the economic shock to existing producers who previously paid nothing. They may also help 
overcome political resistance to the new policy. The grants may be based on current (or partial historical) 
gross emissions (grandfathering) or on emissions per unit output (output based). 
Regardless of the method, such grants, by definition, favour the status quo and can create barriers to 
entry for newer, cleaner firms. Benchmarking firms, which is to award permits based on some form 
of a performance standard, can reduce this bias somewhat, but requires a fair degree of additional 
administration. 
If resale markets are not liquid, initial recipients may not face accurate price signals about the value of 
their resource/pollution rights, under-investing in controls. Often, the aggregate rights available are capped 
at a particular level to protect the resource, a common example of mixing command and control with 
economic instruments approaches.
Types of Ownership. Rights can be owned by individuals, firms, or communally. Communal rights can 
be a good solution for subsistence communities, though care must be paid to how the community itself 
sub-allocates these rights to its members and controls new members from entering the community and 
2 This annex follows the same structure and numbering as Annex III - Impact Economic Instruments on Incentives of Firms and Individuals. Annexes II 
and III can be used in conjunction.
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putting the resource base under excessive pressure again. Where subsistence groups rely on a low level 
of resource access, a market divided into two branches may be set up with large firms competing for 
marketable rights and subsistence farmers/ranchers/fishermen granted subsistence access for free.
Tradable or Not. Rights can be tradable or not. Tradable rights provide better price signals and stronger 
incentives for improvement, since firms can always earn money if they can reduce their need for the 
rights via internal reform or innovation. One drawback to marketable rights is that they may marginalize 
small producers as existing owners sell out to large companies with economies of scale. Even where 
not marketable to third parties, policies may allow averaging of emissions across a plant or company, a 
process that can also generate substantial efficiencies for industry. 
Duration. Rights can be in perpetuity (ownership rights) or for a limited period of time (use rights). 
Development rights, such as patents and prospecting rights, can last for a decade or more, but are not 
permanent. Some permit regimes have rights expire to provide increased pressure for innovation on 
the rights holder. Phased expirations also ensure that there is an active market in the rights as expiring 
allocations must be repurchased. This helps create a more liquid market for the permits, and more accurate 
pricing. Longer durations are generally more valuable to the owner, but provide less flexibility to the public 
to modify the terms by which public resources are used.
Temporal Flexibility. Rights can sometimes be used over multiple years, rather than being restricted 
to a single year. By allowing firms to avoid premature removal of capital, to average emissions across 
production cycles, or to ensure adequate time to vet new technologies, temporal flexibility can bring down 
the cost of achieving a particular environmental goal. Temporal flexibility policies can include: 
•	 Banking	involves	receiving	credit	for	going	below	the	firm’s	annual	allotment	in	early	years,	then	using	
or	selling	credits	above	its	allotment	in	later	years.	
•	 Borrowing	 is	 the	reverse,	where	emissions	or	extraction	 is	higher	 than	allowed	 in	early	years,	but	
lower	in	future	years.
b. Examples of Creating, Clarifying or Improving Rights
Market Creation. Rights are created where previously behaviour was unconstrained. Economic 
instruments-based approaches often allow countries to meet the same pollution target they could stipulate 
by regulation, but at a lower cost.
•	 Tradable	emission/effluent	permits
•	 Tradable	catch	quotas
•	 Tradable	development	quotas	or	rights	(location	stays	the	same,	developer	changes)
•	 Transferable	development	rights	(location	shifted	to	less	environmentally	sensitive	area;	developer	can	
stay	the	same	or	change).
•	 Tradable	water	shares
•	 Tradable	resource	shares
•	 Tradable	land	permits
•	 Tradable	offsets/credits
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Clarification of Basic Property Rights. Government policies fix existing problems in the ownership of 
resource rights. Clear title clears the way for longer-term investment and management.
•	 Ownership	rights:	land	titles,	water	rights,	mining	rights
•	 Use	rights:	licensing,	fishery	access,	use	concessions
•	 Development	rights:	patents,	prospecting	rights
Property Rights Protection. Government policies make it easier for existing owners to enforce their 
rights against potential usurpers.
•	 Contract	law:	right	to	sue	if	contracts	not	followed
2A. Revenue Recovery on the Provision of Public Services
Governments around the world provide wide-ranging goods and services with both direct and indirect 
environmental impacts. Examples include electricity, water, wastewater treatment, rubbish removal and 
recycling, hazardous waste collection and treatment, and wide ranging transportation services. When 
these services are provided free or at subsidized rates the providing agency may be starved for revenue 
and unable to maintain, upgrade, or expand its infrastructure and service area. 
In practice, this often means that the poorest or most rural areas get much-delayed access to basic 
resources, or no access at all. On the demand side, consumers have little incentive to use the resources 
wisely, generating a corrosive spiral of unchecked over consumption (and sometimes depletion) followed 
by demands for larger infrastructure, and sometimes by irrational expansion of this infrastructure. 
a. Variations in Revenue Recovery 
Rate Structures are commonly adjusted so that the poor receive inexpensive (or free) access to a 
subsistence quantity of the resource (water, energy).
Increasing Block Rate structures accomplish this same goal by providing the first units of consumption 
to all customers inexpensively then increasing the unit cost substantially for higher usage rates. Special 
higher rates are often applied to customers (e.g., industries) that require more expensive and specialized 
services, such as when they discharge more difficult to treat industrial wastewater to a publicly owned 
wastewater treatment plant. 
Cross Subsidies. Reduced rates are one form of cross-subsidies. As noted above, these can sometimes 
be used to provide basic services to the poor. Often, however, cross-subsidies also provide below-market 
prices to heavy industrial users of municipal services, such as aluminium smelters or steel mills. Removing 
these types of cross-subsidies can improve pricing accuracy and encourage more environmentally 
sustainable consumption.
Recovery Rate. Depending on the political circumstances, revenue requirements can include recovery 
of public sector administrative overhead, and a fair cost of capital/rate of return on invested public funds. 
Full recovery of these costs should always be the goal, as doing so provides pricing more in line with the 
actual cost of tied-up public funds and allows better choices to be made with regards to future investment 
into substitutes. 
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One caveat. Where the public has already built and paid for the infrastructure, encouraging lots of users 
(of, for example the sewers) to stop using the system can rob a municipality of important revenues if there 
are easy and cheap ways for these users to cut back. Each situation should be evaluated separately, 
though full costing should always be used when evaluating new investment.
Phase-in. Where users have not historically paid anything for the public services provided, rates may be 
phased in over a period of time to reduce the transitional hardships. A phased approach can also help 
avoid the loss of baseline users (as stated above) when the exact cost at which they exit the system is 
not known.
b. Examples of Revenue Recovery
Charges for services provided directly to consumer
•	 User	fees	for	municipal	water,	wastewater	treatment,	energy
•	 Collection	charges	for	solid	waste	pickup
•	 Tolls	on	public	roads
•	 Access	fees	(e.g.,	for	recreational	access)
Charges for impacts that new demand will put on existing infrastructure
•	 Impact	fees
Charges to recover the public sector overhead associated with providing goods and services to users:
•	 Administrative	charges
•	 Regulatory	oversight	charges
•	 Enforcement	action	surcharges
2B. Ensuring Fair Market Value for Public Assets
Item 2A addresses operating municipally-owned organizations. In contrast, this class of instruments deals 
with ways to realize fair market value for public citizens on the sale of municipally-owned infrastructure and 
organizations (privatisation), or on the sale of publicly owned natural resources. 
Natural resource sales occur on a regular basis in most countries, as the government often owns the land 
from which the minerals are extracted. Organizational sales occur less frequently, but can be used to allow 
governments to focus on more basic services, or to bring a fiscal discipline to the enterprise that was 
politically or organizationally impossible for the government to establish itself. 
The sums of money involved often run into the billions of dollars; as a result, policy instruments must 
ensure that this value is not stolen or mismanaged by public officials and their relations.
Transparency is of extreme importance in these situations, and corruption has been endemic throughout 
the world both with privatisations and with resource concessions. Payment terms need to be clear, and 
formal procedures for collecting, investing, and safeguarding resultant funds are needed. 
Since asset sales are in many ways a windfall, some governments have set up financial management 
structures to convert the windfall into a more diversified basket of income-producing assets (often 
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stocks and bonds) for the long-term benefit of its citizens. This helps ensure that at least part of the wealth 
created is protected from short-term political pressures to spend the funds is less productive ways.
a. Variations of Achieving Fair Market Value 
Auction Method. There are a variety of different auction techniques, depending on what type of resource 
is being sold, and whether there is only one auction winner or multiple ones.
Eligible Bidders. Generally, the more bidders, the more competitive the auctions. Opening bidding to 
international firms, and to groups (e.g., environmental NGOs) who might retire rather than exploit the 
rights, can increase the returns to the taxpayer. However, countries need to be sure they can take effective 
enforcement actions against multinationals if there is a problem with how they extract the resources; and 
are willing to enforce purchases that close off the resource to all extraction.
Payment Structure Depending on the certainty of asset value and the goals of the government, sales 
can have different mixes between cash bonus payments (paid at the time a license is awarded), rental 
payments (for the right to hold access to resources within a particular year), and contingent payments such 
as royalties (paid only as resources are extracted and/or sold).
b. Examples
For achieving break-even revenues and/or fair market value on asset sales:
•	 Competitive	auctions	for	resource	rights	or	access.
•	 Full	privatisation	of	stand-alone	enterprises	(so	long	as	the	bidding	process	is	open	and	competitive).	
Where	competitive	markets	exist,	pricing	structures	generally	need	to	rise	to	cover	costs	in	order	for	the	
enterprise	to	remain	viable.
•	 Partial	privatisation	of	stand-alone	enterprises	through	initial	public	offerings	of	stock,	and	the	associated	
adoption	of	required	oversight	and	accounting	procedures.	These	approaches	can	often	achieve	much	
of	 the	benefit	of	 full	privatisation;	 the	key	 issue	 is	whether	 the	remaining	government	 involvement	 is	
hands-off,	allowing	economics	to	drive	decisions,	rather	than	political.
•	 Institute	payment	of	natural	resource	royalties.
•	 Institute	payment	of	excise	taxes	on	natural	resource	removal.
For converting windfalls into long-term sustainable wealth: 
•	 Establishment	of	carefully	controlled	and	 independent	 trust	 fund	to	 receive	some	portion	of	windfall	
gains.	These	 funds	have	conservative	 investment	criteria	 for	 investment	portfolio	and	diversification,	
independent	governance,	transparent	financial	records,	and	high	barriers	for	modifying	these	protections	
by	elected	officials.
2C. Compensation for Environmental Damage (Environmental Externalities/Financial Assurance)
Many industrial and extractive activities cause pollution or other resource damage. A set of economic 
instruments aims to accomplish four objectives: 
•	 Force	the	environmental	costs	into	current	prices;	
•	 Set	 up	 financial	 mechanisms	 that	 protect	 the	 public	 from	 cleanup	 costs	 should	 the	 original	 
firm/government	fail	to	do	so;	and	to	
227The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
A
N
N
E
x
E
S
•	 Provide	a	 legal	mechanism	to	sue	firms	or	governments	 retroactively	 for	 the	damage	their	activities	
have	caused.	
•	 Establish	 informational	 regimes	 (e.g.,	 mandatory	 emissions	 reporting)	 leverage	 market	 forces	 by	
exposing	below-par	performance	to	customers	and	neighbours,	and	by	establishing	a	record	of	past	
performance	that	can	support	legal	action	should	there	be	violations.
a. Varieties of Compensation
Time. Some economic instruments spur reductions in the environmental risks associated with current 
activities; others attempt to recover costs of past damages; and still others help mitigate future environmental 
risks. 
Phase in. As with most economic instruments, instruments can be phased in over time to reduce the 
transitional dislocations.
Polluter Pays Principle. There are degrees to how closely the entity paying is the one who polluted. It 
can be the firm, the industry, the region, or all taxpayers. The closer the payments are to the ones causing 
the problem, the better the price signals will be.
Degree of Risk Control. Protection against future risks is often done through insurance. Governments 
can make this tool more effective by allowing only financially strong insurers into the market, and by 
instituting reinsurance requirements where appropriate. Reinsurers absorb a portion of the potential risks 
associated with a policy, establishing increased diversification for the insurance market. However, they too 
must be monitored for financial solvency.
Border Adjustments Surcharges can be added to competing products coming into the country to offset 
any competitive disadvantage due to environmental regulation.
b. Examples
Addressing risks of current activities:
•	 Pollution	taxes/permits
Recovering damages associated with past activities:
•	 Civil	and	criminal	penalties	for	natural	resource	damages.
Addressing risks of future activities:
•	 Required	liability	or	environmental	insurance
•	 Performance	 bonds	 for	 proper	 site	 remediation/closure.	 Bonds	 can	 be	 issued	 for	 environmental	
performance,	 land	 reclamation	 bonds,	waste	 delivery	 bonds,	 environmental	 accident	 bonds,	 forest	
management	bonds.
•	 Deposit/refund	systems	for	proper	product	return
3. Subsidizing Transition to Sustainable Alternatives
New technologies or alternative resource management practices may have demonstrated environmental 
benefits relative to current practice. Economic instruments that subsidize these alternatives can benefit 
environmental quality by accelerating a market shift to these preferable approaches. 
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Once subsidies are available, however, many groups will seek to obtain them; not all will be justified. Care 
and attention are needed to ensure that the subsidies flow narrowly to the desired recipients if the original 
objectives of the policies are to be achieved.
a. Varieties of Subsidies
Point of Support. Subsidies can support activities linked to desired practices (research into wind power), 
or they can be paid only when the desired practices are actually applied in the market place (tax credit for 
each delivered kWh of wind power). Rewarding only successful innovation is generally much more cost 
efficient and productive, and much of the development and marketing risk remains in the private sector.
Magnitude of Support. Subsidy levels can range from 100 per cent (grants) to much smaller levels 
associated with economic instruments such as revolving funds (small interest rate subsidies). Efficiently 
providing only what is needed to make a technology economic, but no more, allows limited public funds 
to have a much greater impact. Renewable Energy Portfolio standards, for example, force clean energy 
providers to compete against each other for the minimum level of subsidy at which they can provide clean 
energy. This type of an approach helps make subsidies both more efficient and more dynamic over time.
b. Examples
Grant-based subsidies: 
•	 Soft	loans,
•	 Direct	funding,	
•	 Provision	of	hard	currency	at	below	market	rates.
Financing-based subsidies: 
•	 Soft	loans,	
•	 Revolving	funds,	
•	 Sectoral	funds,	
•	 Green	funds,	
•	 Public	interest	rate	subsidies	or	
•	 Loan	guarantees.
Tax-based subsidies: 
•	 Tax	credits,	
•	 Tax	breaks,	
•	 Tax	exemptions,	
•	 Tax	differentiation,	
•	 Accelerated	write-offs.
Risk-based subsidies: 
•	 Subsidized	insurance	or	reinsurance,	
•	 Liability	caps,	
•	 Public	sector	indemnification.
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3 Adapted from UNEP (2004). This annex follows the same structure and numbering as Annex II – A Primer on Economic Instruments. Annex II and III 
can be used in conjunction. 
Impacts of Economic Instruments on 
Incentives of Firms and Individuals3
Annex III
This Annex provides a table summarising the impacts of economic 
instruments on incentives of firms and individuals. The table 
lists the effects that economic instruments can have in the 
following fields: establishing property rights, recovering costs for 
environmental services, receiving compensation for the sale of 
public assets, accounting for environmental harm, and transitioning 
to sustainable alternatives. Examples of related applications 
of economic instruments are given in the second column, and 
the third column lists factors relevant in the application of the 
instruments.
230 The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
Fu
n
ct
io
n
al
 Im
p
ac
t 
o
f 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 In
st
ru
m
en
ts
E
xa
m
p
le
s
Fa
ct
o
rs
 in
 a
p
p
lic
at
io
n
1.
  E
st
ab
lis
h
, c
la
ri
fy
, o
r 
im
p
ro
ve
 p
ro
p
er
ty
 r
ig
h
ts
: c
re
at
in
g 
m
ar
ke
ts
 fo
r 
un
pr
ic
ed
 re
so
ur
ce
s 
an
d 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l s
er
vi
ce
s 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 in
ce
nt
iv
es
 fo
r 
su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 u
se
; e
st
ab
lis
h 
cl
ea
r 
ru
le
s 
fo
r 
re
so
ur
ce
 a
cc
es
s 
to
 c
on
tr
ol
 o
ve
ru
se
.
- 
 In
ve
st
 f
o
r 
th
e 
lo
n
g
 t
er
m
. C
le
ar
 p
ro
pe
rt
y 
rig
ht
s 
en
ab
le
 o
w
ne
rs
 to
 b
en
efi
t f
ro
m
 lo
ng
er
-t
er
m
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t a
nd
 m
an
ag
em
en
t o
f a
 re
so
ur
ce
.
- 
 C
u
rb
 t
ra
g
ed
y 
o
f 
th
e 
co
m
m
o
n
s.
 In
 m
an
y 
ca
se
s,
 p
ro
pe
rt
y 
rig
ht
s 
ap
pr
oa
ch
es
 e
lim
in
at
e 
th
e 
“t
ra
ge
dy
 o
f t
he
 c
om
m
on
s”
 p
ro
bl
em
, i
n 
w
hi
ch
 u
nl
im
ite
d 
ac
ce
ss
 d
es
tr
oy
s 
th
e 
co
m
m
on
 
re
so
ur
ce
 b
as
e.
- 
 In
ce
n
ti
ve
 t
o
 c
o
n
tr
o
l a
s 
m
u
ch
 a
s 
p
o
ss
ib
le
. I
n 
th
e 
ca
se
 o
f p
ol
lu
tio
n 
pe
rm
its
, t
he
 r
ig
ht
s 
en
ab
le
 
pe
op
le
 to
 p
ro
fit
 fr
om
 re
du
ci
ng
 p
ol
lu
tio
n 
m
or
e 
th
an
 re
qu
ire
d 
un
de
r 
cu
rr
en
t l
aw
s.
- 
 M
an
ag
e 
fo
r 
fu
tu
re
 o
w
n
er
s.
 S
o 
lo
ng
 a
s 
rig
ht
s 
ca
n 
be
 s
ol
d,
 o
w
ne
rs
 h
av
e 
an
 in
ce
nt
iv
e 
to
 c
on
tin
ue
 to
 m
an
ag
e 
th
e 
pr
op
er
ty
 c
ar
ef
ul
ly
 
in
 o
rd
er
 to
 a
tt
ai
n 
a 
hi
gh
 re
sa
le
 v
al
ue
. T
hi
s 
al
so
 
pr
ov
id
es
 s
om
e 
in
ce
nt
iv
e 
to
 a
vo
id
 a
cc
id
en
ts
 a
nd
 
po
st
-c
lo
su
re
 c
on
ta
m
in
at
io
n.
- 
 In
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t.
 A
bi
lit
y 
to
 e
nf
or
ce
 
rig
ht
s 
th
ro
ug
h 
lit
ig
at
io
n 
ca
n 
en
su
re
 th
at
 r
ig
ht
s 
re
gi
m
es
 b
ec
om
e 
m
or
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
w
ith
ou
t n
ee
di
ng
 
ce
nt
ra
l g
ov
er
nm
en
t i
nt
er
ve
nt
io
n.
- 
 G
ra
nt
in
g 
fo
rm
al
 h
ar
ve
st
 r
ig
ht
s 
to
 in
di
ge
no
us
 
po
pu
la
tio
ns
 o
r 
al
lo
w
in
g 
tr
an
sf
er
 o
f e
xi
st
in
g 
rig
ht
s.
- 
 E
st
ab
lis
hi
ng
 a
nd
 re
qu
iri
ng
 tr
ad
ab
le
 p
er
m
its
 o
r 
lic
en
se
s 
fo
r 
pa
ra
m
et
er
s 
of
 c
on
ce
rn
 (e
.g
., 
pl
an
t 
em
is
si
on
s,
 fi
sh
in
g
ac
ce
ss
).
- 
 A
llo
w
in
g 
fa
rm
er
s 
to
 s
el
l e
xi
st
in
g 
w
at
er
 r
ig
ht
s 
to
 
ur
ba
n 
ar
ea
s.
- 
 E
st
ab
lis
hi
ng
 o
r 
en
fo
rc
in
g 
rig
ht
s 
to
 s
ue
 p
ar
tie
s 
(in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t) 
fo
r 
vi
ol
at
io
n 
of
 
ex
is
tin
g 
pr
op
er
ty
 r
ig
ht
s.
- 
 G
ra
nt
in
g 
pr
op
er
ty
 r
ig
ht
s 
is
 m
ea
ni
ng
le
ss
 u
nl
es
s 
th
er
e 
is
 a
 fa
ir 
co
ur
t s
ys
te
m
 to
 e
nf
or
ce
 th
em
.
- 
 W
he
re
 c
ou
rt
s 
ar
e 
st
ro
ng
, g
ra
nt
in
g 
of
 a
ut
ho
rit
y/
 
rig
ht
 to
 s
ue
 to
 th
ird
 p
ar
tie
s 
ca
n 
ov
er
co
m
e 
w
ea
k 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
m
in
is
tr
ie
s.
- 
 M
on
ito
rin
g 
of
 m
an
y 
rig
ht
s 
re
gi
m
es
 (e
.g
., 
fis
he
rie
s,
 
em
is
si
on
s)
 c
an
 b
e 
co
m
pl
ic
at
ed
 a
nd
 s
ub
st
an
tia
l.
- 
 H
ow
 in
iti
al
 r
ig
ht
s 
ar
e 
to
 b
e 
di
st
rib
ut
ed
 is
 o
fte
n 
co
nt
ro
ve
rs
ia
l, 
an
d 
ca
n 
ge
ne
ra
te
 w
in
df
al
ls
 to
 
ex
is
tin
g 
pr
od
uc
er
s 
th
at
 m
ay
 b
e 
vi
ew
ed
 a
s 
in
eq
ui
ta
bl
e 
or
 th
at
 p
ut
 s
m
al
l b
us
in
es
s 
at
 a
 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
di
sa
dv
an
ta
ge
.
- 
 E
ns
ur
in
g 
th
at
 r
ig
ht
s 
ar
e 
tr
an
sf
er
ab
le
 is
 im
po
rt
an
t 
in
 e
st
ab
lis
hi
ng
 a
 s
tr
on
g 
in
ce
nt
iv
e 
fo
r 
lo
ng
-t
er
m
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t. 
A
 s
ec
on
da
ry
 m
ar
ke
t i
n 
rig
ht
s 
en
su
re
s 
re
gu
la
r 
re
pr
ic
in
g 
of
 r
ig
ht
s 
an
d 
co
nt
in
ue
d 
ef
fo
rt
s 
to
 re
du
ce
 p
er
m
its
 n
ee
de
d 
if 
pr
ic
es
 a
re
 
hi
gh
.
A
nn
ex
 II
I  I
m
p
ac
ts
 o
f 
E
co
no
m
ic
 In
st
ru
m
en
ts
 o
n 
In
ce
nt
iv
es
 o
f 
Fi
rm
s 
an
d
 In
d
iv
id
ua
ls
231The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
A
N
N
E
x
E
S
Fu
n
ct
io
n
al
 Im
p
ac
t 
o
f 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 In
st
ru
m
en
ts
E
xa
m
p
le
s
Fa
ct
o
rs
 in
 a
p
p
lic
at
io
n
2A
.  R
ec
o
ve
r 
d
ir
ec
t 
co
st
s 
o
f 
en
vi
ro
n
m
en
ta
l s
er
vi
ce
s 
o
r 
o
ve
rs
ig
h
t 
p
ro
vi
d
ed
 b
y 
p
u
b
lic
 a
g
en
ci
es
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
b
en
efi
ci
ar
ie
s:
 p
ol
ic
ie
s 
en
su
re
 th
at
 u
se
rs
 
se
e 
re
al
is
tic
 c
os
ts
 fo
r 
th
e 
pu
bl
ic
ly
-p
ro
vi
de
d 
se
rv
ic
es
 th
ey
 a
re
 u
si
ng
.
- 
 S
el
f-
su
st
ai
n
in
g
 r
ev
en
u
es
. C
ha
rg
in
g 
fo
r 
se
rv
ic
es
 e
ar
ns
 im
po
rt
an
t r
ev
en
ue
s 
en
ab
lin
g 
th
e 
co
nt
in
ue
d 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
of
 c
rit
ic
al
 m
un
ic
ip
al
 s
er
vi
ce
s 
w
ith
ou
t h
av
in
g 
to
 fu
lly
 p
riv
at
is
e 
th
e 
fu
nc
tio
ns
.
- 
 In
ce
n
ti
ve
 t
o
 c
o
n
se
rv
e.
 T
he
se
 c
ha
rg
es
 a
ls
o 
se
nd
 m
or
e 
ac
cu
ra
te
 p
ric
e 
si
gn
al
s 
to
 c
on
su
m
er
s 
th
at
 h
el
p 
co
ns
er
ve
 re
so
ur
ce
s 
su
ch
 a
s 
en
er
gy
 
an
d 
w
at
er
, a
nd
 a
llo
w
 e
xi
st
in
g 
in
fra
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 to
 la
st
 lo
ng
er
 a
s 
de
m
an
d 
fa
lls
.
- 
 C
o
st
s 
b
o
rn
e 
b
y 
su
b
-g
ro
u
p
s 
re
sp
o
n
si
b
le
. 
E
ns
ur
in
g 
th
at
 h
ig
he
r-
co
st
 u
se
r 
gr
ou
ps
 
(h
ig
h 
pe
ak
 d
em
an
ds
; h
ig
h 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 
fo
r 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t o
ve
rs
ig
ht
; m
or
e 
co
m
pl
ex
 
di
sc
ha
rg
es
 fo
r 
tr
ea
tm
en
t p
la
nt
; h
ig
he
r 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n 
co
st
s;
 e
tc
.) 
pa
y 
m
or
e 
re
fin
es
 p
ric
e 
si
gn
al
s 
fu
rt
he
r.
-  
 R
ec
ov
er
 fu
ll 
co
st
s 
of
 m
un
ic
ip
al
 e
ne
rg
y,
 w
at
er
, 
se
w
er
ag
e,
 s
ol
id
 w
as
te
 s
er
vi
ce
s 
fro
m
 c
us
to
m
er
s.
 
Th
is
 m
us
t i
nc
lu
de
 re
al
 c
os
t o
f fi
na
nc
in
g 
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n.
- 
 C
ha
rg
e 
hi
gh
er
 r
at
es
 to
 h
ig
he
r 
co
st
 c
us
to
m
er
s.
- 
 N
ar
ro
w
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
to
 ta
rg
et
 o
nl
y 
th
e 
po
or
es
t u
se
rs
 o
f t
he
 p
ro
du
ct
 o
r 
se
rv
ic
e.
 
- 
 S
el
l g
ov
er
nm
en
t o
w
ne
d 
en
te
rp
ris
es
 to
 th
e 
pr
iv
at
e 
se
ct
or
 to
 c
or
re
ct
 p
ric
in
g 
pr
ob
le
m
s.
 
E
ns
ur
e 
co
nt
in
ue
d 
se
rv
ic
e 
to
 p
oo
r 
vi
a 
di
re
ct
 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
or
 re
gu
la
to
ry
 o
ve
rs
ig
ht
.
-  
 M
an
y 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
fa
ce
 p
ol
iti
ca
l b
ar
rie
rs
 to
 
im
pl
em
en
tin
g 
an
d 
en
fo
rc
in
g 
eq
ui
ta
bl
e 
us
er
 
ch
ar
ge
s.
- 
 P
riv
at
is
at
io
n 
ca
n 
be
 o
ne
 s
ol
ut
io
n 
to
 o
ve
rc
om
e 
th
is
 p
ro
bl
em
, b
ut
 is
 n
ot
 p
os
si
bl
e 
w
ith
ou
t r
ul
e 
of
 
la
w
. I
n 
ad
di
tio
n,
 s
ta
te
s 
m
us
t b
e 
ca
re
fu
l t
o 
av
oi
d 
pr
iv
at
el
y-
ow
ne
d 
m
on
op
ol
y 
pr
ov
id
er
s 
by
 e
ns
ur
in
g 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
m
ul
tip
le
 v
en
do
rs
.
- 
 R
ec
ov
er
y 
of
 a
gg
re
ga
te
 c
os
ts
 w
ill 
no
t b
e 
ef
fic
ie
nt
 
if 
ce
rt
ai
n 
us
er
 g
ro
up
s 
re
ce
iv
e 
cr
os
ss
ub
si
di
es
 
fro
m
 o
th
er
s 
in
 th
e 
ra
te
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
.
- 
 E
nt
er
pr
is
es
 m
us
t b
e 
ab
le
 to
 re
ta
in
 re
ce
ip
ts
 
fo
r 
re
in
ve
st
m
en
t (
ra
th
er
 th
an
 re
m
itt
in
g 
to
 th
e 
Tr
ea
su
ry
) i
f t
he
 E
co
no
m
ic
 In
st
ru
m
en
ts
 a
re
 to
 h
el
p 
en
su
re
 th
e 
en
te
rp
ris
e’
s 
co
nt
in
ue
d 
ex
is
te
nc
e.
232 The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
Fu
n
ct
io
n
al
 Im
p
ac
t 
o
f 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 In
st
ru
m
en
ts
E
xa
m
p
le
s
Fa
ct
o
rs
 in
 a
p
p
lic
at
io
n
2B
.  R
ec
ei
ve
 ju
st
 c
o
m
p
en
sa
ti
o
n 
fo
r 
sa
le
 o
f 
p
u
b
lic
ly
 o
w
n
ed
 a
ss
et
s 
to
 p
ri
va
te
 s
ec
to
r 
en
ti
ti
es
: p
ol
ic
ie
s 
en
su
re
 th
at
 ta
xp
ay
er
s 
ar
e 
fa
irl
y 
tr
ea
te
d 
in
 
pu
rc
ha
se
s,
 a
nd
 th
at
 p
ur
ch
as
in
g 
en
tit
ie
s 
m
ak
e 
re
so
ur
ce
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t/
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
de
ci
si
on
s 
ba
se
d 
on
 re
al
is
tic
 p
ric
es
.
- 
 Ta
p
 r
ev
en
u
es
 f
o
r 
g
en
er
al
 s
o
ci
et
y.
 
Ec
on
om
ic
 In
st
ru
m
en
ts
 th
at
 c
re
at
e 
m
ar
ke
ts
 a
nd
 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 fo
r 
th
e 
sa
le
 o
f p
ub
lic
ly
 o
w
ne
d 
as
se
ts
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 th
e 
re
tu
rn
s 
fro
m
 th
es
e 
sa
le
s 
go
 to
 th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l p
op
ul
at
io
n 
ra
th
er
 th
an
 to
 
po
lit
ic
al
 o
r 
m
ilit
ar
y 
el
ite
s.
- 
 R
ed
u
ce
 o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s 
fo
r 
co
rr
u
p
ti
o
n
. 
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
t p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
ca
n 
al
so
 h
el
p 
re
du
ce
 o
r 
el
im
in
at
e 
th
e 
ab
ilit
y 
fo
r 
co
rr
up
tio
n 
to
 fl
ou
ris
h.
- 
 R
at
io
n
al
 d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
p
at
h
. B
ec
au
se
 
po
lit
ic
al
 a
nd
 m
ilit
ar
y 
po
w
er
 fo
r 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
is
 
of
te
n 
sh
or
t-
liv
ed
, i
nd
iv
id
ua
ls
 m
ay
 r
us
h 
na
tu
ra
l 
re
so
ur
ce
 e
xt
ra
ct
io
n 
to
 m
ax
im
iz
e 
di
ve
rs
io
ns
 
to
 p
er
so
na
l w
ea
lth
. T
ra
ns
pa
re
nt
 m
ar
ke
ts
 
en
co
ur
ag
e 
a 
m
or
e 
ra
tio
na
l d
ev
el
op
m
en
t p
at
h.
- 
 E
lim
in
at
io
n 
of
 a
ll 
re
so
ur
ce
 g
iv
ea
w
ay
s 
ab
ov
e 
a 
ce
rt
ai
n 
si
ze
. R
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
an
d 
tr
ac
ki
ng
 fo
r 
sm
al
l 
su
bs
is
te
nc
e 
ex
tr
ac
tio
n.
- 
 N
at
ur
al
 re
so
ur
ce
 a
uc
tio
ns
 o
pe
n 
to
 a
ll 
bi
dd
er
s,
 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l fi
rm
s 
or
 n
on
 u
se
rs
 s
uc
h 
as
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l g
ro
up
s 
w
ho
 w
is
h 
to
 re
m
ov
e 
re
so
ur
ce
 fr
om
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n.
- 
 E
st
ab
lis
h 
th
re
e 
pa
rt
 fe
e 
st
ru
ct
ur
e:
 b
ou
nt
ie
s 
to
 
co
ve
r 
in
iti
al
 r
ig
ht
s;
 re
nt
al
 to
 c
ov
er
 h
ol
di
ng
 c
os
t o
f 
re
so
ur
ce
 a
cc
es
s;
 a
nd
 ro
ya
lti
es
 to
 s
ha
re
 re
tu
rn
s 
on
 e
xt
ra
ct
ed
 re
so
ur
ce
s.
- 
 O
pe
n 
bi
dd
in
g 
on
 a
ny
 in
fra
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
pr
iv
at
is
at
io
n 
ef
fo
rt
s.
- 
 In
 c
ou
nt
rie
s 
w
ith
 h
ig
h 
co
rr
up
tio
n,
 m
uc
h 
of
 th
e 
re
tu
rn
s 
on
 b
ot
h 
pu
bl
ic
 re
so
ur
ce
 d
ep
os
its
 a
nd
 
ca
sh
 fl
ow
s 
fro
m
 n
at
io
na
liz
ed
 in
du
st
rie
s 
ar
e 
di
ve
rt
ed
 to
 fi
na
nc
e 
po
lit
ic
al
 in
te
re
st
s.
 A
s 
su
ch
, 
re
fo
rm
s 
ca
n 
be
 d
iffi
cu
lt.
- 
 H
ow
ev
er
, p
re
ss
ur
e 
fro
m
 o
ut
si
de
 fu
nd
er
s 
or
 
in
ve
st
or
s 
ca
n 
pl
ay
 a
 p
os
iti
ve
 ro
le
 in
 e
ns
ur
in
g 
so
m
e 
of
 th
is
 c
ha
ng
e 
oc
cu
rs
.
- 
 S
om
e 
po
rt
io
n 
of
 re
ce
ip
ts
 s
ho
ul
d 
su
pp
or
t 
co
nt
in
ue
d 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l m
an
ag
em
en
t.
233The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
A
N
N
E
x
E
S
Fu
n
ct
io
n
al
 Im
p
ac
t 
o
f 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 In
st
ru
m
en
ts
E
xa
m
p
le
s
Fa
ct
o
rs
 in
 a
p
p
lic
at
io
n
2C
.  E
st
ab
lis
h 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 c
h
ar
g
es
 a
n
d
 a
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
ili
ty
 f
o
r 
en
vi
ro
n
m
en
ta
l h
ar
m
: p
ol
ic
ie
s 
in
te
rn
al
iz
e 
th
e 
co
st
 o
f e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l d
am
ag
es
 a
nd
 th
e 
ris
k 
of
 
po
te
nt
ia
l d
am
ag
es
.
- 
 P
o
llu
te
r 
p
ay
s 
m
o
re
 t
h
an
 u
n
d
er
 C
o
m
m
an
d
 
an
d
 C
o
n
tr
o
l (
C
A
C
). 
In
 m
an
y 
C
A
C
 s
ys
te
m
s,
 
at
 le
as
t a
 p
or
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
po
llu
tio
n 
is
 g
ra
nt
ed
 to
 
co
rp
or
at
io
ns
 fo
r 
fre
e 
(th
e 
am
ou
nt
 fr
om
 z
er
o 
up
 
to
 th
e 
st
at
ut
or
y 
lim
it)
. C
ha
rg
es
 a
nd
 fi
na
nc
ia
l 
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y 
fo
rc
e 
m
or
e 
of
 th
e 
so
ci
al
 a
nd
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l c
os
ts
 o
f p
ol
lu
tin
g 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 to
 b
e 
re
fle
ct
ed
 in
 th
e 
pr
ic
e 
of
 th
e 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 p
ro
du
ct
s,
 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 th
e 
in
ce
nt
iv
e 
to
 d
ev
el
op
 c
le
an
er
 
pr
od
uc
ts
.
- 
 In
ce
n
ti
ve
 t
o
 le
av
e 
si
te
 in
 g
o
o
d
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
. 
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 b
on
ds
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
es
ta
bl
is
h 
fin
an
ci
al
 re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
fo
r 
cl
ea
n-
up
 
pr
io
r 
to
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
of
 a
 p
ro
je
ct
, g
re
at
ly
 
re
du
ci
ng
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 s
ec
to
r 
ris
k 
fro
m
 n
eg
lig
en
ce
.
- 
 R
es
p
o
n
si
b
le
 f
o
r 
n
at
u
ra
l r
es
o
u
rc
e 
d
am
ag
e/
n
o
n
co
m
p
lia
n
ce
. L
eg
al
 c
on
tr
ol
s 
ca
n 
cr
ea
te
 
a 
“m
ar
ke
t”
 in
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t, 
em
po
w
er
in
g 
th
ird
 p
ar
tie
s 
to
 b
rin
g 
su
it 
fo
r 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l n
on
-c
om
pl
ia
nc
e.
C
ur
re
nt
 a
ct
iv
ity
-  
 P
ol
lu
tio
n 
ta
xe
s/
pe
rm
its
P
as
t	a
ct
iv
ity
- 
 C
iv
il 
an
d 
cr
im
in
al
 p
en
al
tie
s 
fo
r 
na
tu
ra
l r
es
ou
rc
e 
da
m
ag
es
Fu
tu
re
	a
ct
iv
ity
- 
 R
eq
ui
re
d 
lia
bi
lit
y 
or
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l i
ns
ur
an
ce
- 
 P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 b
on
ds
 fo
r 
pr
op
er
 s
ite
 re
m
ed
ia
tio
n/
cl
os
ur
e
- 
 D
ep
os
it/
re
fu
nd
 s
ys
te
m
s 
fo
r 
pr
op
er
 p
ro
du
ct
 
re
tu
rn
s.
-  
 P
ol
lu
tio
n 
ta
xe
s 
ar
e 
of
te
n 
di
ffi
cu
lt 
to
 s
et
 a
t 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 le
ve
ls
, a
nd
 re
qu
ire
 a
n 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
bu
re
au
cr
ac
y 
to
 m
on
ito
r.
- 
 C
ar
e 
is
 n
ee
de
d 
to
 a
vo
id
 “
ho
t s
po
ts
” 
w
he
re
 th
e 
lo
ca
l e
nv
iro
nm
en
t a
nd
/o
r 
po
pu
la
ce
 a
re
 s
ub
je
ct
 
to
 e
xc
es
si
ve
ly
 h
ig
h 
em
is
si
on
s 
as
 a
 re
su
lt 
of
 th
e 
tr
ad
in
g 
or
 c
ha
rg
e 
sc
he
m
es
.
- 
 Fi
na
nc
ia
l a
ss
ur
an
ce
 a
nd
 d
ep
os
it/
re
fu
nd
 s
ys
te
m
s 
re
qu
ire
 e
nf
or
ce
m
en
t o
f r
ul
es
 in
 o
rd
er
 to
 w
or
k.
 
Th
is
 m
ay
 n
ot
 b
e 
po
ss
ib
le
 in
 h
ig
hc
or
ru
pt
io
n 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ts
.
- 
 C
ar
e 
is
 n
ee
de
d 
to
 id
en
tif
y 
an
d 
m
on
ito
r 
th
e 
cr
ed
it 
qu
al
ity
 o
f p
ro
vi
de
rs
 o
f fi
na
nc
ia
l a
ss
ur
an
ce
.
- 
 G
ov
er
nm
en
ts
 m
ay
 n
ee
d 
to
 s
tip
ul
at
e 
th
e 
re
qu
ire
d 
te
rm
s 
of
 c
ov
er
ag
e 
in
 o
rd
er
 fo
r 
fin
an
ci
al
 
as
su
ra
nc
e 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
to
 b
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e.
- 
 Th
ird
-p
ar
ty
 le
ga
l s
ui
ts
 c
an
 b
e 
ab
us
ed
.
234 The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
Fu
n
ct
io
n
al
 Im
p
ac
t 
o
f 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 In
st
ru
m
en
ts
E
xa
m
p
le
s
Fa
ct
o
rs
 in
 a
p
p
lic
at
io
n
3.
  S
u
b
si
d
iz
e 
tr
an
si
ti
o
n 
to
, o
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
in
, m
o
re
 s
u
st
ai
n
ab
le
 a
lt
er
n
at
iv
es
: p
ol
ic
ie
s 
pr
om
ot
e 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
th
at
 c
an
 a
cc
el
er
at
e 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t a
nd
 
ad
op
tio
n 
of
 c
le
an
er
 te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
 u
si
ng
 b
ot
h 
di
re
ct
 fu
nd
in
g 
an
d 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t p
ro
gr
am
m
es
.
- 
 C
le
an
er
 p
ro
d
u
ct
s 
fa
st
er
. C
an
 a
cc
el
er
at
e 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t a
nd
/o
r 
m
ar
ke
t a
do
pt
io
n 
of
 
im
pr
ov
ed
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
or
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
m
et
ho
ds
.
- 
 R
ed
u
ce
d
 b
u
rd
en
 o
f 
tr
an
si
ti
o
n
. C
an
 re
du
ce
 
tr
an
si
tio
n 
co
st
s 
fo
r 
pr
iv
at
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
to
 in
ve
st
 in
 
ne
w
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
m
et
ho
ds
.
Fu
n
ct
io
n
al
 Im
p
ac
t 
o
f 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 In
st
ru
m
en
ts
- 
 P
o
ve
rt
y 
am
el
io
ra
ti
o
n
. W
he
re
 th
e 
po
or
 w
ill 
be
 
ad
ve
rs
el
y 
af
fe
ct
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
ch
an
ge
, s
ub
si
di
es
 c
an
 
he
lp
cu
sh
io
n 
th
e 
pa
in
 fr
om
 th
e 
sh
ift
.
- 
 P
ay
 p
ri
va
te
 s
te
w
ar
d
s 
o
f 
im
p
o
rt
an
t 
g
lo
b
al
 
re
so
u
rc
es
. C
an
 c
om
pe
ns
at
e 
pa
rt
ie
s 
or
 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
fo
r 
fo
re
go
in
g 
pr
iv
at
e 
ga
in
 in
 o
rd
er
 to
 
st
ew
ar
d 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
w
ith
 h
ig
h 
so
ci
al
 v
al
ue
s 
(e
.g
., 
bi
od
iv
er
si
ty
).
- 
 Fi
sc
al
 s
ub
si
di
es
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
gr
an
ts
, l
oa
ns
, l
oa
n 
gu
ar
an
te
es
, i
nd
em
ni
fic
at
io
n,
 o
r 
ta
x 
br
ea
ks
.
- 
 Fo
rg
iv
en
es
s 
of
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l f
ee
s,
 ta
xe
s,
 
ro
ya
lti
es
, p
en
al
tie
s 
in
 re
tu
rn
 fo
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 in
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l i
m
pr
ov
em
en
t.
- 
 D
iff
er
en
tia
l t
ax
 r
at
es
 d
ep
en
di
ng
 o
n 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l i
m
pa
ct
 o
f t
he
 p
ro
du
ct
.
- 
 Ev
er
yb
od
y 
w
an
ts
 s
ub
si
di
es
 a
nd
 c
an
 m
ak
e 
so
m
e 
cl
ai
m
 to
 ju
st
ify
 w
hy
 th
ey
 n
ee
d 
it.
 C
ar
e 
is
 n
ee
de
d 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
 m
uc
h 
na
rr
ow
ed
 c
on
ce
pt
ua
lis
at
io
n 
of
 
th
e 
m
ar
ke
t s
eg
m
en
ts
 re
qu
iri
ng
 p
ub
lic
 s
ub
si
dy
.
- 
 W
he
re
 s
ub
si
di
es
 a
re
 p
ro
vi
de
d,
 th
ey
 m
us
t b
e 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
t a
nd
 tr
ac
ta
bl
e.
 T
he
y 
sh
ou
ld
 a
ls
o 
ph
as
e 
ou
t a
ut
om
at
ic
al
ly
 a
fte
r 
a 
pr
e-
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 
pe
rio
d 
of
 ti
m
e.
- 
 W
he
re
 tr
an
si
tio
na
l s
ub
si
di
es
 a
re
 to
 b
e 
pa
id
 a
s 
a 
po
lit
ic
al
 p
ric
e 
fo
r 
ac
ce
pt
in
g 
po
lic
y 
ch
an
ge
s,
 
th
es
e 
m
us
t b
e 
ev
al
ua
te
d 
ca
re
fu
lly
 to
 c
ur
b 
ex
ce
ss
es
 a
nd
 c
on
fir
m
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
no
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
es
.
S
ou
rc
e:
 U
N
EP
	(2
00
4)
A
N
N
E
x
E
S
235The Use of Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management
4 The case studies in this Annex are based on UNEP (2004).
Detailed Case Studies4
Annex IV
This annex provides four detailed case studies. They are:
•	 	Grassland	pricing	reforms	in	the	Philippines
•	 	ITQs	for	fisheries	resources	in	South	Africa
•	 	Fishery	ITQs	in	Chile
•	 	Strengthening	user	rights	for	biodiversity	conservation	and	
sustainable use: Mankote Mangrove in St Lucia
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Title Grassland pricing reform in the Philippines
Country Philippines
Problem Definition
Environmental impacts Ranchers are provided with 25 year Pasture Lease Agreements (PLA), 
renewable for another 25 years, at very low grazing fees (approximately 
US$ 0.30/hectare/year). As a result, a relatively small group of people has 
gained control over much of the public grasslands for the 50-year leases. 
The ability to shift cattle to new pastures they control has also reduced the 
incentive for sound management of the pastureland, and led to resource 
degradation in many parts of the country.
Social impacts Policies seem likely to result in over-concentration in access to grazing 
rights. However, they probably do encourage human settlement in some 
more remote, less hospitable areas.
Solution Implemented
Existing grazing fees were increased from PhP15 per hectare/year to 
PhP200/ ha/yr. Original efforts to have higher fees on better land classes 
were shelved. While more than 10 times higher than the prior charge, 
the rates are still believed to be only slightly more than half the lowest 
economically-justifiable rent on the land. In addition, the charge had a five-
year phase-in period. To support the transition, the policy included increased 
technical assistance as well as fee reductions for sound land management.
Summary Analysis
Efficacy of existing 
policy at solving 
problem
Although there is clear agreement that more accurate pricing, coupled 
with enforcement of operating and management plans, would greatly 
improve both access to and management of public grasslands, political 
reality has precluded this solution. As a result, ranchers continue to have 
low cost, long-term access to public grazing lands with little incentive for 
proper land management. The Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (DENR) continues to have poor ability to enforce management 
standards. The Ecosystem Research Development Board (ERDB) has 
increased responsibilities for technical outreach, but no effective plan on 
how to do so yet. To obtain reduced grazing fees associated with sound 
land management, ranchers must initiate review by DENR and have 
pasture management plans approved. With cost savings so large, there is a 
potential of corruption that is of concern.
A number of ranchers have refused to pay the higher fee. As a result, DENR 
ends up collecting nothing from them and has little capability to carry out 
full enforcement. Furthermore, during a trip to the region in early 2002, a top 
government official promised to reduce the fee substantially (to PhP40 from 
PhP200) “to encourage breeding and create 60,000 jobs” (Luzon Bulletin, 
1/6/02). This statement undermined current efforts to collect the higher 
fees, and led DENR to suspend its collection pending formal clarification on 
how to proceed. Personnel pointed out that decades of grazing fees at  
15 PhP had not spurred investment in the cattle industry, so it was not clear 
how PhP 40 would do so.
Detailed Case Study 1
Grassland Pricing Reform in the Philippines
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Title Grassland pricing reform in the Philippines
Country Philippines
Rationale for success/
failure
-  Fees remain too low, and politically difficult to adjust. Ranching interests 
remain extremely strong and oppose any shifts to more market-oriented 
rates. Groups who may be negatively affected by the current leasing 
arrangements do not seem mobilized.
-  Fees that are collected are remitted to the Treasury rather than retained to 
support the land management programme.
-  Lease terms remain very long and holding costs very low, allowing high 
concentration of access to pasturelands to continue.
-  Political resistance prevented the use of market auctions to allocate 
grazing rights, an approach that could have removed the government 
from the role of having to set grazing rates.
-  While DENR has sometimes revoked leases, this has normally been done 
due to abandonment or use for non-grazing purposes. There is little 
evidence of revocation due to improper or destructive grazing practices.
Unanswered questions
Institutional Baseline Conditions in Country
Legal
Fiscal The Philippines already has an infrastructure in place for collecting fees from 
ranchers.
Government institutions
Environmental DENR has lacked resources to oversee management plans. 
Internationallyfunded efforts going back to 1990 have attempted to build 
capacity within DENR related to natural resource accounting, technical 
standards, and grasslands pricing reforms.
Detail on Policy Process
History of response PLAs have been used since the 1950s. Fees were first imposed in 1961 
at an average rate of less than US $0.01/hectare per year. Fees were not 
increased until 20 years later, reaching only US $0.02/hectare per year; then 
again in 1991 to the current rate of US $0.30. Compliance with the fees has 
generally been quite high, which is not surprising given the very low rate. 
To exert some control over grazing processes, the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) requires annual operating 
plans, and a management plan every eighth year. However, there is virtually 
no follow-up monitoring to ensure plans are actually being implemented. 
This is the result of insufficient funding as well as difficult terrain to oversee. 
There is common recognition that fees are too low. To address the problem, 
DE NR’s Ecosystems Research Development Board evaluated what the 
true economic rent should be, the cost of various measures to rehabilitate 
existing damages, and the economics of alternative land uses. They did 
not evaluate options for auctioning, rather than giving grazing rights to the 
ranchers. The economic rents were determined to be far higher than the 
current levels, though the ERDB proposed allowing 80% of the incremental 
payment be used to fix damage on the existing grasslands.
Evaluation of past on 
success/failure
Past efforts to charge for access and to ensure appropriate land 
management existing leases have been plagued by the exact same 
problems that have prevented the most recent effort from obtaining more 
reasonable lease
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Title Grassland pricing reform in the Philippines
Country Philippines
Rationale for using 
Economic Instruments
Economic Instruments, through user fees, have been in effect for nearly 
50 years. While collection levels were high, fee rates were far too low to 
cover either programme costs or provide proper incentives for sound land 
management. Fee reforms were chosen over lease auctions due to political 
resistance.
Legal basis for 1961. 
Economic Instruments
Original basis for grazing fees was through Administrative Order 08 in 
The initial fee increase was authorized in the Forest Land Grazing Lease 
Agreement of 1982. The most current fee adjustment was authorized by 
Department Administrative Order 2001-05, which took effect in August 
2001.
Stakeholder 
involvement
There have been a series of public hearings run by ERDB to discuss existing 
and proposed grazing fees. Ranchers were already well organized as a 
stakeholder group, and strongly opposed rate increases. They argued that 
the government should view their presence on the land as a benefit in that 
it curbed squatting by migrants. They also mobilized strong political actions 
against the ERDB and DENR to oppose the rate increases.
Lead agencies Ecosystems Research Development Board (ERDB) and the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Key barriers addressed Key barriers have not successfully been addressed: existing damage is not 
addressed being addressed by the current policy, nor are grazing rights at 
levels that would encourage more appropriate resource use.
Detail on Policy Response
Allocation of initial with 
rights
There has been no effort to auction grazing rights. Rights have continued 
existing holders, with the price of those rights (through an annual rental 
fee) set by statute. The price of the rights does not adjust automatically 
for inflation, and is far below appropriate market levels. Government 
assessments suggest grazing rights should be divided into three classes, 
with annual rentals ranging from PhP358 to PhP542, between 24 and 36 
times the current levels.
On-going monitoring 
process
DENR has not been able to generate an effective monitoring and 
enforcement process.
Current successes Grazing fees have risen somewhat, but still remain far below market prices. 
Public research efforts have yielded useful results on economic fee rates 
and costs to recover damaged lands.
Remaining gaps/risks There has been strong political resistance to market-based grazing fees. 
Current rates are not set in a dynamic, market-oriented way, and remain 
very much subject to political pressures. The regulating agency has not 
been able to supplement its fiscal policies with credible monitoring oversight 
to prevent land degradation.
Source(s) Case study compiled by Herminia Francisco. Additional sources include: 
Personal Communication with Luzon Bulletin, January 6, 2002. See also 
UNEP (2004).
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Detailed Case Study 2
ITQs for Fisheries Resources in South Africa
Title ITQs for fisheries resources in South Africa
Country South Africa
Problem Definition Environmental impacts Over-fishing leading to increasing decline in fish 
catches and sustainability of the fisheries. Some shortages evident in the 
1960s, as key stocks faced sharp declines. By mid-1970s, declines in hake, 
pilchards, and anchovy were evident. This was the result of over-fishing by 
both domestic and international fleets.
Social Impacts Fisheries in question comprise 1% of GDP, provide 35,000 direct jobs and 
100,000 indirect ones. Fishing rights (as of 1996) were 90% allocated to 
large commercial companies; black fishing communities had less than 1% 
of the total allowable catch (TAC).
Solution Implemented
Since 1997, the country has moved towards use of Individual Transferable 
Quotas (ITQs) under the Marine Living Resources Bill of 1997. A portion 
of the ITQs are withheld to support black-owned businesses and coastal 
communities, to offset the heavy concentration of fishing rights in whiteonly 
businesses that had previously existed. Access control supplements the 
ITQs: total and seasonal closures protect specific fishery areas; strict 
monitoring of 200 mile exclusion zones prevents poaching of stocks by 
foreign vessels.
Summary Analysis
Efficacy of existing 
policy at solving 
problem
There is no detailed assessment of the success of the ITQ yet. Quota 
revenues, rather than being used to support resource management, are 
directed to the general treasury. There is a small levy that goes to the 
Seas Fisheries Fund to support research. The approach does seem to 
have increased market share for domestic fleets relative to foreign, and 
to small communities and black-owned businesses relative to white-only 
businesses.
Although ITQs improve the efficiency of Total Allowable Catch (TAC) 
allocation, intense political pressure to increase the TACs themselves 
remain. This pressure has also been exhibited through efforts to reduce the 
monitoring and enforcement capability of the country, critical programme 
elements if the ITQs are to be effective. Evidence suggests that illegal fishing 
by those without a quota remains a problem.
Rationale for success/
failure
Strong success models from adoption of ITQs in other countries greatly 
increased likelihood of implementation. Inadequate monitoring and 
enforcement risks all potential gains from the ITQ approach. Diversion 
of quota revenues to the general Treasury weakens the ability of the 
Environment Ministry to build a strong programme. However, transfer of 
authority to the Environment Ministry from the Industry Ministry in the early 
1980s helped shift the overall policy focus from resource extraction to 
resource management.
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5 This means that in 2001, 37 countries had less corruption problems than South Africa. 2005 South Africa ranked 46/159. Source: www.transparency.
org.
6 This means that in 2001, 76 countries ranked better than South Africa on the Environmental Sustainability Index. In 2005, South Africa ranked 93/146. 
Source: www.yale.edu/esi/
Title ITQs for fisheries resources in South Africa
Country South Africa
Unanswered questions -  Is there a strong technical basis for setting quota limits today?
-  Has there been an increase in the mutual monitoring of fleets by permit 
holders?
Institutional Baseline Conditions in Country
Legal
Fiscal
Government institutions 2001 Corruption Perceptions Index (38 of 91)5
Environmental 2002 ESI: 48.7 (rank 77 of 142)6
Relevant component rankings: Environmental Governance (33 of 142); 
Reducing Ecosystem Stress (47 of 142); Environmental Systems (91 of 142)
Detail on Policy Process
History of response Early control efforts focused on reducing access to fisheries by 
implementation of a 200 nautical mile fishing zone to keep out foreign fleets 
and increasing the minimum required mesh size in nets to reduce depletion 
of immature fish. Catch limits, in the form of a Total Allowable Catch, was 
set for at least some fish species (e.g., hake) beginning in the late 1970s. 
This was supplemented by efforts to reduce the number of vessels and the 
closure of critical areas (mainly where pelagic fish are targeted). Exclusion 
of foreign commercial vessels was implemented in 1983, along with a 
conservative management strategy. Research has also been conducted to 
identify the benefits of long-lining rather than netting on the overall health of 
the hake fishery. 
Quotas to allocate the TAC were set initially set by the Minister of Economic 
Affairs, Industries, and Agriculture, upon advice from officials in the capital. 
In 1983, general management of the Sea Fisheries Act was transferred to 
the Ministry of Environment Affairs. Criticisms of the Minister-allocated quota 
system led to a transfer of quota setting authority to a statutory board in 
1986, a more formal Quota Board in 1988 (which became effective only in 
1990). During the 1990s, political considerations led to efforts to increase 
the quotas flowing to black communities and companies. Foreign-owned 
vessels still have very limited access to key fisheries. Since 1997, reliance on 
the market to allocate TACs, through the ITQs, has grown.
Evaluation of past 
success/failure
CAC approaches did contribute to some recovery of catch rates, such as in 
the core hake fishery.
Rationale for using 
Economic Instruments
Fishery depletion remained a concern, and created a strong need for 
information to support a more scientific basis for fisheries and catch 
management. ITQs would provide a more flexible and less biased 
mechanism to allocate TAC than would the Quota Board, and provide 
individual fishermen with a more direct stake in effective long term fisheries 
management.
Legal basis for 
Economic
Instruments Basic involvement in fisheries management originates with the 
Sea Fisheries Act of 1940, plus superseding Acts in 1973 and 1988. Direct 
authority for the use of ITQs comes under the Marine Living Resources Bill 
of 1997.
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Title ITQs for fisheries resources in South Africa
Country South Africa
Stakeholder 
involvement
Extensive public consultations, including much education on the application 
of ITQs in other parts of the world. Local communities, scientists, and other 
resource users are organized and actively involved in the management of 
ocean resources.
Lead agencies Ministry of Environment Affairs
Key barriers addressed
Detail on Policy Response
Allocation of initial rights Information reviewed suggested that ITQs were initially allocated for free, 
and somewhat arbitrarily.
On-going monitoring 
process
Appears to be weak and under-funded. Influenced by political lobbying to 
increase overall TAC and to reduce the capability of the State to curb illegal 
fishing.
Current successes
Remaing gaps/risks Proposed reforms attempt to replace giving away fishing rights with risks 
auctions, and earmarking fees/royalties from these rights back to the fishery 
oversight function.
Source(s) Summarized by Herminia Francisco based on Jaap Arntzen. 1999. 
Economic Instruments and the Southern African Environment: Synthesis of 
Experiences of Five SADC Countries. See also UNEP (2004).
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Detailed Case Study 3
Fishery ITQs in Chile
Title Fishery ITQs in Chile
Country Chile
Problem Definition
Environmental impacts Fish stocks were increasingly depleted under the increasing privatisation 
of the fishing industry that has occurred since 1973. Increasing fishing 
pressures especially on the pelagic fisheries drove catches higher, until they 
peaked in 1986.
Social impacts Two concerns dominated the initial implementation of ITQs. The first 
involved artisanal fisherman. The concern was that under an ITQ system, 
they would be excluded from the market and lose their livelihoods. As a 
result, they continue to fish without an ITQ system. The second involved 
competition between northern and southern fishery corporations, with each 
trying to influence the allocation and bidding structures to their advantages, 
rather than to the advantage of long-term fisheries management.
Solution Implemented
The regulatory solution has varied depending on the type of fishery. For 
fisheries with low exploitation and primarily fished by artisanal fishermen 
(who use small boats and tend to stay close to shore), an open access 
system remains in effect. 
ITQs have been implemented for standard fisheries, with separate 
subclasses for fisheries in recovery and emerging fisheries (defined as less 
than 10% of TAC) is being utilized. The application is limited to industrial/
commercial fishers, and only for mono/single species case. Efforts to 
incorporate artisanal fishermen into the ITQ approach will likely add a fourth 
category of ITQs. Artisanal fishermen use small boats, take short trips, and 
stay close to shore. 
For standard fisheries, 100% of the TAC is auctioned in the first year the 
fishery goes into the ITQ system. 10% of the purchased license divests each 
year, hindering long-term control of the catch rights and facilitating more 
frequent market repricing of the rights. Single owners cannot purchase 
more than 50% of the TAC either, to control market concentration. Owners 
can reassign portions of their quota they are not using for a particular year, 
also through the auction system. While international fishery interests may bid 
on ITQs, fish can only be landed by Chilean vessels. This effectively restricts 
market access to domestic fleets. 
Total TAC for fisheries under full exploitation is divided into long-term and 
annual licenses. The long-term licenses comprise 50% of TAC, last ten 
years, and were initially auctioned to the highest eligible bidder. Licenses 
depreciate 10% per year, with the capacity being reauctioned on an annual 
basis. This helps ensure long-term licenses expire gradually each year, and 
allows regular repricing. Single-year licenses comprise the remaining 50%, 
and are renewable, but only to established fisheries and to new comers. 
Public auctions of ITQs are limited to 5% of the TAC for that year. No single 
party can own more than 50% of the TAC.
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Title Fishery ITQs in Chile
Country Chile
ITQ holders must accept the presence of scientific observers, and 
processing plants must provide information about the catch. In addition, all 
industrial fishing vessels regulated under any of the regimes must have a 
satellite global positioning system on board to allow the government to track 
vessel location. 
The ITQ usage remains experimental. More than 90% of the catch remains 
under the “Full Exploitation System,” governed by standard command 
and control techniques. These include restricting access to fisheries to 
new agents, prohibitions on adding new fishing capacity, temporary or 
permanent closure of fishing areas, pre-set minimum sizes and weights for 
fish species, and gear restrictions. Catch quotas are also set for each vessel 
based on a percentage of historical catch levels. These are not transferable 
or divisible, and viewed as a transitory control mechanism until ITQs can 
be applied more broadly. Despite their usage for most of the annual catch, 
there is some evidence (Pena-Torres, 273) that they are ineffective.
Summary Analysis
Efficacy of (existing 
policy at solving 
problem)
Success of the programme is not clear. Current applications combined 
black hake, orange roughly, squat lobster, and yellow prawn) make up only 
1% of the total Chilean landings. While useful as a test of the ITQs, the 
affected sectors are far too small to affect overall fishery health at this point.
-  Final structuring of the ITQ policy seems to have protected Northern 
fishing interests, but reduced the potential benefits of the market-based 
quotas. For example, ITQs have thus far been applied to shrimp and cod 
fisheries, but not to the more heavily exploited pelagic fisheries more often 
under the full exploitation status.
-  There have been some indications, especially in the hake fishery, 
of collusion among ITQ holders, as well as of weak monitoring and 
enforcement of the quotas. In the black hake fishery, quota prices are 
low and there is a suspicion that weak enforcement (allowing unregulated 
fishing) is the reason.
-  Enforcement remains a concern, though the number of violations has 
supposedly declined since ships were required to put GPS systems on 
vessels in 1999. However, use of an ITQ approach requires accurate and 
regularly- updated information on fishery health in order to accurately set 
TAC. Information in Chile is not considered reliable. On-board inspections 
are extremely limited.
-  Funds collected are remitted to the Treasury. While there is some 
indication this has increased funding support for fisheries oversight 
somewhat, this is not necessarily a permanent situation.
Rationale for success/
failure
Where ITQs are applied, fisheries do seem to have an improved incentive to 
manage fisheries for the long-term. Better management, and ability to time 
catch to highest market values, has increased returns to the fishermen.
-  Confidence in the efficacy is undermined somewhat by concerns that the 
TAC limits are not scientifically based and need improvement.
-  The small percentage of total catch currently covered suggests the ITQs 
are not yet addressing the broader goal of protecting Chilean fisheries. 
Exemptions for artisanal fishermen also need to be addressed. Open 
access to this sector may be one reason for an explosion in the number 
of vessels, with the sector growing 27% between 1994 and 1998. 
(Borregaard et al., 2001, p. 13).
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Title Fishery ITQs in Chile
Country Chile
Unanswered questions  -  Impact of high market concentration on the ability of the ITQs to work.
-  Have the ITQs led to removal of capacity in the fishing fleet?
-  Cost of oversight is unknown.
Institutional Baseline Conditions in Country
Legal Constitution includes an article on the right of citizens to live in a clean 
environment, and this has been used to support many environmental 
lawsuits. The Environmental Framework Law also establishes a framework 
for responsibility for environmental damage (with burden of proof on the 
damaged). Property rights are enforced by the Constitution as well.
Fiscal and economic Chile has functioning and generally observed tax, financial reporting/ 
auditing, and insurance markets. There is even an insurance system that 
provides coverage for many environmental risks. Prices are relatively stable, 
and the level of taxation relatively low (10-40% for individuals, 30-40% for 
companies). Efforts are made to keep the tax system simple.
Government institutions Most powers rest with the national (as opposed to regional) institutions. 
Provincial authorities are appointed by the head of government rather than 
elected. In general, there is no bribe taking. Institutions are encouraged to 
work together through the use of coordinating institutions (see below).
Environmental The Environmental Framework Law provides the basic structure for 
environmental concerns in the country. The National Commission on 
Environment is a Coordinating Institution, not a Ministry. As such, it has 
extremely limited financial resources and its Director is considered a 
second-tier civil servant as compared to Ministers.
Detail on Policy Process
History of response Limited access to fisheries was first established in the 1960s in an effort to 
control the total allowable catch. In the 1970s, these policies came under 
criticism for preventing competition between potential investor groups 
during an era of high growth and widespread privatisation. Law 2442 
resulted, allowing free access to fisheries and accepting all fishing permit 
applications. Prior to the late 1980s, fishery laws were loosely defined and 
rarely enforced. 
In the late 1980s, a series of legal reforms were initiated to enforce more 
stringent quota policies for common-pool fish stocks. Authority for quotas 
fell under the regulatory body of SUBPESCA, and monitoring was assigned 
to SERNAP. However, these reforms failed due to insufficient information 
on the fisheries, and to conflict between affected groups and lobbying 
pressure from organized interest groups. Both regulatory instruments and 
fish stock monitoring were applied inconsistently. Furthermore, not enough 
was known about the behaviour of the fish stocks of concern to establish an 
appropriate TAC. 
The Merino Law of 1989 defined fisheries in full exploitation (e.g., the 
Northern and Southern Pelagic fisheries) from remaining ones with 
continuing free access. The Law sought to use transferable quotas as a 
replacement of freezing a fleet’s haul capacity as the method of choice to 
control catch. Challenged by Northern fishing firms concerned that the initial 
allocation of quotas would disadvantage them, portions of the Law were 
declared unconstitutional. 
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Country Chile
The lack of standardized application of regulations frustrated private firms, 
and led to the establishment of seasonal closures (which were easy to 
apply to everybody), which became the primary mechanism of fish stock 
regulation. Northern fishing companies lobbied successfully against 
subsequent efforts to enforce TACs, and each time succeeded in raising 
annual quotas, despite the lack of technical basis for what these quotas 
should be. 
The 1991 General Law of Fisheries and Aquaculture (FAGA) finally brought 
a stronger framework for curbing fish depletion. FAGA contained a 
mechanism for protecting endangered fisheries by closing them entirely, 
for promoting underutilised fisheries, and for using ITQs as an allocation 
mechanism for fishing rights.
Evaluation of past 
success/failure
Regulatory efforts were applied inconsistently. Catch limits did not have a 
technical basis, and were successively increased due to industry lobbying 
alone. Enforcement was extremely weak, with not a single violator fined 
between 1982 and 1986.
Rationale for using 
Economic Instruments
The failure of regulatory approaches to protect the fisheries spurred interest 
Economic in economic instruments. There was no discussion of which 
instrument Instruments to choose: ITQs were chosen from the outset. The 
goal was to control access and overfishing by establishing transferable 
private fishing rights.
Legal basis for 
Economic Instruments
The current ITQ policy is the result of the 1991 fisheries law. That law 
was a compromise between an earlier law under the military government 
based only on ITQs, and a more mixed approach (mix of instruments, 
differentiation of various social and cultural aspects of sub-populations, 
incorporate reality of weak enforcement capability) advocated by the 
democratic government. 
Zonal Fisheries Councils have some regulatory power under the Fisheries 
Law of 1991. However, the councils are comprised of representatives from 
different interest groups involved in the fishing industry (as opposed to 
environmental interests). Thus, the Council’s objectives may not match the 
societal optimum.
Stakeholder 
involvement
There has not been wide support for, or consensus regarding, the 
introduction of ITQs. NGOs and the academic sector were mostly 
absent from the political debate around the fishery law in 1991. Lobbying 
efforts delayed the passage of the Merino law based on challenging the 
government’s authority to limit access and sell property rights to fish 
stock. Explaining the benefits of the ITQ approach to various stakeholders 
has been a difficult and continuous process. Artisanal fishermen (small 
boats) opposed ITQs in general, fearing they would be outbid for rights by 
commercial enterprises and locked out of their profession.
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Title Fishery ITQs in Chile
Country Chile
Lead agencies The Subsecretary of Fishery (SUBPESCA) was a main party in developing 
the ITQs, defines broader fishery policies, and issues the annual catch 
quotas or calls for auction for ITQs. The National Fishery Service (SERNAP) 
is the controlling authority, responsible for collecting data on the catches, 
landings, and boat registries. SERNAP is also in charge of enforcing national 
fishing regulations and inspecting fish quality and processing installations. 
The Chilean Navy monitors GPS data on vessel location. The National 
Commission of Environment has played virtually no role in the development 
or implementation of the fishery regulations, and is not represented on the 
fishery boards where decisions about catch quotas, resource policy, and 
regulations are made.
Key barriers addressed
Detail on Policy Response
Allocation of initial rights The initial distribution of ITQs in the pelagic fisheries was to be based on 
individual firms’ percentage share of global catches in the previous three 
years. This created conflicts between the northern and southern fishing 
fleets, as it made it more difficult for the northern fishing industry to migrate 
southward. Finally, an allocation based on auctions was used.
On-going monitoring 
process
Current successes
Monitoring and enforcement of SUBPECA and SERNAP have some 
additional funding and improved processes in recent years. However, 
sources suggest that the monitoring remains limited, making it difficult to 
confirm actual compliance with the quotas. Enforcement remains weak as 
well. Under the ITQ program, there have been only 100 infractions reported, 
and not a single resultant fine or conviction. Market monitoring is also weak: 
there is no central, transparent and efficient working public registry of 
transactions and their prices. This normally increases the risk of fraud.
Some of the affected fisheries have undergone stock recoveries since 
the ITQs were implemented. Operators also say that they have been able 
to significantly improve the quality of their final products, and by better 
planning and operations, to re-build markets and diminish social conflict 
with their workers.
Remaining gaps/risks Fisheries, especially in the North, remain highly concentrated: the largest 
group controls 55-65% of the total northern harvest, with the second group 
controlling 20-25%. This creates severe risks for lobbying and political 
interference that promotes the fishing interests over the long-term protection 
of the fisheries. In all markets, there are a relatively limited number of market 
participants. In the case of black hake, there have been no new entrants in 
over 8 years.
Source(s) Compiled by Nicola Borregaard. Analysis based on McKee, C. 2001. A 
Review of the Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) in Fisheries; http://
www.colby.edu/personal/t/thtieten/ch-fish.html and Nicola Borregaard, 
“ITQs in Chile - Moving from a Marginal System to a Key Policy Tool;” and 
Nicola Borregaard, Frank Convery, Paloma Gonzales, and Karen Gauer. 
Transferable Fishing Quotas In Chile - Case Study in the Design and Use 
of Market Based Instruments for Resource Policy (Draft), CIMPA, October 
2001; Nicola Borregard, personal communication to Doug Koplow, February 
2002. See also UNEP (2004).
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Detailed Case Study 4
Mankote Mangrove in St Lucia
Title Strengthening user rights for biodiversity conservation  
and sustainable use: Mankote Mangrove in St Lucia
Country St Lucia
Problem Definition
Environmental impacts The Mankote Mangrove comprises the largest contiguous tract of mangrove 
in St. Lucia, and 20% of the total mangrove area in the country. Widespread 
and uncontrolled charcoal harvesting from the trees put the mangroves 
into severe environmental decline. The loss posed a significant threat to the 
many ecosystem services mangroves provide, including maintaining coastal 
stability and water quality, serving as a fish breeding and nursery ground, 
trapping silt, and providing important bird habitat.
Social impacts Charcoal was harvested by local subsistence populations. These people 
were extremely poor and had no legal right to any use of the publicly owned 
mangrove resources. They did not have obvious alternative employment 
should their access to the mangroves be cut off due to resource depletion 
or degradation.
Solution Implemented
Subsistence users were organized into an informal cooperative and given 
communal legal and exclusive rights to harvest the charcoal. They became 
involved with a joint monitoring programme with a regional NGO, the 
Caribbean Natural Resources Institute (CANARI), to obtain accurate and 
timely information on the overall health of the mangrove resource.
Flanking measures to increase the supply of wood outside of the mangrove 
reserves, and to create alternative job options for charcoal harvesters were 
also implemented. Tourism has been one important alternative.
Summary Analysis
Efficacy of existing 
policy at solving 
problem
The programme has halted and reversed the decline in the Mankote 
mangroves. The density and size of trees have both increased. Charcoal 
harvests have been more or less maintained, and the range of employment 
options for this population subgroup have increased somewhat.
Rationale for success/
failure
-  Early tacit approval by government for CANARI to work with the charcoal 
extractors in an innovative and then-controversial endeavour.
-  Formal recognition of property rights for subsistence charcoal extractors 
was a key element in ensuring commitment to, and ability to enforce, 
sustainable harvest practices. Long delays in this recognition made the 
effort somewhat less effective than it could have been.
-  Provision of group tenure, encouraging integrated management of the 
entire resource base and monitoring of cutting patterns by other members 
of the cooperative.
-  Establishment of cooperatives for the extractors, to provide a 
management unit for organizing and overseeing cutting rights; and 
formalization of rules of extraction that help protect resource base. 
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Title Strengthening user rights for biodiversity conservation  
and sustainable use: Mankote Mangrove in St Lucia
Country St Lucia
Rationale for success/
failure
 -  Strong and continuous assessment programme to evaluate overall health 
of the resource base. 
-  Protections against other threats to mangrove health, such as 
development, at least for now.
Unanswered questions -  Quality of continued management. 
-  Degree to which development remains a long-term threat, as well as 
increased pressure from crabbing and fishing within Mankote. 
-  Are the exclusive cutting rights (granted by a letter from the Deputy Chief 
Fisheries Officer) supportable should there be legal action at some future 
date? 
-  Ability of existing members of cooperatives to sell rights to others, and 
implications of this on long-term viability of the approach.
Institutional Baseline Conditions in Country
Legal Widespread self-monitoring of cutting by different members of the
cooperative (each protecting their individual interests) has made
enforcement of the agreement both easier and less expensive.
Fiscal
Government institutions
Environmental St. Lucia’s natural resource management agencies are perpetually under 
funded. Involvement of CANARI made the change in resource management 
possible.
Detail on Policy Process
History of response St. Lucia’s Forest, Soil and Water Conservation Ordinance of 1946 and 
its Wildlife Production Act of 1980 both gave the government a legal 
framework for regulating harvesting activities on public lands. However, little 
was actually done to regulate or control the harvesting of charcoal using 
mangrove wood. 
In 1986, the area was declared a marine reserve, helping to reduce the risk 
of the grove being developed. 
Subsistence charcoal producers did implement a number of positive 
practices on their own. They cut on a rotational basis, allowing time for 
the trees to regenerate before returning. Species that did not make good 
charcoal were also left to provide cover and impede evaporation of the 
swamp.
Following the formation of the Aupicon Charcoal and Agricultural Producers 
Group (ACAPG), the group committed to a set of rules for sustainable 
use of the mangrove. These included a ban on cutting any trees that lined 
the waterways, the preservation of large trees, and cutting on a slant to 
preserve the tree’s stump. Cutting rights were also organized, with each 
charcoal producer getting access to one area for a season, and rotating 
to a different area the next season. Cutting areas are well known to 
avoid conflicts between cutters and encourage monitoring of compliance 
behaviour by other members of the cooperative. However, these rules were 
not formalized until 1996, when ACAPG was granted exclusive rights to the 
timber in the Mankote reserve.
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and sustainable use: Mankote Mangrove in St Lucia
Country St Lucia
Evaluation of past 
success/failure
Prior to the establishment of ACAPG and institution of joint monitoring of the 
resource base, there was no effective control at all on charcoal production, 
leading to widespread degradation of the resource base.
Rationale for using 
Economic Instruments
This is a property rights approach that clarifies use rights in the form 
of charcoal harvesting rights. The approach made sense because the 
subsistence harvesters were the primary cause of the problem. Yet, with no 
formal rights to the resource, they had little incentive to invest in longer term 
resource management.
Legal basis for 
Economic instruments
Development activity in Mankote was prevented through the 1986 
designation of the land as a marine reserve. In 1996, the Department of 
Fisheries, which oversees the reserve, formalized the long-standing de facto 
agreement under which ACAPG member got exclusive rights to the use of 
timber resources from within the grove.
Stakeholder 
involvement
Extensive involvement with ACAPG, the charcoal producers cooperative.
Lead agencies Caribbean Natural Resources Institute (CANARI, a regional NGO); Aupicon 
Charcoal and Agricultural Producers Group (ACAPG), the cooperative of 
charcoal producers established during this initiative.
Key barriers addressed
Detail on Policy Response
Allocation of initial rights Initial rights were given for free to members of ACAPG, the charcoal 
harvesters cooperative. They are subsistence harvesters, and securing their 
tenure increased their interest in sustainable management of the resource. 
It is not clear from available sources how these rights are transferred among 
parties.
On-going monitoring 
process
Regular monitoring of the mangrove resource remains an important activity. 
We have no information on how frequently it is being done, or who pays for 
it.
Current successes By most metrics, including forest health, diversification of job base, 
and earnings of subsistence population, the policy response has been 
successful.
Remaining gaps/risks Mankote and surrounding land remains a target for large-scale 
development, especially for resort and golf courses. Continued vigilance is 
needed to protect the mangrove from these threats.
Efforts to shift from mangrove to hardwood from plantations near Mankote 
have had limited success. This is in part due to the lack of experience the 
producers have with agriculture and marketing.
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Title Strengthening user rights for biodiversity conservation  
and sustainable use: Mankote Mangrove in St Lucia
Country St Lucia
Source(s) Case material compiled by Markus Lehmann based on the following 
sources: 
De Beauville-Scott, S. 2000: A preliminary assessment of the basin 
of the Mankote Mangrove, Saint Lucia, West Indies. Natural Resource 
Management Programme. Department of Natural Resource Management. 
Faculty of Science and Technology, Cave Hill, Barbados. (mimeo) 
Geoghegan, T. and A. H. Smith. 1998: Conservation and sustainable 
Livelihoods: Collaborative Management of the Mankote Mangrove, St. 
Lucia. Community Participation in Forest Management. CANARI. Portecop, 
J. and E. Benito-Espinal. 1985: The mangroves of St. Lucia; a preliminary 
survey. CANARI technical Report no. 45. 
Smith, A. H. and F. Berkes. 1993: “Community-based use of mangrove 
resources in St. Lucia”. Intern. J. Environmental Studies, vol. 43,  
pp. 123-131. 
St. Lucia, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Permanent 
Secretary 2002: Incentive Measures. Case Studies and Best Practices 
on Incentive Measures and Their Implementation. Submission by the 
Government of St. Lucia to the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity. 
http://www.biodiv.org/programmes/socio-eco/incentives/case-studies. asp. 
World Resource Institute 2000: “Managing Mankote Mangrove”. World 
Resources Institute 2000-2001. People and Ecosystems. The Fraying Web 
of Life. World Resource Institute, Washington D.D., pp. 176-177.
See also UNEP (2004)
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Template for Assessing Important Factors 
Affecting Instrument Choice7
Annex V
Annex V is a template for assessing important factors affecting 
instrument choice. It walks the policy planner through the most 
important steps that need to be taken when analysing an existing 
environmental problem for which a policy response is to be found. 
Clarifying questions that help the analyst cover the various aspects 
of the problem are provided, and implications on policy choice 
corresponding to these questions are given. 
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ea
se
d 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
, a
de
qu
at
e 
co
st
 re
co
ve
ry
 o
n 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
pr
ov
id
ed
 g
oo
ds
 a
nd
 s
er
vi
ce
s,
 a
nd
 th
ird
 p
ar
ty
 r
ig
ht
s 
to
 s
ue
.
W
ha
t i
s 
th
e 
an
tic
ip
at
ed
 
se
ve
rit
y 
of
 d
am
ag
e?
- 
 A
re
 d
an
ge
rs
 a
cu
te
 a
nd
 s
ev
er
e,
 o
r 
le
ss
 s
ev
er
e 
bu
t 
pe
rs
is
te
nt
?
- 
 A
re
 th
e 
da
m
ag
es
 ir
re
ve
rs
ib
le
?
- 
 Th
e 
m
or
e 
ac
ut
e 
th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l d
am
ag
e,
 th
e 
m
or
e 
im
po
rt
an
t 
a 
ra
pi
d 
re
sp
on
se
 is
 n
ee
de
d.
 T
hi
s 
w
ou
ld
 a
rg
ue
 fo
r 
m
an
da
te
d 
co
nt
ro
ls
 q
ui
ck
ly
. E
ve
n 
if 
th
e 
in
iti
al
 c
on
tr
ol
s 
ca
us
e 
so
m
e 
pe
rip
he
ra
l e
co
no
m
ic
 lo
ss
es
, t
he
 a
vo
id
an
ce
 o
f t
he
 a
cu
te
 r
is
ks
 
(e
.g
., 
ec
os
ys
te
m
 c
ol
la
ps
e,
 la
rg
e 
an
d 
w
id
es
pr
ea
d 
hu
m
an
 h
ea
lth
 
da
m
ag
e)
 m
ak
es
 th
e 
ch
oi
ce
 a
 p
ru
de
nt
 o
ne
.
W
ha
t d
oe
s 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t h
op
e 
to
 
ac
co
m
pl
is
h?
- 
 D
o 
em
is
si
on
s 
ne
ed
 to
 b
e 
re
du
ce
d 
or
 s
to
pp
ed
 e
nt
ire
ly
?
- 
 A
re
 re
so
ur
ce
 p
re
ss
ur
es
 to
 b
e 
re
du
ce
d 
qu
ic
kl
y 
or
 s
lo
w
ly
?
- 
 W
ha
t s
oc
ia
l, 
po
lit
ic
al
, o
r 
ec
on
om
ic
 c
on
st
ra
in
ts
 is
 th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t l
ik
el
y 
to
 fa
ce
 in
 m
ee
tin
g 
its
 g
oa
ls
?
- 
 EI
s 
ar
e 
m
os
t a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 fo
r 
lo
ng
er
-t
er
m
, g
ra
du
al
 c
on
tr
ol
s 
fo
r 
em
is
si
on
s.
 H
ow
ev
er
, p
ro
pe
rt
y 
rig
ht
s 
re
gi
m
es
 c
an
 p
la
ce
 q
ui
te
 r
ap
id
 
co
ns
tr
ai
nt
s 
on
 th
e 
ra
te
 o
f e
xp
lo
ita
tio
n.
- 
 W
he
re
 n
on
-e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l c
on
st
ra
in
ts
 a
re
 s
ub
st
an
tia
l, 
ea
rly
 
an
al
ys
is
 a
nd
 e
xp
lo
ita
tio
n 
st
ak
eh
ol
de
r 
m
ee
tin
gs
 s
ho
ul
d 
pr
ov
id
e 
su
ffi
ci
en
t a
tt
en
tio
n 
to
 th
is
 a
re
a.
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)
P
ol
lu
ta
nt
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
(w
he
re
 c
on
tr
ol
 ta
rg
et
 o
s 
po
llu
ta
nt
-b
as
ed
)
- 
 P
ol
lu
ta
nt
 n
am
e,
 to
xi
ci
ty
, d
is
pe
rs
io
n 
pr
ofi
le
 (e
.g
., 
to
 a
ir,
 
la
nd
, w
at
er
).
- 
 S
ep
ar
ab
le
 fr
om
 o
th
er
 w
as
te
 s
tr
ea
m
s 
(tr
ea
tm
en
t 
op
tio
ns
)?
- 
 Is
 it
 m
ea
su
ra
bl
e?
 Is
 it
 p
os
si
bl
e 
to
 m
on
ito
r?
- 
 A
re
 th
er
e 
P
ot
en
tia
l r
eu
se
 m
ar
ke
ts
?
-  
  H
ig
hl
y 
to
xi
c 
ag
en
ts
 re
qu
ire
 ti
gh
te
r 
co
nt
ro
ls
. E
Is
, s
uc
h 
as
 re
ba
te
s,
 
ca
n 
be
 u
se
d 
if 
ta
rg
et
 w
as
te
s 
ar
e 
di
sc
re
te
 a
nd
 s
ep
ar
ab
le
 a
ge
nt
s.
 If
 
th
ey
 a
re
 p
ar
t o
f g
en
er
al
 e
m
is
si
on
s,
 c
om
m
an
d 
an
d 
co
nt
ro
l (
C
A
C
) 
ap
pr
oa
ch
es
 s
uc
h 
as
 b
an
s 
or
 s
ev
er
e 
re
st
ric
tio
ns
 a
re
 w
ar
ra
nt
ed
.
- 
 R
eu
se
 m
ar
ke
ts
 in
cr
ea
se
 th
e 
ec
on
om
ic
 v
ia
bi
lit
y 
of
 re
co
ve
rin
g 
an
d 
re
us
in
g 
th
e 
co
ns
tit
ue
nt
s 
of
 c
on
ce
rn
, a
nd
 s
ug
ge
st
 th
at
 a
dv
an
ce
 
de
po
si
ts
 o
r 
ta
ke
-b
ac
k 
pr
og
ra
m
m
es
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e.
- 
 A
re
 p
ro
du
ct
 m
ar
ke
ts
 p
ric
e 
se
ns
iti
ve
?
- 
 M
or
e 
pr
ic
e 
se
ns
iti
ve
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
(i.
e.
, c
om
m
od
iti
es
) w
ill 
of
te
n 
be
 
un
ab
le
 to
 p
as
s 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
em
is
si
on
s 
co
nt
ro
l c
os
ts
 th
ro
ug
h 
to
 
cu
st
om
er
s 
by
 r
ai
si
ng
 p
ric
es
. P
ol
iti
ca
l r
es
is
ta
nc
e 
to
 a
ny
 c
on
tr
ol
s 
is
 
lik
el
y 
to
 b
e 
hi
gh
er
 in
 th
es
e 
ty
pe
s 
of
 p
ro
du
ct
 m
ar
ke
ts
.
R
es
ou
rc
es
 a
t r
is
k 
(w
he
re
 
co
nt
ro
l t
ar
ge
t i
s 
re
so
ur
ce
 
ar
ea
)
- 
 W
ha
t i
s 
(a
re
) t
he
 re
so
ur
ce
(s
) b
ei
ng
 e
xp
lo
ite
d?
- 
 W
ha
t p
er
ip
he
ra
l n
at
ur
al
 a
ss
et
s 
ar
e 
th
re
at
en
ed
?
- 
  Is
 e
xp
lo
ita
tio
n 
th
re
at
en
in
g 
a 
w
id
es
pr
ea
d 
co
lla
ps
e 
of
 th
e 
ec
os
ys
te
m
?
- 
  Is
 th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l d
am
ag
e 
irr
ev
er
si
bl
e?
- 
 Is
 th
e 
re
so
ur
ce
 o
f p
rim
ar
y 
va
lu
e 
to
 th
e 
lo
ca
l c
om
m
un
ity
 
or
 to
 a
 m
or
e 
gl
ob
al
 s
et
 o
f b
en
efi
ci
ar
ie
s 
(e
.g
., 
bi
od
iv
er
si
ty
)?
- 
 A
re
 re
so
ur
ce
 o
w
ne
rs
 (i
nc
lu
di
ng
 th
e 
ta
xp
ay
er
) a
de
qu
at
el
y 
co
m
pe
ns
at
ed
 fo
r 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t/
pl
an
ne
d 
re
so
ur
ce
 
ex
pl
oi
ta
tio
n?
- 
 O
ve
r-
ex
pl
oi
ta
tio
n 
ca
n 
of
te
n 
be
 a
dd
re
ss
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
gr
an
tin
g
/
cl
ar
ifi
ca
tio
n 
of
 p
ro
pe
rt
y 
rig
ht
s.
 W
he
re
 w
id
es
pr
ea
d 
or
 ir
re
ve
rs
ib
le
 
co
lla
ps
e 
is
 im
m
in
en
t, 
ex
tr
em
e 
ac
tio
n 
m
ay
 b
e 
ne
ed
ed
 to
 c
ur
b 
ex
pl
oi
ta
tio
n 
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 (e
.g
., 
fis
hi
ng
 b
an
s)
. D
ur
in
g 
an
 in
te
rim
 
pe
rio
d,
 m
or
e 
fle
xi
bl
e 
lic
en
si
ng
/p
er
m
it 
ap
pr
oa
ch
es
 c
an
 b
e 
de
ve
lo
pe
d.
- 
 Ec
os
ys
te
m
-w
id
e 
vi
ew
 is
 g
en
er
al
ly
 n
ee
de
d 
to
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 th
e 
en
tir
e 
ba
sk
et
 o
f r
es
ou
rc
es
 a
re
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
ly
 a
dd
re
ss
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
po
lic
y.
- 
 W
he
re
 re
so
ur
ce
s 
un
de
r 
th
re
at
 b
en
efi
t r
eg
io
na
l, 
na
tio
na
l, 
or
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l i
nt
er
es
ts
 m
uc
h 
m
or
e 
th
an
 lo
ca
l e
xt
ra
ct
or
s,
 fi
na
nc
ia
l 
pa
ym
en
ts
 fr
om
 th
e 
be
ne
fic
ia
rie
s 
to
 p
ro
te
ct
 th
e 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
ar
e 
of
te
n 
w
ar
ra
nt
ed
.
- 
 E
ns
ur
in
g 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 p
ric
in
g 
of
 a
cc
es
s 
ca
n 
ha
ve
 th
e 
do
ub
le
 
be
ne
fit
 o
f r
ed
uc
in
g 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t p
re
ss
ur
e 
an
d 
ra
is
in
g 
so
m
e 
re
ve
nu
es
 to
 s
up
po
rt
 o
ng
oi
ng
 m
an
ag
em
en
t.
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)
1.
 U
n
d
er
st
an
d
in
g
 t
h
e 
so
u
rc
e 
o
f 
th
e 
en
vi
ro
n
m
en
ta
l t
h
re
at
P
ro
fil
e 
of
 e
m
is
si
on
s 
so
ur
ce
 (i
nd
us
tr
y/
ho
us
eh
ol
d
/g
ov
er
nm
en
t/
m
ob
ile
 s
ou
rc
e)
- 
 Is
 e
m
is
si
on
s 
so
ur
ce
 c
om
pr
is
ed
 o
f a
 s
m
al
l n
um
be
r 
of
 
la
rg
e 
fir
m
s 
or
 is
 it
 a
 c
ot
ta
ge
 in
du
st
ry
?
- 
 D
o 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l fi
rm
s 
co
m
pr
is
e 
a 
la
rg
e 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f 
do
m
es
tic
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n?
- 
 W
ha
t a
re
 th
e 
fir
m
’s
 in
ce
nt
iv
es
 fo
r 
be
in
g 
in
 th
e 
ho
st
 
co
un
tr
y?
- 
 H
ow
 la
rg
e 
is
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t s
ha
re
 o
f g
ov
er
nm
en
t o
w
ne
d 
en
tit
ie
s?
- 
 W
ha
t i
s 
th
e 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
of
 m
ob
ile
 s
ou
rc
e 
th
re
at
s 
(e
.g
., 
in
di
vi
du
al
 c
ar
s 
vs
. fl
ee
t-
 ow
ne
d 
tr
uc
ks
)?
- 
 C
on
ce
nt
ra
te
d 
in
du
st
rie
s 
ha
ve
 p
ow
er
 to
 re
si
st
 w
id
e 
ra
ng
e 
of
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l c
on
tr
ol
s.
 E
Is
 s
uc
h 
as
 m
ar
ke
ta
bl
e 
pe
rm
its
 a
re
 o
ne
 
w
ay
 a
ro
un
d 
th
is
, s
o 
lo
ng
 a
s 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t c
an
 s
et
 a
 re
al
is
tic
 c
ap
 
on
 a
llo
w
ab
le
 p
er
m
its
.
- 
 Fo
r 
sp
ec
ia
liz
ed
 p
ol
lu
ta
nt
s 
w
ith
 o
nl
y 
a 
ha
nd
fu
l o
f s
ou
rc
es
, d
ire
ct
 
re
gu
la
tio
n 
us
in
g 
a 
C
A
C
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
m
ay
 b
e 
m
os
t b
en
efi
ci
al
.
- 
 Fr
ag
m
en
te
d 
an
d
/o
r 
im
po
ve
ris
he
d 
so
ur
ce
s 
ge
ne
ra
lly
 re
qu
ire
 m
or
e 
ou
tr
ea
ch
 a
nd
 tr
an
si
tio
na
l s
tr
at
eg
ie
s.
- 
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l fi
rm
s 
ar
e 
th
e 
m
os
t s
en
si
tiv
e 
to
 in
fo
rm
at
io
na
l 
ap
pr
oa
ch
es
 th
at
 c
an
 h
ar
m
 th
ei
r 
br
an
d 
im
ag
e 
gl
ob
al
ly
. H
ow
ev
er
, 
fir
m
 lo
ca
tio
n 
m
ay
 b
e 
du
e 
to
 la
x 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l o
r 
fis
ca
l o
ve
rs
ig
ht
.
- 
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t o
w
ne
d 
en
tit
ie
s 
ar
e 
of
te
n 
no
t s
ub
je
ct
 to
 s
tr
ic
t fi
na
nc
ia
l 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
. I
t i
s 
di
ffi
cu
lt 
to
 m
od
ify
 b
eh
av
io
ur
 u
si
ng
 E
Is
, t
ho
ug
h 
po
lit
ic
al
 re
si
st
an
ce
 to
 C
A
C
s 
al
so
 is
 li
ke
ly
 to
 b
e 
hi
gh
.
- 
 E
xp
lo
ita
tio
n 
by
 s
ub
si
st
en
ce
 e
xt
ra
ct
or
s 
ca
n 
be
 a
dd
re
ss
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
gr
an
tin
g 
of
 p
ro
pe
rt
y 
rig
ht
s 
(o
fte
n 
co
m
m
un
al
), 
su
bj
ec
t t
o 
pr
op
er
 la
nd
 m
an
ag
em
en
t.
- 
 Fo
r 
al
l e
xt
ra
ct
or
s,
 e
ns
ur
in
g 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 fe
es
 fo
r 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 h
el
ps
 
en
co
ur
ag
e 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 e
xp
lo
ita
tio
n 
ra
te
s.
 In
 c
ou
nt
rie
s 
w
he
re
 th
es
e 
fu
nd
s 
ar
e 
di
ve
rt
ed
 a
s 
ki
ck
ba
ck
s,
 p
ol
ic
ie
s 
to
 im
pr
ov
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 (e
.g
., 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t a
ud
ito
rs
) c
an
 h
el
p.
- 
 Fi
na
nc
ia
l a
ss
ur
an
ce
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s,
 s
uc
h 
as
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 b
on
ds
, 
pr
ov
id
e 
m
ar
ke
tb
as
ed
 le
ve
ra
ge
 to
 e
ns
ur
e 
pr
op
er
 s
ite
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
an
d 
cl
ea
nu
p.
- 
 Li
tig
at
io
n 
to
ol
s,
 s
uc
h 
as
 c
iti
ze
n 
su
its
, c
an
 ta
ke
 th
e 
pr
ofi
t o
ut
 o
f 
po
or
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
th
ou
gh
 th
er
e 
is
 s
om
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l 
ris
k 
of
 to
o 
m
uc
h 
lit
ig
at
io
n 
re
su
lti
ng
.
C
au
se
 o
f o
ve
ru
se
 o
f 
ex
is
tin
g 
re
so
ur
ce
 b
as
e
- 
 Is
 o
ve
ru
se
 th
e 
re
su
lt 
of
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 b
y 
la
rg
e 
co
rp
or
at
io
ns
, 
or
 b
y 
la
rg
e 
nu
m
be
rs
 o
f s
ub
si
st
en
ce
 e
xt
ra
ct
or
s?
- 
 D
oe
s 
th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 re
ce
iv
e 
m
ar
ke
t-
va
lu
e 
fo
r 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
ex
tr
ac
te
d
/s
ol
d?
- 
 A
re
 e
xt
ra
ct
iv
e 
fir
m
s 
fin
an
ci
al
ly
 li
ab
le
 fo
r 
da
m
ag
es
 
th
ey
 c
au
se
 to
 n
at
ur
al
 re
so
ur
ce
s 
in
 th
e 
co
ur
se
 o
f t
he
ir 
ac
tiv
iti
es
?
- 
 Is
 d
om
es
tic
 in
du
st
ry
 u
nd
er
 p
re
ss
ur
e 
fro
m
 u
nf
ai
r 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n 
(s
ub
si
di
ze
d,
 u
nr
eg
ul
at
ed
) f
ro
m
 a
br
oa
d?
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2.
 G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t 
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s
W
hi
ch
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 h
av
e 
an
 
in
te
re
st
 in
 th
e 
ex
pl
oi
ta
tio
n 
or
 re
gu
la
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
is
su
e 
of
 c
on
ce
rn
?
- 
 E
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l m
in
is
tr
ie
s 
ar
e 
of
te
n 
in
 c
ha
rg
e 
of
 
ov
er
se
ei
ng
 w
ha
te
ve
r 
co
nt
ro
l m
et
ho
d 
is
 c
ho
se
n.
- 
 A
re
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l fi
rm
s 
fro
m
 m
aj
or
 p
ow
er
s 
pa
rt
 o
f t
he
 
pr
ob
le
m
?
- 
 A
re
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
re
so
ur
ce
 d
am
ag
e 
ex
po
rt
ed
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
lly
 fo
r 
ha
rd
 c
ur
re
nc
y?
- 
 If 
th
er
e 
w
ill 
be
 re
ve
nu
es
 r
ai
se
d 
(th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
sa
le
 o
f 
pe
rm
its
, i
m
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 p
ol
lu
tio
n 
ta
xe
s,
 o
r 
ch
ar
ge
s 
fo
r 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t-
pr
ov
id
ed
 g
oo
ds
 a
nd
 s
er
vi
ce
s)
, w
ho
 w
ill 
ge
t t
he
m
?
- 
 E
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l m
in
is
tr
ie
s 
m
ay
 h
av
e 
a 
lim
ite
d 
m
an
da
te
 o
ve
r 
th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 o
f a
cc
ep
ta
bl
e 
co
nt
ro
l m
et
ho
ds
 a
nd
 th
e 
de
pl
oy
m
en
t o
f 
co
lle
ct
ed
 re
ve
nu
es
.
- 
 W
he
re
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l fi
rm
s 
ar
e 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t, 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l 
co
nt
ro
ls
 m
ay
 b
e 
un
de
rm
in
ed
 b
y 
fo
re
ig
n-
go
ve
rn
m
en
t l
ob
by
in
g 
ef
fo
rt
s.
 A
m
pl
e 
us
e 
of
 p
ub
lic
ity
 in
 th
es
e 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s 
ca
n 
pr
ov
id
e 
le
ve
ra
ge
.
- 
 W
he
re
 d
om
es
tic
 e
xp
or
t e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
ay
 b
e 
af
fe
ct
ed
, e
xp
ec
t 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n 
fro
m
 tr
ad
e 
an
d 
fin
an
ce
 m
in
is
tr
ie
s.
 P
ol
lu
tio
n 
pe
rm
its
 
or
 ta
xe
s,
 b
y 
pr
ov
id
in
g 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
fle
xi
bi
lit
y 
an
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Annex VI
Annex VI presents data on many economic instruments 
applications gathered from multi-country surveys. The instruments 
are grouped in a matrix that combines their functional objective 
with the resource areas being protected. The number of areas to 
which economic instruments have been applied is quite extensive, 
underscoring the flexibility of these policy approaches to meet a 
wide range of important needs.
Depending on the point of the matrix, different aspects of policy 
and institutional structures dominate. For example, to control 
access to resources, the economic instruments often focus 
on licensing or auctioning of rights. How these initial rights are 
distributed and maintained is of great importance in the type of 
behaviours that will then emerge. Enforcing terms of contract 
relies heavily on a functioning judicial system, whereas efforts 
to encourage efficient use of resources and infrastructure via 
user fees require financial institutions within a country to operate 
effectively. Policy applications tend to be fairly similar within a 
functional area (i.e., down a column). In contrast, there are few 
linking factors within a single resource area that cut across multiple 
functional areas (i.e., across a row). 
One crucial point to highlight is that the efficacy of economic 
instruments in all of the five functional areas is reduced when 
there are baseline subsidies to environmentally harmful activities 
or behaviour. These subsidies counteract the positive effects 
of economic instruments and should be phased out whenever 
possible.
8 Adapted from UNEP (2004).
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